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ficer of the world, in the works of his own hands, and by the existence of any thing, demonstrate the first cause of all things. (Creed. Art. I. fol. edit. p. 19.)
We now come, in our analysis, to the fifth section of Lord Brougham's discourse, which treats of the moral branch of Natural Theology, and would show that it rests upon the same kind of evidence with moral science, and embraces the probable designs of God, with respect to the future destiny of his creatures. These are derived from two sources : the nature of the human mind, and the attributes of the Creator. Hence our author discusses, at great length, the immateriality of the soul,—its separate and future existence as proved by the nature of the mind. The doctrines of materialism he actually grinds to dust and ashes, and scatters them like chaff before the wind. Beautiful, brilliant, ingenious, and fraught with details of singular curiosity, we again commend this portion of his discourse to our readers, lamenting, in sincerity of regret, that our contracted pages forbid us to indulge in the luxury of copious extracts. But we give them the noble author's own epitome of this first branch of his psychological argument.
We have gone through the first division of this second branch of the subject, and have considered the proofs of the separate and future existence of the soul afforded by the nature of mind. It is quite clear that all of them are derived from a strict induction of facts, and that the doctrines rest upon precisely the same kind of evidence with that upon which the doctrines respecting the con. stitution and habits of the mind are founded. In truth, the subjects are not to be distinguished as regards the species of demonstration applicable to them the process by which the investigation of them is to be conducted. That mind has an existence perceivable and demonstrable as well as matter, and that it is wholly different from matter in its qualities, is a truth proved by induction of facts. That mind can exist independent of matter, and survive the dissolution of the body, is a truth proved exactly in the same manner, by induction of facts. The phenomena of dreams, which lead to important couclusions touching the nature of the mind, lead, and by the self-same kind of reasoning, to important conclusions of a similar description, touching the mind's existence independent of the body. The facts, partly physical, partly psychological, which show the mind to be unaffected by the decay, and by even the total though gradual change of the body during life, likewise show that it can exist after the more sudden change of a similar kind, which we term the dissolution of the body by death. There is no means of separating the two classes of truths, those of Psychology and those of Natural Theology; they are parts of one and the same science; they are ascertained by one and the same process of investigation; they repose upon one and the same kind of evidence; nor can any person, without giving way to the most groundless and unphilosophical prejudice, profess his belief in the former doctrines, and reject the latter. The only difference between the two is that the theological propositions are of much greater importance to human happiness than the metaphysical.-Pp. 124—126.
“The moral argument, or evidence of the Deity's designs, drawn from his attributes in connexion with the condition of the species," fills the next head of this section. Always protesting against our noble writer's classification of this branch of his speculations with inductive sciences, and remembering the humility with which these examinations into the probable intentions of God should be handled, we see no reason to protest against them as inconsistent with profound devotion. Our author's arguments on this topic are clever, indeed, and ingenious enough ; but they are neither new, nor, we must add, always sound. The contemplation of the Divine goodness, as deducible from the examples of his benevolent designs, when accompanied with a consideration of the instinctive wishes of the human mind, constantly and universally operating, affords the first argument in favour of the immortality of the soul.
But the inference acquires additional strength from the consideration that the faculties of the mind ripen and improve almost to the time of the body's extinction, and that the destruction of the soul at the moment of its being fitter than ever for worthy things seems quite inconceivable.* -Pp. 128, 129.
There is, perhaps, some kind of presumption that we may retain our powers and capacities of action, of happiness and misery, after death, arising from our present possession of such powers and capacities ;t but the immortality of the soul cannot be inferred from the consideration of the tender affections implanted in the bosom of man ; and much less are we entitled to say with Lord Brougham, that the eternal separation of friends“ appears irreconcilable with the strength of the affections wounded, and with the goodness so generally perceived in the order of the universe,” or that “the supposition of a reunion hereafter overcomes the difficulty, and reconciles the apparent inconsistency." This, surely, is a grievous mistake! It is quite irreconcilable with the scriptural doctrine of the everlasting separation of the wicked from the good, and is akin to that error of the infidel Sadducees, touching the resurrection, which was founded upon the relations of this life, and received immediate answer from the lips of our blessed Redeemer, -- "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God. For in the resurrection, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven."
