NEW ATTORNEYS. The following graduates of the Cincinnati Law School were admitted to practice by the Supreme Court: R. W. E. Davis, Cincinnati. John T. Schoonover, Wapakoneta. M. F. Parrish, New Lexington. The following named gentlemen were examined last week, and on Wednesday admitted to practice: James W. Drouillard, Portsmouth. Warren W. Hole, Salem. Thomas D. Shirkey, Proctorville. OPENING PRIVATE LETTERS. In United States v. McCready, 11 Fed. Rep. 225, where a letter carrier left a letter in the hall of the residence of the person to whom it was addressed, and the defendant opened it with intent to pry into the business and secrets of the owner of the letter, held, to be a violation of section 3892 of the Revised Statutes, and that the protection of a letter so situated is within the constitutional power of Congress. The statute is as follows: "Any person who shall take any letter, postal card, or packet, although it does not contain any article of value or evidence thereof, out of a postoffice or branch post-office, or from a letter_or mail carrier, or which has been in any post-office or branch post-office, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with a design to obstruct the correspondence or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy the same, shall, for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment at hard labor for not more than one year, or both." The court, Hammond, D. J., said: "But it is insisted for the defendant that these facts do not constitute a violation of the statute, because, as the letter was taken by the defendant after its delivery by the letter carrier at a place designated by Lettie Amis for the delivery of her mail, it had in law been 'delivered,' within the intent and meaning of the aet; and that if a proper construction of its language embraces an offense committed after the letter had passed from the actual control of the port-office officials and agents, and before manual delivery to the person to whom it was directed, the enactment is to that extent beyond the legislative power of Congress. * ** The system of mail delivery in cities by letter carriers is of comparatively modern date, and is constantly increasing with the growth and development of the country. It necessarily affords greater and more abundant opportunity for the commission of offenses like those charged in this case than the older method of delivery at the post-office. Letters are left in private boxes, on tables, counters, and under doors, and if the system is to be efficient they must be protected in that situation. Indeed, the postmasters general have for years, by their printed regulations, urged the public to 'provide, in cities where letter carriers are employed, letter-boxes at places of business or private residences, thereby saving much delay in the delivery of mail matter.' For the above reason, it seems to me that section 3892 should receive a liberal construction by the courts. The evil to be remedied and guarded against is so easy of accomplishment. it could not under an opposite or different construction be prevented by the existing statute. It is ample in its letter and spirit, and was no doubt intended to protect the seals of all correspondence through the mails until actual manual delivery to the party addressed, or his authorized agent. The courts should, in my judgment, effectuate that intention by so construing it, and not devolve the duty of affording the required protection on the States upon any theory that there is a want of constitutional power in Congress to do it. It seems an unnecessary separation of the subject-matter to so divide the duty of protection."-Albany Law Journal. DRUNKENNESS AND CRIME. A curious defense was raised in a prosecution for perjury at the Manchester Assizes recently, before Mr. Justice Chitty. It was alleged that It was alleged that the prisoner at the time of giving evidence was under the influence of drink, and incapable of judging clearly the effect of what he said. He head heard several statements that he believed to be untrue, and got into the box and denied them wholesale. It was argued that the prisoner, being in the condition described, was not responsible for what he was saying, and had not committed "wilful" and "corrupt" perjury The learned judge directed the jury "that drunkenness was no excuse in a case of this kind, unless the condition of a man in regard to drunkenness when he was giving evidence in an open court might have some bearing upon the point whether what he said was said deliberately and intentionally. It would be a most dangerous thing to allow a man to get off in a case of this kind on the ground of drunkenness, but if the jury was satisfied that the prisoner was in such a state of mind at the time in question that substantially he was not intending to deceive, they