there is something above matter and motion in the world." In the next place, your lordship may mean by something above matter and motion, either simply an intelligent being; for knowledge, without determining what being it is in, is a principle above matter and motion: or your lordship may mean an immaterial intelligent being. So that this undetermined way of expressing includes at least four distinct propositions, whereof some are true, and others not so. For,

1. My lord, if your lordship means, that to suppose a divine revelation, a man must be certain, i. e. must certainly know, that there is an intelligent being in the world, and that that intelligent being is immaterial from whence that revelation comes; I deny it. For a man may suppose revelation upon the belief of an intelligent being, from whence it comes, without being able to make out to himself, by a scientifical reasoning, that there is such a being. A proof whereof, I humbly conceive, are the anthropomorphites among the Christians heretofore, who nevertheless rejected not the revelation of the New Testament: and he that will talk with illiterate people in this age, will, I doubt not, find many who believe the Bible to be the word of God, though they imagine God himself in the shape of an old man sitting in heaven; which they could not do, if they knew, i. e. had examined and understood any demonstration whereby he is proved to be immaterial, without which they cannot know it.

2. If your lordship means, that to suppose a divine revelation, it is necessary to know, that there is simply an intelligent being; this also I deny. For to suppose a divine revelation, it is not necessary that a man should know that there is such an intelligent being in the world: I say, know, i. e. from things that he does know, demonstratively deduce the proof of such a being: it is enough, for the receiving divine revelation, to believe that there is such a being, without having by demonstration attained to the knowledge that there is a God. Every one that believes right, does not always reason exactly, especially in abstract metaphysical speculations: and if nobody can believe the Bible to be of divine

revelation, but he that clearly comprehends the whole deduction, and sees the evidence of the demonstration, wherein the existence of an intelligent being, on whose will all other beings depend, is scientifically proved; there are, I fear, but few Christians among illiterate people, to look no farther. He that believes there is a God, though he does no more than believe it, and has not attained to the certainty of knowledge, i. e. does not see the evident demonstration of it, has ground enough to admit of divine revelation. The apostle tells us, "that he that will come to God, must believe that he is;" but I do not remember the Scripture any where says, that he must know that he is.

3. In the next place, if your lordship means, that "to suppose divine revelation, a man must be certain," i. e. explicitly believe, that there is a perfectly immaterial Being; I shall leave it to your lordship's consideration, whether it may not be ground enough for the supposition of a revelation, to believe that there is an all-knowing, unerring Being, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, without a man's precisely deter mining in his thoughts, whether that unerring, omniscient Being be immaterial or no. It is past all doubt, that every one that examines and reasons right, may come to a certainty, that God is perfectly immaterial. But it may be a question, whether every one, who believes a revelation to be from God, may have entered into the disquisition of the immateriality of his being? Whether, I say, every ignorant day-labourer, who be lieves the Bible to be the word of God, has in his mind considered materiality and immateriality, and does explicitly believe God to be immaterial, I shall leave to your lordship to determine, if you think fit, more expressly than your words do here.

4. If your lordship means, " that to suppose a divine revelation, a man must be certain, i. e. believe that there is a supreme intelligent Being," from whence it comes, who can neither deceive nor be deceived; I grant it to be true.

These being the several propositions, either of which may be meant in your lordship's so general, and to me

doubtful, way of expressing yourself; to avoid the length, which a particular answer to each of them would run me into, I will venture (and it is a venture to answer to an ambiguous proposition in one sense, when the author has the liberty of saying he meant it in another; a great convenience of general, loose, and doubtful expressions)—I will, I say, venture to answer it, in the sense I guess most suited to your lordship's purpose; and see what your lordship proves by it. I will therefore suppose your lordship's reasoning to be this; that,

"To suppose divine revelation, a man must be certain, i. e. believe that there is a principle above matter and motion, i. e. an immaterial intelligent being in the world." Let it be so; what does your lordship infer? "Therefore upon the principle of certainty by ideas, he [i. e. he that places certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas] cannot be certain of [i. e. believe] this." This consequence seems a little strange, but your lordship proves it thus: "because he does not know but matter may think;" which argument, put into form, will stand thus:

If one who places certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, does not know but matter may think; then whoever places certainty so, cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent being in the world.

But there is one who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, does not know but matter may think:

Ergo, whoever places certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, cannot think that there is an intelligent immaterial being.

This argumentation is so defective in every part of it, that for fear I should be thought to make an argument for your lordship, in requital for the answer your lordship made for me, I must desire the reader to consider, your lordship says, "we must be certain; he cannot be certain, because he doth not know :" which in short is, he cannot because he cannot; and he cannot because he doth not. This considered will justify the syllogism

I have made to contain your lordship's argument in its full force.

I come therefore to the syllogism itself, and there first I deny the minor, which is this:

"There is one who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, doth not know but matter may think."

I begin with this, because this is the foundation of all your lordship's argument; and therefore I desire your lordship would produce any one, who, placing certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, does not know but matter may think.

The reason why I press this is, because, I suppose, your lordship means me here, and would have it thought that I say, I do not know but that matter may think: but that I do not say so; nor any thing else from whence may be inferred what your lordship adds in the annexed words, if they can be inferred from it; " and consequently all revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted fancy, or the heats of a disordered imagination, as Spinosa affirmed." On the contrary, I do say*, "it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself perception and knowledge." And having in that chapter established this truth, that there is an eternal, immaterial, knowing Being, I think nobody but your lordship could have imputed to me the doubting, that there was such a being, because I say in another place, and to another purpose t, "it is impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed a thinking immaterial substance: it being in respect of our notions not much more remote from our comprehensions to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to our idea of matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance, with a faculty of thinking." From my saying thus,

that God (whom I have proved to be an immaterial being) by his omnipotency, may, for aught we know, superadd to some parts of matter a faculty of thinking, it requires some skill for any one to represent me, as your lordship does here, as one ignorant or doubtful whether matter may not think; to that degree," that I am not certain, or I do not believe that there is a principle above matter and motion in the world, and consequently all revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted fancy, or the heats of a disordered imagination, as Spinosa affirmed." For thus I or somebody else (whom I desire your lordship to produce) stands painted in this your lordship's argument from the supposition of a divine revelation; which your lordship brings here to prove, that the defining of knowledge, as I do, to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, weakens the credibility of the articles of the Christian faith.

But if your lordship thinks it so dangerous a position to say, "it is not much harder for us to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking;" (which is the utmost I have said concerning the faculty of thinking in matter): I humbly conceive it would be more to your purpose to prove, that the infinite omnipotent Creator of all things out of nothing, cannot, if he pleases, superadd to some parcels of matter, disposed as he sees fit, a faculty of thinking, which the rest of matter has not; rather than to represent me, with that candour your lordship does, as one, who so far makes matter a thinking thing, as thereby to question the being of a principle above matter and motion in the world, and consequently to take away all revelation: which how natural and genuine a representation it is of my sense, expressed in the passages of my Essay, which I have above set down, I humbly submit to the reader's judgment and your lordship's zeal for truth to determine; and shall not stay to examine whether a man may not have an exalted fancy, and the heats of a disordered imagination, equally overthrowing divine revelation, though the