ledge:" and other the like instances might be produced, were there any need.

Had your lordship produced Mr. Boyle's testimony, that nature, in our tongue, had the same signification with substance, I should presently have submitted to so great an authority, and taken it for proper English, and a clear way of expressing one's self, to use nature and substance promiscuously one for another. But since, I think, there is no instance of any one who ever did so, and therefore it must be a new, and consequently no very clear way of speaking; give me leave, my lord, to wonder, why in all this dispute about the term nature, upon the clear and right understanding whereof you lay so much stress, you have not been pleased to define it: which would put an end to all disputes about the meaning of it, and leave no doubtfulness, no obscurity in your use of it, nor any room for any dispute what you mean by it. This would have saved many pages of paper, though perhaps it would have made us lose your learned account of what the ancients have said concerning quis, and the several acceptations they used it in.

All the other authors, Greek and Latin, your lordship has quoted, may, for aught I know, have used the term us and natura, properly in their languages; and have discoursed very clearly and intelligibly about what those terms in their countries signified. But how that proves there were no difficulties in the sense or construction in that discourse of yours, concerning nature, which I, and those I consulted upon it, did not understand; is hard to see. Your lordship's discourse was obscure, and too difficult then for me, and so I must own it is still. Whether my friend be any better enlightened by what you have said to him here, out of so many ancient authors, I am too remote from him at the writing of this to know, and so shall not trouble your lordship with any conversation, which perhaps, when we meet again, we may have upon it.

The next passage of your vindication, which was complained of to be very hard to be understood, was this, where you say, "that you grant that by sensation and reflection we come to know the powers and pro

perties of things; but our reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason, and not to mere ideas." To rectify the mistake that had been made in my first letter, p. 157, in taking reason here to mean the faculty of reason, you tell me, "I might easily have seen, that by reason your lordship understood principles of reason allowed by mankind." To which it was replied, that then this passage of yours must be read thus, viz. " that your lordship grants that by sensation and reflection we come to know the properties of things; but our reason, i. e. the principles of reason allowed by mankind, are satisfied that there must be something beyond these; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves. So that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason," i. e. to the principles of reason allowed by mankind, and not to mere ideas; "which made it seem more unintelligible than it was before."

To the complaint was made of the unintelligibleness of this passage in this last sense given by your lordship, you answer nothing. So that we [i. e. my friends whom I consulted and I] are still excusable, if not understanding what is signified by these expressions: "the principles of reason allowed by mankind are satisfied, and the nature of things properly belongs to the principles of reason allowed by mankind," we see not the connexion of the propositions here tied together by the words "so that," which was the thing complained of in these words, viz. " the inference here, both for its connexion and expression, seemed hard to be understood;" and more to the same purpose, which your lordship takes no notice of.

Indeed, your lordship repeats these words of mine, "that in both senses of the word reason, either taken for a faculty, or for the principles of reason allowed by mankind, reason and ideas may consist together:" and then subjoins, "that this leads your lordship to the examination of that which may be of some use, viz. to show the difference of my method of certainty

by ideas, and the method of certainty by reason.” Which how it any way justifies your opposing ideas and reason, as you here, and elsewhere often do; or shows, that ideas are inconsistent with the principles of reason allowed by mankind; I leave to the reader to judge. Your lordship, for the clearing of what you had said in your Vindication, &c. from obscurity and unintelligibleness, which were complained of in it, is to prove, that ideas are inconsistent with the principles of reason allowed by mankind; and in answer to this, you say, "you will show the difference of my method of certainty by ideas, and the method of certainty by reason."

