amounted to 8,300,000l., the National Funded Debt being at the outset of the war about 72,000,000l., and having decreased but 6,000,000l. in the seven years of peace since the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.*

It was also at this period that Pitt commenced his bold, yet, as it proved, most safe and wise policy, of raising Highland regiments from the lately disaffected clans. I have already alluded to this measure by anticipation**; let me now add only the glowing words which Chatham himself applied to it in retrospect. "My Lords, we should not want men in 66 a good cause. I remember how I employed the very rebels "in the service and defence of their country. They were "reclaimed by this means; they fought our battles; they "cheerfully bled in defence of those liberties which they had 'attempted to overthrow but a few years before!”***

66

Another measure of public defence was the new modelling of a national Militia. A Bill for this object, which Pitt proposed, had passed the Commons' House in a former Session, but was rejected in the Lords, mainly by the interposition of Lord Hardwicke. It continued, however, a favourite object with Pitt, and was again introduced by Colonel George Townshend, eldest son of Lord Townshend, and brother of Charles. There was a strong disposition in the House that the new Militia might be exercised on Sundays, according to the practice of several states abroad, as, for example, several Protestant cantons of Switzerland. Pitt himself gave a guarded consent to such a scheme†, and

* Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, book v. ch. 3.

** See vol. iii. p. 19.

*** Speech in the House of Lords, December 2. 1777. See Thackeray's Life, vol. ii. p. 339.

"What if they should be exercised on Sundays after Church? "unless the Clergy or Dissenters disapproved it; he would retract this "proposal if it gave offence." (Pitt's speech, December 8. 1755. Lord Orford's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 449.) In the Upper House none of the Bishops appear to have raised any objection to the Sunday exercising, but Lord Hardwicke said in the course of his speech: "If this institution should be "established by a law, I will venture to foretell, that, notwithstanding the "injunction to go to Church, it will be a constant fair and scene of jollity "in the several parishes where those exercises are kept, and the face of

1757.

VOTE OF MONEY FOR HANOVER.

93

the Church at this time remained apparently, if not consenting, at least passive, but petitions against it came in from several bodies of Protestant Dissenters, and the design was dropped.

After many discussions in the Commons, the Bill was sent to the Upper House, where it underwent several amendments, especially the reduction of the number of militia-men to one half of what the Commons had proposed, namely, to 32,340 for England and Wales; and thus the measure became law. During its agitation and its progress it had been most highly popular with the nation at large. No sooner had it passed, however, than it was discovered to press heavily on the very persons who had clamoured for it; and the tide of national feeling was completely turned. Several tumults on this account ensued in the course of the year; at Sevenoaks, for example, the mansion of the Duke of Dorset, Lord Lieutenant of the county, was in danger from the mob*; and it is scarcely possible to conceive how high the popular discontent would have risen had the popular desire in favour of the Bill as it stood in the Commons been indulged to its full extent.

Still greater was the chance of popular disfavour when, in the course of the Session, Pitt brought down a message from His Majesty, asking for aid in the defence of his Electoral dominions; and when, in pursuance of this message, Pitt rose to move a grant of 200,000l. It passed without any opposition, but not without many sneers. Fox, above all, was forward in denouncing the inconsistency between Pitt's former philippics and his present proposals. It was, no doubt, easy to contrast the very strong expressions which Pitt had often let fall against Hanover with the no less strong expressions that he now began to use in its behalf, such as that Hanover ought to be as dear to us as Hampshire, "religion will soon be abolished in this country." See the corrected report in the Parliamentary History, vol. xv. p. 739.

* Earl Stanhope to Mr. Pitt, October 3. 1757, and Mr. Pitt's reply. See Appendix. In the former debates on this Bill Horace Walpole tells us that "Lord Stanhope spoke well on its behalf." (Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 45.)

—or that he would conquer America in Germany! Yet, making some allowance (and I own no small one) for oratorical exaggerations, and for Pitt's natural vehemence of temper, there appears no real divergence of principles or conduct. Pitt's principles were consistently such as before his admission to the Cabinet he had explained them to the Duke of Newcastle. * He would not support any English war for German objects. He would not show any preference to Hanover above Hesse or Holland or Prussia, or any other foreign and friendly state. But, although he would not consent that Hanover should be the better for her connection with England, he would not consent that she should be the He would not consent to put her below Hesse or Holland or Prussia. He would not consent that her Elector should be overwhelmed and despoiled merely because our King was asserting the interests and the rights of his realm. Now such was precisely the case at issue. The French were preparing to invade the Electorate, not from any injury, real or pretended, which the Electorate had done them, but notoriously and avowedly as a sideblow against George the Second, as a retaliation for the measures adopted by His Majesty in British America and India. Would it then be generous, - would it even be barely just, — to suffer the Electorate to fall unaided in a British cause?

worse.

