all the parties found guilty.* So too, in this country, with regard to the removal of property liable to rent from off demised premises, before the remedy of distress for rent was abolished, it has been held to be but one act, and to subject all parties concerned to but one penalty.+

But on the other hand, where the statute relates to an offense in its nature several, as, for instance, to the resistance of process, the acts of each are to be severally regarded, and the penalty to be imposed on each. One may resist, another molest, another run away with goods; one may break the offender's arm, another put out his eye; all these are distinct acts, and the offense of each is entire and complete in its nature. Therefore, each person is liable to a penalty for his own separate offense.‡

Good faith no excuse for violation of Statutes.We have already had occasion to notice the rule, that ignorance of the law cannot be set up in defence. All are bound to know the law; and this holds good as well in regard to common as to statute law, as well in regard to criminal as to civil cases. In regard even to penal laws, it is strictly true that ignorance is no excuse for the violation of a statute.§ So in regard to frequent attempts which have been made to exonerate individuals charged with disobedience to penal laws, on the ground of good faith or error of judgment; it has been held that no excuse of this

* Partridge vs. Naylor, Cro. Eliz. 480; S. C., F. Moore, 453.

Warren vs. Doolittle, 5 Cowen, 678; Palmer vs. Conly, 4 Denio, 375; Conley vs. Palmer, 2 Coms. 182.

Rex vs. Clark, Cowp. 610; Palmer vs. Conly, 4 Denio, 875; Conley vs. Palmer, 2 Coms. 182.

§ Smith vs. Brown, 1 Wend. 231; Caswell vs. Allen, 7 J. R. 63.

kind will avail against the peremptory words of a statute imposing a penalty. If the prohibited act has been done, the penalty must be paid. So in England, in debt, for a penalty under the game laws, for shooting without license, it was urged that the defendant acted in good faith, and relied on a license which proved insufficient; but it was held that acting bona fide was no excuse.* So, where an act directed town supervisors to raise certain sums of money for the erection of public buildings, and declared that if they neglected or refused, each supervisor should forfeit the sum of $250, it was argued that the supervisors had a discretion, and that it must be shown that they abused this discretion or exercised it corruptly; but the act was declared to be imperative, and the supervisors to be liable. So where supervisors were by law directed to audit and allow the accounts of certain judicial officers, and in case of neglect or refusal were subjected to a penalty of $250; a mayor of a city, acting as supervisor, refused to audit an account of this class; and, in his defence, it was urged that he was not liable unless his intention in not auditing the account was corrupt; and that, in fact, he honestly believed the officers whose account had been offered for audit, had been unconstitutionally appointed; but it was held to be no excuse. "The offense," said Mr. Senator Lott, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Errors, "consists in the refusal to perform the duty required by law, and not in the intent or motive by which the supervisors are actuated." So, a justice of

*Calcraft vs. Gibbs, 5 T. R. 19.

+ Caswell vs. Allen, 7 J. R. 63.

Morris vs. The People, 3 Denio, pp. 381 and 402. It was contended that the unconstitutionality of the act under which the judicial officers in question had been appointed, had been settled by the court of last resort

the peace was held liable for a misdemeanor, as for a willful neglect of duty, in refusing to take an affidavit in a cause before him, though he acted in good faith in his refusal. The court said, "The justice knew what was asked of him, and he knew what he refused. There was nothing like surprise, inadvertence, or even apprehension on his part. He refused to administer the oath, and he intended to refuse. This is a willful violation of duty."*

Statutes with regard to Infants.-Where a statute obliges an infant to indemnify the city, town, or county against the expenses of supporting his illegitimate child, and makes it necessary for him to enter into a bond with sureties for the purpose, as the only means by which he can obtain a discharge from arrest; that provision, without further words, gives the infant a legal capacity to make a binding obligation, and his infancy is no defence to an action on the bond.† "Whenever," says Mr. Justice Story, "any disability created by the common law, is removed by the enactment of a statute, the competency of the infant to do all acts within the purview of such statute, is as complete as that of a person of full age. And whenever a statute has authorized a contract for the public service, which, from its nature and objects, is manifestly intended to be performed by infants, such a contract must in point of law be deemed to be for their benefit and for the public benefit, so that when bona fide

(Purdy vs. The People, 4 Hill, 384), and that this was a conclusive defence; but Mr. Senator Lott held that neither the supervisors nor the court in that suit, to which the officers were not parties, could determine the point. * People vs. Brooks, 1 Denio, 457.

