This, then, is a source of loss, and it is directly traced to free trade. What would have been the normal rate had free trade been left for a subsequent and more fortunate period, when it "might" have been effected by international consent? Something below the high rate which the manufacturers have been accustomed to pay up to a recent period. And they have been paying this high rate while their profits have been gradually reduced, by the determination of foreign nations and our colonies to supply, as far as they can, their own markets.1 In effect, therefore, during the latter period of our commercial progress or retardation under free trade since 1873, the manufacturers have been making an annual present to the railway companies. This has encroached upon their profits. It was originally the tribute which the stimulus of free trade contributed to the railway companies. But when that stimulus disappeared— when the "artificial demand," which the manufacturers so carefully created by means of the Legislature, no longer existed-then to pay for its supposed assistance would seem a robbery. Nevertheless, and it must be said to their credit, the manufacturers continued to pay what may be called an inconsequent tax out of their own pockets. A revival of trade would come about, as it came about in the former days of protection, and then they would be able to reap the reward of their patience. But to hope for a revival of

1 The movement against excessive railway rates forms a striking commentary on Cobden's parallels. No doubt but what the manufac turers' profits under free-trade imports are considerably reduced by high railway rates. Under protection, Cobden said the manufacturers' profits were curtailed by the high price of bread. But they did charge them then on the foreign consumer. Who bears them nowadays?

trade under present circumstances, and to base that hope upon our experience of trade depression under a former and protective code, is obviously to hope without sufficient reason of our hope ever being fulfilled. There were certain causes of depression under protection; and as they are causes which tend to operate under favourable circumstances, no matter what the principle be under which our commerce is conducted, they may be called "normal" causes. Such a cause is speculation. While our trade flourished under protection, we read that its uniformly progressive course was marked by periods of depression. These were in nearly every instance caused by over- speculation,1 which led to over-production. As a consequence, the markets, became overstocked; and as "demand" continued but slowly to advance in external markets, and actually receded in the home market, owing to the enforced idleness of a larger or smaller number of labourers, production was consequently reduced till an equilibrium was effected between fresh supply and this new state of demand. Now it was during this period of diminished production that distress prevailed. But who was responsible for the excessive speculation leading up to it? It was not the labourers. They, indeed, were content and happy so long as they were occupied, and the recipients of fair wages; and we will undertake to say that the sum of the prosperous periods under protection is out of all proportion to the sum of the periods of depression. But we need not refer to this fact to remark that it was possible to be, and to continue, prosperous under protection. Who,

1 The opinion of Sir Robert Peel (1839).

then, were mainly responsible for many of those interruptions which disfigure the upward curve of our trade and commerce during protection? It was the ill-advised speculations of the manufacturers. It was the endeavour to make fortunes out of our constant trade, by giving it the character of progressing by fits and starts, that all the havoc to labour directly flowed. This was the fountain source of the mischief.1 The markets were overstocked: production consequently receded. But why was the period immediately following upon the distress of 1837 favourable to the development of an agitation for reform? There had been many antecedent occasions like unto it in all respects—occasions when the price of corn was high and the progress of manufacture retarded by temporary causes. It will readily be allowed that any period of distress is favourable to agitation. Then why was the question of the repeal of the Corn Laws not agitated before 1837? The answer is not far to seek. To conduct an agitation with any chance of its succeeding, there must be a head; and to make it grow and develop, it must have plenty of resources.2

1 To go one step higher, these fits of speculation were more or less the product of the then "improper" state of the currency. It is well known that the currency was regulated according to the supposed wants of commerce (Lord Overstone). When the exchanges were adverse, the difference was paid—not by the income of the country, but out of the capital of the money merchants. Hence the various banks had to eontract or exchange their issues on occasion.

2 But though the repeal of the Corn Laws had not been agitated, yet it had been discussed. The London merchants in 1821 drew up a petition in which the policy of free trade was advocated But the conditions of 1821 were very widely different from those of 1837. What was possible, therefore, in the former year, may not have been practicable to many minds in the latter.

But the time at which Cobden appeared on the stage of the commercial world cannot, exaggerate it as you may, be called extraordinary, though the man undoubtedly was. It required to be made extraordinary by the simple device of arousing enthusiasm amongst the people. Nothing, we believe, can more easily persuade the populace to drown all past recollections of the benefits which have been conferred upon them by the combined genius of their countrymen than the proclamation, uttered with all the earnestness of truth, that they are suffering unjustly at the hands of the ruling class. Only point out to them that they are the subjects of a tyranny, and they are too ready to follow you, whether you have their wellbeing singly in mind, or whether you are taking them by the way, in your endeavour to promote ulterior and prejudiced views. But was it possible that the people, lashed into a fury, should in their blindness perceive the gigantic scheme which Cobden entertained, and of which free trade formed but a part? Was it possible for them to detect any error lurking in the reasons which ascribed their sufferings to the rapacity of the landlords? Absolutely impossible. When the causation of distress was so partially displayed by the enlightened leader, it is not to be expected that the ignorant and enthusiastic mass will be capable of improving it.

And the causation of distress was very imperfectly worked out by Cobden. Indeed, were it not for the fact that the man was above suspicion in this matter, and that he firmly believed he was working in the right groove, any one who has read his speeches closely would at first conclude that he very cleverly imposes

upon his audience. If he was convinced that high rents caused a high price of corn, then he was justified in following out his doctrine to its logical termination. And that was, "You must reduce rents." But we may here remark that the evil consequences of that economical fallacy have not fallen upon Cobden's own head. We cannot blame Cobden for pursuing a mistake, since its nature was undiscovered by his opponents. But it is a very strange circumstance that the adherents of Ricardo, who gave what is regarded nowadays as the true definition of rent, should have allowed what to them must have appeared untrue to pass without a challenge.1 We say that for an erroneous fact or proposition no man is to be blamed if he uses it in good faith, though its consequences may be disastrous. But where censure must be bestowed is when any one, instead of taking a large view of the subject under consideration, confines himself in a narrow circle. And we think it cannot be questioned that Cobden did not make a comprehensive study of the important subject of distress. He did not even include all the facts which determined distress at the time, though he might have done. His conclusion, therefore, must of necessity be unsound. It might refer to a part, but it could not explain the whole of the distress of that period.

1 Admit that the Corn Law did in the first instance increase rent, by maintaining prices above what they would have been without protection. From this admission, which is true, Cobden inferred that rents were afterwards raised by the landlord, in much the same way as by an Act of Parliament, and that in consequence the price of corn was raised. This is false. It is altogether opposed to the facts. Rents did rise, as Cobden said they did; but the average price of corn during periods of ten years from 1815 to 1845 fell, as shown by the gradual reduction in the amount of protection afforded to agriculture.