them to be beaten, but for the king's benefit (for there are no blows forgotten with the smart, but those); then, I say, to make them vassals to vassals, is but to batter down those mastering buildings, erected by King Henry the Seventh, and fortified by his son, by which the people and gentry of England were brought to depend upon the king alone. Yea, my good lord, our late dear sovereign kept them up, and to their advantage, as well repaired as ever prince did. Defend me, and spend me,' saith the Irish churl.

.

Couns. Then you think, that this violent breach of the charter will be the cause of seeking the confirmation of it in the next parliament, which otherwise could never have been moved?

Just. I know not, my good lord, perchance not; for, if the house press the king to grant unto them all that is theirs by the law, they cannot, in justice, refuse the king all that is his by the law. And where will be the issue of such a contention? I dare not divine, but sure I am, that it will tend to the prejudice both of the king and subject.

Couns. If they dispute not their own liberties, why should they then dispute the king's liberties, which we call his prerogative?

Just. Amongst so many and so divers spirits, no man can foretel what may be propounded; but, howsoever, if the matter be not slightly handled on the king's behalf, these disputes will soon dissolve; for the king hath so little need of his prerogative, and so great advantage by the laws, as the fear of impairing the one, to wit, the prerogative, is so impossible; and the burthen of the other, to wit, the law so weighty, as but by a branch of the king's prerogative, namely, of his remission and pardon, the subject is no way able to undergo it. This, my lord, is no matter of flourish that I have said, but it is the truth, and unanswerable.

Couns. But to execute the laws very severely would be very grievous. Just. Why, my lord, are the laws grievous, which ourselves have required of our kings? And are the prerogatives also, which our kings have reserved to themselves, also grievous? How can such a people then be well pleased? And if your lordship confess that the laws give too much, why does your lordship urge the prerogative that gives more? Nay, I will be bold to say it, that, except the laws were better observed, the prerogative of a religious prince hath manifold less perils, than the letter of the law hath. Now, my lord, for the second and third, to wit, for the appointing of treasurers, and removing of counsellors, our kings have evermore laughed them to scorn that have pressed either of these; and, after the parliament dissolved, took the money of the treasurers of the parliament, and recalled and restored the officers discharged; or else they have been contented, that some such persons should be removed at the request of the whole kingdom, which they themselves, out of their noble natures, would not seem willing to remove.

Couns. Well, Sir, would you, notwithstanding all these arguments, advise his Majesty to call a parliament?

Just. It belongs to your lordships, who enjoy the king's favour, and. are chosen for your able wisdom, to advise the king. It were a strange boldness in a poor and private person, to advise kings, attended with so anderstanding a council. But, belike your lordships have conceived

some other way, how money may be gotten otherwise. If any trouble should happen, your lordship knows, that then there were nothing so dangerous for a king, as to be without money: a parliament cannot assemble in haste, but present dangers require hasty remedies. It will be no time then to discontent the subjects, by using any inordinate

ways.

Couns. Well, Sir, all this notwithstanding, we dare not advise the king to call a parliament; for, if it should succeed ill, we, that advise, should fall into the king's disgrace. And, if the king be driven into any extremity, we can say to the king, that, because we found it extremely unpleasing to his Majesty to hear of a parliament, we thought it no good manners to make such a motion.

Just. My lord, to the first let me tell you, that there was never any just prince that hath taken any advantage of the success of counsels, which have been founded on reason. To fear that were to fear the loss of the bell, more than the loss of the steeple, and were also the way to beat all men from the studies of the king's service. But for the second, where you say you can excuse yourselves upon the king's own protesting against a parliament; the king, upon better consideration, may encounter that fineness of yours.

Couns. How, I pray you?

Just. Even by declaring himself to be indifferent, by calling your lordships together, and by delivering unto you, that he hears how his loving subjects in general are willing to supply him, if it please him to call a parliament, for that was the common answer to all the sheriffs in England, when the late benevolence was commanded. In which respect, and because you came short in all your projects, and because it is a thing most dangerous for a king to be without treasure, he requires such of you, as either mislike, or rather fear a parliament, to set down your reasons in writing, why you either misliked, or feared it. And such as I wish and desire it, to set down answers to your objections: and so shall the king prevent the calling, or not calling, on his Majesty, as some of your great counsellors have done in many other things, shrinking up their shoulders, and saying, The king will have it so.

Couns. Well, Sir, it grows late, and I will bid you farewell, only you shall take well with you this advice of mine: that, in all that you have said against our greatest, those men, in the end, shall be your judges in their own cause; you, that trouble yourself with reformation, are like to be well rewarded; for hereof you may assure yourself, that we will never allow of any invention, how profitable soever, unless it proceed, or seem to proceed, from ourselves.

Just. If then, my lord, we may presume to say, that princes may be unhappy in any thing, certainly they are unhappy in nothing more, than in suffering themselves to be so inclosed. Again, if we may believe Pliny, who tell us, "That it is an ill sign of prosperity in any kingdom or state, where such, as deserve well, find no other recompence than the contentment of their own consciences;' a far worse sign is it, where the justly accused shall take revenge of the just accuser. But, my good

tord, there is this hope remaining, that, seeing he hath been abused by them he trusted most, he will not, for the future dishonour of his judg ment, so well informed by his own experience, expose such of his vassals (as have had no other motives to serve him, than simply the love of his person and his estate) to their revenge, who have only been moved by the love of their own fortunes, and their glory.

Couns. But, good Sir, the king hath not been deceived by all?

