The events of the World War and the reorganization of 1920 cause us sometimes to lose sight of this act of 1916. Not only was it the law under which we organized the armies which we put into the World War, but much of the act remains in force today. It is therefore desirable to recall the strengths provided under it. That law provided for a Regular Army of 12,031 officers and 221,045 enlisted men, including Philippine Scouts. It provided for an Officers Reserve Corps, an Enlisted Reserve Corps, and a National Guard of about 435,000 officers and men. It provided for the adequate training of the National Guard and for camps for the training of citizens. Unfortunately only a small portion of the act had been realized when we were plunged into the World War. The actual strength of the Regular Army when war was declared on April 6, 1917, was a little over 121,000 enlisted men. The National Guard had about 66,500 officers and men in Federal service, with about as many more in their armories at home. In drawing conclusions from the World War it is important to remember that the 66,500 officers and men of the Guard still in Federal service on April 6, 1917, had seen a year's active service on the Mexican border. Many others of the Guard had been recently mustered out of Federal service after similar duty.

It was from a nucleus of a little less than 200,000 officers and men actually in Federal service that we expanded until on November 11, 1918, we had two millions of men in France with as many more preparing to come.

But our admiration of what we accomplished in the World War should not blind us to what could not be done nor to defects which under other circumstances might bring disaster. After we declared war it was almost six weeks before the Selective Service Act under which we were to raise the men required became a law. It was not until September 5, five months after the declaration of war, that the first men were called to the colors under the Selective Service Act. It was more than a year after the declaration of war when we put a single division into an active part of the line, and it was seventeen months before an American Army under its own leaders occupied the line. Practically all the guns and airplanes used by us on the front line were of foreign manufacture, was also practically all of the artillery ammunition we fired at

the enemy. The American Expeditionary Forces received ten tons of supplies from our Allies for each seven tons received from home. The men we had in France during the winter of 1917-18 were saved from nakedness by British-made uniforms. Even buttons to replace those bearing the crown of King George were in part made by our Allies. To the last our dependence upon our Allies was absolute in guns, artillery ammunition, airplanes, and tanks. The World War found us unprepared both in men and in matériel. The untold billions of money which we spent after the war was upon us could not relieve the Allies from the weary and critical months upon months of holding the line behind which we could prepare. In the end we played a decisive part, and the Armistice found us at least on a par with our associates. But what would have been the end if the French or British lines had crumpled at the time of the Caporetto disaster in the fall of 1917?

It would require a volume to enumerate the lessons taught by our participation in the World War. But in so far as the necessary laws are concerned, most of the lessons are summarized in the National Defense Act as amended in 1920. As amended the act provides for one Army in which the regular establishment is the least in size but is the keystone of the entire structure in organization and training. The lesson that higher organizations must be kept in being is recognized by the requirement of law that all components of the Army shall at all times be organized into brigades and divisions. The ever increasing importance of matériel is recognized by specifically charging an Assistant Secretary of War with the mobilization of industry. The general conception upon which the strength in personnel was based is best shown by the words of the act:

The organized peace establishment, including the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves, shall include all of those divisions and other military organizations necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the national defense in the event of a national emergency declared by Congress.

Under this conception the act provided a Regular Army of 17,726 officers and 280,000 enlisted men. The National Guard was to have a strength of approximately 435,000 officers and men. The

strength of the Organized Reserves was by inference left to the War Department for determination.

