1860. WAKELIN บ. MORRIS. Shee, Serjt., then elicited that the costs would probably exceed 100Z. It was also elicited that the slander was spoken in the course of an angry altercation at a public-house, and in a verdict against the direction of the Judge-that they should find for the plaintiff in a case fit for substantial damages-and indulged themselves in doing that indirectly which they could not do directly; i. e., deprive the plaintiff of his costs; Levi v. Milne, 4 Bingh. 201. But it was not intimated that the Judge had done wrong in telling the jury the law as to costs. And if the case had not been one for substantial damages, and the jury had found for the plaintiff, even for a farthing instead of a shilling, so as not to carry costs, there seems no reason to say that they would have been wrong; for the damages in libel are not capable of measurement, (where there is no special damage,) and may be affected by any considerations as to the conduct of either party, and among others, by the conduct of the plaintiff in trying to inflict on the defendant the costs of an action for an act which did no real injury. Where, on the execution of a writ of inquiry, in an action for slander, the jury were incorrectly told by the under-sheriff that any amount of damages would carry costs, and they found for less than forty shillings, that was held no ground for granting a new trial, nor even for increasing the amount of the ver dict; Graten v. Collard, 6 Dowl. P. C. 503. And so where, without such information, they gave a similar verdict, although the plaintiff thereby lost his costs; Rendall v. Hayward, 5 B N. C. 424. But where in a case for substantial damages the jury gave a farthing, the Court granted a new trial; Armitage v. Hales, 4 Q. B. 917; supported and followed in Wilson v. Hicks, 26 L. J., Exch. 244 (where see a note of the reporter). And so, where it appears that the jury have taken a wrong way of arriving at a verdict, as, splitting the difference in a case of liquidated demand; Hall v. Poyser, 13 M. & W. 600. But where the jury had given 5l. in an assault, under the idea that it would carry costs, and, on finding that it did not, wanted to give more, the Court refused to grant the plaintiff a new trial; for, per BRAMWELL, B., they had no right to give a verdict with reference to anything else than the injury sustained by the plaintiff. And there they wanted to give or to increase substantial damages merely to carry costs, which would have frustrated the statutes as to costs; Kilmore v. Abdoolah, 27 L. J., Ex. 306. But there POLLOCK, C. B., said: "There is no reason why they should not be informed of the law as to costs if they ask it as part of the law." And this, it is conceived, is the true view that the jury are entitled to know the rule as to costs, to enable them to judge whether they will give any damages beyond the costs, in cases where there has been no real damage. answer to some sarcasms upon the defendant which had caused great irritation. And that the defendant had been ready to retract in writing the imputations suggested, but not to print a retractation in the papers. ERLE, C. J.-There are two parts of the words complained of which, in my opinion, are actionable, if you believe they were spoken in the sense imputed: those supposed to impute that the plaintiff got honest officers dismissed to serve his own purposes, and those that he was dishonest in his office. If you do not believe that they were really spoken so as to convey those imputations, find for the defendant. But if you believe they were so understood, as reflecting on the plaintiff as master of the workhouse, find for the plaintiff. As to the amount of damages, that greatly depends upon the way in which the words were spoken, whether seriously or angrily in mere retaliation and irritation, and partly under the excitement of drink. Words spoken in that way would not be likely to cause so much injury as they otherwise might have done. And then there was the defendant's consent to retractation, even in writing. There was no just ground for demanding an apology in the newspapers for words merely spoken at a public-house. If you believe that the plaintiff really was required to bring this action to vindicate his character, then you may think it proper to give substantial damages which will carry costs. But if you think that it was not so, and that the words did no real injury, you can find nominal damages, which will not carry costs. The jury asked what sum would carry costs. ERLE, C. J.-I am not aware that there is anything to preclude my telling you (a), but the liability to costs depends upon various statutory enactments which it is not (a) Kilmore v. Abdoolah, 27 L. J., Exch. 307. 1860. WAKELIN บ. MORRIS. 