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POSTPONING THE STAR ROUTE GRAND JURY.

Neither the Attorney General nor his associates can be held to be in the slightest degree responsible for the delay. They expected some of the cases to be taken up by the grand jury next week, and they were ready to present them. It will now be about the middle of October before they can hope for another opportunity, and in the interim a broad hint might be conveyed to the accommodating Corkhill that further trifling with this matter will be regarded as a proof of his unfitness to discharge the duties of his position.

We clip the foregoing from the New York Times. It appears to us very much like an insinuation that the Prosecuting Attorney of the District of Columbia is not hurrying the investigation and punishment of the Star Route thieves as he might do. It does seem strange that some people expect Prosecuting Attorneys to work miracles in bringing criminals to justice. The fact that such officers are only human seems to be entirely forgotten; and that their hearts are not always dead to the promptings of mercy, is likewise not remembered. Colonel Corkhill no doubt feels for those gentlemen who have been so unfortunate in their speculations in "advancing" mail routes. They were in a fair way to become very wealthy and very much honored in consequence, when Postmaster General James so officiously interfered and broke up their business. In their misfortune good Colonel Corkhill no doubt deeply sympathizes, and does not, therefore, bear down upon them too severely.

We can understand this kind-heartedness on the part of the official. We have in this good eld County of Franklin a very similar instance of the sweet mercy that shrinks from giving

pain to poor erring humanity. About two years ago a farmer went to a neighbor's house and playfully stuck his big jack knife into his neighbor's corporation, nearly severing his back bone and almost cutting his liver out. The party thus dealt with showed such rare good pluck that he kept on breathing and even trying to get away, and this roused the admiration of the carver to such an extent that he applied a still further test to his tenacity and mashed his head with a brick. Still he wouldn't give in and others induced the masher to desist. The neighbor was not confined to his bed more than five or six months; but upon getting out had his friend arrested and indicted for “cutting with intent to wound." The P. A. would not hurt his feelings by making it "with intent to kill"—such a nice gentleman he was! And until this day he has not been brought to trial. True the neighbor is very much incensed and tries hard to get the ease to trial, particularly as his cut liver shows a disposition to carry him off one of these days, and as the carver comes over periodically and sneers at him and his efforts to get the case to trial. But the good-hearted P. A. spares the feelings of the playful defendant and still he roams at large.

Besides this, there are a dozen butchers slaughtering cattle, hogs and sheep within a

short distance of the benevolent institutions of the State, in violation of a well-known law. The officers of the State have long tried to have the butchers indicted for this flagrant violation of law. But the kind-hearted P. A. won't have it so. He sees the hard times these men have selling beef-steaks at eighteen cents the pound, and losing sleep to get them ready even at that price; and so he kindly refuses to get them indicted, allaying their fears and frowning upon the meddlesome people who would give them trouble. We admire this evidence of heart. None of your hard-hearted Prosecuting Attorneys for us. Give us one like our own William J., whose motto is that "man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn."

A CONUNDRUM.

An indignant Cincinnatian writes for legal advice upon the following statement of facts. He says:

"I am a temperance man-a prohibitionist of the strictest sect, and an ardent admirer of the late lamented President. I was, moreover, one of the contributors to the 'Commercial Fund' to reward a man named Cook, of Newark, for

striking a Democrat who had expressed pleasure at the assassination. Since contributing, for myself and the members of my familynineteen cents, in all-I have heard things which prompted me to investigate the matter. I find that Cook quarrelled with a Republican concerning the differences between the Halfbreeds and Stalwarts; that the other man said. 'there were many Republicans in New York who were no doubt glad that Garfield was shot; that Cook, who was a Conkling man, called the Garfield man a scoundrelly halfbreed,' and was in turn called a liar, and that the blow was then given. Now, I also learn that the 'Fund' has been expended by Cook in fitting up a whiskey shop and buying a stock of liquors, and that he is retailing liquid damnation at ten cents a drink, while I am working for fourteen shillings a day. Now, what can I do? The representations made by the parties calling for the Fund' were false. The money has been given to a man who insulted Garfield by the blow instead of defending him, and now, last and most humiliating of all, he has invested my money to carry on the hellish work of the rum-seller. Is there any redress? "INDIGNANT."

