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against the ticket speculators has thus far and private owners have some rights. I must proven advantageous to Mr. Lester Wallack, in hold that the motion must be granted. whos behalf Messrs. Howe & Hummel obtained a preliminary injunction preventing the sale of tickets in front of his theater. In opposition to
MARRIAGE-CONTRACT-EVIDENCE-COhis motion to make the injunction perpetual,
HABITATION-REPUTE-MODE the defendants urged that Mr. Wallack hall not
OF LIFE. acted in good faith and that the license held by the speculators gave them authority to sell their NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS. tickets. Mr. Wallack's answer to these statements was a denial, and Judge Donohue ren
BADGER v. BADGER. dered his decision, making the injunction permanent. The following is the decision in full:
April 11, 1882. "In this case the plaintiff claims that the de- Marriage may bo established by the proof of cohabitation when such fendants and others obstruct the way to the
cohabitation has the clenients of a matrimonial relation; and in trying an
insle of fact as to the character of such coliubitation, evidence that one of theater, and interfere with the proper right to the parties was reputed to be single is not competent; that he or she lived which he is entitled as the occupant of the
as a single person is competent. premises on which his theater is The defend
The plaintiff' claims dower in the lands of Jacob Badger,
deceased, whom she alleges to have been her husband. ants do not deny the selling of tickets on the The defendants deny the marriage, and so raise an issue sidewalk in front of the theater, but content of fact, which fornis the vital point of the controversy. themselves with the denial of doing so in the
No formal or ceremonial inarriage is proven, nor any ex
press agreement between the parties, constituting such vestibule or the entrance, or in front of it or in relation. The proof oficred is that of cohabitation, conany part except as the license provides. It is tinued for a long period of time, and characterized by substantially admitted that the defendants do
general repute, anci by conduct and conversation indicat
ing, as is claimed, an intercourse rather matrimonial claim the right to sell tickets for his theater, than meretricious. It is not our duty to solve the probon the sidewalk in front thereof, and the first len raised by the evidence, but some general uuderground taken by them is that they have a
standing of the facts is necessary to a proper appreciation
of the questions of law which are submitted for decision. license so to do from the mayor. The answer to The decedent appears to have lived two lives. They ran this is simply to refer to the opinion of Mr. parallel with each other for more than a third of a cenJustice Van Vorst, in Ely v. Campbell, 59 How.
iury, and without approach or collision. In one locality,
and among his own relatives and friends, he seemed to Pr. 333, in which this question is considered, and be a bachelor, possessing considerable wealth, at the to state the conclusion arrived at, that the city head of a respectable business, occupying rooms with has no right by license to appropriate any man's
his sister and with others during much of the period, and
if not alway at home, yet not so frequently absent as to sidewalk or street, for any obstruction to him or
arouse suspicion or remark. In another locality in the the public. It does not add to the defendant's same city, but perhaps in an humbler neighborhood, be right; as he secondly claims, that he is selling
appears as John Baker, living with the plaintiff as his
wife, introducing her as such, called uncle by her what the plaintiff sold him. As well might the nephew, and deemed father by her daughter, paying her man who purchased goods from any wholesale bills and expenses, furnishing her with the food and dealer, claim the right to sell the goods as pur
shelter he shared, nursing her through severe and conchased on the side walk in front of the store from
tinued illness. Seldom absent at night, attending her
mother's funeral as one of the family of mourners, the which they were purchased. The authorities intercourse created no scandal, but reputed to be virreferred to in the case cited, clearly demonstrate
tuous and respectable, and that of husband and wise.
