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A reasonable doubt of sanity must acquit. case of an insane murderer. If it be hopeless In the second case it is this:
that a sane murderer should ever cease to be A party pleading new matter must prove it; dangerous, it is certainly so in the case of a luThe defence of insanity is a plea of new mat- nrtic. He is possessed of an insane delusion,
under the influence of which he has committed A party pleading insanity must prove his plea. one murder and may commit others, or (if we In the third case there are two:
except the theory of “emotional insanity”) he (a) A defendant is as to new matter pleaded is liable under certain circumstances to be so as the prosecution as to the matter alleged against much excited as to be irresponsible, and in that him;
state to commit murder. If committed to an Insanity is new matter ; ergo,
asylum, he may so far improve as to be disA defendant is to his plea of 'insanity as the charged as cured, and yet he may have a recurprosecution to the charge.
rence of dementia which may again impel him to (6) The prosecution must prove its case be- a performance of new crimes. Society is never yond a reasonable doubt;
safe while he lives. The defendant is to his insanity as the prose- In considering this matter, the province of cution to its case ; ergo,
human law must carefully be borne in mind. The defendant must prove his insanity beyond With the measure of the moral guilt of an a reasonable doubt.
offender it has nothing to do. Its only provThe first of the views above referred to is un- ince is to protect the society which estabdoubtedly the most prevalent, and under such a lishes it, and to punish such acts as are harmrule it is, of course, as experience has shown, ful to society, regardless of their moral aspects. easy to obtain the acquittal of almost any mur- It is easy to see that this has been practically derer on the plea of insanity. As an example of recognized to be true, in spite of some isowhat may be done with such a plea by a judge lated instances of an attempt to make the desirous of acquitting an influential criminal, law cover all moral offences, as in the case of the outrageous charge of Mr. Justice Hogeboom, many of the early enactments of the New of the Supreme court of New York, in the well- | England colonies; and the converse of the known case of The People v. Cole, is interesting proposition which the Puritans strove to estaband instructive. It may be questioned whether | fish, that all moral offences should be held legal the doctrine of a reasonable doubt has ever been offences, is seen in the numerous acts everycarried so far, and it is to be hoped for the credit where in force prohibiting under various penof the bench and the safety of society that it alties acts in themselves perfectly proper. never will be again.
Now, it is only by a confusion of ideas upon But behind and beyond the question of what this matter of the province of the law that proof of insanity should be required lies the insanity has been held to be a defence in capital question, which does not seem to have occurred cases. There may be and frequently is no moral to many people, -whether insanity should be a guilt attached to the act of an insane murderer
and it is due to a certain feeling in the public first startling to put it as a debatable matter, but mind that a person not morally guilty should that it is at least open to argument, a little con- not be punished for his act, that his lack of sideration will show. Capital puishment differs responsibility has been held a defence. from other forms of punishment in that it is no This feeling is reasonable enough when part of its aim to work any reformation in the applied to punishments not capital, but to what criminal. "The two aims of punishment in gen- is called “capital punishment” it has no proper eral are, however, as prominent here as any application; and this for the reason that capital where else. These aims are, 1st, to prevent re- punishment is in fact not punishment at all. It petition of the offense by the criminal; 2d, to is of the essence of punishment that it should prevent the commission of the offense by others. have an ulterior end beyond the infliction of Both kinds of punisnment rely on the same means the penalty, and this ulterior end (as to the of effecting the second object, which is the dread criminal) is that he, by experiencing the penof the punishment inflicted in a given case; but alty for his offence, should be deterred from a to effect the former object capital punishment repetition of the crime. It would, in general, removes from the criminal all power of ever act- be manifestly vain to hope for such an effect ing at all, while milder forms rely upon the upon a lunatic, and therefore such punishments dread of again incurring them, to induce the are not applicable to him. criminal to abandon his evil ways. The theory But in capital cases the only aim of the law of the two clearly is, that one who commits the is to destroy the offender, and remove by his higher oftenses is supposed to be so depraved death a danger to society which can be removed that nothing but his death can protect society in no other way. The danger to society from an from him, while in other cases it is supposed insane murderer is at least as great as from a that less extreme measures will suffice.