+ The People vs. Moores, 4 Denio, 518; See also, Winslow vs. Anderson, 4 Mass. 376.

made it is neither void nor voidable, but is strictly obligatory upon them."*

Relief against acts of public officers created by Statute.-Questions often arise as to the remedy against persons exercising a statutory authority, for erroneous exercise of power, as, for instance, in regard to the assessment and collection of taxes; and the general principle seems to be that where the officer acquires jurisdiction, then an error of judgment does not render him liable to suit; but if he undertakes to act in cases over which he has no jurisdiction, he commits a trespass and an action lies. So where a statute

authorized the trustees of a school district to vote and levy a tax "upon the resident inhabitants of the district," and a warrant was issued to collect the tax of parties who were actually non-residents, it was held that no jurisdiction had been acquired, and that an action would lie against the parties acting under the tax-warrant. So again, on the other hand, where an action was brought against a tax collector for levying a tax on a theater which had been erroneously assessed as a dwelling house, it was held that the assessors were clothed with power to assess the property according to the class to which, in their judgment, it belonged; that they had jurisdiction of the subject, and that though they might have erred, still no action would lie against parties acting under their authority.. This distinction is in analogy to the rule founded on

* United States vs. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71.

+ Suydam vs. Keys, 13 J. R. 444.

Henderson vs. Brown, 1 Caines, 92. See also, Prosser vs. Secor, 5 Barb. 607; and Vail vs. Owen, 19 Barb. 22, which leave the question as to the power of assessors in New York, in doubt. See also, as to power of assessors, Weaver vs. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117.

public policy, which has been long and well settled, that a judicial officer is protected whenever he has jurisdiction and a case is presented calling for his decision, no matter how great the error of judgment which he commits, no matter how gross the malice with which he is charged.*

Indeed, even in cases where public officers exceed their authority, there is manifested a disposition by the courts not to interfere, and where their discretionary authority is appealed to, they often refuse. So where writs of certiorari have been applied for to bring up the proceedings of town and county officers in regard to the assessment or imposition of taxes, the courts have declined to grant them. The writ of certiorari, at common law, lies to officers exercising judicial powers, and to bring up proceedings of that character; but the allowance of the writ is discretionary; and on grounds of public policy and convenience, in cases of this kind it is generally denied. So too, in this country, an indisposition is manifested in regard to officers clothed with statutory powers for the prosecution of great public works, to interfere with them by the preventive power of injunction, unless a very strong case for interference is made out. Thus, where a canal company were authorized to make and maintain a canal of "suitable" width, and they undertook

* Mills vs. Collett, 6 Bing. 85; Brittain vs. Kinnaird, 1 Brod. & Bing. 432; Dicas vs. Lord Brougham, 6 C. & P. 249; Doswell vs. Impey, 1 B. & C. 163; Cunningham vs. Bucklin, 8 Cowen, 178; Horton vs. Auchmoody, 7 Wend. 200; Easton vs. Calendar, 11 Wend. 90; Harman vs. Brotherson, 1 Denio, 537; Weaver vs. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117, and cases cited; Stanton vs. Schell, 3 Sandf., S. C. R. 323; Landt vs. Hilts, 19 Barb. 283.

+ The People vs. Supervisors of Alleghany, 15 Wend. 198; The People vs. Supervisors of Queens, 1 Hill, '195; Weaver vs. Devendorf, 3 Denio,