1756.

PREPARATIONS AT PORT MAHON.

67

advantages of ground for defence, being, though rocky, nearly all lowland, except towards the centre of the island, where there rises a detached eminence called Monte Toro*,

a name which appears to have denoted a hill in the primitive tongues, and which may be traced from the Asiatic Mount TAURUS to our own ToRs in Devonshire. But the castle of St. Philip, which commanded the town and harbour of Mahon, had been constructed with great care and cost, and was probably at this time inferior in strength to no other fortress in Europe. The redoubts, ravelins, and other outworks might have done honour to Vauban, while underground a great number of galleries and mines had been cut with incredible labour through the solid rock. Behind

these defences the Governor now withdrew all his advanced parties, calling in especially five companies and two pieces of cannon from Ciudadella. A large herd of cattle was driven into the fort, twenty-five Minorquin bakers were hired to prepare biscuits and bread; the ports were walled up, the posts assigned, and some windmills and houses demolished so as to clear the esplanade and the approaches. Commodore Edgcumbe, who lay anchored off Mahon with a little squadron, being wholly unable to cope with the enemy's, set sail for Gibraltar, leaving his marines to reinforce the garrison; after which General Blakeney sunk a sloop in the channel, and thus obstructed the entrance of the harbour.

The

As to regular troops, however, General Blakeney with every exertion could muster no more than 2,800 men. Of the officers belonging to these troops full thirty-five were absent from their duty, including, besides the Governor, Lord Tyrawley, all the Colonels of the regiments.** chief engineer was confined to his chamber with the gout, and Blakeney himself had, for the most part, to issue his orders from his bed. Amidst so much of negligence or infirmity the conduct of one young officer stands forth in

* Armstrong's History of Minorca, p. 52. ed. 1752. He adds, "Mount "Toro is of the sugar-loaf make, and its vast cone is elevated on a base "that is many miles in diameter."

* See Commons' Journals, May 3. 1757.

spirited contrast. Captain Cunningham had been engineer in second at Minorca, but being promoted to a Majority in England, was on his way homewards, and was only delayed at Nice by the delivery of his wife and the sickness of his children. It was at Nice that he heard of the French designs against his former comrades in St. Philip's; he immediately exclaimed, "They will want engineers!" and determined at all risks to rejoin them; first expending what money he had in purchasing timber for the platforms, and other things needful for defence, and in hiring a ship for the voyage, nor did he hesitate, where his country's service was at stake, to leave his wife and children sick in a land of strangers.

Admiral Byng, on anchoring at Gibraltar, found there Commodore Edgcumbe, and thus learnt the particulars of the French descent upon Minorca. Before he again set sail he was anxious, according to his instructions, to take on board a battalion of troops as a reinforcement to St. Philip's, but General Fowke, who commanded at Gibraltar, having consulted a Council of War, refused to spare them. Fowke had received two orders on this subject from Lord Barrington as Secretary at War, but he afterwards alleged in his defence, though, as I think, without sufficient foundation, that these two orders were confused and contradictory, and left him a full discretionary power. * Byng, therefore, proceeded without these expected succours, but was joined by Commodore Edgcumbe with one man-of-war, and by Captain Harvey with another. On the 19th of May the Admiral came in sight of St. Philip's. He descried with

These two orders are dated March 21. and 28. 1756, and were produced at Byng's Trial. (See p. 10. of the Minutes.) It appears from the unpublished Life of Lord Barrington by his brother, the Bishop of Durham (p. 23.), that the first order had been sent out, together with the second, through an official oversight of Mr. Sherwin, the Deputy Secretary at War. "This," says the Bishop, "was certainly a mistake, but it did not appear a material one, for the last order alone was valid." And he adds elsewhere, "General "Fowke owned to Lord Barrington afterwards, and to several other persons, "that he was prevailed on just before his trial, to make this defence (of his "orders being contradictory and unintelligible), and that it was the action "of his life of which he was most ashamed. His advisers probably did not "know that he had written letters which fully contradicted the justification "they had suggested, and that these letters would be laid before his judges,"

1756.

ADMIRAL BYNG.

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pleasure the British colours still flying from the castle, while the French standards appeared on several bomb-batteries that were playing against it. In reality the enemy had not as yet made much progress in the siege. By the direction of some unskilful engineers, they had raised their first batteries near Cape Mola on the opposite side of the harbour, from whence they could have but little effect against the castle, whilst themselves were exposed to a galling fire. Accordingly they soon thought proper to change their plan of attack, to relinquish their first batteries, and to raise others on the place where the windmills had been destroyed; but these new batteries were not ready to open until the 12th of the month.

