monstrably shown to be a mere subversion of the very purpose and meaning of representation. But we choose rather to view the subject in another light, because it is of great practical importance, though not, perhaps, altogether so familiar, in our political reasonings and, above all, because it leads to the prospect of a palliative, if not a remedy, for the evils at present justly complained of. The people, having in this country parted with the powers of government, have become much more estranged to the interests of their order, and, indeed, to the general interests of the community, than is wholesome for the common weal. It is by no means desirable, indeed, that appeals should be made to them upon the merits of individual measures-if by such appeals we mean real references of the fate of those measures to their decision and yet, how the courtiers of the present day can maintain this doctrine, we marvel exceedingly-for they have never scrupled to make precisely such appeals when it seemed to suit their purpose. A great and most complicated question divided the wisest men in parliament-no less than the merits of two detailed plans for governing our vast dominions on the other side of the globe. Mr. Pitt conceived it right to refer the decision of this question-one of the most nice and complex nature, involving every speculative difficulty, every refined principle of policy, and encumbered with an incredible mass of details-to the people at large. He raised a cry about chartered rights-dissolved the parliament-and, having thrown many of his adversaries out of their seats, he had the gravity to pronounce, that the question was decided by the sense of the country in favour of his plan, and against Mr. Fox's! Twenty years after this notable experiment, the successors of Mr. Pitt-still professing the highest Tory doctrines, still abhorring all popular topics-thought proper to raise another cry against religious liberty, and forthwith to ask the opinion of the country upon the merits of the Catholic question. The late dissolution of parliament is said to have originated in a wish to consult the people on men as well as measures—to give them an opportunity both of testifying their approbation of the conduct of the war, and of pronouncing that mature and flattering judgment respecting the Prince Regent's demeanour in public and private (if indeed, princes have any privacy) which it is quite well known every man in the kingdom must have formed. It would be difficult, then, with such instances staring us in the face, to accuse the Court of a consistent aversion to popular practices, or to comprehend how they can object to giving the people a larger share in the government than they now enjoy. They surely can never have the countenance to maintain that proposition which we would lay down as the corner-stone of the representative system, -that the people ought not to decide directly and finally on any public measures, except the choice of their representatives. This proposition does not, as the lawyers say, lie in their mouths: and it is none of the lightest charges which we have to urge against them and their system, that they have never scrupled to invade the constitution, when it suited the purposes of the moment-sometimes on one quarter, sometimes on another-now in the regal part, now in the popular-with the weapons of tyranny or of anarchy-in the capacity of Tories or of Levellers-exactly as the view of their present interest directed: thus evincing themselves apt scholars in the great school of expedients, whereof Mr. Pitt was for so many years the master. But be this as it may, the principle is an undoubted one and we take leave to maintain it, who can do so with perfect consistency. There are, however, certain explanations necessary to prevent this principle from leading to very fatal mistakes. It is quite true, that the adoption or rejection of specific measures ought in no case to be left with the bulk of the people. But it is equally true, that the people have a right to deliberate on specific measures; to discuss them individually and in bodies; to express the result of those deliberations; and to tender to the legislature and the executive government their opinion, their advice, nay, the free expression of their wishes, upon all matters of public import. This is the sacred inalienable right of the English people: it is theirs, as they are free men; it is theirs, as they are both the fountain and the object of all government; it is a right, the invasion of which we conscientiously hold to form an extreme case-a case, perhaps, more easy than safe to discuss-and one which all lovers of their country, and friends to the peace and good order of society, must fervently pray against ever living to see practically moved. This right, however, was actually violated by Mr. Pitt-by the very man who did not scruple to invade the first principles of the representative system on the opposite quarter, by taking the sense of the country on a particular measure. He was the first minister who ever dared abridge the rights of Englishmen to discuss their own affairs. We are perfectly ready to admit, that very many well-meaning persons, -friends of liberty, generally speaking, and lovers of the Constitution,submitted to this violent, and, in the worst sense of the word, revolutionary proceeding, through the alarms artfully excited in those bad times. Nor should we be disposed to make any allusion to that most dismal period in the history of the constitution, but for the sake of warning all our countrymen against ever again submitting to such gross impostures. To the delusions, and to the suspension of popular rights effected through them, we assuredly owe the continuance of that system which has brought the country into its present condition-overwhelmed with debt, groaning under tribute, and surrounded by the ruins of allied dynasties and the monuments of hostile triumphs. When the laws against popular meetings (commonly and justly named the Gagging Bills) were introduced, an universal disposition had begun to manifest itself for peace. The war had utterly failed in attaining any one of the many objects which its slippery authors had proposed as the ground of it. France was not conquered-the Bourbons were not restored-Holland was not defended-Belgium