was frustrated by a hurricane, which separated them again (for the sixth time); and on the morning of the 29th the commodore made the signal to steer for France. They reached Brest in safety, on New Year's-day, 1797, seven sail in all-not having seen, nor been seen by, their general and admiral once during the whole voyage. Thus ended, by a series of disasters and blunders on which Great Britain had no right whatever to count, an enterprise more formidable to her power than any that had been attempted by the boldest of her enemies since the Spanish Armada. We have no taste, in general, for hypothetical predictions of what would have happened if such and such other things had happened; but it is a safe conjecture-almost beyond a conjecture that, had Hoche and his fifteen thousand veterans been able at that time to get themselves landed in any part of Ireland except the south, the result could have been no other than an Hibernian republic. The government was utterly unprepared for their reception, treated the first rumours of a French descent with scornful derision, as the "frenzy of common fame," and was thrown into absolute dismay by the announcement of the fact. Not a ship nor a regiment was ready to receive the invaders. For five days in that month of December, 1796, a French fleet *Munster was at this period the only province of Ireland not deeply leavened with Defenderism or United Irishism. The peasantry were loyal and anti-Gallican to a man; and had the landing in Bantry Bay been effected, the expectation of native cooperation would have been utterly disappointed, and the object of the invasion most probably frustrated. These poor creatures behaved themselves all through that week of public and ministerial panic, in a way that ought, from that time thenceforth and for evermore (were there gratitude in governments), to have opened a new era in Irish legislation and politics. The Lord-Lieutenant writes to the Duke of Portland on the 10th of January, 1797 :--" During the march of our troops, the utmost attention was paid them by the inhabitants of the towns and villages through which they passed; so that in many places the meat provided by the commissariat was not consumed. The roads, which in parts had been rendered impassable by the snow, were cleared by the peasantry. The poor people often shared their potatoes with them, and dressed their meat without demanding payment." Such was Catholic peasant loyalty after a century of Protestant and landlord oppression. Its reward was an honourable mention in the Dublin Gazette that year, and martial law the next. It must be remembered that the landing in Bantry Bay was no part of the first design of the expedition, but only an after-thought, arising out of the failure of the original plan. Dr. Madden says, on the authority of Arthur O'Connor (United Irishmen, Second Series, vol. ii., p. 296), "The place of the intended debarkment of Hoche's expedition has never transpired; the knowledge of it was confined to Hoche and O'Connor." See a curious anecdote in illustration of the ministerial panic, in Teeling's "Personal Narrative," p. 69. It was thought strange that, with the British government's means of obtaining information and unscrupulousness in the use of them, it remained ignorant of the destination of the formidable armament which had been for months preparing in Brest harbour-so ignorant, that the French fleet did not see an English ship of war either in going or returning. The fact is, the sagacity of the British cabinet over-reached itself. On its being made known to Hoche that "a gentleman with a foreign accent" had been calling on the government printer at Brest, with the offer of a large bribe for a copy of the proclamation which it was foreseen that the general would publish wheresoever he might be bound, Hoche drew up an amended proclamation, with "Portugal” and " Portuguese" substituted for "Ireland" and "Irish," had a few copies struck off, and allowed the gentleman with the foreign accent to obtain possession of one, taking care to have the real proclamation printed elsewhere. The result of the ruse was that Sir John Colpoys, the English admiral, just at the critical moment drew off his fleet from the Brest station, where he had been for several weeks watching the movements of was suffered to lie in an Irish haven without the smallest molestation. The British empire escaped dismemberment-because the wind blew hard, and the ship Fraternité was not a good sailer. If any British statesmen or politicians, in these days of steam navigation, dream of permanently holding Ireland in connection with Great Britain by other ties than those of just and good government, we pray them to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest the "Memoirs of Theobald Wolfe Tone." CHAPTER XII. IRELAND IN 1797-THE LAST OF CONCILIATION AND REFORM-SECESSION OF THE WHIG OPPOSITION PROGRESS OF THE UNITED IRISHMEN - GENERAL LAKE'S PROCLAMATION -MARTIAL LAW IN ULSTER-SECRET COMMITTEE INFORMER NEWELL-THE DISARM ING OF ULSTER- THE SPORT OF MAN-HUNTING" NECESSARY .ACTS OF COERCION-THE UNITED IRISHMEN AT THE CLOSE OF 1797-ALLIANCE WITH THE DEFENDERS-" REMEMBER ORR.' THE failure of Hoche's expedition opened one last chance for the conciliation of Ireland. The circumstances of that attempt at invasion were every way fitted to act both on the prudence and the generosity of any government possessing a particle of either quality. Abortive as the attempt proved, its failure was fortuitous-the work mainly of the elements; and accident could scarcely be relied on to defend the British empire twice. At all events, French invasion was now demonstrated to be not impossible. The boasted guardianship of the wooden walls had turned out not to be infallible; the British Isles were not absolutely inaccessible to hostile fleets. For one entire fortnight the coasts of Ireland had lain at the mercy of an invading enemy; and what had been once might be again. The noble behaviour of the Munster peasanty, too, during the five days that the French were hourly expected to land, invited concession and conciliation. It showed that