and therefore the only source and guard of the tranquillity and greatness of America.*

A SPECIFIC PLAN OF REFORM;

Comprising the Disfranchisement of Delinquent Boroughs-the Transference of the Elective Franchise to large Commercial Towns-a Change in the Scotch System of Representation-and the Restoration of Triennial Parliaments.†

It is peculiarly difficult to make the supporters of Moderate Reform act as one body for, from the very nature of their opinions, they are subject to great divisions. This has been always the main source of their weakness, and the standing reproach of their opponents on both sides. While one of the extreme factions see, in every form of the Constitution, the sacredness of an article of faith, and the other ascribe to every visionary project of change the certainty of a proposition in geometry,-the Moderate Reformers, who pretend only to seek for probable means of quiet improvement, are exposed by the very reasonableness of their principles, to that disunion, from which both classes of their enemies are secured by absurdity and arrogance. It would, however, be a gross deviation from those principles of prudence and expediency on which Moderate Reform is founded, if its partisans were unwilling, at a crisis like the present, to make some mutual sacrifices of opinion. Most of them agree in thinking, that the direct power of the people in the House of Commons is too small, that the right of suffrage ought to be extended, and the duration of Parliament shortened. A plan which promises substantial improvement in these respects, however it may fall short of the opinion of some, or go somewhat beyond that of others, ought to be supported by the main body. The great strength of the cause of Moderate Reform lies in the middle classes, who at the present moment have a strong feeling that there are serious defects and abuses in the Government, and a warm desire of reformation, without any very distinct notion of its particular nature. It seems extremely desirable to present a Scheme of Reform to these important classes, in order to fix their opinions, to form a point of union between themselves, and to guard them against the contagion of extravagant projects. The main benefit, however, to be expected from such a plan, would be the probability of its gradually reconciling the prudent friends of the Establishment, with the better, and perhaps, at last, the larger part of the more zealous Reformers. We are not so ignorant of human nature, as to consider the success of such an attempt as certain, or in any case as easy or speedy. If it be accomplished at all, it can only be by those who have the patience to bear disappointments, and the spirit to rally, successive defeats.

after

One of the best pamphlets ever composed on the question of Reform in Parliament was published in reply to this Essay, by Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, in 1821. It is entitled, "Statement of the Question of Parliamentary Reform; with a Reply to the Objections of the Edinburgh Review, No. 61." Those who wish to see the advantages of an extended suffrage and vote by ballot established on incontrovertible and triumphant grounds, should peruse that admirable and unanswerable production.

+ Speech of Lord John Russell in the House of Commons on the 14th December, 1819, for the Elective Franchise from Corrupt Boroughs to Unrepresented Great Towns.-Vol. xxxiv. p. 461. November, 1820.,

The conditions to be exacted from the proposer of a pacific plan of reformation seem to be the following

First, It ought to provide for a real and considerable increase of the direct power of the body of the people, in the Commons' House of Parliament.

A plan, which did not fulfil this condition, would neither unite Moderate Reformers, nor detach sensible and reputable men from more extensive plans of change. It would be of little value, therefore, in the eyes of those who might be persuaded to employ Reform as an instrument of conciliation. Secondly, It ought to furnish a reasonable security, that it will not be the source of new dangers to the other institutions and establishments of the kingdom.

Without this condition, it would be treachery to propose it to those who at present have the chief influence on public affairs. They have unquestionably a right to such a security; and it would be folly to expect that they would not demand it. No reform which does not satisfy this condition can be a pacific measure.

Thirdly, It ought to be founded, not only on general reasons of political expediency, but in the acknowledged principles, and, as far as may be, in the established and even technical forms of the British Constitution.

This condition is a strong preservative against disunion among the reformers, and the best, if not the only, security which any plan of reform can offer, that its adoption will lead to no changes but those which are contemplated and avowed by its authors.

Fourthly, It should, if possible, be peculiarly founded on such constitutional principles as present a distinct and visible limit to its operation, so as to lead, by no necessary consequence, to the adoption of other measures, and to leave all future questions of that nature to be discussed on their own intrinsic merits.

It is obvious, that a plan of peace ought not to be embroiled by the demand of any sacrifices of opinion respecting future controversies; but justice requires, that it should be so framed that the party which yields should, at the time of the transaction, clearly see all the consequences of his concession.

Fifthly, As a consequence of the previous conditions, the plan should be such as may be reasonably expected to be proposed and carried by an administration friendly to Reform, but inviolably attached to the Constitution.

All the previous conditions are general, and some of them, perhaps, rather abstract. This last divests them of their generality, and brings them into the light of practice :-no Reform can ever be peaceably carried, otherwise than by a friendly administration :-all plans which will not bear the test of this condition are either delusions or instruments of revolution. Whoever seriously intends Reform, and sincerely designs nothing more, ought constantly to bear in mind, in framing his plan, how a minister could propose in the Cabinet, or move it in the House of Commons.

