terms moral and character in their accepted, historical connotation, it will be impossible to take that position. A reasonable familiarity with the writings of Kant and Herbart will also show that their ideas of the moral aim in education involved as much of the idea of service to the social compact as did the specifically stated social aim of Schleiermacher, who has perhaps given that aim its most philosophical statement, or as does the same aim of our modern champions of social efficiency.* fact, the terms: morals, morality, moral conduct, moral character, can not be construed by any manner of cavil or any effort of specious subtility, not to include, and necessarily to include, social service.

In

We should have still more reason for raising the question as to whether the moral aim would necessarily provide for the desirable factor of efficiency. It could perhaps be argued that the concept morality does not include the idea of efficiency, but even that is doubtful. For the inefficient person who, through fault of his own, is a burden on society can hardly be conceived of as a person of true morals. In spite of that, however, it would ordinarily be more convenient to make the more or less arbitrary separation of the ideals of efficiency and morality, especially in view of the fact, that although efficiency may be secured without morality, yet morality can not be secured without also securing efficiency. Efficiency through education would.

* Davidson, Dewey, Bagley in our own country, and Natorp and Bergemann in Germany, the classic land of educational philosophy,

demand a broad, general training for all, in so far as
the duties and responsibilities of all are alike. On top
of that there would need to be a special training,
fitting each individual for his specific duties and
responsibilities.

Working statement of the aim of education.-An-
other ideal of education that does not seem, on first
analysis, to be provided for in the moral statement of
the aim is that desirable development of the different
sides of man's nature which is necessary to enable him
to enjoy the fulness of life and which will also make
him a more agreeable and enjoyable person to meet in
our daily intercourse with others. For all these rea-
sons it might be well to state the aim of education to be
(the development of a well-rounded, efficient, moral char-

acter.)
acter. The purpose of our own investigation is a con-
sideration of the ways and means of realizing the moral
aspect of the complete aim. Hence, the practical phase,
that of efficiency, and the cultural, that of an all round
and symmetrical development, will be ignored except-
ing in so far as they are inextricably woven into the
texture of the moral life.

If throughout the formative years of the child's life
it be our effort to secure for the child a development,
through which he himself will be led to the choice and
pursuit of a worthy work in life, we may rest assured
that this will be the best that education can do for
society through each individual. Neither need we be
troubled lest the individual might not then receive a

aim

66

proper adjustment to his environment, and through that secure that happiness toward which he is urged by his inmost nature and which to the mind of Seneca comes from a good conscience, from noble resolves, from righteous actions, from the contempt for all that is fortuitous, from the calm and steady course of a life ever pursuing one and the same road.” On the other hand, the aim to secure adjustment to environment will be only too apt to lead him into the moral quagmire of an unthinking compliance and obsequious conformity to immediate surroundings; and the direct seeking after happiness too apt to result in a vain chase after an ever-receding fata morgana, or the disastrous pursuit of an elusive will-o'-the-wisp, betraying him unwittingly into the slough of disappointed pessimism, if not the morass of dissolute dissipation and moral stagnation.

CHAPTER II

THE SOURCES OF CONDUCT: INTRODUCTORY

Perhaps for this very

It is perhaps needless to say that to-day there is no problem of greater immediate interest to educators than that of moral education. It is the problem that is receiving pre-eminent attention not only in America, but throughout the civilized world. reason, however, we ought to be on our guard, lest we arrive at the conclusion that it is a new problem, or again, that as a result of this widespread agitation some short-cut method of its solution may be found. Similarly, we would do well to disillusionize ourselves, from the start, of the view that by means of any system of "scientific child study" and "experimental didactics,' of educational statistics and tabulation, we may suddenly discover some patent solution of the problem with which the giant intellects of the centuries have wrestled with indifferent success. Highly valuable as such experimental efforts are, it is best to leave them to the specialists who are qualified to pursue them and profit by them, and for the rest of us to act upon such educational theory as has stood the test of time.

Conduct traced to regard in various forms.-At the outset let us remember that we are not so much con

29

cerned with the problem of moral instruction as we are with the larger problem of moral education, which includes the factor of moral training in addition to that of moral instruction. What we must aim at in education is not merely knowledge or sentiment, but conduct. It is readily seen, therefore, that the problem of moral education is essentially a problem of the education of the will, for conduct is voluntary action toward appropriate ends, whether it involves actual bodily movement or whether it be merely mental action in the form of inhibition, or refusal to perform a given physical action. When we attempt to trace voluntary action to its immediate source, we easily enough decide on desire, or conation. But what lies back of that? A careful analysis will show us that we never experience desire with reference to any object, either person or thing, unless it appeals to what we can legitimately call our "sense of values"; unless we have either a liking or a dislike for the object. "Interest" in the object, "regard" for the object, love of the object are phrases that mean practically the same thing and that show what we have in mind here. The whole problem of moral education, then, reduces itself to this: to create in the child proper likes and dislikes, or, as Aristotle put it, to get him to "love the good and hate the bad." Our whole conduct can, in fact, be traced back to certain groups of motives: regard for self, regard for others, regard for knowledge and truth, regard for the beautiful, regard for right and duty, and lastly, religious