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It has long been settled in the courts of equity in the petition, that there was a contract duly that a contract is not void because it is not re- made and fully performed by the ancestor of the duced to writing. The statute does not in any plaintiffs, it would be hard to find a good reason way effect the substance of an agreement, but it for excusing the other party from a performsimply prescribes as a rule that the same shall ance on his part. not be enforced upon oral proof alone. This is The demurrer keeps from the view of the court the case always when the contract remains ex
many facts and trains of facts that might be ecutory on both sides. But when both parties sufficient or inadequate to establish such a conhave performed the terms and conditions of the
tract as a court of equity would enforce by decontract, it is as valid and binding as though it creeing its specific performance, but when the had been reduced to writing, and duly signed. defendants rely upon a demurrer, they distinctAnd so, likewise, if one party has fully per-| ly admit the facts of the petition, and if they formed his part of the contract, the statute fur- are ample to demand relief the demurrer should nishes no shield to the other to escape from a be overruled. performance because it was in parole. To do so would make the law a protection to a fraud, the
Another question is made by the demurrer. very thing it was intended to prevent.
That the contract between John Ewing, Sr., It is conceded by the demurrer, that in this
and Margaret Gushwa, was not to be performed
within one year from the time it was made, case there has been a complete performance by
and it was therefore obnoxious to the statute of the ancestor of the plaintiffs, by his work and
frauds, which requires all contracts which are labor for the period of over thirteen years, contributing to some extent in the accumulation of
not to be performed within one year. to be re
duced to writing and signed by the party to the large estate left by John Ewing, Sr. And
be charged we may well enquire would it be equitable or just for the court to refuse to enforce the terms of
The authorities upon this branch of the statthe contract on behalf of John, Jr.? Could we
ute are abundant, that when the contract might so decree without aiding in the perpetration of
be performed within one year it is not within & manifest wrong upon the plaintiffs and their
the statule. The statute of descents makes a deceased father, who was a party to and long disposition of a man's estate at his death. The labored in the performance of the agreement?
contract here was on the part of Ewing, Sr., for If this question be answered by the letter and
the care, custody and control of John, Jr., inspirit of the decisions of our courts of equity ever
tended, no doubt, to be until he should arrive since the enactment of the statute, the answer
at the age of majority. But the law would inwould be that the contract must be enforced, for ject the condition in the absence of any condiit is not a case that falls within the terms and
tions to be performed by the representatives spirit of the statute.
of the parties that the contract would be perMany things might be said as reasons why a
formed and terminate upon the death of John contract such as is set forth in the petition Ewing, Sr., and that he might have died withmight be presumed from the acts of the parties.
in one year is beyond cavil. The performance of the terms and stipulations In a case reported in 19 Pickering's Reports, as read in the acts of the parties, would be hard 365, the facts were that a verbal contract was to account for in the absence of an agreement. made to support a child then eleven years old
At one time the doctrine was well recognized until she should arrive at the age of eighteen in the courts of equity, that if a defendant by years. This was held by the court to be a conanswer admitted the contract and then set up tract not within the statute because the party the statute of frauds as a defence, it passed for might have died within one year. no defence to the action, for when the contract
We think the statute furnishes no defence and a part performance was once admitted the against the claim presented by the plaintiffs chancellor would decree a specific performance and the demurrer is therefore overruled. notwithstanding the statute of frauds, and it was also doubted if the advantage of the statute could Reed & Hoagland attorneys for plaintiffs. be taken by demurrer, for by the demurrer the Uhl, Critchfield & Huston attorneys for defacts plead in the bill were admitted. The doc- fendants. trine now prevails however, that when the petition discloses the fact that th: claim is obnoxious to the statute, it may be brought to the no- A Justice of the peace was very much puzzled tice of the chancellor by demurrer, and if the de- a point of law which had been raised in a case over cision of the court is adverse to the defendant which he was trying. Finally he appealed to upon his demurrer he may still have the advant- the attorneys, “You gentlemen understand the age of a denial.
law, tell us honestly how the thing is.” S. laid Under our code the demurrer admits to be true it down from his side of the case, and M. from the all the facts that are well plead, at the samė other, and a thoughtful pause followed as the time securing to the party the right of making judge compared the points. Finally the judge a more complete defence by answer after the de- spoke. "Gentlemen, are you ready for the demurrer shall be overruled. But taking the de- cision?" "We are." "Well, the decision of the murrer here as an admission of the facts set forth
court is, that one of you has lied.”
