To what extent this claim was acquiesced in by the Church of England, we need not stop to consider. Sufficient to say that the Statute of 24th Henry VIII. completely negatived that claim so far as the Church of England was concerned; a statute, wherein the law of right and truth in this matter was most cogently and tersely expressed: "Causes spiritual must be judged by judges of the spirituality, and causes temporal by temporal judges."

This great principle of the exclusive rule of the Church in matters ecclesiastical, and of the state in matters civil, is nowhere more universally admitted than in these United States.

The substantial import of the Constitutions of nearly every state in the Union is, in effect, not only a declaration against any established church or state religion, but it is also impossible to find therein the slightest imputation that the civil courts are to be charged with any supervision of ecclesiastical administration, in order to secure the liberty of conscience vouchsafed by these constitutional declarations. In addition to this, no principle seems better established in the jurisprudence of this country than that no civil court can undertake to revise revise the proceedings of ecclesiastical tribunals upon the merits of the case decided by those tribunals, and sit as a court of error and appeal upon the proceedings. There are only two cases (Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511; and Watson v. Avery, 2 Bush, 332) which give the slightest countenance to any such doctrine, and both of them have been severely criticized by the courts of the several states and by the Supreme Court of the United States. The questions in the Watson v. Avery Case came before the United States Supreme Court, and the decision of the Kentucky court was overruled by that court so far as it could overrule a state court.

It has been declared over and over again in different states, that the decisions of ecclesiastical courts within the range of their jurisdiction, and while passing bona fide upon matters of strictly ecclesiastical cognizance, are as conclusive upon the civil courts as the judg

ments of any other tribunal, domestic or foreign. This is the rule declared in one of the most careful and well-considered judgments on the subject by the court of appeals of South Carolina in the early case of Harmon v. Dreher, Speers Eq. 87. The case turned upon certain rights in the use of church property claimed by the minister thereof, who had been expelled from the ministry of the Lutheran Church by the synod of that church. "He stands," says the court, "convicted of the offenses alleged against him, by the sentence of the spiritual body of which he is a voluntary member, and whose proceedings he had bound himself to abide by. It belongs not to the civil power to enter into or review the proceedings of a spiritual court. The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority. The judgments, therefore, of the religious associations, bearing on their own members, are not examinable here. a civil right depends upon an ecclesiastical matters, it is the civil court, and not the ecclesiastical, which is to decide. But the civil tribunal tries the civil right, and no more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right arises as it finds them."

. . When

One of the conclusions of law laid down by the court of appeals of Texas in Peace v. First Christian Church, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 85, 48 S. W. 534, is that "the courts of this country have no power to determine for religious bodies. ecclesiastical or doctrinal questions, and they have never evinced a disposition to invade that domain, and will only inquire into such questions when property rights become involved and are the subject of litigation, and then only so far as to determine those rights."

In Baxter v. McDonnell, 155 N. Y. 83, 49 N. E. 667, 40 L.R.A. 670, the New York court of appeals decided, in the case of a priest of the Roman Catholic Church praying the courts to examine and pass upon questions growing out of his relations to the church and the bishop, that "in such a case, when it ap

pears that the whole controversy had once been submitted by the parties to the ecclesiastical tribunal which the church itself has organized for that purpose, the civil courts are justified in refusing to proceed any further. The decision of the church judicatory may and should then be treated as a bar to the action and a good defense in law."

In the very important case of Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509, 11 Am. Rep. 95, wherein it was sought to enjoin a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church and an ecclesiastical court from proceeding

with the trial of an accused clergyman, the supreme court declared: "We have no right, and therefore will not exercise the power to dictate ecclesiastical law. . . . Freedom of religious profession and worship cannot be maintained if the civil courts trench upon the domain of the Church, construe its canons and rules, dictate its discipline, and regulate its trials. The larger portion of the Christian world has always recognized the truth of the declaration, 'A church without discipline must become, if not already, a church without religion'

ceded that when jurisdiction attaches, the judgment of the church court is conclusive as to merely ecclesiastical offenses. It should be equally conclusive upon the doubtful and technical questions involving a criticism of the canons, even though they might comprise jurisdictional facts."

The United States Supreme Court in the case of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L. ed. 666, was called upon to decide a controversy between the "Old School" and the "New School" of the Presbyterian Church regarding the possession of certain church property. The issue was joined in the circuit court for the district of Kentucky, and that court decided that "this court and all other civil tribunals were concluded by the action of the general assembly of the said Presbyterian Church in the United States of America." On appeal from that decision the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below, and after a most exhaustive review of the various decisions on cognate questions in the several state courts, declared: "We cannot better close this review of the authorities than in the language of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, in the case of the German Reformed Church v. Com. 3 Pa. St. 291: 'The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other judicial tribunal, are final, as they are the best judges of what constitutes an offense against the Word of God and the discipline of the church. Any other than those courts must be incompetent judges of matters of faith, discipline, and doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise as to attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which come within their jurisdiction, would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt which would do anything but. improve either religion or good morals.'

The conclusion deducible from the authorities above cited, one of which is supported by a preponderating weight

of judicial authority in this country, is that whenever the question of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom. or law has been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the civil tribunals must accept such decision as final. and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.