Under the circumstances, we can only say to our correspondent that, while he has a very grievous grievance, the less said about it the better.

There can be little doubt that an action would lie against the solicitors of the "Fund," but the money could hardly be recovered from Cook. He would no doubt "set 'em up" to you, if you were to drop into his saloon and explain the matter, unless, indeed, he feared that each giver of a penny would be coming in for a free drink, in which case he would wisely decline. The best thing "Indignant" can do is to steer clear of "Funds" in the future, unless he is certain the object of the charity is entirely worthy and his tale a true one.

LAWYERS AS LAW MAKERS.

The following from the Kansas Commonwealth meets with our heartiest endorsement:

"It is not the fault of the lawyers in the legislature that so many unconstitutional laws are passed. Almost invariably such acts become laws in the face of protests from lawyers. *** At every session there have been a lot of members who thought to make themselves popular by denouncing lawyers. Every measure proposed by a lawyer would be opposed by these wiseacres. They would try to make the people believe that lawyers were aways trying to get some measure through to rob the people. The result has been, and always will be, that crude, unwise laws have been passed. We mean, always will be till the people send men to the legislature, who either know something themselves, or know enough to know that they don't know anything, and will follow the advice of those who do know something.”

THE DEAD PRESIDENT.

Remarks before a Citizens' Meeting held at Columbus, Wednesday evening, September 21, 1881.

BY HON. R. A. HARRISON.

A meeting was called by the Mayor of Columbus, for the purpose of giving some public expression upon the death of the late President, Garfield, at which Hon. R. A. Harrison was called to preside, who, on taking the chair, said:

"To me the death of President Garfield is, I had the delight and the honor of knowing him, in truth, a personal, individual bereavement. personally, long and well. It was my good fortune to be an humble co-laborer with him in his first public service. Twenty-one years ago last January he and I entered yonder Senate Chamber as members elect of the Senate of Ohio. General Garfield was then a young man—the youngest man in the Senate. In spite of his youth, he soon became its foremost member in the important debates and the important measures. O, how vividly the sad and painful event of his demise has recalled what manner of man he was then. His private life was then, as it has ever been, spotless. His heart was then, as ever afterward, warm, generous, charitable and unsullied. His habits were then, as they have ever been, regular and abstemious, industrious and studious. His manners were then, as they always were, singularly youthful, simple, sincere and genial. He was then, as he never ceased to be, a man of sturdy, active and inspiring faithbelieving in Christ and his fellow man. He was in the Ohio Senate, as he afterward became in the House of Representatives of the United States, the ablest debater and most eloquent orator. The finger of him who "touched Isaiah's hallowed lips with fire" touched his. Perhaps when he entered the Senate he knew more of books than he knew of men, but he soon read, understood and became master of the one as he did of the other. He then was without fortune, and so exclusively did he ever afterward devote all his energies to the public service, and so incorruptible was he, that he died without fortune. He was, at that time, when the clouds of civil war were rapidly gathering over the Republic, the determined and eloquent defender of the maintenance of liberty and Union, at all hazards. When the time for argument had passed, he left the Senate chamber for the tented field,

and there did yeoman service for the preservation of an individed and undivisible Republic. As a member of the Senate he was a devotee in the service whereunto the people had called him, taking an active interest not only in what concerned the physical well being of his country, but in every measure which might promote the intellectual and moral improvement of the people. He took a special interest in whatever concerned the public schools and the benevolent institutions of the State. He was then, as he always was, an unrelenting and active enemy of oppression in every form. He abhorred human slavery, and on every fit occasion denounced it. He was then recognized, as he has since so often demonstrated himself to be, a man of courage-not merely physical courage, but that which is far more noble and more rare, moral courage. No man then had more devoted friends; but they were confined to the comparatively few who then knew him. O, how from year to year they have multiplied. No public man was ever more beloved by his countrymen than General Garfield is to-day. And it can be said with literal truth that those who paint him truest, praise him most.