Just. No, my lord, neither have all been trusted, neither doth the world accuse all, but believe, that there be amongst your lordships very just and worthy men, as well of the nobility, as others, but those, though most honoured in the commonwealth, yet, have they not been most employed your lordship knows it well enough, that three or four of your lordships have thought your hands strong enough to bear up alone the weightiest affairs in the commonwealth, and strong enough all the land have found them to bear down whom they pleased,

1

Couns. I understand you: but how shall it appear, that they have only sought themselves?

Just. There needs no perspective glass to discern it; for neither in the treaties of peace and war, in matters of revenue, and matters of trade, any thing hath happened either of love or judgment. No, my lord, there is not, any one action of theirs eminent, great or small, the greatness of themselves only excepted.

Couns. It is all one; your papers can neither answer nor reply, we can. Besides, you tell the king no news in delivering these complaints, for he knows as much as can be told him,

Just. For the first, my lord, whereas he hath once the reasons of things delivered him, your lordships shall need to be well advised; in their answers, there is no sophistry will serve their turn, where the judge and the understanding are both supreme. For the second, to say that his Majesty knows, and cares not, that, my lord, were but to despair all his faithful subjects. But by your favour, my lord, we see it is contrary; we find now, that there is no such singular power as there hath been; justice is described with a balance in her hand, holding it even; and it hangs as even now as ever it did in any king's days; for singular authority begets but general oppression.

Couns, Howsoever it be, that is nothing to you, that have no interest in the king's favour, nor perchance, in his opinion; and, concerning such a one, the misliking, or but misconceiving of any one hard word, phrase, or sentence, will give argument to the king, either to condemn, or reject the whole discourse. And, howsoever his Majesty may neglect your informations, you may be sure that others, at whom you point, will not neglect their revenges; you will therefore confess it, when it is too late, that you are exceeding sorry that you have not followed my advice. Remember Cardinal Wolsey, who lost all men for the king's service, and, when their malice, whom he grieved, had not outlived the king's affection, you know what became of him as well as I.

Just. Yea, my lord, I know it well, that malice hath a longer life, than either love or thankfulness hath, for as we always take more care

to put off pain, than to enjoy pleasure; because the one hath no intermission, and with the other we are often satisfied; so it is in the smart of injury and the memory of good turns: wrongs are written in marble; benefits are, sometimes, acknowledged, rarely requited. But, my lord, we shall do the king great wrong, to judge him by common rules, or ordinary examples; for, seeing his Majesty hath greatly inriched and advanced those that have but pretended his service, no man needs to doubt of his goodness, towards those that shall perform any thing worthy reward. Nay, the not taking knowledge of those of his own vassals, that have done him wrong, is more to be lamented, than the relinquishing of those that do him right, is to be suspected. I am, therefore, my good lord, held to my resolution, by these two, besides the former: the first, that God would never have blessed him with so many years, and in so many actions, yea, in all his actions, had he paid his honest servants with evil for good. The second, where your lordship tells me, that I will be sorry for not following your advice, I pray your lordship to believe, that I am no way subject to the common sorrowing of worldly men, this maxim of Plato being true: dolores omnes ex amore animi erga corpus nascuntur. But, for my body, my mind values it at nothing.

Couns. What is it then you hope for, or seek?

Just. Neither riches, nor honour, or thanks; but I only seek to satisfy his Majesty (which I would have been glad to have done in matters of more importance) that I have lived, and will die an ho

nest man.

The Author's Epitaph, made by himself.

EVEN such is time, which takes in trust
Our youth, and joys, and all we have,

And pays us but with age and dust;

Which in the dark and silent grave,
When we have wander'd all our ways,

Shut up the story of our days:

And from which earth, and grave, and dust,
The Lord shall raise me up, I trust.

THE

ACCUSATION AND IMPEACHMENT

OF

JOHN LORD FINCH,

BARON OF FORDWICH,

Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England, by the House of Commons. Printed Anno Domini 1640. Quarto, containing twelve pages.

Imprimis,

THAT

HAT the said John Lord Finch, Baron of Fordwich, Lord Keeper, &c. hath traiterously and wickedly endeavoured to subvert the fundamental laws, and established government of the realm of England, and, instead thereof, to introduce an arbitrary tyrannical government against law; which he hath declared by traiterous and wicked words, counsels, opinions, judgments, practices, and actions.

II. That, in pursuance of those his traiterous and wicked purposes, he did, in the third and fourth years of his Majesty's reign, or one of them, being then speaker of the commons house of parliament, contrary to the commands of the house, then assembled and sitting, deny and hinder the reading of some things, which the said house of commons required to be read for the safety of the king and kingdom, and preservation of the religion of this realm; and did forbid all the members of the house to speak; and said, that, if any did offer to speak, he would rise and go away; and said, nothing should be then done in the house; and did offer to rise and go away; and did thereby, and otherwise, as much as in him lay, endeavour to subvert the ancient and undoubted rights and course of parliaments.

III. That he, being of his Majesty's council, at the justice-seat held for the county of Essex, in the month of October, in the tenth year of his now Majesty's reign, at Strafford-Langton, in the same county, being then of his Majesty's council, in that service did practise, by unlawful means, to enlarge the forest of that county many miles beyond the known bounds thereof, as they had been enjoyed near three hundred years, contrary to the law, and to the charter of the liberties of the forest, and other charters, and divers acts of parliament; and, for effecting the same, did unlawfully cause and procure undue returns to be made of jurors, and great numbers of other persons, who were unsworn, to be joined to them of the jury; and threatened and awed the said jurors to give a verdict for the king; and, by unlawful means, did sur