might take a merciful view of the case." The jury found the prisoner guilty, and sentence was deferred. There is no doubt that, as Patterson, J., said in R. v. Cruse, 7 C. & P., 541, "although drunkenness is no excuse for any crime, yet it is often of very great importance in cases where it is a question of intention." And in R. v. Thomas, 7 Ĉ. & P., 817, Parke, B., in summing up to the jury, said that "where the question is whether words have been uttered with a deliberate purpose, or merely low and idle expressions, the drunkenness of the person uttering them is proper to be considered." This comes very close to the recent case, and the direction given to the jury by Mr. Justice Chitty corresponds with article 29th of Mr. Justice Stephens' Digest of Criminal law, where it is laid down that if the existence of a specific intention is essential to the commission of a crime, the fact that an offender was drunk when he did the act which if coupled with that intention, would constitute such crime, should be taken into account by the jury in deciding whether he had that intention. Solicitor's Journal. MEMOIRS. We reproduce the following from one of our foreign exchanges, believing that it excels anything that was ever said or written about any member of the American Bench or Bar. It certainly will not be adopted as a model here: JUSTICE ONOOCOOL CHUNDER MOOKERJEE.-The Hindoo English author of a "Memoir of the late Honorable Justice Onoocool Chunder Mookerjee " thus describes the merits of the subject of the memoir before his elevation to the Bench: "Since he joined the native Bar down adinfinem of his career as a pleader, he had won a uniform way of pleading. He made no garish of words, never made his sentences long when he could express his thoughts in small ones. Never he counter-changed strong words with the pleaders or barristers of the other party. In defeating or conducting a case his temper was never incalescent and hazy. He well understood the interest of his client, and never ceased to tussle for it until he was flushed with success, or until the shafts of his arguments made his quiver void. He was never seen to illude or trespass upon the time of court with fiddle-faddle arguments to prove his wits going a-wool-gathering, but what he said was nude truth, based upon jus civile, lex non scripta, lex scripta, etc., and relative to his case and in homo-geneity to the subject matter he discussed, and always true to the points he argued. He made no quotation having no bearing to his case, but cited such acts, clauses and precedents that have a direct affinity to his case, or the subject-matter of his argument. By-the-by, I should not here omit to mention that he had one peculiarity in his pleading which I have observed very minutely. Having first expounded before the court the anatomy of his case, he then launched out on the relative position of his client with that of the other, pointing out the quidproquo or bolstering up the decision of the lower court with his sapience and legal acumen and cognoscence, waiting with quietude to see which side the court takes in favorable consideration, knuckling to the arguments of the court, and then inducing it gradually to his favor, giving thereby no offense to the court." DUTIES OF JURIES. The refractory jury at Bristol, who refused to take their law from the judge, and desired to be furnished with a copy of the report of R. v. Negus, L. R., 2 C. C., 34, were probably unaware that they were guilty of a most unconstitutional usurpation, and a grave breach of their duty. If instead of remitting them with a mild lecture to the bosoms of their families, Lord Coleridge had detained them while he read the observations of one of his predecessors, they would probably have understood more clearly the heinous nature of their offense. "The fundamental definition of trial by jury," said Lord Mansfield in R. v. Dean of St. Asaph, 21 How. State Trials. 1039," depends upon the universal maxim ad quæstionem juris non respondent juratores; ad quæstionem facti non respondent judices," and he added, "the constitution trusts that, under the direction of judge, they will not usurp a jurisdiction which is not in their province. They do not know, and are not presumed to know, the law; they are not sworn to decide the law; they are not required to decide the law. It is the duty of the judge, in all cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences." It appears that in the United States the question was once raised whether this rule applies in criminal cases, but it was unhesitatingly decided that it did; and Mr Justice Story, in one of the finest of his judgments, laid it down that it is "the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law. It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law as it is laid down by the court. This is the right of every citizen, and it is his only protection. * **Every person accused as a criminal has a right to be tried according to the law of the land, the fixed law of the land, and not by the law as a jury may understand it, or choose, from wantonness, ignorance, or accidental mistake, to interpret it." United States v. Battiste, 2 Sumn., 243. It would be difficult to state more forcibly the reasons why, in criminal cases, juries should not follow the example of the Bristol wiseacres.