Other facts are stated in the opinion. that the city has no power to license any business on the sidewalk or in front of any man's
FINCH, J. It is over the cohabitation and its true char
acter and meaning that the controversy arises. So far premiser without his consent. It is hardly nec- as we know, the association began when the plaintiff was essary to discuss the question wether the use of young and the decedent in middle life, and continued the street to carry on any business not neces
until he fell dead an old man of seventy-six. It lasted
without break or interruption. It survived the loss of sarily confined to the streets, is a hindrance to youth and its attractions; it ran on through sickness, the public, as it is too plain for argument. paralysis, and some degree of mental weakness; it
showed no trace of the satisfied passion that tires of its If the right exists for one employment not so victim and abandons her for new temptation; it did not necessary, it is for all, and people would hardly change when the girl had grown into the matron and be
came deaf and lume; it stayed with the tenacity of love pay rent for offices if the sidewalk could be had
and duty, remaining patient and faithful until the end. for such uses. It was stated on the argument It is argued with great force that if this relation was that that the legislature passed some law on the sub- only of lover and mistress, it approached strangely near
to matrimonial truth and devotion, and gave to unlawful ject, which was before the Governor, and the de
lust an endurance and virtue not common or expected. cision of this case was asked to be suspended The reputation attending this cohabitation in the until that was disposed of, as it might give the neighborhood where it existed and was known, among defendants the right to carry on the business
those brought into its presence by relationship, business,
or society, was that which ordinarily attends the dwellsought to be restrained. What right the Legis
ing together of husband and wife. It has been well delature will leave to the citizens or property scribed as the shadow cast by their daily lives. 1 Bishop owners of the city might be difficult to say,
on Mar. and Div. 0 438. In the general repute surroundand in this case we cannot speculate upon it;
ing them, the slow growth of months and years, the re
sultant picture of forgotten incidents, passing events, bu , as this case arose before any such act passed,
habitual and daily conduct, presumably honest because it must be disposed of as the law is, and hold
disinterested and safer to be trusted because prone to
suspect, we are enabled to see the character of the cobabwith Judge Van Vorst's decision that the public itation and discern its distinctive features. It is for that
reason that such general repute is permitted to be proven. It sums up a multitude of trivial details. It compacts into the brief phrase of a verdict the teaching of inany incidents and the conduct of years. It is the average intelligence drawing its conclusion. It wouli leall us without serious doubt to the true inference to be aulopted, but for the apparent concealment indicated by tho assumption of a false naino, and the persistent silence of the clecodont among his own relatives. We have no certuin explanation of those facts. We cannot tell why they existol. While not necessarily inconsistent with tho fact of a marriage, and perhaps possible of explanation, we cannot deny that they belong more naturally to and are more easily explained by an illicit anil clandestine intercourse than one honest and open and not noodling disguise. They tended, therefore, to throw some doubt upon the character of the cohabitation, and to raise over it a question as to the legitimate inference to be drawn.
To another alleged fact pressed upon us for the same purpose by the defendants we give little head.
It was said that this cohabitation was illicit in its origin, and must be presumed to retain that character until proof is given of a change in its object or purpose. To establish the fact the appellants go back to the girlhood of the plaintiff and recall an ovent which they claim reflects upon her purity. At the age of about soventeen she returns to her home with an infant of tendor years. No husband comes with her or is known; there is no acknowledged father of the child; not a word of explanation seems have been mado; and we are askoil, for this reason, to infer that an illicit connection had existed betweon tho mothor and some person unknown. When this child was two or three years old the mother and Jacob Badger are found living together in Macdougal Street, keeping house, to all appearance as husband and wifo, and their cohabitation assuming at once, to all outward soening, the characteristics which attendeel it to the end. Because of this alleged lapse of virtue on the part of the woman it is argued that the cohabitation was illicit in its origin. The proof does not warrant such a conclusion. It shows no connection whatever between the parties prior to the cominencernent of their cohabitation in Macdougal Street. Back of that, it is sufficient to say we have no information or evidenco of any intorcourse between them. We do not even know, except, perhaps, presumptively, that the child born before is the plaintiff's daughter. We certainly do not know who was its fathor, nor whether the offspring of an illicit intercourse or a inatrimonial connection. At all events the testiinony introducos Jacob Badger for the first time at tho commencemont of the cohabitation which is tho subject of dispite. To say that it was illicit in its origin is to assuno its moretricious charactor in the face of the evidenco which tonds to show it to have been matrimonial, and so beg the question, since the cohabitation at tho beginning is not shown to bo other or difforont froin its continuous character to the end. Prior to this wo are without information and must not presymo guilt where innocence is possible, and loast of all indulge in a mere guess that Jacob Badger was a party to the wrong.
