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THIRD DEPARTMENT, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1880.

seems to be important that general confessions should not be excluded. The order may therefore be modified by adding a clause that neither the bill of particulars nor anything in the order should prevent the defendants from giving evidence of any declarations or statements, oral or written, made by said Dwight, of his having had said ailments, which declarations or statements are general as to time and place.

As thus modified the order should be affirmed, and the costs of this appeal and printing disbursements should abide the event.

Present-LEARNED, P. J., and BOCKES, J.; MARTIN, J., taking

no part.

Orders affirmed as modified; $10 costs and disbursements to abide the event; order to be settled before LEARNED, P. J.

THE GOODYEAR DENTAL VULCANITE COMPANY AND JOSIAH BACON, APPELLANTS, v. MARCELLUS M. FRISSELLE AND HYMAN ROSA, RESPONDENTS.

Judgment of the United States Circuit Court-an action will lie thereon, though it has been docketed, without first obtaining the leave of the court-Code, § 71.

A judgment of the United States Circuit Court, though docketed in a county clerk's office, still remains a judgment of that court, and an action can be brought thereon without first obtaining leave from the court so to do, as is required by section 71 of the Code when an action is to be brought upon a judgment recovered in a court of this State.

APPEAL from a judgment in favor of the defendants, entered upon the trial of this action by the court without a jury.

This action was brought, without leave of the court, upon a judgment recovered by these plaintiffs against these defendants, on February 18, 1876, in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, a transcript of which judgment was, on March 20, 1876, docketed in the office of the clerk of the county of Ulster, in pursuance of section 39 of chapter 470 of 1847.

THIRD DEPARTMENT, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1880.

The question involved was whether or not such an action could be maintained, without first obtaining the leave of the court so to do.

W. II. L. Lee, for the appellants.

J. E. Van Etten, for the respondents.

PER CURIAM:

Although the judgment had been docketed in a county clerk's office, yet it still remained a judgment of the United States Circuit Court. It did not become a judgment of a court of this State. And therefore leave to sue them was not necessary under section 71 of the old Code.

The case of Tompkins v. Purcell (12 Hun, 662), in the First Department, decides an analogous point; that is, that proceedings supplementary cannot be taken in the Supreme Court on a judgment of the United States Court, although it has been docketed in the office of a county clerk.

As a general rule, a party has a right to sue on any cause of action which he holds. Any statutory exception to that right. must be distinctly expressed.

The language of the section above cited does not distinctly, or by implication, include judgments recovered in courts other than those of this State. Nor do we think that the policy of the statute applies to any others. It is sufficient to notice in this connection that the decision above cited is a good reason why the plaintiff should desire to have a judgment in a court of this State.

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

Present-LEARNED, P. J., and BOCKES, J.

Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to abide event.

22 176 25ap 24

THIRD DEPARTMENT, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1880.

IN THE MATTER OF
OF THE APPLICATION OF THE BOSTON,
HOOSAC TUNNEL & WESTERN RAILWAY COM-
PANY, APPELLANT, TO ACQUIRE LANDS OF THE TROY &
BOSTON RAILROAD COMPANY, RESPONDENT.

Eminent domain—damages to be paid by a railroad company-they are to be determined by the detriment occasioned to the owner, and not by the value of the land to the company.

The road of the Troy & Boston R. R. Co. originally crossed the Hoosac river at two points. Thereafter that company bought certain land, and so turned the course of the river as to leave their road entirely on its east side. By so doing, they left a piece of land between the track and the old channel, to which there was no access either by a public or a private road. Another railroad company having applied to take a portion of this land, commissioners to appraise the damages to be awarded therefor were appointed, and a hearing had, at which witnesses called by the petitioners testified that $50 an acre was a liberal price, while the president of the Troy & Boston R. R. Co. testified that it was worth $12,000 for railroad purposes. The land was not however of that value to the Troy & Boston R. R., their tracks having already been constructed on adjoining land. The commissioners fixed the damages to be paid by the petitioners at $5,000, stating that in arriving at that sum they included in it the value of the land, as situated, for general railway purposes.