-Solicitors' Journal. SUPREME COURT RECORD. [New cases filed since last report, up to June 13, 1882.] 1199. John Goodwin et al v. Commissioners of Van Wert County. Error to the District Court of Van Wert County. I. N. Alexander and J. L. Price for plaintiffs; G. M. Saltzgaber for defendants. 1200. Waldemar Otis v. Henry M. Claflin. Error to the District Court of Cuyahoga County. W. C. McFarland and R. E. Knight for plaintiff. 1201. Margaret I. Jones et al v. Eliza A. Hines et al. Error to the District Court of Gallia County. W. H. C. Ecker, David Davis and Russell & Russell for plaintiffs; S. A. Nash for defendants. 1202. Iron Railroad Company v. Jacob Fink. Error to the District Court of Lawrence County. Neil & Cherrington and W. A. Hutchins for plaintiff; Ralph Leete for defendant. 1203. Cow Run Iron Tank Co. v. James D. Lehmer. Error-Reserved in the District Court of Washington County. Sibley, Ewart & Sands for plaintiff; Loomis, Alban & Guthrie for defendant. 1204. Martin Landon v. John S. Payne. Error to the District Court of Licking County. Chas. Follett & Son for plaintiff. 1205. Willis Robbins v. Sylvester Ciemings adm'r et al. Error to the District Court of Licking County. Chas. Follett & Son for plaintiff; J. R. Davis for defend 1207. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. William T. Leech adm'r. Error to the District Court of Jefferson County. J. Dunbar for plaintiff; W. P. Hays for defendant. 1208. Mary Fanning v. Hibernia Insurance Company. Arnold Green for plaintiff; W. S. Kerruish for defendant. 1209. I. N. Topliff v. William Harrison. Error to the District Court of Cuyahoga County. Arnold Green for plaintiff; Wilson & Sykora for defendant. 1210. John Rathburn et al. Error to the District Court of Clarke County. J. K. Mower, F. C. Goode and Harrison Olds & Marsh for plaintiffs. 1211. Joseph A. Treat et al v. Ransom Cole exr. Error to the District Court of Summit County. N. W. Goodhue and John L. Means for plaintiffs; Kohler & Sadler for defendant. 1212. Nimsila Coal Co. v. Patrick McGuire. Error to the District Court of Summit County. Green & Robinson for plaintiff; J. A. Kohler for defendant. 1213. In the matter of the assignment of Cornelius Newkirk, John H. Schneider assignee. C. W. Coates and C. R. Sanders attorneys. 1214. David Banker v. Lucy Shepherd et al: Error to the District Court of Butler County. Morey, Andrews & Morey for plaintiff; Thos. Millikin and Doty & Todhunter for defendants. 1215. Joseph S. Skerritt et al v. The First Presbyterian Society in Chillicothe. Error to the District Court of Ross County. L. Frend for plaintiffs. 1216. The State of Ohio ex rel Geo. K. Nash, Att'y General v. Andrew Baughman et al. Que warranto. Attorney General Nash for the State. 1217. Morris Cadwallader v. Julia A. Cliffinger et al. Error to the District Court of Delaware County. Powell & Ricketts for plaintiff. 1218. Charles A. McElroy, Exccutor v. John McElroy. Error to the District Court of Delaware County. Powell & Ricketts and Fulton for plaintiff. 1219. William Miller v. L. D. Warner et al. Error to the District Court of Champaign County. W. J. Gilmore and T. J. Frank for plaintiff. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. JANUARY TERM, 1882. Hon. JOHN W. OKEY, Chief Justice; Hon. WILLIAM WHITE, Hon. W. W. JOHNSON, Hon. GEO. W. McILVAINE, Hon. NICHOLAS LONGWORTH, Judges. Tuesday, June, 13, 1882. 117. Robert R. Hamilton et al. v. James S. Rodgers ot al. Error to the District Court of Lawrence County. LONGWORTH, J. By his will, R. dovised his whole estate, consisting principally of personal property, to trustees with direc tions to pay certain annuities out of the income of the estate and after the "final cessation" of said annuities, to distribute the estate among certain children and grandchildren of the testator, then living, and the heirs of the body of those deceased, and, in default of such heirs, their brothers and sisters. Held: 1st. That no state vests in the beneficiaries under the will, until the time for distribution as fixed by the terms of the will. 2nd. The "final cessation" of annuities mentioned in the will takes place either upon the death of all the annuitants, or upon the surrender or release of their annuities. 