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time, and under it a system of local laws has grown up covering the whole field of municipal government. Assuredly, the Legislature never intended, by the appointment of the board of commissioners, to repudiate the principle of municipal self-government, upon which it has to this day almost invariably acted in dealing with the city of New York. The charter of 1897 vested the legislative power of the city in the common council and board of aldermen, continued in full force and effect all ordinances then in force, and gave them. power to grant railroad franchises and pass all ordinances to carry those franchises into effect. It also declares in positive terms that the city shall not part with the rights and duties at all times to exercise in the interests of the public full municipal superintendence, regulation and control in respect to all matters connected with grants of railroad franchises. Laws of 1897, chap. 378, §§ 17, 41, 45, 50, 74, 75. And the same provisions are contained in the charter of the Greater New York. Laws of 1901, chap. 466, §§ 17, 41, 50, 75. The attitude of the Legislature, as exhibited in the spirit of its past legislation concerning the city, and especially the provisions of the charter of the Greater New York, evinces no intention to abridge or restrict the power of self-government which it has enjoyed from an early day to the present time. We, therefore, conclude that the act of 1890 (chap. 565) did not have the effect to take from the city of New York the right to make the ordinance on which this action is based and to enforce the penalty for disobeying it.

We entertain no doubt that the ordinance was reasonable in its requirements. Indeed nothing could more completely vindicate the reasonableness and necessity than the circumstances which attended its violation in this case, as shown upon the trial; besides, the presumption is that the ordinance is reasonable and it was for defendant to show that it was unreasonable. Mayor v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 137, 133 id. 104. This it did not do.

There was no proof on the trial of any accident which rendered compliance with the ordinance impossible. The remark of the conductor to the passengers about "the lights

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not working" in the car, brought out on the cross-examination of plaintiff's witness, was not evidence of such an accident. If the defendant claimed exemption from the penalty sued for, it should have brought itself within the proviso of the ordinance by proof of an accident such as is specified in the ordinance, but none was offered.

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

FREEDMAN, P. J., concurs.

GREENBAUM, J. (concurring). One of the respondent's contentions in support of the judgment seems to be that the board of aldermen of the city of New York had no power to enact the ordinance for the alleged violation of which this action is brought, by reason of the limitations contained in the plaintiff's charter.

*

The correctness of respondent's position must depend upon the construction of section 50 of the New York city charter, which, so far as it is material to this discussion, contains the following provisions: "Subject to the constitution and laws of the state, the board of aldermen shall have power to regulate the use of streets and sidewalks by foot passengers, animals or vehicles; to regulate the speed at which horses shall be driven or ridden and at which vehicles shall be propelled in the streets; * * to prevent encroachments upon and obstructions to the streets and to authorize and require their removal by the proper officers; and to make all such regulations in reference to the running of stages, omnibuses, trucks and cars as may be necessary for the convenient use and accommodation of the streets, piers, wharves or stations." The respondent argues that the ordinance in question was obviously adopted to further the convenience of passengers riding upon the cars, and that it does not relate to the "convenient use or accommodation of the streets," which is the limitation placed upon the power of the board of aldermen by the section of the charter above quoted.

*

* *

The power conferred upon the municipality by the charter in controlling the use of the public streets is very broad and

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extensive. Everything which tends to render the streets useful or convenient for the purposes of traveling upon them as common public highways, is within the power of and may be exercised by the corporation." New York & Harlem R. R. Co. v. Mayor, 1 Hilt. 562, 585.

The ordinance requires every street surface railroad company to carry "without change therefrom, each and every passenger to any regular stopping place desired by him, upon such car's route, in the direction of the destination" designated " upon a sign board or placard which it is required shall conspicuously appear in front and on top of each car." It is evident that, in the absence of an ordinance of the general character above described, the surface cars might congest the traffic of the streets and interfere with "the convenient use and accommodation of the streets," by depositing upon the streets passengers compelled to change cars as often as the railroad company officials would see fit so to do, with the result that crowds of passengers would be congregated at various points throughout the city's streets, to their peril from passing vehicles and the inconvenience of traffic upon the public highways.

The reasonableness of the provisions of a statute or ordinance is not only generally presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, but in this case the reasonableness of the ordinance under discussion must be apparent to every one accustomed to traverse the busy highways of the city. It is obvious that there exist perils and dangers to life and limb on the part of those using the streets as pedestrians, which are increased by having a crowd of passengers come upon the street from a car which they are compelled to leave by the act of the officials of the road, who for reasons of their own force them to board a car ahead" or wait for a car behind. It is well settled that when a construction, is "reasonable and in favor of the validity of the statute, it should be adopted, rather than the contrary." Curtin v. Barton, 139 N. Y. 505, 513. "In the attempt to ascertain the intention of the legislature, it is a just rule, always to be observed, that the court shall assume that every provision of the statute was in

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tended to serve some useful purpose." Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 145.

Even if it be assumed that the motive of those who enacted the ordinance in question was to promote "the convenience of passengers riding upon the cars," so that these passengers may not be put to the annoyance and inconvenience of being transferred from the car upon which they were accepted as passengers to some other car upon the same route, this would be no ground for declaring the ordinance a nullity, if power for the enactment of the ordinance can be found. "When power is conceded, we have no right to inquire into the motives or reasons for doing the particular act." People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401, 405.

An ordinance which requires a surface railroad car to place a sign or placard showing its destination is well calculated to regulate the running of cars so as to prevent the congregating upon the streets of individuals who would be otherwise unexpectedly required to leave the car whenever the railroad officials decide not to permit the car to proceed further.

It is not likely that an intending passenger would deliberately board a car, which is not to reach his destination, when he might avoid the necessity of change by riding upon one which will carry him to his destination.

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The ordinance read in its entirety is clearly a regulation affecting the running of cars, and one which the municipality may deem necessary for the convenient use and the acccommodation of the streets," and, therefore, within the power expressly conferred by the charter.

I concur in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Gildersleeve and in his conclusions.

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, February, 1904. [Vol. 43.

ABRAHAM FRIELAND, Appellant, v. THE UNION SURETY & GUARANTY Co., Impleaded, etc., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, February, 1904.)

Municipal Court of the city of New York - Jurisdiction in an action against a foreign corporation, having an office in said city, as surety upon a city marshal's bond.

The jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of the city of New York to render judgment against a foreign corporation, having an of fice in said city and being surety on the bond of a city marshal, is to be determined by the Municipal Court Act (L. 1902, ch. 580, § 1, subds. 5 and 18) and under these subdivisions when read together there is no jurisdiction where the plaintiff claims more than five hundred dollars.

Section 296 of said act authorizing a justice of the Supreme Court to order prosecution in the said Municipal Court of a marshal's bond without limitation as to its amount cannot aid the plaintiff and is to be condemned as an attempt to give such a justice power to confer upon the said Municipal Court jurisdiction in such a case beyond five hundred dollars.

APPEAL by the plaintiff from a judgment rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, ninth district, borough of Manhattan, in favor of the defendant.

S. Sultan, for appellant.

Van Schaick & Norton, for respondent.

GILDERSLEEVE, J. The sole question raised by this appeal is whether the Municipal Court has jurisdiction to render judgment against a foreign corporation, having an office in the city of New York, and being the surety in a bond given by one of the marshals of the city of New York for a greater sum than $500. The Municipal Court held, in this case, that it had not, and, as the plaintiff claimed to recover upward of $600, dismissed the complaint on that ground alone. Hence this appeal.