The rule that a connection confessedly illicit in its origin, or shown to have been such, will be presumed to retain that character until somo change is established, is both logical and just. The force and effect of such a fact is always very great, and we are not disposed in the least degree to weaken or disregard it. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 198. Very often the character of the cohabitation is indicated by facts and circumstances which explain tho cause, and locate the period of the change. So that in spite of the illicit origin the subsequent intercourse is deemed matrimonial.
Fenton v. Řced, 4 Johns. 52; Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige, 574; Star v. l'cck, 1 Hill, 270 ; Jackson v. Claw, 18 Johns. 340.
But a change inay occur, and be satisfactorily established, although the precise time or occasion cannot be clearly ascertained. If the facts show that there was or must have been a change, that the illicit beginning has become transformed into a cohabitation matrimonial in its character, it is not imperative that we should be able to say precisely when or exactly why the change occurred. inujole v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90. While we have no hesitation about the rule, and shall be prompt to apply it in a case which demands such application, we do not see that the facts before us require it, since they fail to establish an illicit origin of the cohabitation as a seperate and independant fact. But the other facta remain and are en
titled to their due consideration. The disguise of a false name, known and assented to by both parties; the two lives so different and utterly unlike, running on at the same time and demanding adequate explanation, must bo adınitted to bear upon the character of the intercourse, and to have introduced into it possible elements of llout,
We are thus enabled to see what the precise question of fact was. A continuous cohabitation for about thirty-five years between these parties was established. cither meretricious or inatrimonial, and all the evidence properly admissible and touching that inquiry was such only as tender to solve the doubt.
The defendants were permitted to prove, under repeated objections and exceptions, that Jacob Badger was reputed to be a bachelor and unmarried. This proof was given by persons who were his friends and acquaintances, but who knew nothing of the plaintiff, were unconscious of her existence, and in total ignorance of her cohabitation with the decalent. The repute thus proven was not the product of the cohabitation, and did not tend to explain it, or solve its character. It ould not by possibility bear upon it. It was not its shadow, for it. cast none into the locality where these witnesses were. It was the shadow of a different and distant fact which in itself was not ambiguous, and needed no explanation to relieve its character of doubt.
That the decedent lived a single life without presence or appearance of wife or daughter, at his rooms when boarding with his sister, was a fact properly proved, and clearly admissible. But that among those who thus saw him, and before whom nothing had occurred to raise the question, he was reputed to be unmarried, was pure bearsay, explaining nothing since there was nothing to be explained. The life of John Baker, in Macdougal Street, was ambiguous in the sense that it might indicate an illicit intercourse or a matrimonial connection. To ascertain which, the shadow it cast upon surrounding society could be examined and studied usefully for the solution of the doubt. The life of Jacob Bruger, in Joralemon Street, was not ambiguous at all, and needed no help to solvo its character. It is indeed said that the purpose was to show a divided ropute, and so contradict the reputation of marriage which, to be effective, must be general. But the general repute proved, and that required to be shown, does not and cannot go beyond the range of knowledge of the cohabitationt. If within that range there is division as to tho character of the fact, the divided reputo merely continues tho ambiguity and detormines nothing.