The wisdom and justice of this controlling principle, so universally recognized by the courts is self-evident. Unless ecclesiastical courts and ecclesiastical assemblies can be allowed to decide their own controversies in their own way, when fairly within the range of spiritual jurisdiction, they will be far more helpless than any mere voluntary association, more so than even an arbiter appointed by the parties to the controversy.

But while full effect is given by the civil courts to the decision of an ecclesiastical tribunal, certain fundamental rules of law must have been observed. Before such decision becomes obligatory it must be shown that the ecclesiastical court had jurisdiction in the matter, that the proceedings were regular, and that the defendant had an opportunity to be heard.

The ecclesiastical court possesses none of the prerogatives of a civil court. When its decrees or records are introduced as evidence, they must be proved by testimony. The question of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court is ⚫ always open. Such a court must be considered as one of special and limited jurisdiction, and therefore it must be shown that the court was properly constituted under the laws of that particular church, that it had jurisdiction both of the subject-matter and of the parties. and that the trial was bona fide, and substantially in conformity with the can

ons.

To this effect is the decision of the court in Jennings v. Scarborough, 56. N. J. L. 401, 28 Atl. 559. A dissolution of the pastoral relation having been sought, proceedings to effect the same were begun under a certain section of the canon of the diocese having reference thereto. Before these proceedings were consummated, the mode of procedure

was changed to another section of the same canon. The court held that there was a distinction of great importance between the two methods of procedure, and that the defendant in the case had not been accorded a hearing as provided by the canon. "As already appears, the course of procedure for dissolving the pastoral relation of the rector with his parish is, by the canons of the Episcopal Church, specially prescribed. An order dissolving that relation, not made in conformity with the canons, is coram non judice. With respect to the judgment that shall be pronounced by the bishop, with the concurrence of the committee, after a hearing, the authority of the bishop is discretionary and supreme. The prosecutor is an ordained minister of the church, is subject to the laws of the church and to its constituted authorities, but at the same time he is entitled to a hearing in compliance with the laws of the church before judgment is pronounced. The proceedings on which the order in question was made are not in compliance with the canons of the church, and for this reason the order should be set aside."

The court also held that while the Rev. Mr. Jennings was not entitled to be represented by counsel, "he was entitled as of right to a hearing before the committee pursuant to the canon, especially as the result of the deliberations of that tribunal might deprive him of property rights which, under the general canons of the church, inured to him in virtue of his rectorship." The court further held that, "where the civil rights of an individual are involved, jurisdiction is committed to the courts of law to protect those rights, which the court cannot discard."

Whether the right of a clergyman to officiate in a parish to which he has been called, but without the consent of the bishop of the diocese in which such parish is situated, is such a civil right as to give him a standing in the civil courts; also the queston, whether a clergyman of the Episcopal Church could officiate as rector of a parish against the prohibition of the bishop of the diocese in which such parish was located,-came before the supreme court of the state

of New York in the case of St. James Church v. Huntington, 82 Hun, 125, 31 N. Y. Supp. 91. N. Y. Supp. 91. Both questions were decided in the negative. The court holding that the bishop had a right under the canons to issue an order of inhibition against a clergyman called as rector without his consent.

In Stack v. O'Hara, 98 Pa. 213, the court held that "the profession of a priest or minister of any denomination is held subject to its laws; these he agrees to obey; if he violates the laws of his church, or disobeys the lawful commands made in accord with his compact, the civil courts will not maintain his footing in the church. It would be a grievous wrong to the church to rule that its priests and ministers are exempt from its proper discipline because of their profession. They have no property in such profession that is shielded from the consequences of their broken vows and compacts. They neither acquire nor hold it as they do lands or chattels."

This case was cited with approval by the court in Tuigg v. Sheehan, 101 Pa. 363, 47 Am. Rep. 727. To the same effect is Rose v. Vertin, 46 Mich. 457, 41 Am. Rep. 174, 9 N. W. 491; Baxter v. McDonnell, 155 N. Y. 83, 40 L.R.A. 670, 49 N. E. 667; Walker v. Wainwright, 16 Barb. 486.

The question of church membership being entirely an ecclesiastical matter, the civil courts will not as a general rule interfere with or pass upon the act of the Church or its officers in excommunicating a person from membership. But they may inquire as to the legality of the act of excommunication. The opinion. of the Supreme Court of the United States on this point is well stated in Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131, 21 L. ed. 69. "It may be conceded that we have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from membership. We have only to do with rights of property. We must take the fact of excommunication as conclusive proof that the persons exscinded are not members. But we may inquire whether the resolution of expulsion was the act of the church, or of persons who were not of the church, and who, consequently, had no right to ex

communicate others. In a congregational church, the majority, if they adhere to the organization and to its doctrines, represent the church. An expulsion of a majority by a minority is a void act." To the same effect, Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253; Ferraria v. Vasconcelles, 23 Ill. 456.

The several authorities herein cited conclusively prove that it must be the unlawful infringement, of some personal right, of pecuniary value, and of a character redressible in the civil courts, in order to justify their interference in matters which are distinctly of ecclesiasti

cal cognizance. Unless this can be clearly shown, the decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals will be recognized by the civil courts as of controlling power, and be undisturbed by them. More than this the civil tribunals ought not to require. If they do, and sanction the investigation of every point involved, they will shake the foundation of government in every church, and do dishonor to religion.

Edwins. A. White