COURSE OF THINGS.
Digest of Decisions.
U. S. CIRCUIT COURT, S. D. NEW YORK.
Rose v. THE STEPHENS AND CONDIT TRANSPORTA
(Court of Appeals.) TION COMPANY,
J.J. CONN V. THE STATE OF TEXAS. February 18, 1882.
March 13, 1882. Theft-Principals-Charge of Court- Unauthorised Con1. The plaintiff was injured by the explosion of a boi.
duct of the Court.-1. It is the duty of the trial court to ler which was under the control of the employees of
charge the law applicable to every phase of the case made defendant; Held, that the jury might infer negligence
by the evidence, or any part of the evidence, leaving the from the fact of the explosion; a presumption of negli
jury to pass upon the strength of the evidence, but the gence is indulged as a legitimate inference whenever the
court should never charge a rule of law, though perfectly occurrence is such as, in the ordinary course of things,
sound, which has no support in the evidence. does not take place when proper care is exercised and is
2. The jury, after having retired, may ask further inone for which the defendant is responsible.
structions of thg judge touching any matter of law. 2. The instructions to the jury niust be considered in
This should be done in a body in open court through their integrity and not in isolated parts.
their forernan, and the defendant should be made ac
quainted with such roquest. The court must inmuruct On motion for a new trial.
upon the point presented in the request of the jury, and The plaintiff was injured by the explosion of
this must be done in writing. If not proper matter for
instruction the court must inform the jury of this fact a steam boiler, which was being used by the de- in writing. fendant to propel a vessel chartered by the
3. The fact that a State's witness is related to one of defendant to others, to be used for the transpor
the defendants, is no good and sufficient ground to au
thorize leading questions by the State's attorney, when tation of passengers and freight. The jury the witness shows no disposition to evade or answer in found a verdict for the plaintiff
doubtful or double senso, but answers frankly, plainly
and pertinently each question propounded. WALLACE, J.
4. The conduct and remarks of the trial couri, and of
the prosecuting attorney, held to be highly improper and If the explosion resulted either from the careless- which are severely condemned. ness of the employees of the defendant in charge of the boiler, or from the negligence of the de
SALLIE HILL v. THE STATE OF TEXAS. March 1, 1882. fendant in sending forth an unsafe or dangerous
Murder-Manslaughter-Charge of Court.-1. The cler
ical omission trom the charge of the court of a word boiler to be used where human life would be en which would naturally and unmistakably supply itself dangered if it should explode, it is conceded the from the context, anii which could not possibly have defendant was liable. It is contended, however,
confused or misled the jury, would not be ground for re
versal. that it was error to instruct the jury that they 2. Where the evidence tends to show that the killing might infer such negligence from the fact of the was done by tlie use of means not in their nature calcuexplosion, and it is argued that such a presump
lated to produce death, and that the defendant was not
actuated by an intention to kill or by an evil or cruel tion only obtains when the defendant is under a
disposition, then the killing could not be murder and the contract obligation to the plaintiff, as in a case offense might be reduced to any grade of assault and batof a common carrier or bailee. Undoubtedly the
tery, and the court should chaige upon this phase of the presumption has been more frequently applied in cases against carriers of passengers than WILLIAM FRANKEL v. HEIDENHEIMER BROS. February in any other class, but their is no foundation in 13, 1882.