In Clayton v. Warilell, 4 N. Y. 230, the divided repute was of « inarriago ainong some friends, and a disrepu. tablo connection among others; thus negativing a general roputo of connubial intercourse ainong those having knowledge of the cohabitation. In Commonwealth v. Stump, 5:3 Penn. St. 135, the reputation shown related to the parties and their association, and vas that they were not married. In Vincent's Appcal, 60 Penn. St. 228, the husbind lived two lives as here, and his repute as a bachelor among those who know hiın by his true name was provod, but no question was raised over it, and it was not allowel to prevail as against the general repute of marriage in the locality where both parties lived. It was treated as utterly ineffective to produce a divided reputation. In Lyle v. Ellwood, 19 Eq. ('as. 98, the reputo was divided, and that of inarriage allowed to prevail, but it was among those cognizant of the cohabitation and having reference to it as a fact to be explained. We have been able to find no caso where such evidence as was hore given, upon its admissibility being challenged by objection, has been held competent. The evidence of reputation, when adınitted, is an exception to general rules, It should never be allowed to stray beyond some useful or necessary purpose. In its application to cases of pedigree it is justified by the difficulties of proof, and confined generally to the family and relatives whose knowledge is assumed, and who bave spoken before a controversy arisen. In its applicaton to the fact of marriage it is inore than mere hearsay. It involves and is made up of social conduct and recognition giving character to an admitted and unconcealed cohabitation. But in its application to a man living in appearance a single life, it adas nothing to that fact, it creates no further contradiction to an intercourse carried on elsewhere under tbe appearance of matrimony, and throws no additional light upon it. It amounts to bare hearsay, and the unsworn declaratiops of persops knowing poibing of the facts in
controversy. In the present case twenty-three different fact of very great importance in its bearing on the queswitnesses were allowed to testify to the reputation of the tion of evidence. The plaintiff proved a long cobabitadecedent as a bachelor, not one of whom before his tion, matrimonial and respectable in its character, and death, had seen or heard of the plaintiff, or known of her relied upon the inforence of marriage to be drawn from connection with him. We do not think this evidence it. To rebut that inference and weaken its force the dewas admissible. Its very volume and frequency indi- fendants proved a parallel life wearing the appearance of cates the dangerous effect it may have produced upon celebacy. To modify that fact, and break its force as the mind of the court, and we cannot disregard the founding a counter inference, the plaintiff proved the
declarations of decedent that he had been a married man, We think also that the letter offered in evidence, the but it would not do to let “the women," meaning the body of which was in the handwriting of the decedent, relatives with whom he was living, know it. This stateand which was signed by the plaintiff as Mrs. Mary ment tended to explain consistently with an existing Baker, and addressed to her nephew, was improperly ex- marriage the silence of the decedent to his relaties, and cluded. That the decedent wrote the body of the lotter, to take away the natural inference to which his life as a and was at least assenting to its transmission, is not de- single man led. And tnus the meaning of that life was nied. Although signed by her it was their joint act. It challenged. The defendants then sought to restore the congratulated the nephew upon his marriage; it said "we inference by showing the declarations of decedent to the wish you much joy ;' it added “we expected a visit from same witness that he was unmarried. No objection was you and your wife;" it announced that a present was made to the effort by the plaintiff, but it failed by reason awaiting him, and that his mother called on a previous of the denial of the witness. Then Almira Badger was day; and its signature was a representation by the wo- called and the declaration of decedent to Whitbeck man signing that she was a married woman passing by proved by her. At this point an objection was interthe name of Baker. The Dysart Peerage Appeal, H. of posed, but general, and assigning no specific ground. L. Cas. part 4, p. 512. The nephew swears that decedent The declaration was certainly relevant and material. It afterwards asked him if he received the letter, and that tended to restore to the defendants the benefit of the inhe called and obtained the promised present. Here was an ference to be derived from the decedent's bachelor life, act wbich tended to characterize the existing relati::n as against the effect of the declarations proved by plainand indicated in many ways its connubial character. tift. It bore, therefore, in the end upon the main issue, The use of the plural "we" withont unnecessary explan- and cannot be treated as a collateral matter and immaation, and assuming that it would be perfectly under- terial so as to prevent contradiction, and make the anstood, is one such fact. If the connection was hal- swer conclusive. Being evidence relevant and material, lowed and disgraceful, would the parties to it be likely it was admissible unless some rule of law excluded it. to invite a newly married couple, beginning in their Platner v. Platnmr, 78 N. Y. 90. The objection taken at youth a life' of virtue, to a scene of concubinage and the trial pointed ont none. On the argument here, two lechery? And if they were shameless enough for that, only are stated. These are that defendants were bound would they have called the person addressed nephew, by Whitback's answer, which would have been true if and sent the letter with a distinct assertion of marriage the subject of inquiry had been collateral instead of bearin its signature? It seems to us, as we read it, to indicate ing, as we have seen, upon the precise issue involved; a conscious innocence in the relation of the parties send- and that Almira was an interested party and could not ing it, and an entire confidence that the nephew already testify to a personal transaction between herself and deso understood its character. It was a joint act, occurring ceased. It was not such. There was no transaction or during the cohabitation, calculated to reflect light upon conversation b'tween her and decedent. She was merely its character, and clearly admissable as a part of the res a listener to one between him and the witness. Carey v. gestæ. We think it was error to exclude it.
