comparison with Aristotle's position too li of "form" is no longer tenable.

This solution of the mind-body probl physical vistas which I would gladly ex postpone this exploration until another tim at present in giving a firm foundation to was in pursuance of this task that we fou to justify the implications of the Advan The conclusion at which we have arrived the problems which confronted empirical Minds are distinct, while reality as a wh

CHAPTER X

TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE

MANY thinkers have discussed the nature of truth without

a prior examination of the meaning of knowledge; and this procedure has led to controversies more or less barren of results. We must ask ourselves whether the question of truth does not so revolve around that of knowledge that it is impossible to tell what truth means and is unless it be first known what knowledge is. This closeness of connection between the two terms is indicated by the fact that the expression "true knowledge" is felt to be a tautology. It is like speaking of a round circle. Why is this?

This problem of the connection of truth and knowledge can be approached in two ways, the analytic and the genetic, and these should lead to the same general conclusion. When I assert that it is nonsense to speak of a round circle, I do so because the adjective might suggest that there are circles which are not round. I know that the definition of a circle includes roundness. Is the case the same with true knowledge? Yes and no. It certainly does seem to outrage our sense of propriety to speak of true knowledge as though knowledge could be other than true and still be knowledge. Truth would seem to be the criterion of knowledge so that no information could be knowledge unless it were true. Trueness would be a stamp, or seal, placed by judgment upon ideas, theories, propositions, data, etc., without which they would be held in doubt or considered not to be knowledge at all. In the same way, we might consider roundness a sign of a circle so that no figure that did not possess this characteristic would be adjudged a circle. Trueness and knowledge, roundness and a circle would thus be inseparables. We would be able to state that whatever is a case of knowledge is true, and whatever is true is a case of knowledge. And this relationship we shall find to be very suggestive. But, in a very real sense, we can say that' knowledge is not always true. Were knowledge always true,

reception of ideas which present themselv more inquisitorial and tentative. Ideas again, they may be false. We may conclu sis that the claim to knowledge and, accor of knowledge logically precedes that of tru falsity.

The genetic approach will likewise confi that truth is a reflective meaning. It has out that a child believes everything it is there is no contradiction, or so long as realize that there is a contradiction, it ac knowledge. Man's primary attitude is The predominance of an idea carries bel first predominance is the rule. Only after ment is a more hesitant attitude towa Philosophers and psychologists of diverse upon this fact; and since it is one of the fev they have agreed, let us note it joyfully term "belief" has a more personal flavo edge. Reflection has already entered in to necessary validity of what we believe. L time being the contrast-meanings which ha the word, I think we have a right to say the experience of knowing. Knowing acceptance is more primitive than that

belief. It follows, then, that knowledge as a meaning and experience precedes doubt and the hesitation and uncertainty which accompany it. But it is only after disbelief has succeeded belief that what was looked upon as knowledge is qualified as not-knowledge. When this exigency arises, the distinction between true and false beliefs is developed. Belief differentiates out from the knowledge-attitude and takes to itself the contrast with doubt and disbelief. What is believed

rightly is a true belief, and a true belief gives us knowledge. Thus the previous analysis applies. It follows that the 7 analytic and the genetic ways of approach confirm each other and assure us that knowledge as an experience precedes truth as an experience. Hence, we must examine the knowledgeexperience as closely as we can in order to prepare the way for an understanding of what is meant by truth.

Vague as the term "knowledge" is, it is apparent that it implies an apprehension of some sort and that truth and its opposite refer to what is apprehended and thus presuppose the apprehension. Before we can go a step further, we must come to a decision in regard to the meanings of the word "knowledge." The critical investigations we have already made in the preceding chapters should stand us in good stead.1

The nature of knowledge can be understood only after an adequate standpoint has been reached; that is why we have been forced to postpone discussion of it until now. He is mistaken who thinks he can understand the various meanings of knowledge by a hasty inspection of the cognitive attitude alone. We have already realized that this supposition was the primary mistake made by the new school of realists. The position adopted in common by Stout (Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, 1910-11, p. 188) and Russell (ibid., p. 119), that ideas do not intervene between reality and the subject knowing, is due to this hasty inspection-view of knowledge. The result is a confusion between the necessary distinctions of logic, of common sense, and of epistemology. To understand the nature of knowledge, we shall be obliged to see what it

1 While not a pragmatist, I heartily agree with the protest voiced by James against the usual assumption that the meaning of knowledge is clear in the current philosophies. Were it clear, I feel certain that idealists would no longer feel that they are justified in denying the right of the mental to know the non-mental.

individual by means of the presence of knowledge gained in this way may be large it is felt to involve immediate contact wit It is, moreover, less general than knowledg although it contains conceptual elements. on the other hand, is indirect knowledge. conceptual and has its source in inference or A detective may possess knowledge about the founded on the traces left behind. He ma criminal is a strong man or a man of co Again, he may be told by a witness that the so and is engaged in a certain business i evident that knowledge-of-acquaintance is, edge due to acquaintance, and knowledge-a due to inference and communication. W language possesses only the word "know" two kinds of knowledge, many other lang words. Thus knowledge-of-acquaintance in knowledge-about is scire. In French, there sponding words, connaitre and savoir; in Ge wissen. This distinction was emphasized since his time, has become one of the recog knowledge. The greater part of the know possessed by any individual is knowledge-al upon books and conversation and interpre