sane murderer, and society has as much need for Now, if these views are applied to the case of a protection in the one case as in the other. If it lunatic it will be seen that every argument that is vain to hope that the sane murderer, who is can be adduced to show the necessity for the open to the effects of milder penalties, can be death of a sane murderer has tenfold weight in rendered harmless while he lives, it is still more so in the case of an insane murderer, upon the defendants, on which verdict judgment was rendered. whom milder penalties would have no effect. The plaintiff having prosecuted error in the district court, Every argument that will apply in favor of the that court reserved the case to this court for decision. death penalty at all, will apply with greater
The facts, so far as it is material to state them, are as force in the case of the insane than in that of follows: On May 24, 1873, Nathan B. Tyler, at Warren the sane, with perhaps one seeming exception.
in Trumbull County, filled the blanks in a printed note, This exception is that of the argument de
and signed it. The instrument was then in the followrived from the deterrent effect of the example ing form: upon others who might be tempted to commit
"WARREN, O., May 24, 1873. the same crime. Of course, if insanity were no
“$1,000. Four months after date, I promise to pay to defence it would never be falsely set up by one
the order of myself one thousand dollars, at Trumbull accused of murder; but would the death penalty
National Bank, Warren, O., value received.
N. B. TYLER.” have any deterrent effect upon those not yet guilty ? 'It would certainly take away one hope residing in a village in the same county, and the evidence
On the same day he took the note to Henry Fowler, for escape from the sane murderer in posse, and it may be doubted whether it would not have
tended to show that he represented to him that he needed
money and wished to get the note discounted at the bank some effect upon the insane, who certainly seem sometimes to calculate upon the immunity
named therein, which representation Fowler believed to
be true, and at the request of Tyler then signed his name which their state affords them. But whether
on the note below that of Tyler, and handed the paper to this be so or not is really immaterial. The
him. There was also evidence tending to show that both great object of the death penalty is the death of Tyler and Fowler believed that Fowler had then done the criminal, and this being attained, and everything necessary to be done in order to clothe Tyler society being freed from the menace of his exist
with full authority to dispuse of the note and transfer a ence, the rest is but of secondary importance. complete legal title to any person, for his (Tyler's) own
It is too late now to altar the law so as to benefit. cover the President's assailant, but apart from
Tyler was then indebted to the plaintiff in error in the the considerations attached to this particular
sum of $469.55, money paid by it to Tyler for his draft case, the safety of the public no less than that
for that amount on G. Eichier, known as the Canton draft, of its rulers requires these two amendments to and also in the sum of $500 on a promissory note falling the general law. Let us have no man escape due that day, indorsed by John Koehler. the consequences of his crime because he is
On the day of the execution of the note by Tyler and happily foiled in completing it, and let us
Fowler, Tyler presented it to the plaintiff in error for disdestroy an insane niurderer as we do any one or count, but discount was refused. The plaintiff in error anything else whose continued existence threat- was willing to take it as collateral security. Tyler said ens the general safety.-EDWARD B. Hill, New he could take up the draft in ten days, and the plaintiff York, in American Law Review.
in error desired the collateral security that he would per
form his obligation. Nothing was said with express refSUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
erence to collateral security for the Koebler note. Tyler
agreed to transfer the note of Fowler and hiinself as colFIRST NATIONAL BANK,
lateral security, and thereupou wrote his name across the v.
back of it and delivered it to the plaintiff in error. The HENRY FOWLER, ET AL.
naine of Fowler was never indorsed on the note. Eyi.
dence was given that the plaintiff in error had no knowl1. A promissory note containing the words, "I prom
edge of any understanding between Tylet and Fowler as ise to pay to the
order of myself," having been signed by to the manner in which the noto executed by them two persons and placed by one of them in the hands of should be disposed of by Tyler. the other to be by him put in circulation for his own benefit, the latter may, before the note is due, by indorsing
On April 15, 1874, Tyler being in failing circumstances, bis name thereon, invest a bona fide holder with a com- Fowler as principal, and James H. Humiston as surety, plete title thereto, although ihe name of the other maker executed to the plaintiff in error the note upon which is not so indorsed. 2. In violation of an agreement between principal and
this suit was prosecuted, and took up the note executed surety in a promissory note, the principal transferred the by Tyler and Fowler. Subsequently, Fowler obtained note, before due, as collateral security for an extension judgment against Tyler on the latter note, but during of ten days in the time of payment of a protested drast the trial of this case, tendered to the plaintiff in error an for a less amount, the person receiving the collateral acting in good faith, and having no knowledge of such assignment of that judgment. agreement: Held, that the title of such holder, to the A bill of exceptions was taken during the term, setting extent of the draft, is valid.