White, 59 N. Y. 336; Hildebrandt v. Crawford, 65 Ib. 107. A further question arose over the evidence of a witness We cannot say, then, that error was committed in the resought to be contradicted. One Whitbeck, called on be- ception of this evidence, in view of the course of the trial half
of the plaintiff, testified to a conversation with dece. and the character of the objections taken. Underlying dent when living in Bainbridge Street, and when they the whole subject are grave questions as to what, in s were sitting on the front piazza, in which the latter said case like the present, constitutes the res gestæ, and the he was a married man once, when he was a young man. limitations which properly attach to declarations offered The witness was cross-examined as to this conversation on that ground, which we do not undertake to determine and then dismissed. At a subsequent stage of the trial since they were not sufficiently raised. he was recalled by the plaintiff and testified only to the Judgment reversed. date of his residence in Bainbridge Street, to the fact that Almira Badger lived there as his tenant, and that Jacob Badger did not reside there or stay there at night. On
COLORADO. cross-examination he was asked by defendant's counsel whether on an occasion when they were moving furniture he did not ask decedent, in the presence of Almira,
(Supreme Court.) whether he was married, to which he replied, “No, sir; I am a bachelor.” The witness denied any such conversation. Later in the trial Alinira Badger was called to
PALMER V. RAY ET AL. AND THE CITY OF DENVER. testify to this conversation. Objection was interposed 1. Taxation-Assessinent—Sidewalks- Eminent Domain. on behalf of plaintiff. The court admitted the evidence, - There is but one mode of taxation provided in the con"to contradict Whitbeck and not as a declaration of de. stitution of Colorado. This mode requires that all taxes ceased." The limitation of the court seems to concede must be “uniform upon the same class of subjects withthat the declarations of decedent were incompetent as in the territorial limits of authority levying the tax," such in behalf of the defendants. While it is now and assessed upon all property according to its just valclaimed that they were admissible as part of the res gestæ, uation. it is quite evident that the ruling at the_trial went on á Assessments upon abutting property to defray the costs different ground. In Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 57 Barb. 241, 1 of making sidewalks are a form of taxation, Street imit was held that the declarations of Taylor, made in proveinents, being mainly for the public benfit, it would promiscuous conversations, having no reference to Mrs. contravene the rule of uniformity as well as that of valu. Taylor, that he was not a married man, were properly ation, to impose the whole burden, or an unequal porexcluded ; that they did not refer to her status, and con- tion of it, upon part only of the same class of subjects stituted no part of the res gesta. This is a somewhat within the territorial limits of the authority levying the narrower statement of the rule than that given by the tax." Hence, neither under the taxing power, nor under chancellor in Taylor's case, 9 Paige, 614. But the case the right of eminent domain, can the cost of making here is different from both. It resembles the former in sidewalks be assessed against abutting property: the peculiar fact of two lives running parallel with each
2. Police Power-Sidewalks. Though the authority to other, and tending to contradictory injerences. Taylor regulate the relative rights, privileges and duties of inseemed to be a married man at Harlem, where he dwelt dividuals in society in respect to property or business is with a woman whoin he recognized as his wife, and ap- a mere police regulation, yet it may assume the form of peared to be a bachelor at Rye, where he lived with his taxation, and, under the police powers of municipal cor. own immediate relatives. His declarations at the latter porations, the owners of adjacent lots may be required, place were excluded. Without determining the propriety at their own expense, to construct sidewalks, and the of that ruling, there is in the present case an additional cost thereof may be made a lien upon such abutting lots JOURNAL
Olio law Journal.
mainder of the eight days mentioned in Sec.