was not reclaimed-the balance of power was not re-established-and the gulf of bankruptcy, which used to yawn in France through the costly orations of the ministers, seemed shifting its positions a few points nearer the orators themselves. Meanwhile, tax after tax was imposed and submitted to our trade was shackled-the prices of all articles were on the rise-a perpetual borrowing promised a long duration to the burthens successively thrown upon the country-and with the money the best blood of the nation was lavished in unprofitable expeditions, which only served to signalise some illustrious branch of the royal family, or, at the most, to add a useless sugar island to our unwieldy empire all these things were very sensibly felt by the people, and they were beginning to evince the impression which was produced: meetings for peace were in agitation every where; and, before the session closed, one universal cry would have been raised for it, from north to south. Even in Scotland, where there is much less popular feeling than elsewhere, because there is no popular representation at all, it was quite plain that the sense of the people VOL. V. 4 was strong, and would speedily have been expressed. How else can we explain the petitions against the gagging bills sent from this part of the kingdom, which was so little affected by them in ordinary times? We believe the one from Edinburgh had 20,000 signatures, and comprehended a prayer for peace also. : The courtiers saw these signs of the times, and knew the probable fate which awaited their favourite war. They proceeded, therefore, at once to remove the very corner-stone of the Constitution, and made it no longer possible for the people to meet and deliberate on public measures, as it is their unquestionable right at all times, and oftentimes their bounden duty to do. The expression of popular feeling was checked-the mock embassy of Lord Malmsbury was despatched-the nogociations were broken off-the war was renewed and there being no longer any fear of control from the voice of those whose lives and properties were exhausted to feed it, onwards it went for year after year-as fruitless, as expensive as before-until another set of courtiers, having quarrelled with its authors, thought they could turn a little popularity by making a peace, when there was nothing left to fight about, and scarce any thing to fight with. Now, we take the liberty of holding, that a clear and general expression of the popular opinion in favour of peace, by unrestrained, frequent, numerous meetings in all parts of the country, must necessarily have influenced the conduct of the government, and would have put a stop to the war some years before, or at all events would have put the sincerity of the enemy to a real test. Does any one doubt that, at the least, such an expression of public opinion would have procured us peace on Bonaparte's return from Egypt?-Yet the war lasted long enough after that, to produce the overthrow of the fortunes of Austria in Italy, and its invasion in Germany-to augment the glories of France by Hohenlinden and Marengo. We have taken the question of war as an example only-though it is doubtless the most important one-of the benefits which result to the country from an unrestrained expression of popular opinion; and a proof how incumbent on the people the duty is as imperious, indeed, as their right is indisputable-of freely canvassing and reporting to the government, their judgment on all important matters of state. It is essential to the freedom and stability of our happy constitution, as well as to the right administration of our affairs, that the people should have the practice of frequent public meetings, at which the discussion of their great interests may be undertaken, their voice raised boldly, yet peacefully, to the parliament and the prince; and their sentiments made known without reserve. This practice, so far from being inimical to the representative system, or in the least degree inconsistent with it, flows naturally from it, and gives it life and vigour. For surely it cannot be pretended, that the people of England are, only once in seven years (or in three years, supposing the constitution were restored), to exercise the right of interfering with the management of their affairs; and that this interference is to be confined rigorously to one function -the choice of their delegates. Were this the case, only see with what powers those delegates are invested, and consider both how impossible it would be to find persons worthy of so dreadful a trust, and how ridiculous to elect them for more than a few months. Then, indeed, the foolish sarcasm of Rousseau would have some meaning,-that once in seven years the people of England are free-at all other times slaves. But if any further reasoning were required on this head, it might be sufficient to state, that a people limited to the exercise of this one function of election, must necessarily lose the capacity of making a fit choice; and, if it even retained the capacity, would very speedily be either cajoled or forced out of the exercise of it. The elective franchise-the whole system of representation-may safely be pronounced at an end, from the moment that the people confine themselves to the exercise of this one political function. Again:-Though we do not maintain that the representatives of the people are strictly the agents of their constituents, and bound, on each individual question, to follow their specific instructions,-a doctrine wholly untenable, in our apprehension,-yet he would err just as far on the other side, and in a far more dangerous kind, who should hold the representatives to be quite independent of the people, except at the moment of election. For this would be to maintain, that the government of England is a mere oligarchy; and that the people, exercising no voice in the administration of their affairs, limit themselves, in their politic capacity, to the bare performance of an empty triennial or septennial ceremony. This must strike every one who reflects how certainly a member's conduct would pass unnoticed, and be forgotten, at each succeeding election, if the mass of his constituents stood by, idle and listless, during the whole currency of the Parliament. But if this were not the consequence, and if the people