When our noble author examines (section vi.) the doctrines of Lord Bacon, respecting Final Causes, he endeavours, we think, without success, to show that he was not adverse to the speculation, when kept within due bounds; though it is allowed by our ex-chancellor that the father of Inductive Philosophy “more than once treats of the inquiry concerning final causes as a barren speculation, comparing it to a nun or a vestal consecrated to heaven.S Lord Brougham vainly relies upon the fact, that Bacon did not undervalue the doctrines of natural religion to manifest his non-hostility to the doctrine, which he himself holds with respect to final causes. But this is a gross non sequitur; all that Bacon has
* In mortal diseases not affecting our reflecting powers, “persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life. They discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire,” &c. &c.—See Butler's Analogy, Part I. c. i. pp. 32, 33.
+ See Butler's Analogy, Part I. c. i. & 2 p. 17. Matt. xxii. 29, 30. g"Sterilis et tanquam virgo Deo sacra non parit." - Bac, De Dig. lib. iii. c. 5.
laid down on those doctrines being compatible with his rejection of Lord Brougham's hypothesis.
In the first book of the De Dignitate, he (Lord Bacon) 'says, there are two books of religion to be consulted—the Scriptures, to tell the will of God, and the book of creation, to show his power.-P. 140.
But what then? Here is no proof that Bacon admitted the doctrine of Final Causes as a legitimate branch of natural theology. Just the reverse : for the philosopher teaches us that only the power of the Deity is manifested by his works, according to the investigations of natural theology, whilst the will of God must be learnt from his word.
But these are dull and dry matters, we fear, in the judgment of our readers, and therefore we dismiss them, together with the subject of the seventh section of the discourse,-Inductive Analysis and Synthesis, and proceed to the consideration of the second part of the volume before us, which treats of the advantages of the study of Natural Theology, and consists of three sections.
The first shows that the precise kind of pleasure derived from the investigation of scientific truths is derived from this study.
The second treats of the pleasures which are peculiar to this study.
The third treats of the connexion of natural with revealed religion.--Introduction, p. 14.
Natural Theology, like the other sciences, whether physical or mental, bestows upon the student the pleasures of contemplation-of generalization; and it bestows this pleasure in an eminent degree. To trace design in the productions and in the operations of nature, or in those of the human understanding, is, in the strictest sense of the word, generalization, and consequently produces the same pleasure with the generalizations of the physical and of psychological science. ..... It is a highly pleasing contemplation of the self-same kind with those of the other sciences, to perceive every where design and adaptation-to discover uses even in things apparently the most accidental - to trace ihis so constantly, that where peradventure we cannot find the purpose of nature, we never for a moment suppose there was none, but only that we have hitherto failed in finding it out-and to arrive at the intimate persuasion that all seeming disorder is harmony-all chance, design-and that nothing is made in vain; nay, things which in our ignorance we had overlooked as unimportant, or even complained of as evils, fill us afterwards with contentment and delight, when we find that they are subservient to the most important and beneficial uses. Thus inflammation and the generation of matter in a wound, wefind to be the effort which nature makes to produce new flesh, and effect the cure; the opposite hinges of the valves in the veins and arteries are the means of enabling the blood to circulate; and so of innumerable other arrangements of the animal economy.Pp. 183, 184.
But, beyond this, we shall find a peculiar pleasure arising from natural theology, associated with a peculiar improvement. In the first place, the nature of the truths with which she is conversant,—the evidences of design, of contrivance, of power, and wisdom, and goodness,-are highly gratifying to the mind, inasmuch as they afford great scope to the reasoning powers, exercise the resources of our ingenuity, give a new aspect to the most ordinary appearances, and are continually surprising us with novel proofs of intentions plainly directed to an end.
Secondly, the universal recurrence of the facts on which natural theology rests, deserves to be regarded as increasing the interest of this science. But,
Thirdly, and chiefly, natural theology stands far above all other sciences, from the sublime nature of its objects, exceeding the bounds of material existence, and rising from the creature to the Creator. These contemplations, even in the abstract, are fraught with no ordinary interest, are a noble employment of our intellects, and a dignified privilege of our nature.