The act as amended provided machinery and strengths which made it possible for the first time in our history for the War Department to work out in every detail satisfactory and effective plans for the National Defense. The plans prepared by the War Department contemplated that the Regular Army would furnish the necessary overhead for all components, the overseas garrisons, the necessary schools and detachments both for its own training and that of the other components, and nine divisions for immediate use in an emergency. The National Guard was to furnish eighteen divisions in condition for immediate use in defensive missions. The Organized Reserves were to furnish the officer and enlisted keymen necessary to begin the organization and training of twenty-seven divisions. Each of the three components was to furnish the auxiliaries which in modern war are more than ever before essential to support and supply the divisions. It was the plan of the War Department that the Regular Army and National Guard would be called immediately upon the outbreak of an emergency, and that sufficient ammunition and similar items would be maintained in peace to supply their combined strength of twenty-seven divisions until production on a large scale could begin. The Organized Reserve divisions could under these plans not take the field until production got into its full swing. With the indispensable auxiliaries the Regular Army and National Guard divisions were to constitute three field armies numbering in all about a million and a half men, and this was the number for which it was proposed to provide ammunition and such other supplies as could not be procured promptly on the outbreak of war. Although in the World War we did not get artillery ammunition to the front in the nineteen months we were at war, it is generally believed that better planning will in the future enable us to get into quantity production in approximately one year. In a year's time then it would, under the plans, be possible to augment the Regular Army and National Guard battle order by such Reserve divisions as might have completed their training. It will be noted that the full peace strength provided by the National Defense Act for the Regular Army and National Guard

is less than half the million and a half men which those two components were to number on a war footing. Since about six months are required to recruit and train the soldier, it would not be until the second six months that we could put a million and a half men in the field.

For a nation such as ours, a field force of a million and a half during the second six months of war can hardly be termed overpreparedness, nor could a force of seven hundred thousand, most of whom could at best be trained only for a purely passive defense, be similarly characterized. On the other hand there can be no question but that the plans which have been outlined were sound and wise, and if carried out would guarantee the National security.

But the forces contemplated in time of peace by the National Defense Act have never been provided. At the present time the Regular Army has less than 125,000 enlisted men, and the National Guard totals about 180,000 officers and men. The components on which we must exclusively rely during the first six months of a war are but little over one-third the strength contemplated by the National Defense Act. The Selective Service Act lapsed with the World War and we have no law, except for voluntary enlistments, for providing the men we would require in another emergency. It has become the fashion to measure National Defense in terms of dollars and not in requirements in men and matériel.

Of the three components, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves, of the Army of the United States, the Regular Army is in the most unsatisfactory condition. With the numbers on overhead, on duty with the other components, and in overseas garrisons a fixed minimum, any reduction in enlisted men in the Regular Army necessarily falls on units in the United States, and primarily on the Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery. In addition, the beginning of an emergency is precisely the time when our need for troops at the various schools is greatest. The present reduced strength of the Regular Army makes it impossible for it to provide fifty thousand mobile combat troops. The training necessities of other components result in the mobile troops of the Regular Army being scattered through

out our vast territory. The organizations are so small that they can hardly be considered to be more than skeleton units which can conduct summer training camps for the other components. Shortage of funds coupled with the disgraceful condition of the shacks in which many of the troops are housed demand the use of the soldier as a common laborer to the undoubted detriment of his training. As a matter of fact this great Nation of nearly a hundred and twenty millions of people has not in home territory a single battalion, let alone a regiment or division, ready today to take the field at war strength or at any really effective strength. Το any one who studies our problems it must be apparent that the greatest defect in the National Defense is the lack of any force instantly available at war strength. This is true whether we consider a minor or a major emergency. A detailed study of the most powerful combination that can be imagined against us would show that a Regular force of three divisions and a Cavalry division (in all 75,000 men) instantly available for offensive operations, and backed up by the National Guard, would be worth more in actual defense than a million men raised in the second six months of war. We should at the earliest possible moment put at least one division on a war footing and keep it in condition for instant use. In the meantime our most crying need is adequate financial support to maintain what we now have in matériel as well as personnel. The National Defense costs money, but so do police, fire departments and other forms of insurance. The great body of the American people want adequate defense, but the enemies of such preparation are now, as they always have been, inertia, false slogans, and lack of information as to our actual preparation. Whether we have adequate defense or not depends entirely on whether or not the great body of intelligent public opinion takes the trouble to inform itself as to the true facts. Surely it is not too much that for a moment that opinion should Stop! Look! Listen!

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