I watched, with lively interest, the career of General Garfield from the time he left the Ohio

Senate in the spring of 1861, until he was placed by the American people upon the summit of earthly fame. I venture to say that there cannot be found in the world's history a man who, upon a theater so vast and varied, made a steadier and more rapid growth than he in all the great and ennobling qualities of statesman, orator, soldier, patriot and political leader. Would to God that he had been spared to complete a life of three score and ten years, for the sake of his country, the world and posterity, as well as for the sake of his noble family and of the aged and beloved mother, whose sterling characteristics were impressed upon the son and made him the idol of his countrymen and illustrious among mankind.

No other country could have produced such a man. He was a perfect type of our free institutions. The horrid hand of an assassin has deprived him of his life and his country of his services before he attained fifty years of age. Still, young as he was, his honest fame is as wide as the globe and will be perpetual as time. The announcement of his death carried inexpressible sorrow to every household and every heart. In common with the American people, the rest of

the civilized nations are in mourning that this young but illustrious man is now lost to his country and mankind. One touch of nature makes the whole world kin. While General Garfield's name and fame will be held in perpetual and sacred remembrance, the crime, and the name of the perpetrator of the crime, which has brought this irreparable calamity, will be given over to eternal execration.

The heroic and Christian patience, fortitude and courage with which General Garfield bore his terrible and prolonged sufferings from the day he fell until his demise, and the manner of his death, confirm Sir Thomas Browne's declaration that "marshaling all the horrors of death, and contemplating the extremities thereof, I find not anything therein to daunt the courage of a man, much less a well-resolved Christian."

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

There is, I believe, a growing conviction among the jurists of the present day, that the law of punitive or exemplary damages has been built upon a wrong foundation, and is alike contrary to principle and evil in its effects. I share deeply in this feeling, and in the hope of effecting something, however little, toward a reform, would willingly add a few words to what was once a much discussed question.

damages are proper, to give complete redress, so far as this can be estimated in a pecuniary way. Whatever the practical result may be, the law does not confess its inability to give just compensation, nor abandon the theory that the remedy is sufficient. The controversy has been with reference to the proper rule of damages in cases of aggravated torts.

It is the aim of the common law in cases where

A few of our courts in this country maintain, that the proof of malicious motives forms a basis for special or extraordinary compensation; to cover not only the natural and legal results of the tort, but as near as can be estimated, damages for mental or physical pain, anxiety or distress, or degradation, which actually resulted from the

act.

But in the rulings of these courts which uphold the system of exemplary or vindictive damages, a radical difference is made between ordinary torts, and cases where there is fraud, willful negligence, or actual malice on the part of the defendant-the rule not confining the jury to simple compensation, but allowing them to give such further damages "as will mark their sense of the injustice and insult done to the plaintiff, as punishment upon the defendant, and as a wholesome example to the community." We find these words in substance used again and continued repetition, unaccompanied by explanaagain by the courts of this country, until their tion, tries the ear. The judges seemingly endeavor to evade the responsibility and inconsist

ency of the doctrine, by parrotting the expression of others. The position taken by those who, like Mr. Sedgwick (Sedgwick on Damages 573, note, 6th ed.), and Dillon J. (Berry v. Fletcher, 1 Dillon 67), have the vigor to assert an open opinion is, that it is only just to the outraged sense of the community, that the defendant should be assessed such a farther sum, beyond compensation, in proportion to his wealth as will relieve the sting of insult, and deter the defendant from a repetition of the offence. The fact, that the assessment goes to the plaintiff is incidental, and subservient to the necessity of giving an example to the community and of punishing the defendant.

This, in a few words, is the principle of the doctrine of exemplary damages. To us it seems to have arisen under a mistaken idea, and as a result of unadvised dicta and incompetent reasoning. It is quite well established in this country, though the tendency of some modern decisions is to repudiate it altogether. Some courts recognize the inconsistency, while they yield to the authority of precedents. Brown v. Swineford. 44 Wis. 282; Smithwick v. Ward, 7 Jones. L. R. (N. C.) 64.