6606, Rev. Stat.-upon the ground of absence of COLUMBUS, OHIO,
JULY 6, 1882.
the "regular uttorney in the case," "absence of
the defendant,” and “not ready for trial.” PlainThe Supreme Court last Saturday morning, tiff objected to adjournment and insisted upon adjourned until September 25th, next.
trial. No affidavit offered, witness sworn Chief Justice Okey will remain in Columbus for other showing made for continuance, nor was the present; Judge McIlvaine will go to New a jury required, or the Justice actually engaged Mexico; Judge White will spend part of the in other official business. The Justice granted among thc Lake Eric Islands :
the adjournment until Monday, June 19th, 1882, Judge Longworth will go to Lake George and the entire cight days, basing his authority upon thc Adirondack Mountains, and Judge Johnson
discretion and Sec. 6606 Rev. Stat. Was the for the present will remain at his home in Iron
magistrate's conduct authorized by law? We ton.
think not. Dwight Crowel, Clerk of the Court is still confined to his home in Ashtabula County, where
His authority can be found in neither of the he has been a sufferer for nearly three months.
sources he mentioned. We are glad to know he is improving.
A Justice of the Peace's power is purely statuLaw Librarian, Mr. Frank N. Beebe will prob- tory, defined and limited by positive law. ably spend the heated term among his possess. Harding v. Trustees, 3. Ohio 546, 549.
Davis v. ions in northern Michigan. Assistant Libra- Bartlett, et al, 12, 0. S. 530, 534, and the primary rian, Mr. James Bell, will spend his summer va- meaning of the word discretion as defined in the cation in camp with the Governor's Guard at books is "the decision of what is equitable, juDoor Park.
dicious, or right in view of and guided by the Deputy Clerk, Orange Frazer, avill spend his
circumstances of the case and the wisdom of the summer vacation in his canoe among the Thousand Islands. Sub-Deputy, W. W. Sharpe, will magistrate, unfettered by specific rules of positive
law." remain in charge of the clerk's office.
Where the manner of exercising a power or CORRESPONDENCE.
jurisdiction conferred upon & Justice of the
Peace is prescribed and limited by statue, it EDITORS OHIO LAW JOURNAL:
must be confined to those limits, and cannot be A proceeding before a Justice of the Peace, the
exercised in any other mode, i. e. the trial magother day in our city, revealed an opinion on
istrate can exercise no discretion where his duthe part of said Justice and some investigation ties are pointed out. McCleary v. McLain, 2, warrants the assertion that the opinion is not 0, S. 368. limited to him alone, but is held and exercised
The Legislature has undertaken to define the by others in his position and endorsed by not a
duties of Justices upon the subject of adjournfew attorneys—that an adjournment of a trial
ments. Sec. 6534, Rev. Stat., provides for adin forcible detainer is entirely discretionary journments without the consent of either party with the Justice, provided the adjournment or and gives to the Justice a limited choice in three aggregate of adjournments do not exceed eight classes of cases, only upon the transpiring of days.
either of two events, viz. "if a jury be required," The facts will afford a better understanding or "if the Justice be actually engaged in other of the legal proposition. Summons in forcible official business;" if either of these events occur detainer was returnable Mcuday, June 12th, upon the return day, then the maximum length 1882, at 10 A. M., parties appeared by attorney of adjournment is fixed by: 1. That the defendand continuance had by consent of parties at
ant is not a resident of the County. 2. That he request of defendant. Friday, June 16th, 1882, at
is in attendance under arrest. In these two same hour, again parties appeared by attorney, classes the adjournment is limited to forty-eight defendant not present in person, and defendant's hours. And 3. All other cases are classified toattorney asked a further adjournment–the re- gether and the time limited to eight days, and
. | has
it must be born in mind that this power to ad- for profit, which must have a capital stock journ where the parties do not consent can only for purposes other than for profit, consisting of
owned by stockholders. 2nd. Those organized be exercised either when time is required to ob
members associated together for å lawful purtain a jury, or the Justice is at the time other- pose. To the second class belong corporations wise officially engaged.