Evidencc-Res Adjudicata.-1. Whenever all that porauthority or in reason for any such limitation
tion of the record pertaining to, and enough of it to show of the rule of evidence. The presumption orig- the action had in relation to facts stated in a plea of res inates from the nature of the act, not from the
adjudicata is offered ir evidence, it should be admitted nature of the relations between the parties.
by the court, it being unnecessary that other portions irIt
relevant and unnecessary to the issue should be prois indulged as a legitimate inference whenever duced, the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course
2. The applicability of the plea of res adjudicata deof things does not take place when proper care
pends upon the identity of the cause of action or matters
of defense in issue, and not the identity or similarity of is exercised, and is one for which the defendant the grounds or points urged to support or maintain the is responsible. Scott v. The London and St. action or matter of defense, and all the matters deter
mined by the court are as fully concluded by the judgKatherine Docks Company, 3 H. & C. 596;
ment as those considered and discussed, if the inatter put Transportation Co. v.Downer, 11 Wall. 129; Mul- in issue has been determined by the court upon the merlen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567. In the present
its. case 1.he boiler which exploded was in the con
TOM BROWN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS. March 1, 1882. trol of the emyloyees of the defendant. As
Affidavit – Information – Amendment – Agreement of boilers do not usually explode when they are Counsel-Practice.-1. The fact that the person making in a safe condition and are properly managed, the affidavit upon which the' prosecution is founded, dethe inference that this boiler was not in a safe condi
posed to the best of his knowledge and belief and not
positively to the facts stated, does not affect or invalidate tion or was not properly managed was justifiable, The affidavit. and the instructions to the jury were correct.
2. An information referring to the complaint upon The instructions must be considered in their in
which it is founded and alleging that it shows to the
court the matter and thing charged against the accused, tegrity and not in isolated parts, and so consid- is fatally defective. ered present the whole of the case fairly and 3. Quære. Whether an agreement by defendant's atcorrectly.
torney allowing the amendment of an information, as to
matters of substance, would be upheld in the face of the Motion denied.
express language of the statute upon this subject,
KENNEDY. v. McKay, June, 1881. 1. Tort- Innocent Vendor-- Agent's Fraud-Action.An innocent vendor cannot be sued in tort for the fraud of his agent in effecting a sale.
2. Contract-Deceit—Rescission-Liability of Agent.In such cases, the vendee may rescind the contract and reclaim the money paid, and if not repuid may sue the vendor in assumpsit for it, or he may sue the agent for the deceit.
THE AMERICAN RAPID TELEGRAPH Co. v. THE CONNECTICUT TELEPHONE Co. February, 1882
Mandamus- Telephone Company-Telegraph CompanyPatent. The respondent having organized as a jointstock company to carry on a telephonic exchange syg. tem, at Bridgeport, purchased from a Massachusetts company, which owned the patent, the right to use its magnetic' telephone for a certain period, under certain conditions, among which were that the respondent should not permit telegraph companies to use the system who had not purchased the right of the Massachusetts company. The petitioner, a telegraph company which had not purchased the right, prayed a writ of maddamus to compel the respondent to permit the petitioner to use the system. Held, that the respondent was not a common carrier of articulate speech, and that the writ must be denied.
THE PEOPLE v. MILNE, Jannary 24, 1882. Criminal Procedure- Indictmenl-One Attempt and Seve eral Offenses- Validity.-Where an indictment sets forth the act, and the intent to commit two or more offenses according to the fact, it is not bad for duplicity. There is but one attempt alleged, though the object aimed at in the attempt be multifarious. LXVTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OHIO.
SYNOPSIS OF LAWS PASSED THIS SESSION.
MUTUAL NATIONAL BANK v. RICHARDSON. Nov. 1881.
Partnership-. Partner using Firin Name for Personal Advantage— Validity.-A partner cannot use the name of the firm as security for the debt of a third person or of himself, without special authority from all composing the firın. A party receiving such security, under those circumstances, although not chargeable with actual mala fides, does so at his risk and peril and cannot hold the firm and its other members responsible, unless upon proof of knowledge, couisent, or ratificatioú.
(Court of Appeals.)