The foundations of such a Reform as might fulfil all these conditions may be found, we think, in the two General Resolutions, moved by Lord John Russell, on the 14th of December, 1819, after a speech, which combined the prudence of a Statesman with the enlarged views of a Philosopher. These Resolutions are as follows:

"1. That it is expedient that all Boroughs, in which gross and notorious bribery and corruption shall be found to prevail, shall cease to return members to serve in Parliament.

2. That it is expedient that the right of returning Members to serve in Parliament, so taken from any borough which shall have been proved to have been guilty of bribery and corruption, should be given to some great towns, the population of which shall not be less than 15,000 souls; or to some of the largest counties."

The debates on these Resolutions, and on the measure which followed them, are remarkable, as the first occasion on which a majority of the House of Commons showed a willingness to listen favourably to a proposal of Parliamentary Reform. The object of Lord John was twofold: -to redress a particular grievance, and to take that opportunity of introducing a reformatory principle into the Constitution. The nature of his measure, and the conditions under which the principle was to be applied, were well suited to the attainment of these objects. The most material change which we should propose in his plan would be an inversion of the order of time in which the two Resolutions are to be carried into effect.

I. The first article in a wise plan of reformation would, in our opinion, be the immediate addition of twenty Members to the House of Commons, to be chosen by the most opulent and populous of the communities which are at present without direct representation; with such varieties, in the right of suffrage, as the local circumstances of each community might suggest, but in all of them on the principle of a widely-diffused franchise. In Scotland, Glasgow ought to be included; in Ireland we think there are no unrepresented communities to which the principle could be applied.

In endeavouring to show that this proposal is strictly constitutional, according to the narrowest and most cautious use of that term,—that it requires only the exercise of an acknowledged right, and the revival of a practice observed for several ages, we shall abstain from those controverted questions which relate to the obscure and legendary part of our Parliamentary history. A very cursory review of the authentic annals of the House of Commons is sufficient for the present purpose. In the writs of summons of the 11th of Edward I., the Sheriffs were directed (as they are by the present writ) to send two Members from each city and borough within their respective bailiwicks. The letter of this injunction appears, from the beginning, to have been disobeyed. The Crown was indeed desirous of a full attendance of citizens and burgesses, a class of men then subservient to the royal pleasure, and who, it was expected, would reconcile their neigh– bours in the provinces to the burthen of Parliamentary grants. But to many boroughs, the wages of burgesses in Parliament were a heavy and sometimes an insupportable burthen; and this struggle between the policy of the Crown and the poverty of the boroughs occasioned great fluctuation in the towns who sent Members to the House of Commons, in the course of the 14th century. Small boroughs were often excused by the Sheriff on account of their poverty, and at other times neglected or disobeyed his order. When he persisted, petitions were presented to the King in Parliament, and perpetual or temporary charters of exemption were obtained by the petitioning boroughs. In the 1st of Edward III. the county of Northumberland and the town of Newcastle were exempted, on account of the devastations of the Scotch war. The boroughs in Lancashire sent no Members from the reign of Edward III. to that of Henry VI.; the Sheriff stating, in his returns, that there was no borough in his bailiwick able to bear the expense. Of 184 cities and boroughs summoned to Parliament in the reigns of the three first

Edwards, only 91 continued to send Members in the reign of Richard 11. In the midst of this great irregularity in the composition of the House of Commons, we still see a manifest, though irregular tendency to the establishment of a constitutional principle; viz. that deputies from all the most important communities, with palpably distinct interests, should form part of a national assembly. The separate and sometimes clashing interests of the town and the country were not entrusted to the same guardians. The Knights of the Shire were not considered as sufficient representatives even of the rude industry and infant commerce of that age.

The dangerous discretion of the Sheriffs was taken away by the statutes for the regulation of elections, passed under the princes of the House of Lancaster. A seat in the House of Commons had now begun to be an object of general ambition. Landed gentlemen, lawyers, even courtiers, served as burgesses, instead of those traders-sometimes, if we may judge from their names, of humble occupation-who filled that station in former times. Boroughs had already fallen under the influence of neighbouring, proprietors; and, from a curious passage in the Paston Letters, we find, that in the middle of the fifteenth century, the nomination of a young gentleman to serve for a borough, by the proprietor, or by a great man of the Court, was spoken of as not an unusual transaction. From this time the power of the Crown, of granting representation to new boroughs, formed a part of the regular practice of the Government, and was exercised without interruption for two hundred years. In the cases of Wales, Chester, and, löng after, of Durham, representation was bestowed by statute, probably because it was thought that no inferior authority could have admitted Members from those territories, long subject to a distinct government, into the Parliament of England. In these ancient grants of representation, whether made by the King or by Parliament, we discover a great uniformity of principle, and an approach to the maxims of our present constitution. In Wales and Chester, as well as in England, the counties were distinguished from the towns, and the protection of their separate interests was committed to different representatives the rights of election were diversified, according to the local interests and municipal constitution of the several towns.