But it is equally certain that the science derives an interest incomparably greater from the consideration that we ourselves, who cultivate it, are most of all concerned in its truth--that our own high destinies are involved in the results of the investigation. This, indeed, makes it, beyond all doubt, the most interesting of the sciences, and sheds on the other branches of philosophy an interest beyond that which otherwise belongs to them, rendering them more attractive in proportion as they connect themselves with this grand branch of human knowledge, and are capable of being made subservient to its uses. See only in what contemplations the wisest of men end their most sublime inquiries! Mark where it is that a Newton finally reposes after piercing the thickest veil that envelopes nature-grasping and arresting in their course the most subtle of her elements, and the swiftest-traversing the regions of boundless spaceexploring worlds beyond the solar way-giving out the law which binds the universe in eternal order! He rests, as by an inevitable necessity, upon the contemplation of the great First Cause, and holds it his highest glory to have made the evidence of his existence, and the dispensations of his power and of his wisdom, better understood by men.-Pp. 193, 194.
But, still further, the student of natural theology cannot fail to discover an intimate connexion between Natural and Revealed Religion, the works and the word of God mutually pointing to the common parent of us all; so little reason is there for the objections which some men have raised against the doctrines of natural religion, as if they were meant to be adopted as a substitute for the discoveries of Christianity! so little truth is there in the assertions of such as have contended that by the light of unassisted reason we can know absolutely nothing of God and a future state! In point of fact, there is no opposition, no rivalry, no hostility, between the two subjects. Nay, more than this, we are prepared to contend that natural theology is indispensably necessary to the support of revelation. The existence and the attributes—the character—of the Deity must be proved by arguments drawn from natural theology. How else shall we know him to be a God of truth? Without this conviction of the moral character of God, independently of his word, --for aught we know he may be a demon of falsehood, and cruelty, and injustice, deceiving us by his miracles, and cheating us by his promises! We cannot be assured that any revelation proceeds from our Creator, unless it agrees with his moral character, as we can collect that character from his works and his providence. “We have no rule, no principles, by which to judge of the law pretending to come from God; we cannot tell whether it be worthy of him or not; we do not so much as know what worth or goodness is, either in ourselves, or in the Deity. Nor will any external arguments, even the most unquestioned miracles, of them. selves, be sufficient to confirm its pretensions. For how shall we know that these miracles are from God, unless we understand what his attributes are; and whether the occasion for which they are wrought be such as is consistent with them ?"* So that those zealous persons who repudiate the aid of natural theology as unnecessary, or hostile to the establishment of Christianity, defeat their own purpose, and make the proof of any revelation impossible. For,
Suppose it were shown by incontestible proofs that a messenger sent immediately from heaven had appeared on the earth; suppose, to make the case more strong against our argument, that this messenger arrived in our own days, pay, appeared before our eyes, and shewed his divine title to have his message believed, by performing miracles in our presence. No one can possibly imagine a stronger case. .... Now even this strong evidence would not at all establish the truth of the doctrine promulgated by the messenger; for it would not show that the story be brought was worthy of belief in any one particular except his supernatural powers. These would be demonstrated by his working miracles, all the rest of his statement would rest on his assertion. But a being capable of working miracles might very well be capable of deceiving us. The possession of power does not of necessity exclude either fraud or malice....... But the doctrines of the existence of a Deity and of his attributes, which natural religion teaches, preclude the possibility of such ambiguities, and remove all those difficulties. We thus learn that the Creator of the world is one and the same; and we come to know his attributes, not merely of power, which alone the direct coinmunication by miracles could convey, but of wisdom and goodness. Built upon this foundation, the message of revelation becomes at once unimpeachable and invaluable. It converts every inference of reason into certainty, and, above all, it communicates the Divine Being's intentions respecting our own lot, with a degree of precision which the inferences of natural theology very imperfectly possess.-Pp. 205–208.
Our noble author still further insists upon the services of natural religion as subsidiary to, and cooperative with, “ the great help of revelation;" for that, without these, Christianity would rest merely upon tradition, or the evidence of testimony, and the foundation of revelation would " become weaker and weaker as the distance in point of time increases from the actual interposition."
We submit that this is a very loose statement, and most unphilosophical. Lord Brougham's assertion is untrue; and, indeed, allowing its truth, his inference is clearly untenable. It is not true that Christianity, deprived of the services of natural religion, would have no foundation but tradition, or the evidence of testimony. Does our noble author forget the fact of the existence of Christianity? Can that fact be reasonably accounted for, but upon the hypothesis of the truth of the christian revelation ? We have no space for the pursuit of our argu