the assumption on which the whole fabric of coercive and penal legislation rested was a fallacy; the millions were loyal at heart, after all. With a people in such a temper, concession would have conciliated; it would have come with a good grace—not the French marine, and left the coast of Ireland at the mercy of the enemy during a whole fortnight. The evidence given by the United Irish leaders before the Secret Committee of 1798 shows that the counsels of the Union, like those of the government, were deranged by false and contradictory intelligence. When Emmet was asked by the committee, "How do you account for the people being so loyal and well-disposed while the French were in Bantry Bay?" he replied, "About November, 1796, a messenger arrived here from France, who stated that a descent would immediately be made with 15,000 men. In a very few days after this messenger had quitted Ireland on his return, a letter arrived which was considered as authentic by the Irish Executive, stating that the expedition was deferred till spring. This contradiction threw the Executive off their guard, in consequence of which no measures were taken to prepare the people for the reception of the French army." as a reluctant surrender of weakness and fear to popular turbulence, but as the free-will acknowledgment of popular loyalty. For the Popish peasants, that shared their potatoes with the king's troops, and harnessed themselves in droves to drag the king's guns through mountain passes (snow-drifts notwithstanding), something surely might be done by the king's government, without any compromise either of dignity or of Protestantism. The event of the Bantry Bay expedition had its lessons for the United Irishmen likewise, and was well suited to dispose the most eager and sanguine of them to moderation and compromise. The northern middleclass republicans now discovered, much to their surprise, that they were not so strong as they had imagined; that the national unanimity on which they had fondly calculated did not exist; that the millions would, when it came to a practical question, be not with them (as they had too easily taken for granted), but against them; that the instinct of loyalty was still rooted in the heart of the peasant population, all penal codes, potatoetithe, Whiteboy and Insurrection Acts notwithstanding. Nor were they altogether clear what would have been the result of the success of an invasion of foreign sympathisers. Separation from Great Britain, certainly: an Hibernian republic, probably;-but national independence, possibly not. The expedition was on a scale far beyond the expectations of the most sanguine among them, and the wishes of the more considerate. Their demand was, not fewer than five thousand men, nor more than ten thousand. With fifteen thousand of the best soldiers of France, and a general like Hoche, they might have found themselves too strong. The republic was not always scrupulously tender of the liberties of the nations whom she liberated. Those who came as deliverers, might have staid as conquerors; and at any rate, demands would have been made on Irish gratitude inconsistent with Irish pride and independence. Considerations of this kind disposed many of the patriot leaders at this period to recede from the extreme of their previous political aspirations, and try once more for that legal and constitutional reform which, however defective in theory, would have been practically a large and substantial instalment of justice to Ireland. On the 2nd of January, 1797, a public meeting was held at Belfast, in which O'Connor, Sampson, and others of the northern leaders took part, when it was resolved,― "That the imperfect state of the representation in the House of Commons is the pri mary cause of the discontent at present existing in the country: "That the public mind would be restored to tranquillity, and every impending danger effectually averted, by such a reform in parliament as would secure to population and property their due weight in the scale of government, without distinction on account of religious opinion: "That a determination, firmly manifested on the part of government, to comply with the just desires of the people, would have the happiest effect in conciliating the affections of the people, whose object is reform alone; and thereby constitute the only rampart of defence that can bid complete defiance to the efforts of foreign and domestic enemies: "That we can conceive a government by King, Lords, and Commons (the Commons being thus reformed), when wisely and honestly administered, capable of affording every happiness a nation can enjoy." A similar meeting was held in Dublin by Emmet and his friends, and amicable communications were opened with some of the members of the Whig Opposition in parliament. There can scarcely be a doubt but that at this time the pacification of Ireland might have been effected, had the government honestly desired it. The United Irish leaders were in a mood for compromise and equitable adjustment. In their overtures to the Whigs they had abstained from pressing the obnoxious points of annual parliaments and universal suffrage, and any considerable and substantial concession would have tranquillised, if not contented, a large proportion of the agitators. O'Connor, Emmet, and Macneven say, in their " Memoir on the Origin and Progress of the Union" "If in the course of that effort for reform it had not become evident that success was hopeless, it was the wish of many among the United Irishmen, and the Executive would have gladly embraced the occasion of declining to hold any further intercourse with France, except sending a messenger there to tell them that the difference between the government and the people had been adjusted, and that they would have no business a second time to attempt a landing." For a while, it seemed as if an adjustment were likely to be effected. Reports were circulated and believed that the British cabinet had determined on conciliatory measures. Catholic emancipation and " temperate reform" were again talked of. The resignation of Lord Camden was