Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge |
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Page 9
... forced to admit is that he sees a portion of the world selected by the position of his body and the focalization of his eyes and somehow brought to a focus by the brain . However , this is not what the plain man believes that he ...
... forced to admit is that he sees a portion of the world selected by the position of his body and the focalization of his eyes and somehow brought to a focus by the brain . However , this is not what the plain man believes that he ...
Page 13
... forced to refuse to identify thing and percept . In our account of concomitant variation we have thus far paid attention mainly to spatial and qualitative differences be- tween the thing and its appearance ; but temporal variations are ...
... forced to refuse to identify thing and percept . In our account of concomitant variation we have thus far paid attention mainly to spatial and qualitative differences be- tween the thing and its appearance ; but temporal variations are ...
Page 14
... forced to testify against its own possibility and to furnish the basis for an explanation of that which occurs . The result is the suggestion of a compromise : things are there where we judge them to be , but we do not perceive them ...
... forced to testify against its own possibility and to furnish the basis for an explanation of that which occurs . The result is the suggestion of a compromise : things are there where we judge them to be , but we do not perceive them ...
Page 15
... forced to make the percept a function not only of physical conditions , but also of what , in contrast , are usually termed mental conditions . Accidental associations , even , enter as determinants . When these personal elements in ...
... forced to make the percept a function not only of physical conditions , but also of what , in contrast , are usually termed mental conditions . Accidental associations , even , enter as determinants . When these personal elements in ...
Page 17
... does not itself prove that they are of one fundamental kind ; rather , it suggests what other difficulties have forced us to assume . But togetherness is not ; compromise does not seem to have w apply psycholo NATURAL REALISM 17.
... does not itself prove that they are of one fundamental kind ; rather , it suggests what other difficulties have forced us to assume . But togetherness is not ; compromise does not seem to have w apply psycholo NATURAL REALISM 17.
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Common terms and phrases
activity Agnosticism analysis appearance argument assert assumption basis belief Berkeley body brain called causal chapter character characteristic cognitive relation common sense concepts conclusion connected consciousness considered construction contrast correspondence critical realism developed distinction dominant dualism elements empirical epistemological evident examine existence existential experienced external fact feelings field of experience function Hence idea idea-object idealism idealist images independent individual individual's experience inner sphere interpretation introspection intuition involves judgment knowl logic means mediate mental pluralism mind mind-body mind-body problem motives Natural Realism non-mental object known object of thought organism outlook panpsychism panpsychist perceived perception philosophy physical things physical world position present principle problem processes psychical psychology qualities question reality realize reason reference reflection regard result rience scientific realism scientist seems sensations social solipsism spatial subject-self subjective idealism supposed temporal term theory of knowledge thing-experiences thinkers tion truth unity view of knowledge
Popular passages
Page 210 - In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account.
Page 181 - But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure.
Page 222 - We can trace the development of a nervous system, and correlate with it the parallel phenomena of sensation and thought. We see with undoubting certainty that they go hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum the moment we seek to comprehend the connection between them.
Page 162 - Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.
Page 3 - ... existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any...
Page 27 - For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.
Page 163 - We are ignorant. it is true. of the manner in which bodies operate on each other. Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible. But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind.
Page 122 - The pointing of our thought to the tigers is known simply and solely as a procession of mental associates and motor consequences that follow on the thought, and that would lead harmoniously, if followed out, into some ideal or real context, or even into the immediate presence, of the tigers.
Page 258 - It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known by description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to make the judgment which Bismarck alone can make, namely, the judgment of which he himself is a constituent.
Page 63 - When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any. this will serve to confirm our suspicion.