forth certain requests by the plaintiff in error for instrucError to the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull tions to the jury, the charge given, and exceptions to the County. Reserved in the District Court:
refusal of the court to charge as requested, as well as to On September 23, 1874, the First National Bank of the charge given. Among other things which the plaintWarren, plaintiff in error, brought suit in the Court of iff in error requested, was that the jury be charged as fol. Common Pleas of Trumbull County, against Henry Fow- lows: “That the defendant Fowler was bound by whatler and James H. Humiston, defendants in error, on a ever disposition Tyler made of the note, in the ordinary promissory note executed to the plaintiff by the defend- course of business, unless the transferee had notice of ants for $1,067.25, dated April 15, 1874, and payable four some special arrangement between said Tyler and Fowler, months after date.
limiting Tyler's authority in the use of the note." The An answer and a reply were filed, and the cause was court refused so to charge, and on the contrary charged, submitted to a jury, which jury returned a verdict for among other things, as follows: “If the defendant Fow.
ler did not authorize the use made of the old note, and in do manner assented thereto, being a mere surety upon the note, he was not liable upon it when received by the plaintiff as a security or pledge for the payment of the Canton draft within ten days." And again : “In order to transfer the legal title of the note, as commercial paper, the note should have been indorsed by both Tyler and Fowler."
The case was decided in this court during the term of Gilmore, C. J.
E. B. Taylor, for plaintiff in error.
On the trial of this case the testimony was quite conflicting. We do not find it necessary to express any opinion as to the preponderance of the evidence. Of course the plaintiff in error was entitled to recover, if Fowler and Humiston, at the time they executed the note sued on in this case, knew the terms upon which the note of Tyler and Fowler was held. Equally clear it certainly is, that the plaintiff in error was not entitled to recover if it concealed from the defendants in error the terms upon which it held that note, and thereby induced the execution of the note here in suit. The question is as to the liability of the defendants in error upon the assumption that without their fault, or the fault of the plaintiff in error, they were ignorant of those terms. In that case their liability should be measured by the liability of Fowler on the note executed by himself and Tyler. The requests for instructions to the jury, the refusal to charge as requested, and the charge given, in connection with the tendency of certain testimony set forth in the statement of the case, fairly present the question as to the liability of Fowler on the Tyler-Fowler note in the latter view, and require us to say whether the action of the crurt in that respect was or was not erroneous.
The note executed by Tyler and Fowler was what is known as an irregular instrument. Byles on Bills (6th Am.ed.) *90; 1 Daniel on Neg. Inst. 28 128, 148. Although signed by both of them, its terms are, “ I promise to pay to the order of myself one thousand dollars.” Where a note signed by two or more persons is payable to the order of one of them, it becomes effectual when he writes his name upon the instrument and puts it in circulation. If it is payable, in terms, to the order of two of the makers, the same thing must be done by both of them in order to vest in the holder a legal title. A note payable to the maker's own order is wholly void until indorsed by him and put in circulation, but becomes by such transfer a valid promissory note in the hands of a bona fide holder, and is, in effect, payable to bearer.
The only indorsement made upon the note by Tyler and Fowler, was that made by Tyler by writing his nama on the back of the instrument. Was the court warranted in saying to the jury that, “in order to transfer the legal title of the note, as commercial paper, the note should have been indorsed by both Tyler and Fowler ? " In our opinion this question must be answered in the negative upon three grounds.
First. Where a note the terms of which are," I promise to pay,” is signed by more than one person, it may be read, “ We or either of us promise to pay." Wallace v. Jewell, 21 Ohio St. 163. Here the instrument is signed by two persons, and its language is, “I promise to pay to the order of myself one thousand dollars." No greater violence is done to language by reading it, “We or either of us promise to pay to the order of ourselves or either of us," than was done in Wallace v. Jewell; and
we think where such interpretation is in barmony with what seems to have been the intention of the parties, the instrument may be so read. Conner v. Routh, 7 How. (Miss.) 176; Boyd v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. 93; Pearson v. Stoddard, 9 Gray, 199; Higley v. Newell, 28 Iowa, 516.
