grows, in proportion to the burden on the people, heavier, hath been explained so much in the debates on a late detestable occasion, that much less needs to be said on the subject here. If we consider, in the increase of taxes, nothing morethan the increase of officers first, by which a vast number of new dependents on the crown are created on every part of the kingdom; (dependents. as numerous, and certainly more prevalent than all the tenants and wards of the crown were anciently;) and secondly, the powers given to the treasury, and other inferiour officers, on account of these taxes, which are at least as great and as grievous, in this free government of ours, as any that are exercised in the most arbitrary government, on the same occasions; if we consider this alone, we shall find reason sufficient to conclude, that although the power of prerogative was more open, and more noisy in it's operations, yet the power thus acquired is more real, and may prove more dangerous for this very reason, because it is more covered and more silent. That men began to see, very soon after the revolution, the danger arising from hence to our constitution, as I said above, is most certain. No less than seven acts were made, in king William's reign, to prevent undue influences on elections; and one of the acts, as I remember, for I have it not before me, is grounded on this fact, "that the officers of the "excise had frequently, by threats and promises, "prevailed on electors, and absolutely debarred "them of the freedom of voting*." What hath *Tertio Gul. & Mar.

been

been done, or attempted to be done, since that time, in the same view, and what hath been done, or attempted to be done, both in the reign of king William and since, to prevent an undue influence on the elected, as well as on the electors, I need not recapitulate. They are matters of fresh date, and enough known. Upon the whole, this change in the state and property of the publick revenue hath made a change in our constitution, not yet perhaps attended to sufficiently, but such a one however as deserves our utmost attention, since it gives a power, unknown in former times, to one of the three estates; and since publick liberty is not guarded against the dangers that may arise from this power, as it was, and as it is now more than ever, against the dangers that used to arise froin the powers formerly possessed or claimed by the crown. Formerly, prerogative was kept in sight, and provisions were made against the effects and encroachments of it, as often as occasion required, and opportunity offered. They who called themselves friends to the government, in those days, opposed these provisions. They who were friends to the constitution promoted them. That the same thing should happen again, in a similar case, we must expect. But as the friends of the constitution, in times past, were not deterred, tempted, nor wearied, while they defended it against dangers of one kind, and by their honest perseverance delivered it down, not only safe, but more improved, to posterity; let

us flatter ourselves with this agreeable hope, that the friends of the constitution, at this time, and in all times to come, will be neither deterred, tempted, nor wearied in the same generous cause, in watching and guarding it against dangers of another kind; and that they will deliver it down, in like manner, to future generations. Sure I am there are reasons, and those of no small moment, why they should be more watchful, more upon their guard, more bold, and more incessant in their endeavours, if possible, even than the assertors of British liberty were formerly; and the enumeration of some of these reasons is an article not to be omitted on this occasion.

I am, SIR, &c.

VOL. III.

U

SIR,

LETTER XIX.

A's the means then of influencing by prerogative, and of governing by force, were considered to be increased formerly, upon every increase of power to the crown, so are the means of influencing by money, and of governing by corruption, to be considered as increased now, upon that increase of power, which hath accrued to the crown by the new constitution of the revenue since the revolution. Nay farther. Not only the means of corrupting are increased, on the part of the crown, but the facility of employing these means with success is increased, on the part of the people, on the part of the electors, and of the elected. Nay, farther still. These means and this facility are not only increased, but the power of the crown to corrupt, as I have hinted already, and the proneness of the people to be corrupted, must continue to increase on the same principles, unless a stop be put to the growing wealth and power of one, and the growing depravity of the other. We are, to be sure, in no danger from any advantages his majesty will take of this situation; but if advantage be not taken, in favour of our constitution, of the present most happy reign, of the mild and beneficent temper of our heroical monarch, of the generous principle, instilled by nature, and improved by philosophy, of his royal consort, it may be supposed, for we speak hypothetically

thetically all along, as the reader will please to remember, even where the precaution is not used; it may be supposed, I say, that pretended friends to the government, and real enemies to this constitution, no matter whether they are such by principle, or become such by their crimes, will get into superiour power, in some future time, and under some weak or wicked prince: and whenever this happens, the subversion of our constitution, and of our liberty by consequence, will be the most easy enterprise imaginable; because nothing can be more easy, than the creation of an anticonstitutional dependency of the two houses of parliament on the crown will be in that case; and because such a dependency of the two houses is as real a subversion of our constitution as an absolute abolishment of paliaments would be.

The first of those means of corruption, that have grown up, or been increased, since the revolution, which I shall mention, is the establishment of the civil list; not so much on account of the manner in which it was originally given, as on account of that in which it hath been since given, and ofthe vast augmentations that have been made to it; augmentations, that may be doubled, or trebled, in times to come, upon the same motives, under the same and other pretences; in short, just as speciously as they have been made. The revenue of king James the second, as it stood at his abdication, hath been mentioned; and it would not be hard to show, by indisputable computations, that they who apprehended he might