"2

respected as far as local circumstances and the necessities of war will admit." "Local circumstances and the necessities of war" may cover a multitude of sins, and it is not likely that a commander bent on bombarding the residential section of a town would find this expression of confidence a serious check on his actions, but it may well cause a commander who would otherwise be inclined to take action of this kind, to think twice before taking it.

The hope of the committee has not been realized in any international agreement, although the provision in the Naval Convention that when a naval force destroys military supplies or establishments in an undefended town it shall do as little damage as possible, leans in that direction. Nor has it been realized in international practice. Leaving out of consideration the cases where the injury to private homes has been unavoidable or accidental, the number of cases where the resident portions of besieged towns have been deliberately bombarded in recent wars is not inconsiderable. It seems to have been part of the deliberate policy of the Germans in the FrancoGerman War. When Strasburg surrendered, "448 private houses had been destroyed completely, nearly 3,000 (out of a total of 5,150) were more or less injured, 1,700 civilians had been killed or wounded, and 10,000 persons were made homeless. The total damage done to the city was estimated at nearly £8,000,000." 8

The practice is objected to on principle, on the ground that it is an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the other belligerents through the suffering and fears of noncombatants. G. F. de Martens is authority for the statement that during our Revolutionary War Great Britain laid down the following proposition as a recognized rule of war: "When, in war, one is not able to destroy the adverse party or to lead him to reason without reducing his country to distress, it is permitted to carry distress into his country." Whether any such rule was ever formally enunciated by Great

2 Parl. Papers, 1875, Misc. No. 1, p. 285. 3 Spaight, War Rights on Land, pp. 161 et seq.

Britain, there was much in her conduct of the war, as for instance the raids by Benedict Arnold, to give color to de Martens' statement.

General Sherman wrote to General Halleck in a similar strain from Savannah, December 24, 1864. He said: "I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular, we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies." And so, General Sheridan: "I do not hold war to mean simply that lines of men shall engage each other in battle, and material interests be ignored. This is but a duel, in which one combatant seeks the other's life; war means much more, and is far worse than this. Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see but little of the horrors attending such a duel, and even grow indifferent to them as the struggle goes on, contenting themselves with encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause to fill up the shattered ranks as death thins them. It is another matter, however, when deprivation and suffering are brought to their own doors. Then the case appears much graver, for the loss of property weighs heavy with the most of mankind, heavier often than the sacrifices made on the field of battle. Death is popularly considered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man has demonstrated in more than one great conflict." 6

Apparently neither General Sherman nor General Sheridan would see much that was objectionable on principle in the bombardment of the residential districts of besieged towns, but the greatness of their names must not blind us to the substantial progress that has been made in the conduct of warfare since they fought. The improved treatment of 4 Precis, Bk. VIII. chap. IV, § 280.

5 Rebellion Records, series IV, vol. I, pp. 1094 et seq.

6 Sheridan's Memoirs, vol. I, p. 486.

prisoners of war and of the sick and wounded since the Civil War refute the heresy that war cannot be refined. No such declaration as that attributed to Great Britain in the Revolutionary War would be tolerated in civilized warfare to-day, and it is not likely that either General Sherman or General Sheridan would have gone to the extremes that their words indicate. They were refuting a doctrine that would make war a duel between the military and naval forces of the two belligerents, and this was a great service.

The doctrine that they were combating has as its text the famous dictum of Rousseau, that war "is not a relation of man to man, but a relation of state to state, in which individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of the country, but as its defenders." This doctrine has been used, on the one hand, to stamp as illegal the spontaneous uprisings of the population in occupied territory, and, on the other, to condemn the capture of private property at sea. Each of these matters should be considered on its own merits. It is not axiomatic that no pressure should be brought to bear on the other belligerent save through his armed forces. If effective pressure can be brought to bear upon him through an attack on his commerce, there are strong reasons for allowing the attack to be made. "It takes no lives, sheds no blood, imperils no households; has its field on the ocean, which is a common highway; and deals only with persons and property voluntarily embarked in the chances of war, for the purpose of gain, and with the protection of insurance." The danger to commerce in war has also been one of the powerful preventives of war. To prejudge such a question by a catch phrase such as that of Rousseau would be mischievous.

8

Equally mischievous would it be to condemn spontaneous uprisings in oc

7 Du Contrat Social, L. I, chap. IV. 8 Dana's Wheaton, p. 401.

9 Spaight, p. 164.

cupied territory on any such a priori grounds. At the Brussels Conference the smaller powers bitterly resented the attempt of the great military powers to incorporate into the text of the Declaration language making such uprisings illegal. They felt that their very life was at stake. General Sherman and General Sheridan did a useful service, therefore, in combating a mischievous theory, and their words must be read in the light of that fact.

About as helpful a generalization as can be made to test the rightfulness of conduct in warfare is that comparatively useless injury is to be condemned. Not vengeance on the enemy, but advantage to one's self, is the end to be kept in view. And the advantage should be weighed in the balance with the injury that would accompany it. Tested by this principle, is the bombardment of residential sections of besieged towns justified? It may well be doubted. It is said that the inhabitants of Strasburg were in perfect accord with the commander, and that if in their opinion he erred at all it was in capitulating prematurely.9

Probably most of the injuries to private residences from bombardments in recent wars have been unavoidable or accidental, due to the fact that the town was practically a walled camp. The tendency to-day is to build fortifications at some distance from the place they are to protect. This is likely to lead to the elimination of the unavoidable and accidental injuries to private residences from bombardments, and to make apparent the intentional character of any such injuries in the future. This, it is believed, will be an effective cause in the practical elimination of the bombardment of residential districts. Though Italy's protest be in advance of the usage of the recent past, it is in line with modern progress, and will perhaps serve as a fresh instance of the progressive character of the law of war.