APRIL 5, 1882 S. B. 32. To amend Sections 6445 and 6447 of the Revised Statutes, to read as follows:
Section 6445, any railroad corporation of this State may condemn and appropriate to its own use, the interest and easement in, and quiet title to, any unfinished road-bed, or part thereof, lying within the State, and on the line of its proposed road, owned or claimed by any other railroad company or companies, person or persons, partnership or corporation, where such road-bed or part thereof bas remained or shall thereafter remain, in an unfinished condition, and without having the ties or iron placed, and continued thereon for the period of five years or more, immediately preceding the commencement of proceedings to condemn or appropriate the same as herein authorized, and every such company or companies, per. son or persons, partnership or corporation, shall be made a party defendant to such proceedings to condemn or appropriate the same, and shall be required to answer therein, setting forth fully its or their title to or interest in such road-bed or part thereof, so sought to be appropriated or condemned, if any, it or they claim, to which answer the plaintiff shall plead issuably, unless it admit the validity of the defendant's claim; and in such case, if such party defendant be a non-resident of this state, or a foreign corporation, service of summons may be made by publication, under sub-division three, of section 5048 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, and that the terms, company, or companies, as used in this chapter, shall be held to embrace also person or persons, partner. ship or corporation, as used in this section.
Section 6447. Proceedings under this act may be commenced in the Probate Court, the Court of Common Pleas, or the Superior Court of any county in this State in which such 'road-bed or part thereof so sought to be appropriated or condemned may be situated ; all or part only of such road-bed, within this State may be included in one proceeding, and wbeu such proceeding is commenced in the court of common pleas or superior court, the same proceeding shall be had as is prescribed in this chapter for the conduct of the same in the Probate Court,
DILLEBER V. THE HOME LIFE INSURANCE Co. November 22, 1891.
Life Insurance— Evidence. In an action on life policy where the defence is a breach of warranty by reason of a fraudulent concealment of the fact that the assured had had well-defined symptons consumption, it iy
competent, amination of a witness who has testified that certain facts did not necessarily indicate any disease of the lungs and that a heinorrhage in the previous year did not change his opinion, to include in the hypothetical question a hemorrhage occurring the month after the policy was issued to ascertain how far that fact would modify the opinion expressed as to a bleeding in the prior year.
In framing hypothetical questions to put to expert witnesses counsel are not confined to facts admitted oralsolutely proved, but may assume any facts which there is any evidence tending to establish and which are perti. neat to any theories they are attempting to uphold.
On cross-examination of an expert they may, in putting hypothetical questions, assume any pertinent facts whether testified to or not with a view of testing the skill and accuracy of the expert, subject, however, to the control of the court.
so far as the same may be applicable to such Common cating liquors are on other days sold or exposed for sale, Pleas or Superior Court, and not excepted in this sec- except regular drug stores, shall on that day be closed, tion, and the case shall, on inotion, be taken out of its or- and whoever makes any such sale, or allows any such der, by the court or by any roviewing court, and deter- place to be open or remain open on that day, shall be mined without any unnecessary dolay; and proceedings Hned in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, and in error to such Common Pleas or Superior Court may he be imprisoned in the county jail or city prison not excommenced directly in the Supreme Court, but the pro- ceeding thirty days. In regular hotels and eating houseu visions of this chapter as to viewers, shall not apply to
the word "place" herein used, shall be held to niean the appropriations authorized by such sections, and when room or part of room where such liquiors are usually sold any railroad corporation shall commence proceedings or exposed for sale, and the keeping of such rooin or part under this act, the president of said corporation shall of room securely closed shall be held, as to such hotels inake, subscribe and file in the court where any such and exting houses, as a closing of the place within the proceeding is had, a statement under oath, declaring meaning of this act. that it is the bona fide intention of said corporation to Sec. 2. Said original section 604 be and the same is complete and operate a railroad on the road-bed so hereby repealed. sought to be appropriated ; and if said corporation sball, Sec. 3. This act shall take eftect and be in force from for a period of one year after it shall have acquired rights and after its passage. to occupy the road-bed, fail to expend in and about the completion of a railroad thereon, a sum eqnal to twenty
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. five per centum of the total cost of completing the same, to be estimated by the coinmissioner of railroad and tel. egraphs, then, and in such case the said road-bed shall be
JANUARY TERM, 1888. open to appropriation and condemnation, under this act by any other railroad corporation. The word road-bed Hon. JOIN W. OKEY, Chief Justice; Hon. nsed in this act shall be held to include right of way,
WILLIAM WHITE, Hon. W. W. JOHNSON, Hon. depot grounds and other easements connected therewith, and it shall be sufficient in the petition and proceedings
Geo. W. McILVAINE, Hon. NICHOLAS LONGWORTH, under this act to designate the road-bed as the road-bed | Judges. of the railroad corporation, by which the route of the road was located and established with the terminal points within which appropriation is sought.