3rd. The trustees have no power undor the will to purchase in the annuities, and the mere fact that the annuitants declare that they are willing to release their annuities (but not having done so), upon payment to them of a sum in gross, will not authorize the court to order a distribution of the estate, and to decree the payment of such gross sums out of the funds of the estate. Judgment affirmed. 973. Ohio on relation of Joseph Turney, State Treasurer, v. Luko A. Staley, Treasurer of Hamilton County. In Mandamus. MCILVAINE, J. Held: 1. Proceedings by mandamus, on the relation of the Treasurer of State, will lie to compel the treasurer of a county to transfer to the state treasury the state's proportion of taxes collected by such county treasurer. 2. A petition for a writ of mandamus in such case, which shows the collection of such taxes by the county ⚫ treasurer, is not defective for want of an averment that the taxes so collected remain in the county treasury subject to the command of the writ. 3. Under section 1043 of Revised Statutes, as amended April 19, 1881 (78 Ohio L. 226), the amount of taxes for which the treasurer stands charged, is the whole amount of taxes levied on the duplicate, less the amount returned delinquent and the collection fees allowed the treasurer. 4. The amount of money in the treasury, for which the treasurer stands charged, cannot be increased or diminished by the exercise of the authority conferred on the auditor by said section to correct "any error which may have occurred in the apportionment of taxos at any previous settlement." 5. In obedience to a writ commanding a county treasurer to pay into the state treasury a balance due the state on its portion of taxes collected by the county treasurer, and for which no provision has been made by the County Auditor in his apportionment of taxes, any excess of money in the treasury over the sums apportioned to other funds for which taxes were levied, inay be used by the treasurer in making such payment. Demurror to 1st and 4th defenses sustained. JOHNSON, J. dissents. 34. Charles W. Rowland et al. v. The Meader Furniture Company. Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati. WHITE, J., Held: 1. Where a corporation de facto, in a proceeding in quo warranto, has been ousted from the franchise of being a corporation, such ouster is no defense to a suit by a creditor against stockholders, to enforce payment of their stock subscriptions. Gaff v. Flesher, decided by the Commission, (33 Ohio S. 115, 453), approved and followed. 2. The act of Feb. 27, 1846, "rogulating suits by and against companies and partners," (S. & C. 1138), applies only to unincorporated companies. Neither corporations de jure nor de facto are within its provisions; and an action cannot be maintained under the act, to chargo the stockholders with the payment of a judgment against the corporation. 3. Corporations de facto and de jure stand on the same footing as respects their liability to creditors; and the liability of the stockholders of the former, whether arising by statute or on stock-subscription, may be enforced for the benefit of creditors, the same as the liability of the latter. Judgment reversed and petition dismissed. No 1181. Daniel Catoir v. Moses G. Waterson, Treas urer of Cuyahoga County. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. Reserved in the District Court Error to No. 730. William Jumper v. Isabella Day. the District Court of Putnam County. Dismissed at costs of plaintiff in error, by agreement of parties. No. 1045. The State of Ohio on relation of the Attor ney General v. Middleburgh Mutual Aid and Life Association. Quo warranto. Judginent of ouster from the franchise to be a corporation. To be reported hereafter. No. 1047. The Stato of Ohio on the relation of Attorney General v. The Mutual Life Association of America. Quo warranto. Judgment of ouster from the franchise to be a corporation. To be reported hereafter. No. 1118. Jacob Ridenour v. The State of Ohio. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County. Judgmont aflirmed. To be reported hereafter. MOTION DOCKET. 104. John Goodwin et al. v. Commissioners of Van Wert County. Motion to dispense with printing bill of exceptions in cause No. 1199 on the General Docket. Motion overruled, unless the plaintiff in error waive the errors assigned on the bill of exceptions. 105. Philip H. Kumler, city Solicitor of Cincinnati . The City of Cincinnati ot al. Motion to take cause No. 721 of the General Docket out of its order for hearing. Motion granted. 107. Walter Dixon v. J. D. Henry et al. Motion to dismiss cause No. 780 on the General Docket for want of printed record. Motion sustained. 108. Lemuel McMannoss, Adm'r, v. Edwin Boutwell. Motion to extend time for filing printed record in cause No. 1109 of the General Docket. Motion granted and time extended to July 15, 1882. 