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Rey, W. Toplam Hobson, of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and of Rochdale, to Frances Maria, daughter of Walter Vavasour, Esq. of Crossfield.

At Littleham, near Exmouth, the Rev. William Heberden, M.A. of Exeter College, Vicar of Broadhembury, Devon, to Susanna, daughter of the late J. Buller, Esq. of Downes.

At Worfield, the Rev. Cornelius F. Broadbent, B.A. of St. Mary Hall, to Barbara, daughter of the Rev. E. S. Davenport, of Davenport House, Shrop


At Brislington, near Bristol, the Rev. Seth Burge Plummer, late of University College, and of Castle Cary, Somerset, to Mary Anne Hurle, second daughter of the late J. Cook, Esq. of Brislington.

At Ealing, Francis Nicholas, M.A. of Wadham College, to Mary Ann, eldest daughter of Charles Robinson, Esq. of Rochester House, in the parish of Ealing.

At Willingale, the Rev. Charles Bradshaw Bowles, M. A. of Exeter College, and of Pinbright, in Surrey, to Sophia, second daughter of the Rev. John Deades, Rector of Willingale, Essex.

At Plymouth, the Rev. Robert Sengen Burton, M.A. of Christ Church, Vicar of the Abbey, Shropshire, to Mary Anne Elizabeth, eldest daughter of the Rev. C. Pyne Coffin, of East Dawne, Devon, and relict of the Rev. Orlando Hamlyn Williams, of Clovelly, in the same county.

At St. George's, Devon, the Rev. John Besley, D. C. L. late Fellow of Balliol College, Vicar of Long Benton, Northumberland, and Rector of Aston, Subidge, Gloucestershire, to Frances, widow of R. Bent, Esg. Mountstone, Devon.

The Rev. John Daubeny, M.A. of Exeter College, and Rector of Creed, to Mary Uzella, eldest daughter of William Foster, Esq. of Llanwithan, Cornwall.

At Ainbleside, Westmoreland, the Rev. Bryan J. Broughton, Rector of Elmley Lovett, Worcestershire, to Margaret Elizabeth, youngest daughter of William Briggs, Esq. M.D.

The Rev. Henry Clutterbuck, Vicar of Kempstone, Bedfordshire, and third son of

Peter Clutterbuck, Esq. of Stanmore, Mid. dlesex, to Louisa Butler, niece of Colonel Crighton, of Gower Street, London.

Rev. H. B. Martin, of Richmond, Surrey, to Louisa, fourth daughter of the late Mr. John Buckler, of Warminster.

The Rev. W. F. Hope, to Miss Meredith, of Berrington.

The Rev. C. Penny, Curate of Sutton Courtney, Berks, to Miss Eliza Alpass, of Deersley, Gloucestershire.

The Rev. John D'Arcy Preston, eldest son of Rear-Admiral Preston, of Askham, in the County of Cork, to Hannah Elizabeth, eldest daughter of the late Sir John St. Leger Gillman, Bart, of Carrabeen, in the County of Cork.

Rev. H. Reeks, to Maria Adriana, daughter of the late John Smee, Esq. of the Honourable East India Company's Service at Bombay.

At Christ Church, Marylebone, the Rev. Arnold White, to Sarah Cordelia Crow, relict of William Crow, Esq. of Broomscroft Wateringbury, Kent.

At Westbury Church, by the Rev. R, B. Cartwright, the Rev. Henry S. Layce, of Pembroke College, Vicar of Caldecot, Monmouthshire, to Mary Anne, daughter of the late R. Cartwright, Esq. of Shirehampton.

At St. Mary's, Islington, the Rev. S. Thackwell, M. A. of Pembroke Coll. second son of the late J. Thackwell, Esq. of, Gloucestershire, to Ann, only daughter of E. Cooper, Esq. of Redinarley D'Abitot, Worcestershire.

DEATH. The Right Rev. Thomas Elrington, D.D. Lord Bishop of Leighlin and Ferns. His Lordship had passed his 70th year. Dr. Elrington was consecrated Bishop of Limerick in 1820, and was translated to the united sees of Leighlin and Ferns, in 1822, According to the Irish Church Temporalities' Act, the Bishopric of Ferns is one to which the Bishopric of Ossory, had it become first vacant, was to be united ; but Ferns itself being first vacant, the Bishop of Ossory becomes, by virtue of the Act, Bishop of Ferns.

ERRATUM At p. 420, line 25, for through the Moloch, where the offering was brief,' read through the fire to Moloch, where the suffering was brief.'

