moral obligation to lie, and steal, and murder, and to avoid every exercise and expression of real benevo< lence. But if God cannot destroy the essential difference between virtue and vice, either by an act of his power, or, by an act of his authority, then it is absolutely certain, that this difference depends not on his will, but on the nature of things, and must remain as long as moral beings exist.

I might now proceed to improve the subject, were it not proper to take notice of one or two objections, which may be made against what has been said.

Object. 1. To suppose the difference between virtue and vice results from the nature of things, is derogatory and injurious to the character of God. For, on this supposition, there is a standard of right and wrong superior to the will of the Deity, to which he is abso lutely bound to submit.

To say, that the difference between right and wrong does not depend upon the will of God, but upon the nature of things, is no more injurious to his character, than to say, that it does not depend upon his will whether two and two shall be equal to four; whether a circle and square shall be different figures; whether the whole shall be greater than a part; or whether a thing shall exist and not exist at the same time. These things do not depend upon the will of God, because they cannot depend upon his will. So the difference between virtue and vice does not depend upon the will of God, because his will cannot make nór destroy this immutable difference. And it is more to the honor of God, to suppose, that he cannot, than that he can, perform impossibilities. But if the eternal rule of right must necessarily result from the nature of things, then it is no reproach to the Deity to suppose, that he is morally obliged to conform to it. To set God above

the law of rectitude, is not to exalt, but to debase his character. It is the glory of any moral agent to conform to moral obligation. The supreme excellency of the Deity consists, not in always doing what he pleases, but in always pleasing to do what is fit and proper in the nature of things.

Object. 2. There is no other difference between virtue and vice, than what arises from custom, education, or caprice. Different nations judge differently upon moral subjects. What one nation esteems a vice, another nation esteems a virtue. We esteem stealing a moral evil; but the Spartans taught their children to steal, and approved and rewarded them for it.

We esteem murder a great and heinous crime; but the Chinese put their aged and useless parents to death, and destroy their weak, sickly, or deformed children, without the least remorse. Such contrariety in the opinions and practices of different nations, refutes the notion of an immutable standard of right and wrong in the nature of things.

This objection is more specious than solid. For, in the first place, it is certain, that all nations do feel and acknowledge the essential distinction between virtue and vice. They all have words to express this distinction between right and wrong. And since words are framed for use, we may presume, that no nation would frame words to express ideas or feelings, which never entered their minds. Besides, all nations have some penal laws, which are made to punish those who are guilty of criminal actions. It is, therefore, impossible to account for some words, and some laws, which are to be found among all nations, without supposing, that they feel and regard the essential distinction between virtuous and vicious conduct.

This leads me to observe, in the second place, that no nation ever did deny the distinction between virtue and vice. Though the Spartans allowed their children to take things from others without their knowledge and consent; yet they did not mean to allow them to steal, in order to increase their wealth, and gratify a sordid avaricious spirit. They meant to distinguish between taking and stealing. The former they considered as a mere art, which was suited to teach their children skill and dexterity in their lawful pursuits; but the latter they detested and punished as an infamous crime. So when the Chinese expose their useless children, or their useless parents, they mean to do it as an act of kindness both to their friends and to the public. For in all other cases they abhor murder, or the killing of men from malice prepense, as much as any other nation in the world. There is nothing, therefore, in the practice of the Spartans, nor in the practice of the Chinese, which leads us to suppose, that any nation ever denied the essential distinction between virtue and vice. But though the heathens have never denied this distinction, yet their practice has often shown, that they have mistaken vice for virtue. The Spartans did in indulging their children in the practice of taking things from others without their knowledge and consent. And the Chinese are guilty of the same mistake, in their conduct towards their superannuated parents, and unpromising children. But these, and all other mistakes of the same nature, are to be ascribed to the corruption of the human heart, which blinds and stupifies the conscience, and prevents it from doing its proper office; which is to discover the nature of moral actions, and distinguish right from wrong, good from evil, in practice. Were it not for the blind. ness of the heart, all men would perceive the eternal

rule of right, and, under the same circumstances, would form precisely the same judgment with respect to their duty. And corrupt as the world now is, mankind generally agree as well in their moral sentiments, as in their political, philosophical or metaphysical opinions. So that the general sentiments and practices of mankind concur with the reasons which we have offered, to prove the essential distinction between virtue and vice, in the nature of things.

It now remains to make a number of deductions from the important truth, which we have explained and established.

1. If there be an immutable difference between vir. tue and vice, right and wrong; then there is a propriety in every man's judging for himself in matters of morality and religion. No man ought to rely upon the bare opinion of others, when he is capable of judging for himself, according to an infallible standard. Right and wrong, truth and falsehood, do not depend upon the opinions of men, but the nature of things. Every person ought, therefore, to examine every moral and religious subject for himself, and form his own judgment, without any regard to the authority or opinion of others. As God has given men their eyes to distinguish colors, and their ears to distinguish sounds; so he has given them their reason and conscience, to distinguish truth and falsehood, right and wrong. And, so long as they enjoy these natural and moral powers, they are under moral obligation, to use them for the purposes, for which they were given. The man who has eyes is obliged to see. The man who has ears is obliged to hear. And the man who has reason and conscience is obliged to examine and judge for himself, in matters of morality and religion. It is no less the duty than the right of every man, to deter

mine for himself, what is true and false in theory, and what is right and wrong in practice. As others have no right to impose their opinions upon him; so he has no right to receive their opinions upon trust. It is his indispensable duty to embrace, or reject all moral and religious sentiments, according to his own private judgment. It may be proper and necessary, in a thousand cases, to collect evidence from others; but after we have received all the information, which they are able 'to give us, on any subject, it then lies upon us, to form our own opinions, according to evidence, without any regard to the authority, or opinion of fallible creatures. There is a true and false in principle, and a right and wrong in practice, which we are obliged to discover, and according to which we are obliged to believe and act.

ments.

2. If there be a standard of right and wrong, in the nature of things; then it is not impossible to arrive at absolute certainty, in our moral and religious sentiIt is the opinion of many, that we can never attain to certainty in any thing, but what we are capable of demonstrating by figures, or immediately perceiving by our external senses. But there is no foundation for this supposition, if right and wrong, truth and falsehood, result from the nature of things. Many suppose, that moral and mathematical subjects are totally different in respect to certainty. They imagine, that we may attain to certainty in mathematics, but not in morals. But if moral truths as much result from the nature of things as mathematical, then no reason can be assigned, why we may not arrive at certainty in morals as well as in mathematics. For we are as capable of discerning what is right and wrong, as what is true and false, in the nature of things. The author of nature has given us the faculty of reason, to discover mathematical truths, and the face