My lord, as I remember, the expression in question was not," that the nature of things properly belongs to our reason, and not to my method of certainty by ideas; but this, that the nature of things belongs to our reason, and not to mere ideas. So that the thing you were here to show was, that reason, i. e. the principles of reason allowed by mankind, and ideas; and not the principles of reason, and my method of certainty by ideas, cannot consist together:" for the principles of reason allowed by mankind, and ideas, may consist together; though, perhaps, my method of certainty by ideas should prove inconsistent with those principles. So that if all that you say, from this to the 153d page, i. e. forty-eight pages, were as clear demonstration, as I humbly conceive it is the contrary; yet it does nothing to clear the passage in hand, but leaves that part of your discourse, concerning nature, lying still under the objection was made against it, as much as you had not said one word.

if

But since I am not unwilling that my method of certainty should be examined, and I should be glad (if there be any faults in it) to learn the defects of that my definition of knowledge, from so great a master as your lordship; I will consider what you here say, " to show the difference of my method of certainty by ideas, and the method of certainty by reason."

Your lordship says, "that the way of certainty by reason lies in two things:

"1. The certainty of principles.

"2. The certainty of deductions."

I grant, that a part of that which is called certainty by reason, lies in the certainty of principles; which principles, I presume, your lordship and I are agreed, are several propositions.

If then these principles are propositions, to show the difference between your lordship's way of certainty by reason, and my way of certainty by ideas; I think it is visible, that you ought to show wherein the certainty of those propositions consists in your way by reason, different from that wherein I make it consist in my way by ideas. As, for example, your lordship and I are agreed, that this proposition, whatsoever is, is; is a principle of reason, or a maxim. Now my way of certainty by ideas is, that the certainty of this proposition consists in this, that there is a perceivable connexion or agreement between the idea of being and the idea of being, or between the idea of existence and the idea of existence, as is expressed in that proposition. But now, in your way of reason, pray wherein does the certainty of this proposition consist? If it be in any thing different from that perceivable agreement of the ideas, affirmed of one another in it, I beseech your lordship to tell me; if not, I beg leave to conclude, that your way of certainty by reason, and my way of certainty by ideas, in this case are just the same.

But instead of saying any thing, to show wherein the certainty of principles is different, in the way of reason, from the certainty of principles in the way of ideas, upon my friend's showing, that you had no ground to say as you did, that I had no idea of reason, as it stands for principles of reason; your lordship takes occasion (as, what will not, in a skilful hand, serve to introduce any thing one has a mind to?) to tell me," what ideas I have of them must appear from my book, and you do there find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims, which you cannot but think extraordinary for the design of it, which is thus summed in the conclusion*, viz. that it was to show, that these maxims, as they B. iv. c. 7. § 20.

are of little use, where we have clear and distinct ideas, so they are of dangerous use, where our ideas are not clear and distinct. And is not this a fair way to convince your lordship, that my way of ideas is very consistent with the certainty of reason, when the way of reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon general principles, and I assert them to be useless and dangerous?"

In which words I crave leave to observe,

1. That the pronoun" them" here seems to have reference to self-evident propositions, to maxims, and to principles, as terms used by your lordship and me; though it be certain, that you and I use them in a far different sense; for, if I mistake not, you use them all three promiscuously one for another; whereas it is plain, that in that chapter*, out of which you bring your quotations here, I distinguish self-evident propositions from those, which I there mention under the name of maxims, which are principally these two, "whatsoever is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be." Farther it is plain, out of the same place, that by maxims I there mean general propositions, which are so universally received under the name of maxims or axioms, that they are looked upon as innate; the two chief whereof, principally there meant, are those above-mentioned: but what the propositions are which you comprehend under maxims, or principles of reason, cannot be determined, since your lordship neither defines nor enumerates them; and so it is impossible, precisely, to know what you mean by "them" here and that which makes me more at a loss is, that in this argument you set down for principles or maxims, propositions that are not self-evident, viz. this, "that the essential properties of a man are to reason and discourse," &c.

you

that in

2. I crave leave to observe, that tell me, my book "you find a chapter of self-evident propositions and maxims," whereas I find no such chapter in my book: I have in it indeed a chapter of maxims, but never an one intitled "of self-evident propositions * Essay, b. iv. c. 7.

VOL. IV.

BB