Tuesday, April 18, 1882.
GENERAL DOCKET. S. B. 12. An act to moe effectually provide against No... City of Ironton v. Kelly and Wife. Error to the evils resulting froin the traffic in intoxicating the District Court of Lawrence County. liquors. It goes into effect on the first day of May next
LOXGWORTH, J., Held: and provides :
Where the trustees of waterworks in a city, authorized When the place of business of any person engaged in and directed the digging of trenches in the streets for the liquor traffic is located not within ang village or city, the purpose of laying water mains, in pursuance of a nor within one mile thereof, the tax will be $100; when previous ordinance of council, and it is made the duty within a village having a population of less than 2,000 or of the superintendent to cause such trenches to be dug within ono mile thereof, $150; when within any other and mains laid, the city is responsible for his negligent village or city, having a population of less than 10,000) acts in doing the work cuusing injury, while such auinhabitants, or within one mile thereof, $200 ; when thority and direction remain unrevoked ; notwithstandwithin any city of the second class, having a population ing the trustees, individually, while said work was boof 10,000 inhabitants, or more, or within two miles ing done, notified the superintendent that they would thereof, $250; aud when within any city of the first class, have nothing further to do with the work. or within two miles thereof, $300).
Judgment affirmed. Every person engaged in such traffic, aud every person 7797. Ohio on relatiou of the Attorney General Rol. hereafter engaging therein, is required to execute to the lin C. Powers et al. In Quo Warranto. State of Ohio his bond in the suin of $1,000, with at least MCILVAINE, J. Held: two sureties, resident of the county, and each holding
1. Common school districts and boards of education therein a freehold estate, not exempt froin execution, are not corporations within the meaning of section 1 of worth at least double the amount of the bond above en: article 13 of the Constitution. cumbrances, which bond shall have indorsed thereon a 2. Under section 26, article 2, and section 2, article 6 pertinent description of the lot or premises wherein of the Constitution, laws regulating the organization said traffc is or shall be carried on together with the and inanagement of common schools must have a uni. pame of its owner, and the sureties thereon shall be to form operation throughout the State. the acceptance of the probate judge of the county, who Judgment of ouster. shall keep and record the saine, together with the in- White and Johnson, J. J., did not concur in the 2nd dorsement thereon, in a book to be by him kept for that proposition. purpose, which bond shall be conditioned for the faith- 76. Scioto Fire Brick Company v. Erastus Pond. Erful performance of all, and singular, the requirements of ror to the District Court of Scioto County. this act, and the probate judge shall receive in each case JOHNSON, J. Held: for his services under this act, to be paid by the person A., by an agreement in writing, "leased” to B., "all giving such bond, the sum of two dollars. If the tax be not the clay that is good No. 1 fire clay, on his land" depaid the condition of the bond shall be deemed broken, scribed, for a term of three years, subject to the condiand an action will lie thereon against the principal and tions that B. “shall mine, or cause to be mined, or pay his sureties.
for, not less than 2,000 tons of clay every year, and shall Heavy penalties are annexed for all violations of the pay therefor, twenty-five cents per ton for every ton of law.
clay monthly, as it is taken away." Held: It provides that the taxes arising from the liquor traf- 1. That this was a contract, which gave B. the exclufic shall be paid into the county treasury, and two-thirds sive right to mine and remove all the good No. 1 fire clay thereof shall be credited to the townships, villages and that was on the land, and not a lease of the land itself. cities from which the taxes were received, and the re- 2. It clay of that quality, and in quantity sufficient maiping one-third to the general county fund.
to justify its being mined existed, B., on failure to mine It also provides that the act shall not be construed or at least 2,000 tons per year, each year while the contract held to autborize or license in any way the sale of intox- was in force, was bound to pay for that amount, at the icating liquors.
agreed price per ton.