This clear principle of action, this broad distinction between the wars of 1741 and 1756, - was, I believe, accurately discerned by the nation; nor does it appear that Pitt's proposal for assisting Hanover at this juncture lost him any portion, however small, of his rising popularity.

Nor can it be pretended that the King, while he requested the aid of our resources, was sparing of his own. The yearly income of Hanover might average at that period half-a-million sterling; of which His Majesty had ever since his accession laid up a considerable share. All this money he now, notwithstanding his parsimonious temper, readily applied to the defence of his Electorate. A Memorial drawn *See ante, p. 51.

1757.

COURT MARTIAL ON BYNG.

95

up by his commands in 1758, and shown to Speaker Onslow, states that he had already expended in the war 2,500,000l., the savings of thirty years, besides borrowing 200,000 7. in Germany, and as much in England. "The King," concluded the Memorial," can do no more himself towards the war." *

No sooner had the new administration been installed than it had to deal with the case of Byng. His Court Martial was held at Portsmouth, presided over by Admiral Smith, an illegitimate brother of Lord Lyttleton; it began in December, 1756, and continued through great part of January. Besides his defence before his judges, the Admiral had published a statement in his vindication. Thus far he certainly succeeded in proving, — that many and flagitious arts had been employed to blacken him. It was shown how his own letters and reports to the Admiralty had been garbled and perverted before they were allowed to appear in the Gazettes, so as to give some colour to the charge of cowardice; thus the words "making the best of my way to Gibraltar" were substituted for the passage, "making my way to cover Gibraltar." Before the Court Martial many witnesses were examined on both sides, eliciting the facts as I have already endeavoured to relate them. Towards the close of the proceedings an express was despatched to the Admiralty in London to inquire, on the part of the officers of the Court, whether they were at liberty to mitigate an article of war on which they had doubts. They were answered in the negative. Their doubts related to the 12th of the articles, which had been new-modelled some years before, and which, to strike the greater terror into remiss or careless officers, left no alternative but death as the punishment on neglect of duty. Thus confined to the rigorous bounds of the law, the Court Martial framed their sentence, fully acquitting the Admiral either of treachery or of cowardice, but declaring that in their unanimous opinion he had not done his utmost, either to relieve St. Philip's Castle or to defeat the French fleet. They therefore pronounced that he fell under part of the 12th Lord Orford's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 457.

article, and, as the law required, adjudged him to be shot to death. But with the same unanimity the Court declared that, on weighing all the circumstances of the case, they most earnestly recommended him as a proper object of mercy to the Crown.

The Admiral's conduct during his imprisonment had; on some points, appeared ill-judged and froward, but was throughout manly and firm. When one of his friends was endeavouring to inform him, by degrees, of his sentence, and dropping a hint of ill news, Byng started, and exclaimed, "What! they have not put a slur on me, have they?" — apprehending that they had condemned him for cowardice. On being assured that they had not, his countenance at once resumed its serenity, and he went to hear the sentence of his death pronounced with the utmost calmness and composure.

In almost any other Court, or almost any other case, an unanimous recommendation to mercy from the judges would be treated as conclusive. Not so was it held in the case of Byng. The English people were still chafed at their loss of Minorca, and clamorous for a victim. Anonymous letters reached His Majesty's hands, with threats, if he should venture to pardon. Hand bills were posted up, with the paltry rhyme, and more paltry sentiment, HANG BYNG, OR TAKE CARE OF YOUR KING. Some of the late administration were base enough to hope that the sacrifice of the Admiral would be their own vindication. And, above all, each party was lying in wait, eager to charge and denounce the others upon the slightest symptom as favourers of Byng.

At this crisis the conduct of Pitt appears to me in no small degree deserving of honour and respect. He saw the tide of popular opinion running decidedly and strongly against Byng. And it was on popular opinion only that Pitt himself leant for support. He could not trust to dexterous cabals, like Fox, nor to Royal favour, as once Granville, nor to patronage of boroughs, like Newcastle. Yet this public feeling, which alone had borne him to office, which alone could maintain him in office, he now, when he