rumoured; and, what was best of all, it became known that the popular and liberal Prince of Wales had besought his royal father to send him to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant, with Earl Moira as Commander-in-Chief, and had expressed a most decided opinion to Mr. Pitt in favour of a system of conciliation. But the pleasing prospect-like all other pleasing prospects which our history has opened-was destined to be of but brief continuance. Conciliation was not desired by the cabinet of either country. The government of Ireland was in the hands of a faction that wished the people would rebel, that ministers might see the rebellion and crush it;"* and the offer of the heir apparent to the crown, to tranquillise by justice and mercy a third part of the empire, was rejected. First subdue, and then reform," was the ministerial answer to the Whig minority in parliament when, in the course of the ensuing session, the question of reform was re-opened. It was the last time of asking. A majority of four to one responded AYE to this programme of coercive and cruel policy and Grattan and the Whigs, disgusted and despairing, seceded from the House of Commons. 66 The prospect of returning tranquillity with which the year commenced was too slight and transient to have any practical effect on the general state of the country. It did not produce even a suspension or mitigation of the disorders which then rent the entire north of Ireland. The government went on pouring troops into the country from England and Scotland, arming and disciplining the Orange yeomanry, arresting the people on suspicion, imprisoning without bail, and transporting without trial, and sanctioning by connivance every description of magisterial oppression and military insolence. The misdoings were not all on one side. Terror was met by terror, and outrage answered to outrage. The United Irish *Speech of Mr. John Claudius Beresford, March 20, 1797. Early in the year, a party of musqueteers attacked the office of the Northern Star (Samuel Neilson's paper), at Belfast. They broke into the house, destroyed the presses, threw the types into the street, and lodged the printers in gaol. Redress or compensation was, of course, not a thing to be thought of. men continued their military exercisings and drillings, till, in April, they had (on paper at least) an organised force of a hundred thousand men. They, too, intimidated, plundered, and murdered, after the example of their rulers, and for a while with equal or superior efficiency. The Report of the Secret Committee of 1798 says, with reference to this period— "To deter the well-affected from joining the yeomanry corps, and to render the administration of justice altogether ineffectual, the most active system of terror was put in operation. Persons enrolled in the yeomanry, magistrates, witnesses, jurors-in a word, every class and description of people who ventured to support the laws-became objects of the most cruel persecution in their persons, property, and even in the line of their business; and multitudes were compelled to take illegal oaths, and profess an adherence to the party, as a means of security. "In the latter end of 1796 and beginning of 1797, the loyal inhabitants of Ulster suffered most severely from the depredations of the United Irishmen. Throughout the province they were stripped of their arms. The most horrid murders were perpetrated by large bodies of men in open day; and it became nearly impossible to bring the offenders to justice, from the inevitable destruction that awaited the witnesses or jurors who dared to perform their duty." The above statement is founded on fact, though the facts have lost nothing in the hands of the Secret Committee. The truth is, the "loyal inhabitants of Ulster" were now in the minority. The Report omits to state that the loyal inhabitants had begun the "active system of terror," of which these United Irish outrages were but the natural reaction; and is altogether silent on the subject of the "depredations and horrid murders" of the Orange exterminators, offenders whom it had been found quite impossible to bring to justice. The active system of terror met, for a time, with considerable success. During the spring assizes of this year the crown prosecutions very generally failed. Witnesses would not swear up to hanging point, juries would not convict, and the confidence and zeal of the Unionists were greater than Intimidation seems to have been reinforced by bribery. The Report already quoted states that— ever. "Entries of money appear in their proceedings, as paid to procure, as well as to buy off, witnesses; in many cases to gaolers, for being guilty of breaches of trust; and even to under-sheriffs, for returning partial panels. Handbills to intimidate jurors were circulated, and every species of indecent management was practised in the courts to exclude from the jury-box persons unconnected with their party.”* *As reports of secret committes are not always trustworthy historical documents, it may be well to add that the papers of the United Irishmen actually do contain some suspicious entries, corroborative, so far as they go, of the above charge. In one memorandum of their proceedings (dated "County of Down Committee, June 8th, 1797"), we find the following items of "costs of the law :" "Gaoler Two Assistants. 10 guineas. £20 each. 20 guineas. £200." And in another (April 14th, 1797), an entry of £498 4s. 04d. "to counsel and witnesses is prefaced with the significant notice-"We have had a great deal of trouble at the last assizes; the expense was immense; they have ended with honour to the people. See Appendix xiv. to the Report of 1798. The information given in this Appendix is stated to have been furnished by "Nicholas Maguan, of Saintfield, in the county of Down, who was himself a member of the provincial and county committees, and also a colonel in the military system of the United Irishmen. He was present at each of the meetings of which an account is here given, and from time to time, immediately after each meeting, communicated what passed thereat to the Rev. John |