3. But it, in fact, clay of that quality and in quantity SUNDAY LAW.
sufficient to justify its being mined could not, Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of by the use of due diligence be found on the land, then the State of Obio, that the sale of intoxicating liquors, there was no obligation to pay the amount agreed on, in whether distilled, malt, or vinous, on the first day of the case of failure to ming. Cook v. Andrews, 36 O. St. 178 week, commonly called Sunday, except by a regular followed and approved. druggist, on the written prescription of a regular practic- 4. Where it is an open question, whether such clay, ing physician, for medicinal purposes only, is hereby de- was to be found on the land, and the exclusive possesclared to be unlawful, and all places where such intoxi- sion of the clay lands was vested in the lossee or pur
ment of the Common. Please Court of Jefferson County. Motion granted and cause taken out of its order.
62. Elisha Wilkinson et al. v. Commissioners of Preble County. Motion to take cause No. 908 on the General Docket out of its order. Motion overruled.
63. Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati & Indianapolis Railway Co. v. Arthur Nazor. Motion for leave to substituto copies and withdraw original papers in cause No. 934 on the general Docket. Motion granted.
65. Ohio ex rel. the Attorney General v. The Standard Life Ins. Co. Motion to take canse No. 1047 on the Gen. eral Docket out of its order. Motion granted and cause set for trial April 28, instant. .
66. Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. The Middleport Mutual Aid Association. Motion to take cause No. 1045 on the General Docket out of its order. Motion granted and cause set for trial April 27, instant.
SUPREME COURT RECORD.
(New cases filed since last report, up to April 18, 1882.]
chaser of the clay, for the purpose of ascertaining the fact, the burden is upon him, in order to defeat a recov. ery for the annual sums to be paid in case of a failure to mine and remove the same, to prove that such clay as is contemplated in the contract did not exist in minable quantity. Cook v. Andrews, supru.
Judgmants of common pleas and district courts reversed and cause remanded.
6. Samuel Shorten v. Drake et al. Error to the District Court of Hamilton county.
WHITE, J. Held:
1. Where a debtor purchases real estate and causes it to be conveyed to his wife in fraud of his creditors, bona fide mortgagee from the husband and wife, will not be affected by the fraud.
2. The possession of the husband and wife at the time of taking the mortgage will not charge the mortgages with notice of the fraud ; nor will he be affected by notice of levies made upon the property as that of the hus. band subsequent to the conveyance to the wife.
3. The loiy of an order of attachment, in the absence of process of garnishment, has no greater operation than the levy of an execution.
4. Where, in a court of equity the fund in controversy is held for distribution, and the equities of the respective claimants are equal in point of merit, the dis. tribution will be ordered according to the maxim, qui prior est tempore potior est jure.
Judgment reversed; and distribution ordered (1) in payment of the mortgage, (2) in payment of the execution, 'and (3) of the attachment.
72. The Trustees of the original surveyěd township of Oxford, Butler County, Ohio, v. Thomas H. B. Columbia and Elsie Columbia. Error to the District Court of Putnam County.
OKEY, C. J.
1. Where a party requests that the court state separately the conclusions of fact and law under the civil code, 280 (Rev. Stats. i 5205), and the request is not complied with, a judgment against such party should be reversed, unless it appear from the record that he was not prejudiced by the refusal.
2. 'Trustees of a township bolding the title to lands granted to them by the general government for school purposes, are not exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations, in an action to recover possession of the premises prosecuted by them.
