Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge |
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Page 6
... construction took . He did not distinguish clearly enough between perception and knowledge and was , therefore , led to regard his critique of Natural Realism and of the Lockian notion of substance as completely covering all forms of ...
... construction took . He did not distinguish clearly enough between perception and knowledge and was , therefore , led to regard his critique of Natural Realism and of the Lockian notion of substance as completely covering all forms of ...
Page 40
... constructions . Truth is a slowly achieved product attained by conquering error and correcting inadequacies . Furthermore , science has realized that all error is relative and is often of great assistance in the progressive creation of ...
... constructions . Truth is a slowly achieved product attained by conquering error and correcting inadequacies . Furthermore , science has realized that all error is relative and is often of great assistance in the progressive creation of ...
Page 46
... as a basis , he seeks to show that the constructions built up by science , the generalized or universal Experience with which it is immediately concerned has grown out of , · depends upon , and is really but an extension 46 CRITICAL ...
... as a basis , he seeks to show that the constructions built up by science , the generalized or universal Experience with which it is immediately concerned has grown out of , · depends upon , and is really but an extension 46 CRITICAL ...
Page 47
... construction in which conceptual elements dominate , but the possessor of this construct is still the concrete individual . There can be no other subject of experience except such an individual . With this last assertion we shall agree ...
... construction in which conceptual elements dominate , but the possessor of this construct is still the concrete individual . There can be no other subject of experience except such an individual . With this last assertion we shall agree ...
Page 55
... constructions which have a history , and this history makes their abstraction from individual minds factually impossible.1 ... construction whose genetic elements can be partially traced . Finally , let us call to mind that percepts are ...
... constructions which have a history , and this history makes their abstraction from individual minds factually impossible.1 ... construction whose genetic elements can be partially traced . Finally , let us call to mind that percepts are ...
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Common terms and phrases
activity Agnosticism analysis appearance argument assert assumption basis belief Berkeley body brain called causal chapter character characteristic coexistential cognitive relation common sense concepts connected consciousness considered construction contrast correspondence critical realism denotation developed distinction dominant dualism elements empirical epistemological evident examine existence existential experienced external fact feeling field of experience function Hence idea idea-object idealism idealist images independent individual individual's experience inner sphere interpretation introspection intuition involves judgment knowl logic means mediate mental pluralism mind mind-body mind-body problem motives Natural Realism non-mental object known object of thought organism outlook panpsychism panpsychist perceived perception philosophy physical things physical world position present principle problem processes psychical psychology qualities question reality realize reason reference reflection regard result rience scientific realism scientist seems sensations social solipsism spatial subject-self subjective idealism supposed temporal term theory of knowledge thing-experiences thinkers tion truth unity view of knowledge
Popular passages
Page 214 - In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account.
Page 185 - But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure.
Page 226 - We can trace the development of a nervous system, and correlate with it the parallel phenomena of sensation and thought. We see with undoubting certainty that they go hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum the moment we seek to comprehend the connection between them.
Page 166 - Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.
Page 5 - ... existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any...
Page 31 - For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.
Page 167 - We are ignorant. it is true. of the manner in which bodies operate on each other. Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible. But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind.
Page 126 - The pointing of our thought to the tigers is known simply and solely as a procession of mental associates and motor consequences that follow on the thought, and that would lead harmoniously, if followed out, into some ideal or real context, or even into the immediate presence, of the tigers.
Page 262 - It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known by description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to make the judgment which Bismarck alone can make, namely, the judgment of which he himself is a constituent.
Page 67 - When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any. this will serve to confirm our suspicion.