"

Held, on appeal by the petitioner, that the commissioners erred in so doing. That the damages to be paid were to be determined by the detriment occasioned to the owner of the land taken, and that the amount thereof should be neither increased or diminished by the fact that the land to be taken was peculiarly well or ill adapted to the uses of a railroad.

APPEAL from the award of commissioners appointed to appraise the value of certain lands, the property of the Troy & Boston Railroad Company, which the appellant sought to acquire by virtue of the provisions of the general railroad act.

The Troy & Boston Railroad runs from Troy to the Hoosac Tunnel, and the Boston, Hoosac Tunnel & Western Railway from Mechanicville to the tunnel, and the routes of the two roads are substantially parallel from Schaghticoke to the tunnel. At the point where the land lies which was taken in this proceeding, the line of the Troy & Boston road crossed, at two points, the former bed of the Hoosac river. In order to avoid the necessity of building two expensive bridges, the Troy & Boston road turned the

THIRD DEPARTMENT, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1880.

course of the Hoosac river at this point, so as to build the road wholly on the east side of the river, and for the purpose of so doing purchased the land taken in this proceeding, and has held it ever since. The appellant company now desires to take a portion of this land for the uses of its own railroad. It was claimed that, by reason of the change of the course of the river, made by the respondent company, the petitioner would thereby be enabled to build its road upon a fill across the old channel of the river and to dispense with the necessity of building two bridges, one four hundred feet long, and the other of the length of two hundred feet.

The land in question, for other than railroad purposes, was of nominal value. Evidence was given tending to show that for railroad purposes this land was worth $12,000, and that it was worth $10,000 or $12,000 more for such purposes than it would have been had not the Troy & Boston road turned the river by their embankment at this point. The commissioners made an award of $5,000. In compliance with an order of the Special Term, the commissioners stated that in arriving at the said compen sation they included the value of the land for railroad purposes, and excluded any amount for the value of the use of it to the respondent for their railroad purposes, except that they included what they deemed a proper amount for the value of the land for general railroad purposes.

James Gibson and E. W. Paige, for the appellant.

Esek Cowen, for the respondent.

LEARNED, P. J.:

The commissioners in this case awarded as compensation to the Troy & Boston Railroad Company, for land to be taken by the Boston, Hoosac Tunnel & Western Railroad Company, the sum of $5,000. The matter was sent back to them to state certain mat ters, as to the mode at which they arrived at this amount. And by a further report they stated that, in arriving at said compensation, they did include the value of the real estate for railroad purposes; that they excluded the value of the use of the land to the Troy & Boston Railroad Company, except that they included what HUN.-VOL. XXII.

12

THIRD DEPARTMENT, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1880.

they deemed a proper amount for the value of the land for general railroad purposes.

The land taken was a strip about one hundred feet in width and about three acres in size. It had never been used by the respondent or any one else, and was unavailable for purposes of cultivation. The Troy & Boston Railroad at this place crossed the old channel of the Hoosac river at the two points. In order to turn the river the Troy & Boston Railroad Company bought this land. They then turned the course of the river, so as to build their road wholly on its east side. By doing this they left what was called the "Island," a piece of land between their track and the bend of the old channel. The application to take the land in question, a part of that island, had been opposed by the Troy & Boston Company; and the court had found that the land proposed to be taken was not necessary to, or required by, the respondent, for the purposes of its incorporation.

On the hearing before the commissioners, a witness, on behalf of the petitioners, testified that $50 an acre was a liberal price. On the part of the respondents, their president testified that the value of the land was $12,000. He explained, on cross-examination, that he meant that this was its value to the Troy & Boston Railroad Company, for the purposes of its incorporation; and that there was no access to the land by public or private road.

The question on this appeal is whether or not the commissioners made up the amount of compensation on a correct principle. It is not disputed that $50 an acre is a full value for this land as farming land. But it is urged by the respondents that, when part of the land of an existing railroad company is taken by another road, and the value of the land has been greatly enhanced for railroad purposes by improvements of the existing railroad, the new road must pay its fair value for railroad purposes.

In considering this question, we must first notice that it has been already found by the court that the piece of land to be taken is not necessary to, or required by respondents for their own purposes. No special value to them can therefore come into account, because they do not need this land. It is undoubtedly true that, if the respondents had not constructed their track upon an embankment

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