71. The Trustees ofthe original surveyea townsbip of Oxford, Butler County, Ohio, v. Calvin L. Noble. Error to the District Court of Putnam County. Judgment affirmed on authority of case No. 72, in which the same plaintiffs are plaintitts in error, and Thomas H. B. Columbia and Elsie Colunubia are defendants in error.
56. Baltimore & Ohio Railway Company 0. Isaac J. Clark. Error to the District Court of Perry County. Judgment reversed on authority of Baltimore & Ohio Railway Co. v. McElroy, 3.3 Ohio St. 147. There will be no further report.
68. Edward Poor et al. v. Lucinda Burris et al. Error to the District Court of Jackson County. Judgment alfirmed without penalty. There will be no further report.
140. City of Ironton v. Thomas D. Kelly. Error to the District Court of Lawreuce County. Judgment affirmed without penalty; following No. 50 above reported. There will be no further report.
MOTION DOCKET. John D. Williams v. Charlotte Englebrecht et al. Error to the District Court of Scioto County. Motion to re-instate cause and to revive action, &c.
BY THE COURT. A judgment of reversal is effective notwithstanding the death of the plaintiff in error during the pondency of procedings in error. Such judgment takes effect, by relation, as of the date of the commencement of the procoeding in error; and it is competent for the court, to wuich the cause is remanded for a new trial, to order a revivor of tbe action in the name of the proper representative of the deceased party.
53. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Benjamin C. Zeigler, Mction to advance No. 879 on the General Docket to be treard with No. 379 on saine docket. Motion granted.
61. Robert C. Lindsay v. The State of Ohio. Motion for loave to file a petition in error to reverse the judg
No. 1112. Henry New begiu et al. v. Samuel Van vlerah. Error to the District Court of Defiance County. Newbegin & Kingsbury for plaintiffs.
1113. Iron National Bank v. W. T. Lodwick, Assignee. Error to the District Court of Scioto County. Moore & Newman for plaintiff; W. A. Hutchins and J. W. Bennon for defendant.
1114. Chester Bedell v. Joseph Brown. Error to the District Court of Mahoning County. Jones & Murray for plaintiff; Van Hyning & Johnson for defendaut.
1115. Levi Scudder v. H. H. Wallace, Adm'r. Error to the District Court of Butler County. S. Z. Gard and H. L. Morey for plaintiff; I. Robertson for defendant.
1116. Robert J. Turnbull v. Horatio Page. Error to the District Court of Franklin County. Lorenzo English for plaintiff.
1117. Charles Stoddard 2. The State of Ohio. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County. Charles Stillwell for plaintiff; Attorney General Nash for defendant.
1118. Jacob Ridenour_v. The State of Ohio. Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County. C. H. Blackburn and others, for plaintiff; Attorney General Nash for the State.
1119. Elizabeth Barrett v. J. B. Hart. Error to the District Court of Ottawa County, T. L. Magers for plaintiff; T. J. Marshall' for defendant.
1120. Hugh A. McNicol v. The Village of East Liverpool. Error-Reserved in the District Court of Columbiana County.
1121. Paul J. Kreitz v. The Citizens Savings and Loan Association. Error to the District Court of Cuyabogs County. Stove & Hessenmueller and F. C. Gallup for plaintiff; E. D. Stark for defeudant.
,1122. Newman Lumber.Co. v. John W. Purdum et al. Error to the District Court of Scioto County. Moore & Newman for plaintiff; H. W. Farnbam for defendants.
SUPREME COURT ASSIGNMENT.
FOR ORAL ARGUMENT. April 20th--- No. 9.. Julius Bowen et al., v. C. L Bowen et al. Error to the District Court of Washington County.
April 21st-No. 34. Charles W. Rowland v. The Meader Furniture Co.
April 26th-No. 40. W. H. Crabill Ex'r v. Nancy Marsh,
April 27th-No. 1045. Ohio ex rel. v. The Middle burgh Mutual Aid and Life Association. Quo warranto.
April 28th-No. 1047. Ohio ex rel. v. The Standard Life Association of America. Quo warranto.