109. George Allred v. The State of Ohio. Motion for leave to file a petition in error to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County. Motion overruled. 110. Mary Fanning v. Hibernia Insurance Company. Motion to advance cause 1208 to its original place on the General Docket. Motion Granted. Motion for a supersedeas overruled on the ground that whatever relief the plaintiff is entitled to, may be had under section 6718 of Revised Statutes. 111. Warren Wilder v. The Commissioners of Hamilton County. Motion to dispense with printing in this cause on the General Dockot. Motion granted. THE OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION which was adjourned to re-convene at Cincinnati July 5th, 1882, is notified that the meeting of this year has been postponed until the 27th of December. This is announced from Athens, Ohio, as the action of the Executive Committee of which Gen. C. H. Grosvenor is Chairman and L. J. Critchfield Esq., of this city, Secretary. We are not sure that this is an improvement upon the old date. The reaction following the Christmas festivities will prove as disastrous, we fear, and will interfere as seriously with a full attendance as the enervating indulgence in 4thof-July-spread-eagleism. would have done. The following is the official notice: ATHENS, JUNE 16, 1882. To the Members of the State Bar Association: Believing that the annual meeting of the Association at Cincinnati on July 5, prox., will fail to bring together as large an attendance as is desirable, by reason of the weather, the condition of the courts, the absence of members, and other reasons not necessary to be given in detail, the Executive Committee, by a nearly unanimous vote has postponed said meeting till December 27, 1882, at which time it will be held at Cincinnati or Columbus, as may be hereafter designated. By order of the Executive Committee. C. H. GROSVENOR, Ch'n. L. J. CRITCHFIELD, Sec'y. THE OHIO STATE REPORTS, We have been informed that bids for the publication of the State reports for the term of twenty years have been advertised for, and that in response thereto, two bids have come in which required the intervention of the Attorney General to determine which should be accepted. We never saw the advertisement for bids and did not know that bidding was in progress until after all was over. We do know however that lower bids than either of those offered were waiting the opportunity to be presented. That, howeve ris of no consequence now. The bids received were: 1st. By H. W. Derby, of Columbus, as follows: Three hundred and fifty volumes to the State at 92 cents per volume. Those purchased by the profession to be at one dollar and fifty cents per volume. 2nd. By Robt. Clarke & Co., of Cincinnati, as follows: Three hundred and fifty volumes to the State free of charge; and other folks to pay one dollar and seventy five cents per volume, for the volumes bought by them. The bid of H. W. Derby was decided by Mr. Nash to be the lower and we believe it has been accepted. In 1902 the contract will be re-let for another term of years. We promise to keep our readers posted as to who gets the job next time. NEW BOOKS. Pleadings Parties and Forms, under the Code. By Clement Bates Esq., of the Cincinnati Bar. In No. 3 of vol. 2 of this paper the first volume of Mr. Bates' work was noticed at length. What was then said concerning the general plan and purpose of the book applies with equal force to the second volume. It is a thorough and well arranged digest of statute and case law in Ohio and of pertinent citation of authorities in those states where code practice obtains. The labor involved in the preparation of the book will be appreciated when it is stated that over eight thousand authorities on pleadings and parties are digested, being gathered from twentyfive Code States and Territories. These authorities are cited, not piled up as is the manner of too many law writers, and the manner of the citation leads to the conclusion that the case cited has a direct bearing upon the point sought to be made plain. The profession in Ohio has now two excellent works on Code pleading, Green & Kelly's in one volume, and Bates, in two volumes; and one or the other ought to be-and will be, in the hands. of every lawyer in the state. The price is $12.00 for the two volumes and is sent post paid on receipt of that sum. The mechanical execution of the book is fully up to the usual excellence of the publications of Robt. Clarke & Co., Cincinnati, Ohio. AMERICAN DECISIONS, VOL. XXXIV. WE have heretofore compared the magnitude of the undertaking of which this volume is one added step, to the building of a TransContinental line of railway. As the work progresses we discover a similitude more pertinent, in the character of the undertaking itself. Each succeeding volume is an added section to a great causeway of legal knowledge, which, when completed, will make per |