formed under the provisions of Section 3630 of
the Revised Statutes for the mutual protection Sec's. 6535 and 6536, Rev. Stat. provides for
and relief of its members, and for the payment adjournments by cither party without the of stipulated sums of money to the family or consent of the other, and in which the Justice
heirs of deceased members.
2. Corporations formed for this purpose, has no choice or discretion whatever.
though not subject to the provisions of Chap. From the foregoing we must conclude that 10, Title II of the Revised Statutes, relating to the Justice can legally grant an adjournment Life Insurance Companies, on the mutual or against the objection of either party for no length
stock plan, are subject to all the general provis
ions of Chap. 1 Title II, which apply to corpo of time whatever, except as follows: 1. Jury rations formed for purposes other than profit. business. 3. Upon the sworn statement of the
been organized and incorporated, the meinbers
thereof are those mutually engaged in promoting party asking it, if required by the adverse party. the purposes of the organization, and who, by And that Sec. 6606 Rev. Stat. extends no addi- virtue of their relation to the corporation are
entitled to the mutual protection and relief protional power or discretion to the Justice, but is
vided, or whose fanıily or heirs are, in case of simply a limitation upon Sec's. 6535 and 6536, his death, entitled to the specific relief provided that when the showing has been made under for them. oath for continuance as provided by thosc Sec
4. The members of such a corporation are the
elective and controlling body, authorized to elect tions, the adjournment shall be for the time
trustees and prescribe regulations for the govmentioned therein, provided the action be not ernment of the same, not inconsistent with the forcible entry and detention, but if so, Sec. 6606
laws of the State. Neither the incorporators nor
the trustees first elected are authorized to adopt steps in and says only eight days and not for
a by-law or regulation providing that they shall thirty or ninety days, unless you give an under hold office during life, and in case of vacancy, to taking for accruing rent.
fill the same by appointment. The opinion of the Justice would make Sec. faithfully executing the trust which the law and
5. Trustees are charged with the duty of 6606 modify Sec's. 6535—6 and repeal Sec. 6534 regulations impose on them. They are entitled at least as to actions of forcible detainer, which to a reasonable compensation for the service renis scarcely possible, the sections were all enacted dered; but any plan or scheme by which money at the same Session of the Legislature in 1853,
is collected from members by assessment or othand are harmonious.
erwise, with a view to their indi,idual profit,
and beyond what is necessary to defray the reaT. H. R.
sonable expenses of executing the trust, is a Columbus, O., 19th June, '82.
breach of trust. [If our correspondent would attempt to seek a Justification for the multifarious and bewilder- poration by which the member in consideration ing orders and decisions of Justices of the Peace,
of his payment of a membership fee, annual dues we fear he would lose both heart and mind and
and a pro rata assessment with his fellow memin the end meet with the inevitablemutter fail.
bers to pay a sum of money to the family or uro.-Eng. Law JOURNAL.]
heirs of a deceased member, in consideration of which the association at his death stipulates to
pay to his family or heirs a sum of money, gradMUTUAL LIFE ASSOCIATIONS. uated by the number of members in his class, is
a contract of life insurance. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
7. Such a contract of insurance to pay in case of a member's death "to himself or assignees"
“to his estate," "to his executors or administraTHE STATE OF Ohio, ex rel., THE ATTORNEY tor," or to any person, whether a relation or not, GENERAL.
who is not of his family or heirs, is against pub
lic policy, and void. THE STANDARD LIFE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA.
The object of this action is, to oust the defend
ant, a corporation organized under section 3630 1. Corporations organized under the laws of of the Revised Statutes, from its franchise to do Ohio, are of two classes: 1st. Those organized | business, as an insurance company, on the ca