Second. Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a promissory note; but where the instrument is of the class we are now considering, parol evidence may be admitted to explain it. McCrary v. Caskey, 27 Geo. 54; Taylor v. Strickland, 37 Ala. 642; Kelsey v. Hibbs, 13 Ohio St. 340. “If you can construe an instrument by parol evidence, where that instrument is ambiguous, in such manner as not to contradict it, you are at liberty to do so. Parke, B., in Goldshede v. Swan, 1 Welsby, H. & G. 154, 158. And Prof. Parsons says: “Where the language of a note is capable of two meanings, parol evidence may direct the proper choice to be made between them." 2 Bills & N. 517.
Third. The evidence shows that when Tyler received the note from the hands of Fowler, the latter intended to invest him with the power to negotiate it, and to do what-, ever was necessary to be done in order to transfer a legal title to the instrument. Tyler, under the circumstances, was empowered, on his own behalf and as agent for Fowler, to invest another with a legal title to the note. One may be orally authorized to indorse for another a promissory note, and where the instrument is in the form of the one under consideration, the indorsement may be made as the note was indorsed, if that was the manner of indorsement contemplated by the makers. 1 Daniel on Neg. lnst. 82 272–308.
But the defendants in error claim that Tyler diverted the note from the object for which it was executed, and hence Fowler, who executed the note for the accommodation of Tyler, was discharged. The note, as we have seen, is an irregular instrument, and is payable at another bank than the plaintiff in error; but having been indorsed in the manner stated, if there was an understanding between Fowler and Tyler that the latter had general authority to transfer the note, the instrument differs, in no legal sense, from the most formal instrument, although the plaintiff in error know Fowler was surety. Stone v. Vance, 6 Ohio, 246; Riley v. Johnson, 8 Ohio, 526; Williams v. Bosson, 11 Ohio, 62; Clinton Bank v. Ayres, 16 Ohio, 282; Portage Co. Bank v. Lane, 8 Ohio St. 405; Erwin v. Shaffer, Ohio St. 43; Knox Co. Bank v. Lloyd, 18 Ohio St. 353; Kingsland v. Pryor, 33 Ohio St. 19: Indeed, according to the syllabus, the transfer of such note, even in violation of an agreement between the principal and surety, will not discharge the latter, if the indorsee had no knowledge of the agreement.
Finally, it is urged, in support of the instruction to the jury, that Tyler had no power, however fair the transac-. tion may have been on the part if the plaintiff in error, to pledge the note as collateral security for the payment, within ten days, of a protested draft for $469.55. But the position is not untenable, for there was an agreement to delay collection of the draft for the specified time. Erwin v. Shaffer, supra; Roxborough v. Messick, 6 Obio St. 448; 1 Daniel on Neg. Inst. 88 829-832.
For error in refusing to chargé as requested, and for error in the charge as given, in the particulars indicated in this opinion, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
December, 1870, they caused to be taken and re
moved from the bed of the river, below the lowDANIEL L. JUNE ET AL
water mark thereof, opposite said island and
between it and the center of the river, about John PURCELL.
sixty wagon loads of sand. They deny all state
ments of facts contained in said Purcell's peti1. The principle decided in Gavit v. Chambers (3 Ohio, tion not in this their answer specifically ad496), that the owners of lands situate on the banks of navigable streams running through the state are also
mitted. owners of the beds of the rivers to the middle of the At the April term, 1873, the court found the stream, as at common law, has become a rule of property, issues in favor of the plaintiff and assessed his and, irrespective of the question of its original correctness, ought not to be disturbed.
damages at $10 for which judgment was ren2. The same rule applies to lands bordering on the San- dered. dusky river, in the tract of two miles square surveyed and sold under the act of congress of April 26, 1816. 3
The motion of the defendants for a new trial Statutes at Large, 308.
having been overruled, a bill of exceptions was 3. Hence, the riparian owner can recover for sand tor- taken, embodying all the evidence. tiously taken from the bed of the river.