PacyBordwell

W

re

HEN revolution seized upon Mexico, Mr. Taft considered that the Monroe doctrine entailed upon this government unusual sponsibilities in respect to foreign subjects domiciled there. He took prompt and resolute measures to secure all the protection for foreign subjects in Mexico that he claimed for our own nationals. The Wilson administration is faithfully carrying out the same policy.

The administration is now confronted with a new question growing out of the irregular method whereby Huerta seized upon political power.

The administration is reluctant to recognize any government head in Mexico until this fact is determined by an election. Maximilian had learned from the diplomatic correspondence between this government and France that the United States would recognize any form of government which the people of Mexico would, by their own free choice, adopt.

Maximilian thereupon declined the Crown of Mexico. Thereupon an election was held in Mexico, and Maximilian was elected by "an immense majority" of the people of Mexico, and accepted. Later on it devolved on this government to decide that the election was fraudulent.

Any election of a President for Mexico will, doubtless, be carried by the same "immense majority;" the same enthusiastic outpouring of the people, that placed Maximilian on the throne of Mexico. An election, therefore, of a

President for Mexico will be an election by the machine guns of whatever faction may be in power at the time.

It occurs to me that the best solution of the question would be to recognize the Huerta government at once. This would simply be a recognition of existing conditions, and not a recognition of any legal or moral right to so administer the affairs of the government of Mexico.

Such recognition would cut but little, if any, figure with foreign governments, except as notice to the syndicate in France, which, it is said, is proposing to loan Mexico $100,000,000. Mexico had the question up as to the validity of a loan of $15,000,000 in the year 1859. Mexican bonds amounting to $15,000,000 were issued under the supervision of Miramon, who was at the time at the head of the government of Mexico, like Huerta is now.

The constitutional party of Mexico conceded that all the international obligations must be assumed by the successive governments of the state, yet it claimed that the administration of Miramon was in no sense a government, but that it was only an unsuccessful revolution, and that therefore the obligations created by it were not binding upon the Republic of Mexico.

If Huerta's revolution should be unsuccessful the same defenses could be made against the validity of any bond issues during Huerta's self-constituted rule of the Republic of Mexico, that were so successfully made against the $15,000,000 Mexican bond issue while General Miramon was the temporary head of the Republic of Mexico.

There was, however, a defense of fraud in the sale of the Miramon bonds.

In case the proceeds of the $100,000,000 Huerta loan are used in the liquidation of the just obligations of Mexico, in whole or part, which were incurred prior to the seizure by Huerta of the reins of government, the Mexican government will be bound for their payment to this extent, whether Huerta makes good his title as a de facto ruler or not. The states of Sonora and Coahuila are carrying on war against the Republic of Mexico. The state of Sonora now controls the entire territory of the state except the port of Guyamas on the gulf of California. The state of Sonora controls all the railroad lines within the state. These railroad lines connect with our systems of railroads in the state of Arizona at Douglass, Naco, and Nogales. Such protection to life, liberty, and property

system connects with ours at Eagle Pass, and our railroads touch her borders at other points. It is due to ourselves as well as to these two states that "belligerent rights" be granted them.

One of our largest transcontinental railroad systems, the Frisco system, has recently gone into the hands of a receiv

as our nationals are obtaining are accorded to them by the state of Sonora. Under the rules of international law, the state of Sonora is entitled to have this government recognize her "belligerent rights." The state of Coahuila stands in very much the same relation to us as the state of Sonora. She has control of nearly all her territory. Her railroad

er, partly in consequence of the embarrassments

of

rassments would be largely, if not entirely, removed by a recognition of belligerent rights. Our government could very well take the initiative

in respect to the grant of belligerent rights to Sonora and Coahuila and any other states that may hereafter show themselves entitled to such recognition.

The recognition of belligerent rights must not

be confounded with the subject of the recognition of the independence of these states of the government of Mexico. This recognition of independence is a very different proposition, and one that is not here under consideration.

J. B. Edgington.

T

HUS wrote the poet Tennyson in 1842, and the Twentieth Century may witness a realiza

tion of his dream. Authorities differ as to the number of aeroplanes and other aircraft now owned by the various governments. It is stated that France has 174 aeroplanes, Russia 150, Great Britain 86, Germany 50, United States 16; and that of dirigible balloons Germany has 30, France 15, Russia 9, and the United States 1; also that by 1915, France will have in the military service 900 aeroplanes and 1,500 trained pilots.

The number of aircraft now owned by any government is, however, comparatively unimportant, because the day of 1 American Year Book, 1912.

"aerial navies" has only dawned, and the number of aircraft available to-day is insignificant compared with the "fleets" which will, no doubt, sail the skies within the next few years. But if war were declared to-day, it is evident that Germany, with her enormous Zeppelins, would hold the supremacy of the air, and that the United States would fall behind the other great powers in equipment for aerial warfare.

But while Germany, with her great aerial battleships, appears to be in the lead, France stands well in the forefront of military aviation. Her activity is evidenced by the steady increase in the French aeronautical budget for the past four years, which is as follows: 1910, $48,000; 1911, $400,000; 1912, $1,024,000; 1913, $7,593,000. In September, 1912, occurred in France the first review of an aeroplane armada, 72 army aero