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formity with some of the notions in my book. But it is to be observed he speaks them as his own thoughts, and not upon my authority, nor with taking any notice of me.

6. By virtue of this, he is presently entitled to I know not how much of my book; and divers passages of my Essay are quoted, and attributed to him under the title of "the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning," (for he is by this time turned into a troop) and certain unknown (if they are not all contained in this one author's doublet) they and these, are made by your lordship to lay about them shrewdly for several pages together in your lordship's Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, &c. with passages taken out of my book, which your lordship was at the pains to quote as theirs, i. e. certain unknown anti-Trinitarians.

Of this your lordship's way, strange and new to me, of dealing with my book, I took notice.

To which your lordship tells me here you replied in these following words, which your lordship has set down as no unnecessary repetition. Your words are: "it was because the person who opposed the mysteries of Christianity went upon my grounds, and made use of my words;" although your lordship declared withal, "that they were used to other purposes than I intended them :" and your lordship confessed," that the reason why you quoted my words so much, was, because your lordship found my notions, as to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation on which the author of Christianity not mysterious went; and that he had nothing that looked like reason, if that principle were removed, which made your lordship so much endeavour to show, that it would not hold; and so you supposed the reason why your lordship so often mentioned my words, was no longer a riddle to me." And to this repetition your lordship subjoins, that "I set down these passages in my second letter," but with these words annexed, "that all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing of this matter."

Answer. I say so indeed in the place quoted by your

lordship, and if I had said no more, your lordship had done me justice in setting down barely these words as my reply, which being set down when your lordship was in the way of repeating your own words with no sparing hand, as we shall see by and by, these few of mine set down thus, without the least intimation that I had said any thing more, cannot but leave the reader under an opinion, that this was my whole reply.

But if your lordship will please to turn to that place of my second letter, out of which you take these words, I presume you will find that I not only said, but proved, "that what you had said in the words above repeated, to clear the riddle in your lordship's way of writing, did nothing towards it."

That which was the riddle to me, was, that your lordship writ against others, and yet quoted only my words; and that you pinned my words, which you argued against, upon a certain sort of these and them that nowhere appeared, or were to be found; and by this way brought my book into the controversy.

To this your lordship says, " you told me it was because the person who opposed the mysteries of Christianity, went upon my grounds, and made use of my words."

Answer. He that will be at the pains to compare this, which you call a repetition here, with the place you quote for it, viz. Ans. 1. will, I humbly conceive, find it a new sort of repetition: unless the setting down of words and expressions not to be found in it be the repetition of any passage. But for a repetition, let us take it of what your lordship had said before.

The reason, and the only reason there given why you quoted my words after the manner you did, was, "because you found my notions as to certainty by ideas, was the main foundation which the author of Christianity not mysterious went upon." These are the words in your lordship's first letter, and this the only reason there given, though it hath grown a little by repetition. And to this my reply was, " that I thought your lordship had found, that that which the author

of Christianity not mysterious went upon, and for which he was made one of the gentlemen of the new way of reasoning, opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity, was, that he made or supposed clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty: but that was not my notion as to certainty by ideas," &c. Which reply, my lord, did not barely say, but showed the reason why I said, that what your lordship had offered as the reason of your manner of proceeding did nothing towards the clearing of it: unless it could clear the matter, to say you joined me with the author of Christianity not mysterious who goes upon a different notion of certainty from mine, because he goes upon the same with me. For he (as your lordship supposes) making certainty to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct ideas; and I, on the contrary, making it consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of such ideas as we have, whether they be perfectly in all their parts clear and distinct or no: it is impossible he should go upon my grounds, whilst they are so different, or that his going upon my grounds should be the reason of your lordship's joining me with him. And now I leave your lordship to judge, how you had cleared this matter; and whether what I had answered did not prove that what you said did nothing towards the clearing of it.

This one thing, methinks, your lordship has made very clear, that you thought it necessary to find some way to bring in my book, where you were arguing against that author, that he might be the person, and mine the words you would argue against together. But it is as clear that the particular matter which your lordship made use of to this purpose, happened to be somewhat unluckily chosen. For your lordship having accused him of supposing clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty, which you declared to be the opinion you opposed, and for that opinion having made him a gentleman of the new way of reasoning, your lordship imagined that was the notion of certainty I went on. But it falling out otherwise, and I denying it to be mine, the imaginary tie between that author and me was un

expectedly dissolved; and there was no appearance of reason for bringing passages out of my book, and arguing against them as your lordship did, as if they were that author's.

To justify this (since my notion of certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charged with, as opposite to the doctrine of the Trinity) he at any rate must be brought to agree with me, and to go upon my notion of certainty. Pardon me, my lord, that I say at any rate. The reason I have to think so is this: either that the author does make clear and distinct ideas necessary to certainty, and so does not go upon my notion of certainty; and then your assigning his going upon my notion of certainty, as the reason for your joining us as you did, shows no more but a willingness in your lordship to have us joined: or he does not lay all certainty only in clear and distinct ideas, and so possibly for aught I know may go upon my notion of certainty. But then, my lord, the reason of your first bringing him and me into this dispute will appear to have been none. All your arguing against the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning will be found to be against nobody, since there is nobody to be found that lays all foundation of certainty only in clear and distinct ideas; nobody to be found, that holds the opinion that your lordship opposes.

Having thus given you an account of some part of my reply (to what your lordship really answered in your first letter) to show that my reply contained something more than these words here set down by your lordship, viz. "that all this seems to me to do nothing to the clearing this matter:" I come now to those parts of your repetition, as your lordship is pleased to call it, wherein there is nothing repeated.

Your lordship says, "that you told me" the reason why I was brought into the controversy after the manner I had complained of, " was because the person who opposed the mysteries of Christianity, went upon my grounds;" and for this you quote your first letter. But having turned to that place, and finding there these words," that you found my notions as to certainty by

ideas was the main foundation which that author went upon;" which are far from being repeated in the words set down here, unless grounds in general be the same with the notions as to certainty by ideas: I beg leave to consider what you here say as new to me, and not repeated.

Your lordship says, that you brought me into the controversy as you did, because the author went upon my grounds." It is possible he did, or did not: but it cannot appear that he did go upon my grounds, till those grounds are assigned, and the places both out of him and me produced to show, that we agree in the same grounds, and go both upon them; when this is done, there will be room to consider whether it be

so or no.

In the mean time, you have brought me into the controversy, for his going upon this particular ground, supposed to be mine, " that clear and distinct ideas are necessary to certainty." It can do nothing towards the clearing this, to say in general, as your lordship does," that he went upon my grounds; because though he should agree with me in several other things, but differ from me in this one notion of certainty, there could be no reason for your dealing with me as you have done that notion of certainty being your very exception against his account of reason, and the sole occasion you took of bringing in passages out of my book, and the very foundation of arguing against them.

Your lordship farther says here, in this repetition, which you did not say before in the place referred to as repeated," that he made use of my words." I think he did of words something like mine. But as I humbly conceive also, he made use of them as his own, and not as my words; for I do not remember that he quoted me for them. This I am sure, that in the words quoted out of him by your lordship, upon which my book is brought in, there is not one syllable of certainty by ideas.

No doubt whatever he or I, or any one, have said, if your lordship disapproves of it, you have a right to question him that said it. But I do not see how this

VOL. IV.

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