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form habits of them, and these will react on the feelings; they can regard the higher interests of those with whom they are associated, and cause thé LAW OF LOVE to take the place of those capricious emotions which have nothing in common with it but the name. They can thus vindicate the supremacy of the moral nature, and, instead of a sweltering and chaotic mass of moral corruption, tending to a.corruption still deeper, can cause society to present the order and beauty of the planetary spheres.
In our division of what were called the instrumental powers,
powers that are to be governed, that are for an end beyond themselves, we made one class of those that indicate ends, and another of those in the light of which ends are pursued. The first class we have now considered, and a few words will suffice for the second.
These may all be comprised under the one term Intellect; but will include only those faculties and operations of intellect that may be modified by the will. It will include all those faculties by which we arrive at truth by a process,
and will exclude those that are intuitive. In a system of psychology it would behove us to consider these powers before those of emotion, since something must be known before anything could be felt. are now considering ends, and the initiatory step towards an end is not, as has been said, in the intellect, but in some tendency or craving, some feeling of want or apprehension of excellence. For this the intellect is indeed a condition; but it seemed more accurate to begin with our fundamental conception, and the powers which give us that, and then to regard the intellect as simply instrumental. This, however, is a mere question of arrangement, and is not particularly important. What is important is that we should apprehend fully the connection of
truth with the rational pursuit of ends, and our responsibility for a knowledge of the truth.
That the intellect, as now defined, is simply an instrument, there can be no doubt. It is difficult for us to separate wholly the operation of knowing from ulterior results; but when this is done we see that it cannot be an end in itself. Knowing is in order to feeling and action, and without these would be wholly barren. The law of the intellect, therefore, like that of the powers already considered, will be from its end. That end, as we now contemplate it, is 'not knowledge to be acquired promiscuously under the stimulus of curiosity, but practical truth, as the first condition of wisdom. For this the intellect was given. It was intended for this, as the eye for seeing, and the true dispositions required in the conduct of it are earnestness and candor.
Of these, earnestness will secure that self-denying labor, that careful analysis, and patient induction, and comprehensive research, which the Scriptures imply when they say, “buy the truth and sell it not;" and candor will secure us against all biases from interest, and, as was said under the affections, from our having already chosen a wrong supreme end. This is the same as that singleness of eye spoken of by our Saviour, through which, if a man has it, “ his whole body shall be full of light.” It is a disposition - and this shows the philosophy of what was said by our Saviour, and cannot be too strongly enforced - a disposition which is impossible to any man who has chosen a supreme end that is wrong. On some points he may be candid, but not in reference to those persons and things which would thwart him in the attainment of that end. No man can be wholly candid who has not chosen the right supreme end, and so has no interest that he conceives
RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPINIONS.
to be supreme, to be otherwise. It is not that candor cannot exist where it is opposed to interest, but only to that which is regarded as supreme. In this case a man cannot consistently come to the light. To do so would be death to him in that which he counts his dearest interest, and so his very
life. But he who has chosen the true supreme end and pursues it in simplicity, must see all things truly. There can be no refraction in his mental vision, and his whole body will be full of light. This is the only position we can take in which the light that God sends will not be refracted. Without this we shall see some things falsely; more or less we shall “walk in a vain show."
On this subject we concede that there are laws of evidence. Nay, this is the very thing we assert, and it is just because there are such laws that we hold men responsible for their opinions. Without them they could not be. If there were no certain road by which a man could reach a given place, he would not be responsible for not getting there. But if there were such a road, and he should be too careless and self-confident to inquire for it, or should think it too difficult or disagreeable for him to travel, he would be responsible. So here. Truth is one. It corresponds to the mind as light to the eye. It was intended to be seen, and if the laws of evidence, the fixed condition of our receiving it, be fully complied with, it will be seen as in a pure white light, and, so seen, “ will make men free." If not, the mind is wrongly constituted in its relation to the objects of knowledge, and the constitution of man is hopeless. What should we think of a man who should hold a prism before his eyes, or shut himself in a room with windows of colored glass, and then complain that he could not see objects in their true color, because there were fixed laws and conditions of vision ? Let there but be earnestness and candor, and nothing can prevent the truth from being both seen and received. But for earnestness and candor we are responsible. This none will deny who admit of responsibility at all.
The truth is, we are so endowed and so placed as to be capable, not of all knowledge, nor of freedom from mistakes, but of knowing the truth so far as it bears practically upon our highest interests. This we cannot do by any direct act of will, but through fixed conditions, which will ensure it, and to comply with these conditions is among our very highest and most sacred duties. To love the truth is here the first and great commandment; to tell the truth, which is like it, and a corollary from it, is only the second. It is, however, a duty that has been too much overlooked. In our current treatises on morals, truthfulness has had a large place, while this primal and higher duty of knowing the truth has been scarcely noticed. To this the time permits me simply to give, as I have now done, what seems to me its true place, and in doing so I bring to a close the consideration of those powers which require to be governed, and whose chief end is out of and beyond themselves.
THE MORAL NATURE. — REASON. — IDEAS OF DIFFERENT ORDERS. - HAVE
AN ORDER OF DEVELOPMENT.
FREE-WILL. - PERSONALITY. - ACTION
TO WHICH RESPONSIBILITY ATTACHES.- ALL MORAL PHENOMENA IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CHOICE OF A SUPREME END.CONSCIENCE.
THE MORAL NATURE DOUBLE. THE HIGHEST GOOD.- COINCIDENCE OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED LAW.
INSTINCTS, appetites, desires, natural affections, intellect, - mere intellect, or understanding, — these are all subordinate and instrumental. They are not, for man, governing powers; and however they may be, in whole or in part, a condition for the moral nature, they are no part of it, and may be conceived of as acting wholly without it.
In passing upward in the scale of being we reach, as I have said, points of transition where there is no longer merely gradation, but a leap, and the introduction of something wholly new. We come to a difference, not in degree, but in kind. So we find organization in a variety of forms, and in great perfection, before a nervous system is introduced. That, as endowed with sensation, is wholly new. It supposes antecedent and auxiliary organization into which it may be put, of which it may take possession, and which may minister to its ends. There is much in every vegetable that simulates, and seems to anticipate a nervous system, but it is not there, and when, with its filaments and centres, it first pervaded an organization adapted to it, and responded consciously to the stimulus of the external world, it was as if there had been a new