The following are the material parts of the Error to the District Court of Sandusky bill of exceptions: County.
"Be it remembered, that on the trial of said The original action came into the court of com- action to maintain the issues on the part of the mon pleas by appeal.
plaintiff, the following facts were agreed to by April 8, 1873, John Purcell filed his petition in the defendants, and with the consent of both said common pleas court against Daniel L. and the plaintiff and defendants, received and conDaniel S. June, setting forth that he is the owner, sidered by the court as evidence in said action in fee simple and in actual possession, of out- on behalf of the plaintiff, that is to say, that at lots number 61 and 62, in said city of Fremont, the date of the alleged trespass herein, the plainSandusky county, Ohio, which said lots were des- tiff was the owner in fee, and was in the actual ignated in the original survey thereof as tracts possession to the ordinary or low-water mark, of number 23 and 24 in the United States Reserva- out-lots sixty-one (61) and sixty-two (62), the tion of two miles square at the foot of the lower same being out-lots twenty-three (23) and rapids of the Sandusky river. That said lots or twenty-four (24), according to the original surtracts comprise all of the large island in the San-vey thereof, in the city of Fremont, Sandusky dusky river, which is a navigable stream. county, and state of Ohio. That said out-lots
That said Purcell owns to the center of the comprise all of the large islands in the Sandusky river, subject, however, to the right in the pub- river, which is a navigable stream, and within lic to navigate the same.
the Reservation of two miles square_at the foot That a portion of the bed of the river im- of the lower rapids of said river. That within mediately adjacent to the westerly side of said the bed of said river, on the north-west side of island had, at the time of committing the wrongs said island, opposite the willow tree designated complained of, risen so high as to form a distinct in the sixth course in the record of the survey ridge or bar, which at ordinary stage of water was left dry. That said bar lies wholly between exhibit 'A,' as being 10 inches in diameter, the center of said river and said island, and con- bearing very much down stream, marked with nects with said island by a narrow neck, bar or six notches, and between said island and the ridge.
center or thread of the stream there is a sandThat about December 1, 1870, and at other bar, lying parallel with said island, the result times between that day and the commencement of gradual and imperceptible accretions to the of this action, the said Daniel L. and Daniel S. bed of said river, which sand-bar at ordinary June, wrongfully and unlawfully entered upon or low-water, is surrounded by water. That said premises, dug up, took and carried away during the month of December, A. p. 1870, the from said bar or ridge, and converted to their defendants dug up, took, and carried away from use, one hundred and twenty wagon loads of the rorth-west side of said sand-bar, and besaid Purcell's sand, earth and soil, being the tween said island and the center or thread of alluvium and accretions so as aforesaid deposited said stream, about 60 wagon loads of sand, of upon the bed and shore of said river adjacent to the value of ten dollars. Whereupon the plainand on the westerly side of said island, to said tiffrested. Thereupon, the defendants, to Purcell's damage, &c.
maintain the issues on their part, gave, in eviDaniel L. and Daniel S. June, answering, dence on the trial of said action, the record of admit:
the plat and field notes of a survey of said outThat the lots described in Purcell's petition lots, inade by the United States in the month comprise the large island in the Sandusky river, of July, A. D. 1816, under and in accordance with which is a navigable stream. That said island an act of congress approved April 26th, 1816, is situate in the city of Fremont, Sandusky and 'entitled an act providing for the sale of county, Ohio, and within the United States the tract of land at the lower rapids of the SanReservation of two miles square at the foot of dusky river,' of which record a copy duly, cer. the lower rapids of the Sandusky river.