As we cannot exactly agree with the sentiments of an “ Original Subscriber," upon the subject of
Family Prayer, we trust he will not be displeased at our declining to insert his letter in oar

"A Trinitarian," and " X." have been received.
« D. J. E." shall hear from ns.





Art I.-A Discourse of Natural Theology, showing the Nature of the

Evidence, and the Advantages of the Study. By Henry Lord BROUGHAM, F.R.S. and Member of the National Institute of France. London: Knight. 1835. 8vo. Pp. 296.

Op this elaborate discourse, we proceed to give the second portion of our Review, persuaded that we are performing an acceptable service to our readers, who, doubtless, are anxious to be informed of the whole contents of this remarkable volume, in which we admire the singular versatility, the various learning, and the metaphysical acumen of the noble author, to whom we would apply the familiar panegyric of the Roman orator, and say, "Fuit in illo viro ingenium, ratio, memoria, literæ, cura, cogitatio, diligentia."*

We need not remind our readers, that the primary object of Lord Brougham's discourse is to prove that philosophy and natural theology are identical sciences, and that the latter rests upon the same foundation with all other inductive sciences, and is, therefore, calculated to bestow the same kind of gratification which the investigation and the

soars far above all other investigations from the sublime and elevating nature of its objects, exceeding the bounds of material existence, and lifting her students from the creation to the Author of nature, of whose goodness, and wisdom, and power, it is her highest glory to be the handmaid and interpreter.

We entertain grave doubts of the accuracy of our noble author's views in that main object of his work, the proof that natural theology is, strictly speaking, a branch of inductive knowledge, formed and

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supported by the same kind of reasoning, upon which the physical and psychological sciences are founded.

The same induction of facts, which leads us to a knowledge of the structure of the eye, and its functions in the animal economy, leads us to the knowledge of its adaptation to the properties of light. It is a truth of physics, in the strictest sepse of the word, that vision is performed by the eye refracting light, and making it converge to a focus upon the retina; and that the peculiar combination of its lenses, and the different materials they are composed of, correct the indistinctness which would otherwise arise from the different refrangibility of light; in other words, make the eye an achromatic instrument. But if this is not also a truth in natural theology, it is a position from which, by the shortest possible process of reasoning, we arrive at a Theological truth, namely, that the instrument so successfully performing a given service by means of this curious structure, must have been formed with a knowlegde of the properties of light. The position from which so easy a step brings us to this doctrine of natural theology, was gained by strict induction. ... The same remarks apply to every part of the animal body. The use to which each member is subservient, and the manner in which it is enabled so to perform its functions, as to serve that appointed use, is learnt by an induction of the strictest kind. But it is impossible to deny that what induction thus teaches, forms the great bulk of all natural theology.- Pp. 28, 29, 32.

In our judgment, the difference between these investigations is palpable and broad : and it is this : that in physical sciences we have actual experiments on which to erect proofs of a positive nature, and that our inductions are made from facts submitted to our senses; but that when we proceed to infer a First Cause Intellectual from the marks of skill and design discoverable in the universe, our proof is merely a matter of inference. In the first case, we walk by sight; in the second, by faith. In the first case we may be said to know the truth ; in the latter, we do but guess at it. In the one case we build our conclusions upon experiment—this is induction ; in the other, we proceed upon assumptions from certain arrangements, and certain effects, the works and productions of man, to proof of an intelligent First Cause, whom "no man has seen"—this is, strictly speaking, merely inference, which necessarily bears reference to our own nature, and the knowledge we have of our own minds, derived from our own consciousness and experience. Our author tells us, (p. 258,) that “all induction proceeds upon similar grounds. It is the generalization of particulars; the concluding from a certain limited number of instances to an indefinite number.” If our author's discourse were only a popular essay, we should, probably, dismiss these nice distinctions as little worthy of regard ; but when he is at such pains to tell his readers, that his "work is a logical one,” (p. 7,) and insists with such elaborate argumentation upon the absolute identity of natural theology, with reference to its nature and foundations, and other inductive sciences; we think it fair to give them an examination, to which of themselves they might have but a questionable title. Suffice it to say, that there is as much difference in the evidence on which physical science and natural theology rest, as

there is “ between the proof of an overt act, such as murder, and an attempt to prove by inferences from overt acts the motives which led to the murder."*

The acute mind of our author seems, indeed, to have been alive to this distinction, notwithstanding his arguments; and we need but ask our readers to peruse the following extract to convince them that certain misgivings twitted the noble member of the National Institute of France, whilst he was urging his point with such zealous labour.