The difficulty of estimating compensation by intangible injuries, was the cause of the rise of this doctrine; the hardship of particular cases was the pretext; and without comprehending the extensive consequences, the judges of our courts have, perhaps unintentionally, allowed their sympathy for mental distress to overpower the principles of the law. There can be no doubt, that there are cases arising, which require extraordinary remedy beyond the mere money loss; and when the early judges allowed the jury discretion to assess beyond the pecuniary damage, there being no apparent computation, it was nat ural to suppose that the excess was imposed as punishment. The courts in subsequent cases took this view, and in many instances were, no doubt, deceived by the indignation expressed in terms so strongly against the defendant, as to give rise to the idea that the damages were pu

nitive.

In spite of the dicta of the courts and the able views of Mr. Sedgwick (Law Reporter, April and June 1847) and other jurists, I do not think such damages can be sustained on principle. The arguments of Judge Nelson of New Hampshire (Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342), and Mr. Greenleaf (2 Gr. on Evidence, 235, note, 13th ed.), are more conclusive; and it must become more and more evident to careful thinkers, that the doctrine is unsound, and if carried to its legitimate results, that it would be very disastrous. It might seem at first sight (and some writers have taken this view: Hilliard on remedies for Torts 440, note a; Field on damages 70), that the distinction between exemplary damages, and damages given as special or extraordinary compensa tion, is one of words merely; and the effect of allowing the former, is the same as that produced upon the theory of compensation, when this is extended to cover injury beyond the pecuniary

loss. If this is true, which I believe it is very far from being, the terms "exemplary" and "punitive" damages, are certainly very ill chosen ; for it leads the jury, however much restrained in theory, to make the estimate of damages, with a view to punish the defendant rather than compensate the plaintiff: Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379.

But the distinction is more than one of words. The jury under the one instruction, would be liable to go beyond the ends of justice. Under the system of exemplary damages, they are instructed to give not only compensation, but are allowed to punish the defendant with a further sum; and it is expressly held, that evidence of his pecuniary ability, is admissible to guide the jury in estimating what sum must be assessed against him to make the punishment effective: Guengerech v. Smith, 34 Iowa 348; Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152.

Under the principle that damages should never be given beyond compensation, the jury is instructed to estimate the entire injury, taking into consideration the mental anxiety and distress, as well as pecuniary loss, and to give full compensation for all the injury which defendant's malicious act has caused; and beyond this, not one cent. The result is very different. The jury in the latter case deal with the question as one of remedy, and not of criminal fine.

And it is difficult to see how, under the established system, any reasonable restraint can be on principle imposed on the jury. It is said that the court may set aside the verdict, if it is unreasonably large; but in such cases it is found, that when the judge comes to consider the verdict, he practically looks to the doctrine of actual compensation, which is supposed to be for the time being discarded. The conclusion is, that if the verdict is allowed to stand, it is because it corresponds to the theory of the advocates of compensation, and that of exemplary damages has been practically disregarded. Nelson J., in Fay v. Parker, before cited, shows, that under the latter doctrine there is no inconsistency in compensating the plaintiff four times

over.

In the case of Markham v.

reported in

2 Erskine's Speeches, p. 9, the great barrister Erskine shows, that the words of Lord Kenyon have been misinterpreted, and never authorized the incorporation of criminal remedies into civil procedure. procedure. It seems to me, that the mingling of the criminal principles with the civil, which the doctrine necessitates, is altogether wrong. And even if it be allowable to fine the defendants in a civil court, there seems no reason why plaintiff should be the recipient. It is difficult to see why a man should receive a fine, to which he is not entitled in right as compensation. If the plaintiff is entitled to damages as a matter of right, let him receive them in the proper character of indemnity; if he is not so entitled, there is no power in any government which can justly deprive another of his property for plaintiff's ben

efit. Judicial procedure ought not to be made a cover for the confiscation of private property.

The attempt has been made to bring the doctrine within the constitutional provision, "that no person shall be subject for the same of fence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;" and though according to the strict rules of interpretation, the objection is not well made, yet the spirit of our institutions would seem to forbid a civil fine for an offence which could be punished criminally (Austin v. Wilson, 4 Cush. 275). As to its being a matter which public benefit justifies, Lord Commissioner Adam of Scotland, has said, "a civil court in matters of civil injury is a bad corrector of morals; it has only to do with the rights of the parties:" Beattie v. Bryson, 1 Murr. R. 317.