The Admiral now made an attempt to communicate with the Governor, and the Governor another attempt to communicate with the Admiral. Both attempts, however, appear to have been faint and slack, and much too readily despaired of. That same evening M. de La Galissonière had come in sight; next forenoon (the 20th of May) he bore down with all his ships; and Byng drew out his own in line of battle. The two fleets were almost equally matched, but the French, as was alleged, a little superior in weight of metal and in number of men. At a signal from Byng the engagement was begun by Rear Admiral West, who was second in command on the British side. So impetuously did he attack the enemy with his division that the ships opposed to it were in a short time driven out of their line. But the other division, commanded by Byng, kept aloof at this critical time, and West found himself unable to pursue his advantage. Thus the engagement was interrupted, and the French Admiral showed no disposition to renew it. Next morning the French fleet was out of sight, and Byng, perplexed and irresolute as to his movements, adopted that favourite resource of incapable commanders, a Council of War. He urged to the assembled officers his inferiority in men and weight of metal to the enemy, his loss on the foregoing day of 42 killed and 168 wounded, the damaged or unsound con

dition of his ships. He stated his opinion that if even he should succeed in beating the French fleet, that victory would not suffice to raise the siege of St. Philip's, - and upon the whole, therefore, he proposed to leave Minorca to its fate, and to steer back to Gibraltar, which might be in equal need of protection. In these views the Council acquiesced, and to Gibraltar accordingly the fleet returned.

Such were the transactions which in their result lost Byng both his reputation and his life. In reviewing them at this distance of time with complete impartiality and calmness, we may in the first place dismiss with a smile of contempt the insinuation ventured by party violence, that Byng or his employers, or both, had some secret interest in betraying Minorca to the enemy. The charge of cowardice against Byng himself may deserve more serious consideration. But it appears by the evidence at his Court Martial that Lord Robert Bertie, Lieutenant Colonel Smith', and other officers who were near his person on the 20th of May, did not perceive any backwardness in him during the action, nor any marks of fear or confusion either in his countenance or behaviour, and that he seemed to give his orders coolly and distinctly.* It appears also that his delay in giving succour to West arose partly from his becoming accidentally entangled amidst some of his own ships, and partly from an overstrained idea of discipline as to the importance of all advancing in line. Nor does the Admiral seem to have shown any mean and unworthy jealousy of his second in command; he wrote the very evening of the action a letter of thanks to Admiral West, acknowledging most warmly his "fine and gallant conduct." "Your behaviour," he

adds, ,"was like an angel to-day.” "** But though Byng was a man perfectly honest and sufficiently brave, we may acknowledge, without disrespect to the name of an unfortunate officer, that he wanted capacity. Even before reaching St. Philip's he had already, as appears from his

Sentence of Court Martial, January 26. 1757. (Minutes, p. 124.) ** Minutes of Trial, p. 19.

1756.

SIEGE OF ST. PHILIP'S.

71

own letters produced at his trial, despaired of relieving it. Even from Gibraltar on the 4th of May, writing to the Lords of the Admiralty, he had stated his opinion that "throwing "men into the castle will only add to the numbers that must "fall into the enemy's hands," -- and that, "if I should fail "in the relief of Minorca I shall look upon the security and "protection of Gibraltar as my next object." He trembled not at danger, but like many other weak men in high posts he did tremble at responsibility. He thought far more of shunning failure than of gaining success. On the 20th he might have advanced more eagerly to the support of West. On the 21st he might have been tempted by the partial success of West's division, even unassisted, to a renewed and vigorous attack. He should not have taken for granted that no naval victory would suffice to save the island. And, above all, he should have felt that even a defeat, had he sustained one, would be less ignominious to the British arms than a retreat without a blow.

The garrison of St. Philip's, however mortified at the disappearance of Admiral Byng from the coast, and at the FEUX DE JOIE which they heard fired on this account from all the French lines, still cherished a hope that the English fleet would be reinforced and sail back to their relief. Meanwhile they continued their defence with unabated spirit, insomuch that the Duke de Richelieu found it necessary to obtain further reinforcements from France. Thus the castle `became invested by an army of 20,000 men, and battered day and night from 62 cannon, 21 mortars, and four howitzers, besides the small arms. Nevertheless the loss of men amongst the besieged was inconsiderable, since they could for the most part secure themselves in the subterranean works which were impervious to shells or shot. The works above ground, however, ere long, presented more than one practicable breach. On the 27th of June the French marched up to the assault, headed by the Duke de Richelieu in person. Up to this time Richelieu had gained but slight • Minutes of Trial, p. 6.