retained their regard for public questions, and were resolved, as far as in them lay, to be consulted; and if we still suppose them only to interfere in the act of election; then an evil of an opposite kind, and scarcely less hurtful to the representative system, must infallibly arise; -the electors, unable to trust him whom they can neither watch nor control, will take care to choose such a man as may be tied down, regarding each vote he is to give, by previous stipulations. And we ask the pretended friends to our Constitution, whether so niggardly and jealous a delegation of this important trust could ever answer the true ends of representation? One of these evils, however, is quite sure to happen. In the present state of the country, we rather dread the first; and we think it not only more imminent, but of a worse description—for it involves the loss of the elective system altogether. We shall only stop to mention one other point of view in which the subject may be considered. Even if the duration of parliaments were reduced to the constitutional period of three years-or if, as some learned and virtuous persons think, of one year-still, in the changeful scene of political affairs, unforeseen events arise, upon which the representative could not possibly have had a previous understanding with his constituents, and must be left wholly in the dark as to their feelings and opinions, and oftentimes as to their interests, if he has no opportunity of learning those by their own free and united deliberations. Some unexpected rupture with foreign powerssome novel measure affecting trade-some new invention in the art of taxing -some extraordinary stretch of prerogative,-all these incidents may demand a communication between the parliament and the people, which popular meetings alone can fully and safely maintain. Hitherto we have been arguing, upon strict and admitted constitutional principles, to show the connexion between frequent popular meetings and the representative system. But, in our minds, there is a far more important view of the question, arising out of the indirect effects of such meetings, both in giving strength to the hands of the representative, and in setting bounds directly to the encroachments of tyranny and misgovernment. This involves considerations so much more momentous than any we have been reviewing, that we must stop to dwell a little at large upon them. We are still, it may be premised, proceeding on the supposition, that the representation of the people is quite pure-and that, by a salutary reform, the practice of the constitution is restored to a correspondence with its principles; and we are showing that, in such a state of things, the frequent interference of the people is necessary to our liberties. We shall afterwards advert to the vast additional strength which the argument derives from the actual state of the parliamentary representation. Let us cast our eyes upon the real foundations of liberty in this country, as these are laid in the powers and privileges of Parliament. The question is, to what cause must we ascribe the control which Parliament has over the power of the Crown? What makes the sovereign a limited monarch? He is a master of a vast army, and a treasure scarcely calculable, if he pleases to divert it from the purposes for which it was granted. He has an influence, dangerous to liberty we must admit it to be, from patronage almost unbounded. Why is this influence not absolutely fatal? Why is military force, generally speaking, harmless? Why does the weight of this enormous treasure press so lightly upon our rights and privileges? It cannot be maintained, that there is any thing very formidable to a tyrant in the physical force of six or seven hundred gentlemen, even if we add to the corps all their families and immediate dependants. Their influence, the power which their wealth gives them, may be somewhat greater; but, divided and unorganised as they necessarily are, this can be nothing worth estimating in the scale. Their debates and resolutions may have weight— the weight of reason-the force of eloquence-the power of worth and character. But a file of grenadiers dispersed them once; -and if such coarse instruments were again to enter the house, we suspect they would again prove as deaf to the debate as irresistible to the debaters. But the members of the Parliament sit not in their individual capacity-they are the delegates of the whole people, and represent the people. An attack upon them is therefore an attack, not on six or seven hundred individuals, but on the nation at large. All this is very true; but unfortunately it is only theory; and, practically considered, it sinks into a mere figure of speech, to which the armed affecter of despotism would be found extremely insensible. Then what stops his course-a course which in fact almost every prince has more or less desire to pursue-which on every sacred principle of the constitution we are bound to presume all princes may be prone to follow? The answer is perfectly obvious. He knows that the constituent will make common cause with the representative-that the people will side with the Parliament*-that the nation at large will resist-that the army will waver, perhaps suddenly desert him and cleave to the country. He knows that a project, so senseless on his part, would inevitably produce a state of things frightful to contemplate,-a necessity most hateful to all good men, but far more terrible to tyrants ;- -a necessity so very terrible that it is quite sure never to occur. The doctrine of resistance, as was well observed by the first nobleman in the empire, standing in his place as premier peer of * Some of the reasonings in this, and other parts of this article, may probably strike our readers as bearing a very near resemblance to those which have been already submitted to them, in the review of Mr. Leckie's publication. That article, however, was printed off before the present was received; and while the general coincidence of sentiment may perhaps appear to afford some additional presumption of its justness, it may be proper to remark, that the former paper was devoted merely to clear the genuine theory, and legitimate practice of the Constitution, while this is intended to point out its existing hazards and natural securities. |