titied is hereto attached, marked exhibit 'A' and They also admit that during the month of I made part hereof. Also, the following facts were agreed to by the plaintiff, and, with the con- the American and English law of real property, sent of both parties, admitted and considered by to be open to discussion. *** The doctrine, the court as evidence on the trial of said action that on rivers where the tide ebbs and flows, on behalf of the defendants, that is to say, that grants of land are bounded by ordinary highby the survey of the Reservation of two miles water mark, has no application in this case; square at the foot of the lower rapids of the nor does the size of the river alter the rule. Sandusky river, made by the United States, in To hold that it did, would be a dangerous tamthe month of July, 1816, under and in accordance pering with riparian rights, involving litigation with the act of congress aforesaid, none of the concerning the size of rivers as matter of fact, subdivisional lines of said survey extend to or rather than proceeding on established principles embraced the bed of the river, but that, on the of law.” 24 How. U. Š. 65. See also, Delaplaine contrary, all of the subdivisional lines of said v. C. & N. W. R’y Co., decided in 1877, by the survey, approaching the river, were so run as supreme court of Wisconsin, 42 Wis. 214; and to extend only to certain points on the bank of Braxton v. Bressler, decided by the supreme court the river at greater or less distances from the of Illinois in 1872, 64 Ill. 488. margin of the water, which points are designa- In Sloan v. Biemiller, 35 Ohio St. 492, it was ted by said survey as corners to the respective held that the rule did not apply to Lake Erie subdivisions of said Reservation. And also that and its bays; and a similar ruling was made in the river was meandered on the bank thereof, Wisconsin, in Delaplaine v. C. & N. W. Ry Co., to and from said respective corners.
supra. upon defendants rested. Whereupon the court The plaintiffs in error rely on the case of Railfound and ruled that the aforesaid act of con- road Company v. Schurmier, decided by the sugress under which said surveys were made, re- preme court of the United States in 1868. 7 served only an easement to the public of the Wall. 272. right to navigate the waters of said river, and In that case it was declared that the common that by said act and the said surveys of the law rules of riparian ownership did not apply, United States, made under said act as aforesaid, under the acts of congress, to lands bordering on the boundary line of plaintiff's said land was not navigable non-tidal streams, where the title to restricted to the margin of the water at ordi- such lands is derived from the United States. nary or low-water mark, but the same extended But in the subsequent case of Barney v Keokuk to the center or thread of the stream, and that (94 U. S, 338), it is said, whether, as rules of the plaintiff, being the owner of the island afore- property, it would now be safe to change the said, was by virtue thereof the owner of the bed doctrines of the common law where they have of the river opposite to said island to the center been applied, is for the several states themselves or thread of the stream, subject only to the right to determine. “If they choose to resign to the of the public to navigate the waters thereof, and riparian proprietor, rights, which properly bethereupon rendered a judgment in favor of the long to them in their sovereign capacity, it is plaintiff against the defendants."
not for others to raise objections." The judgment having been affirmed by the The common law doctrine, having been incordistrict court, the present proceeding in error is porated into the jurisprudence of this state at so prosecuted by the plaintiffs in error, in this early a day, and having been regarded as a rule court, to obtain the reversal of the judgments of of property for more than half a century, it ought both courts.
not now, irrespective of the question of its orig
inal correctness, to be disturbed. To disturb the WHITE, J.
rule now, "would be a dangerous tampering The ruling of the courts below is in accordance with riparian rights.". with the decision of this court in Gavit v. The decision in Gavit v. Chambers related to Chambers decided in 1828. 3 Ohio, 496. In the Sandusky river, the same river that is inthat case it was held, that in this state the own- volved in the present case; but the land in ers of land situate on the banks of navigable question in that case was surveyed and sold streams running through the state, are also under the act of May 18, 1796. Ohio Land Laws, owners of the beds of the rivers to the middle of 35. In the present case the land was surveyed the stream, as at common law. The same doc- and sold under the act of April 26 1816. 3 U. trine has been recognized in subsequent cases, S. Statutes at large, 308. and has become a rule of property in this state. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs in Lamb o. Rickets, 11 Ohio, 311; Walker v. Board error, that the decision in Gavit v. Chambers of Public Works, 16 Ohio, 544. The rule is in does not apply to the act last named. It is true accordance with the doctrine of the common the case arose under the former act, but the doclaw, which regards all non-tidal streams, that trine of the common law which it lays down in are navigable in fact, as mere highways; and regard to the rights of riparian owners must be the same rule prevails in most of the states. kept in view in giving construction and applica
In Jones v. Soulard, decided in 1860, the rule tion to the act now in question. was applied by the supreme court of the United It is admitted in the agreed statement that States, to the Mississippi river. In speaking “none of the subdivisional lines of the survey of the rule, it is said in the opinion : "We think extended to, or embraced the bed of the river, this as a general rule too well settled, as part of but that, on the contrary, all of the subdivisional