If indeed it be said that we never can be so certain of the things we infer, as we are of those we have observed, and on which our inference is grounded, we may admit this to be true. But no one therefore denies the value of the science, wbich is composed of the inferences ; for our assurance may be quite sufficient to merit entire confidence.-P. 260.

To be sure it may: no doubt it does ; but the cogency of the proof is not disputed; only it is contended, in opposition to Lord Brougham, that the classing of Natural Theology with Inductive Sciences is not so accurate an arrangement as the noble peer would teach us to believe.

Ere we come to the discourse under review, we would just remark what appears to us to be an inconsistency, at least, in our author's statements. He tells us that “the belief that mind exists is essential to the whole argument, by which we infer that the Deity exists,” and that“ it is the foundation of natural theology in all its branches." (P. 79.) He repeats this position in a note, and would convict Paley of incapacity for metaphysical researches upon the ground of his non-allusion to this fundamental point : yet he subsequently says that “the evidences of design derived from the structure of the universe are the great foundation of natural theology !" (P. 244.) How is this, my Lord ? “Non nostrum est tantas componere lites.”

We have already hinted, in our former critique, that there is no portion of the discourse more effective than the fourth section, which refutes the argument à priori as applied to prove the existence and attributes of a Deity. Of this kind of demonstration, Dr. Clarke and Locke are the chief and most illustrious champions; in opposition to whom our author triumphantly shows that their argument is, in a great degree, unsound ; that it is insufficient for the purpose to which it is applied ; that it serves only to a limited extent; and that to this extent it is in reality not distinguishable from induction, or the argumentum à posteriori. Dr. Clarke argues that the existence of space and time proves the existence of something whereof these are qualities, for that they are not themselves substances ; and the conclusion is, that the Deity is that something. To this Lord Brougham's reply is unanswerable :

To argue from the existence of space and time to the existence of any thing else, is assuming that those two things have a real being independent of our

• Spectator's Library, No. CCCLXV. p. 613.

conceptions of them : for the existence of certain ideas in our minds cannot be the foundation on which to build a conclusion that any thing external to our minds exists. To infer that space and time are qualities of an infinite and eternal Being is surely assuming the very thing to be proved, if a proposition can be said to have a distinct meaning at all which predicates space and time as qualities of any thing. What, for example, is time but the succession of ideas, and the consciousness and recollection which we have of that succession ? To call it a quality is absurd ; as well might we call motion a quality, or our ideas of absent things and persons a quality

Again, if space is deemed a quality, and if infinite space be the quality of an infinite Being, finite space must also be a quality, and must, by parity of reason, be the quality of a finite being. Of what being ? Here is a cube of one foot within an exhausted receiver, or a cylinder of half an inch diameter and three inches high in the Torricellian vacuum. What is the being of whom that square and that cylindrical space are to be deemed as qualities? ..... There can be no doubt that this argument rests either upon the use of words without meaning, or it is a disguised form of the old doctrine of the unima mundi, or of the hypothesis that the whole universe is a mere emanation of the Deity. Pp. 34–86.

But the truth is, that this argument, professing to be à priori, and independent of experience, is inductive, and must be classed with the arguments derived from the observation of external objects, the ground of our reasoning à posteriori as to matter, or, at the utmost, with the information given by consciousness, the whole ground of our reasoning à posteriori as to mind. These so called demonstrations of the existence and attributes of the Deity à priori, are, indeed, fond fancies, or, as Dr. Reid says, "the wanderings of imagination in a region beyond the limits of human understanding." For ourselves, we must confess, unwilling as we are to derogate from any argument that is brought to prove this conclusion, that we think exactly with our noble author, and hold such reasoning to be utterly fallacious. Nor do we feel much greater respect for the opinion of Mr. Stewart, who has said that “the fact of the ideas of immensity and eternity forcing themselves upon our belief seems to furnish an argument for the existence of an immense and eternal Being."

But, immensity and eternity, or infinite space and endless duration, are merely negatives : how, then, can they furnish an argument for the existence of an immense and eternal Being? Is not this speculation more sublime than solid ? The attributes of eternity and immensity are ascribed to God, because without them he would not be perfect; and, indeed, self-existence and necessary existence seem to be of the essence of the Deity, to whom no limits can be assigned as to his power, his presence, and his being, without destroying his very nature. And yet, in these mysterious speculations, we must check the pride of our vain reasonings, and be content to acknowledge that though the existence of the Deity“ be of itself an immediate, certain, necessary truth," according to Pearson, “yet it must be evidenced, and made apparent unto us by its connexion with other truths," and " we must read the great Arti

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