If the theory of punishment is to be carried out, consistency would require, that the amount charged to the defendant should be divided into two parts-the one to be awarded to the injured party as compensation, the other to be paid to the state as in cases of criminal fine. And, moreover, there never was the necessity for this doctrine which eminent judges have supposed. There is indeed this much of justice in it, that in particular cases it furnished a means of redressing wrong, when there seemed no other expedient at hand; and which, though contrary to principle, was sufficiently effectual. A good result has been often obtained by it, but a comprehensive application of the theory of compensation, would accomplish every purpose in a more rational manner: Meagher v. Driscoll. 99 Mass. 281; Fillebbrown v. Hoar, 124 Id. 580. There is no impracticability in calling upon a jury to estimate the damages with reference to the full injury sustained, taking into consideration not only direct and indirect pecuniary loss, but also the hurt done to the finer instincts of human nature, If an insult is contemplated, the injury is greater on that account. If the act proceeded from mala mens or malice, this fact has caused mental anxiety and vexation, perhaps disgrace, which can be accounted for in money.

And, as is undoubtedly the truth, if in many cases any pecuniary compensation is, from the nature of things, essentially inadequate,the courts should not be either deterred thereby from coming as near as possible to complete compensation, or be made the means of inflicting a criminal fine for injury which the defendant has not caused. The maxim causa proxima, non remota spectatur," should apply here as elsewhere, and the defendant be made liable to the extent that the injury is the result of his wrong, and no further.

There is no doubt extensive authority in this country to sustain the doctrine of exemplary damages, but I question very much whether it is as overwhelming as is generally supposed. Dicta will be found probably in every state which seem to support the principle; but we are apt to be misled by mere words. Mr. Greenleaf criticises with considerable success, the authorities chiefly relied on by Sedgwick, and his reasoning

will apply to a great many other and later cases, which he has not touched: Greenleaf on Evidence 235, 13th ed.

There is a large class of decisions supporting the doctrine superficially, which upon analysis, really go no farther than to authorize extraordinary compensation. The courts speak of "damages beyond compensation," but by the latter word or "actual compensation," as some have called it, they mean to cover simply the pecuniary loss proved at the trial. That something beyond this should in certain cases be given, every one acknowledges; they call it "exemplary damages," but it is compensation, in spite of the misnomer.

The spirit of these decisions, however illchosen the words ay be, is undoubtedly not in favor of "punishing" the defendant beyond full indemnity. When the courts speak of giving damages "as compensation to the plaintiff, and an example to the community," it is a ridiculous misuse of words and goes no farther. Compensation is given because the plaintiff is entitled to it, independent of the effect upon the public. ment, and an example is purely incidental. Yet That the assessment often does operate as a punish

the courts have followed the letter rather than the spirit of decisions, and have deceived the judges in after cases by their misuse of terms; while the latter conceive themselves more bound by authority, than reason. This, in a word, is the history of exemplary damages in nearly every state where they can be said to be established.

Of the class of cases above spoken of, Linsley_v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, is a fair illustration. In that case, the court elaborates upon the necessity of full and adequate of full and adequate compensation, in distinction from the mere taxable costs. Malone v. Murphy 2 Kan. 262, decided in Kansas, is another similar case; and the dictum is for exemplary damages, as long as they do not conflict with the theory of actual compensation.

A careful review of authorities shows, that of the states commonly considered as adhering to the doctrine, there are several where a vigorous decision in favor of simple compensation would be justifiable in view of precedent, as following the spirit rather than the words of the decisions. This was the condition of things in New Hampshire, before the case of Fay v. Parker fixed the position of that state beyond question.

Among the states which now stand in this middle position, I think I can with reasonable certainty name California (Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal. 54; Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Id. 553; Selden v. Coshman, 20 Id. 56), in this state the subject is now regulated by statute; Connecticut (Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 267); Indiana (Millison v. Hoch, 17 Ind, 227, but contra Shafer v. Smith, 1 Cent. L. J. 271; Iowa (Hendrickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa 379); Kansas (Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 262; Hefly v. Baker, 19 Id. 9; Titus v. Corkins, 21 Id. 722); Michigan (Welch v. Ware, 32 Mich. 77; Daily Post v. McArthur, 16

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