In the preamble of the Chester Act, representation is stated to be the means of securing the county from the wrong which it had suffered while it was unrepresented. It was bestowed on Wales with the other parts of the laws of England, of which it was thought the necessary companion; and the exercise of popular privileges is distinctly held out as one of the means which were to quiet and civilize that principality. In the cases of Calais and Berwick, the frontier fortresses against France and Scotland, where modern politicians would have been fearful of introducing the disorders of elections, Henry the Eighth granted the elective franchise, apparently for the purpose of strengthening the attachment and securing the fidelity of their

* In October, 1455, Richard Plantagenet, Duke of York, John Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk, and John de Vere, Earl of Oxford, very openly, and in somewhat strong terms, recommended two gentlemen to be elected Members for the county of Norfolk.-Paston Letters, i. pp. 95.99. In 1472, the Dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk agreed on the Members for the county of Norfolk. In that year also the Duchess of Norfolk's steward procures the returns for Yarmouth, and recommends Sir John Paston for Malden.-Paston Letters, ii. pp. 99, 107.

The following short extract shows how much a seat in Parliament had become an object of ambition-what part the Court took in elections-and how they obtained seats for their adherents.

"If ye miss to be burgess of Malden, and My Lord Chamberlain will ye may be in another place; there be a dozen towns in England that chuse no burgess, which ought to do it; ye may be set in for one of those towns, if ye be friended."

inhabitants.-The Knights of the shire for Northumberland were not then thought to represent Berwick sufficiently.

While we thus find in these ancient examples so much solicitude for an adequate representation of the separate interests of classes and districts, it is particularly worthy of remark, that we find no trace in any of them of a representation founded merely on numbers. The statute which gave representatives to Wales was within a century of the act of Henry VI. for regulating the qualifications for the voters in counties; and, on that subject, as well as others, may be regarded as no inconsiderable evidence on the ancient state of the Constitution. Had universal suffrage prevailed till the 15th century, it seems wholly incredible, that no trace of it should be found in the numerous royal and parliamentary grants of representation, which occur in the early part of the 16th. Mere accident must have revived it in some instances; for it certainly had not then become an argument of jealousy or apprehension.

In the reigns of Edward the Sixth, Mary, and Elizabeth, the struggles between the Catholic and Protestant parties, occasioned a great and sudden increase of the House of Commons. Fourteen boroughs were thus privileged by the first of these Sovereigns, ten by the second, and twenty-four by Elizabeth. The choice, in the reign of Edward and Elizabeth, was chiefly in the western and southern counties, where the adherents of the Reformation were most numerous, and the towns were most under the influence of the Crown. By this extraordinary exertion of prerogative, a permanent addition of 94 members was made to the House of Commons in little more than fifty years. James and Charles, perhaps dreading the accession of strength which a more numerous House of Commons might give to the popular cause, made a more sparing use of this power. But the popular party in the House of Commons, imitating the policy of the ministers of Elizabeth, began to strengthen their parliamentary influence by a similar expedient. That House had, indeed, no pretensions to the power of making new Parliamentary boroughs; but the same purpose was answered, by the revival of those which had long disused their privilege. Petitions were obtained from many towns well affected to the popular cause, alleging that they had, in ancient times, sent members to Parliament, and had not legally lost the right. These petitions were referred to the Committee of Privileges; and, on a favourable report, the Speaker was directed to issue his warrant for new writs. Six towns, of which Mr. Hampden's borough of Wendover was one, were in this manner empowered to send members to Parliament in the reign of James. Two were added in 1628 by like means, and six more by the Long Parliament on the very eve of the civil war.

No further addition was made to the representation of England, except the Borough of Newark, on which Charles II., in 1672, bestowed the privilege of sending Burgesses to the House of Commons, as a reward for the fidelity of the inhabitants to his father. The right of the first burgesses returned by this borough in 1673 was questioned,-though on what ground our scanty and confused accounts of the Parliamentary transactions of that period do not enable us to determine. The question was suspended for about three years; and at last, on the 26th day of March, 1676, it was determined, by a majority of 125 against 73, that the town had a right to

* Browne Willis, Notitiæ Parlamentariæ, ii. p. 102. Borlase's Hist. of Cornwall, and Whitelocke's Notes on the Writ of Summons.