1860. WAKELIN v. MORRIS. easy always to carry accurately in mind, and the answer might mislead you (a). Verdict for the plaintiff, damages 1s. (a) (a) A verdict in tort for not above 57., without certificate, would not carry costs in trespass, Norwood v. Pitt, 28 L. J., Exch. 212; but in slander no certificate can be given. So ruled per WILLIAMS, J., on the Norfolk Circuit. Er relatione Keane. Spring Assizes. Although, where a servant has once been held out by his master as having authority to pledge his credit, that authority cannot be withdrawn merely by orders to the servant, but there must be notice to the tradesman; yet, without express evi STAVELY v. UZIELLI. ACTION for work and labour as farrier and veterinary surgeon. Pleas: 1. Never indebted. 2. Payment. The particulars claimed 667. upon an account extending from October, 1852, to June, 1857; all the items (which were given with dates) being small, a few shillings at a time, and credit being given in February, 1852, for a payment on account of 41. 9s. The plaintiff's case consisted chiefly of the defendant's answers to interrogatories to the following effect :--That of actual from 1846 to 1858 he had in his employ a groom named Cotterell, and that during the whole of that period he had horses under Cotterell's care. sons to shoe or attend to the notice, there may be evi dence from all the circum stances; as, lapse of time, in accounts, &c.; from which it may be inferred man must have That the engaging of per horses was attended to by the not sending Cotterell, who had directions and money to pay ready money for whatever was done. That the instructions to Cotterell were not to procure anything upon credit, but that the trades- to pay ready money, and that he was supplied with ready money according to that arrangement; and that the defendant never gave him money for any debt incurred on his, such authority, and that he did the defendant's, credit; but that, in 1851, Cotterell handed on the credit of him an account amounting to 201. 4s. 4d. as due to the plaintiff, and that he, the defendant, paid that amount by cheque drawn in favour of the plaintiff. That since then known that there was no not contract the master. he had not known who attended to his horses; and that he had received no account of the plaintiff's until July, 1858; the groom having died in May previous. The plaintiff was called, and proved that upon the orders of Cotterell he had attended to the defendant's horses at Hornsey from January, 1847, to June, 1857, and had received payments always through Cotterell; in April, 1847; in January, 1848; in February, 1849; in January, 1850; in February, 1851 (the payment, by cheque, of 201. 4s. 4d.); and in October, 1852. That he had sent in accounts annually; and had sent in similar accounts in 1853 and 1854, but not after that year, until the entire amount was sent in July, 1858. There was some confusion about the payment of 41. 9s. on account in October, 1852; the amount for that year being much more (the average annual amount being 107. or 127.), and there was no explanation of the absence of accounts for the last four years (except that for a great part of the period the defendant had been abroad), nor why the account had not been sent in or before the groom's death, nor until more than a year after the defendant's removal from Hornsey. The defendant was called, and denied any authority to Cotterell to contract on credit; and declared that when he paid the amount in 1851 he had expressly forbidden him to do so, and that after that time he had settled with him monthly for all stable expenses, and produced some vouchers -suggested but not sworn to be the groom's-bearing out that statement. Some of them included items for farriery. The defendant, however, could not say that he had ever cautioned the plaintiff not to continue to give credit; and Finlason, for the plaintiff, cited and relied upon Aste v. Montague (a); but ERLE, C. J. (to the jury). The lapse of time makes a 1860. STAVELY 0. UZIELLI. 1860. STAVELY v. UZIELLI. difference in this case. And the question is, under these circumstances, whether you are satisfied that the plaintiff did the work on the credit of the defendant. Because, although the law as laid down in that case is clear, that the master who has once held out a servant as having authority to contract on credit must withdraw that authority by notice, not to the servant, but to the tradesman, and that it is not enough to do so by notice merely to the servant; yet there is much more than that in this case, and there may be notice by other means than by express or actual notice. And here you have the fact, that no accounts were sent in, even to the servant (and none to the master), for four years before the servant's death; and no account sent in until after his death and the plaintiff's removal. All these circumstances are material to the question, whether, in fact, the plaintiff did, after 1851, do the work upon the credit of the defendant; or whether, on other grounds, the plaintiff did not know that the servant had no authority to pledge his master's credit. The plaintiff must satisfy you that he did the work on the credit of the defendant; and if you think he did not, find for the defendant. Verdict for the defendant (a). Finlason for the plaintiff. (a) By a special jury, and (as any explanation as to the payment of so small a sum in 1852, on ac count. |