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ganized in this State, and obtain from the super- To the petition there was a demurrer on the intendent of insurance a certificate of such com- ground that the state court had no jurisdiction pliance.

in rem against the steamboat and, therefore, as The statute under which the relator is organ- the court had no jurisdiction of the action in ized and the by-laws under which its business is which the bond was given, no action could be carried on, authorize it to engage in the business maintained on th bond. On error to this court, of “inguring lives on the plan of assessment upon it was held, that the judgment in the action surviving members," without other restrictions against the boat, will not be held void, in a col. than that policy holders shall have an interest lateral action on the bond, for want of jnrisdicin the lives of members.

tion, where it does not appear that the judgment Companies of this State cannot engage in the was rendered on a maritime cause of action. business of life insurance thus unrestricted, un- Inasmuch as the petition on the bond did not der section 3630 of the Revised Statutes; nor can show the nature of the claim on which the ves. companies organized under section 3587 to in. sel was seized, and as the watercraft law had sure lives“ on the mutual or stock plan,” without been held valid as to claims not maritime, the furnishing security for the assured, as provided court would, until the contrary was shown, pre in section 3593. The section last named relates sume in favor of the jurisdiction of the court to domestic companies organized under section making the seizure. The demurrer was there. 3587; but the equivalent provision applicable to fore overruled. Hamilton o. Merrill and Shepsimilar companies of other States if found in ard, 25 O. St. 11. The case was remanded to the section 3604.

common pleas, where an answer was filed allego The law of comity which the relator invokes ing the maratime nature of the original cause in support of his application, is fully satisfied of action and the absence of jurisdiction of the when foreign companies are permitted to do busi

; ness in this State upon the terms prescribed for without authority of law, had seized the steamdomestic companies.

boat, and that the owner was compelled, in order The writ must therefore be refused.

to obtain the custody of his property, to give Okey, C. J. did not sit in this case.

this bond. [This case will appear in 37 O. S.]

The reply admits the maratime nature of the

action, but in avoidance, alleges that the bond RECOVERY ON BOND GIVEN TO DIS- was taken by the sheriff at the request of the CHARGE WATERCRAFT.

obligors, to obtain possession of the boat, and

that Merrill was master and sole owner, and as SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

such pleaded to that action in the

of the boat, and made defence to the merits JONATHAN HAMILTON

without objection to the jurisdiction of the

court, hence it is claimed that these defendants, John P. MERRILL AND A. O. SHEPARD. Merrill and Shepard, are estopped from object

ing to the jurisdiction of the court in the pres

March 21, 1882. ent action. 1. No recovery can be had on a bond given to obtain

A demurrer to this reply has been sustained the discharge of a watercraft, seized under the Watercraft Law of Ohio, in an actiou against such craft, on a cause

in the courts below, and the object of the present of a maritime nature, which is within the exclusive admir- proc :eding is to reverse these decisions. alty jurisdiction of the United States Courts.

2. The fact that the owner of such craft, after the bond Simeon Nash, for plaintiff in error.
was given, defended the action against it, on the merits,
without objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, does

T. W. Hampton and D. B. Hebard, for defendpot op bim and his sureties from pleading such want

ant in error. of jurisdiction in an action against them on the bond, The General Buell v. Long, 18 Ohio St. 521, followed and

JOHNSON, J. approved.

It is conceded that the cause of action in Error to the District Court of Gallia County. which the steamboat was seized, to obtain the

On the 8th of May, 1860, plaintiff commenced discharge of which this bond was given, was of a an action against the Steamboat R. B. Hamil- maratime nature, and within the exclusive cogton, under the Watercraft Law of Ohio, to re- nizance of the United States Courts. cover damages for sinking the plaintiff's flat- This being so, the State court had no jurisdicboat while navigating the Ohio River.

tion to seize the property, and no authority of Upon a warrant issued in that action the boat law to exact the bond for its release. was seized by the sheriff. To obtain its dis- The sole question, therefore, is, are the oblicharge, the sheriff, as authorized by the 5th sec- gors on the bond estopped to raise the question tion of that law (1 S. & C. 254)), took a bond of jurisdiction, by reason of the facts stated in from defendants in the usual form, and delivered the reply. the boat to the defendant, Merrill, as master The acts alleged, as creating an estoppel are, thereof.

that Merrill, who was sole owner of the boat, A final judgment was rendered in that action defended on the merits in the action against the in favor of the plaintiff, but the boat was not the boat without objecting to the jurisdiction of forthcoming to satisfy the same; hence this ac- the courts. These acts were all after the bond tion on the bond.

was given. How these after acts can vitalize a




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bond which the court had no authority to exact, possession was not voluntary, but was obtained it is not easy to comprehend.

by duress and illegal compulsion. It was not a voluntary bond. It was given in It was, however, held, that as no plea to the invitum, to obtain the release of property. As jurisdiction had been made in the trial court, the seizure of the property was void the bond and as the court of appeals had no authority on falls with it. Giving it under such circum- review, to consider questions not made and destances could not confer jurisdiction on the cided in the court in which the judgment was court, over the subject-matter of the seizure. rendered, the obligors on the bond must be Homan v._Brinkerhoof, 1 Denio 184; In the deemed to have waived such plea. Here, howmatter of Faulkner, 4 Hill 598.

ever, the want of jurisdiction was urged in the The claim is, that Merrill by defending on the court below, first by demurrer, as appears in 25 merits, in the original action, has waived his 0. St. 11, and again by answer, to which the reright to defend in this action on the bond, on the ply under consideration was filed. ground that the court was without jurisdiction Counsel for plaintiff are mistaken in supposto require it.

ing that this reply is sanctioned by the decision We regard this question as settled. The of Cockroft v. Vose, 14 Wallace 5, or that the deSteamboat General Buell v. Long, 18 O. St. 521. cision in that case conflicts with the holding of

That case arose before the decision in The Bel- this court in the case of The General Buell. fast, 7 Wallace 764, and other cases, which de- All that was there decided was, that the Sucided that our watercraft law, so far as it related preme Court of the United States had no juristo maratime causes, was unconstitutional and diction to review on error, under the 25th secvoid.

tion of the judiciary Act, the decision in 44 N. The boat was seized for such a cause. The Y. for the reason that it did not appear from the defence was upon the merits, in the courts be- record that the decision of the State court was low, without objection to the jurisdiction of the in favor of the validity of the New York WaterState court. After a petition in error had been craft Law. Hence no Federal question was prefiled in this court by the craft to reverse the sented on the record and the writ of error was . judgment rendered on the merits, a new assign- dismissed. The remarks of Mr. Justice Miller ment of errors was allowed, and then for the first in dismissing the writ were simply to show that time want of jurisdiction was set up as a ground the State court had not decided that the State of reversal.

law was valid, but the contrary, and, therefore, This court held, that a failure to plead to the that the case did not come within the provisions jurisdiction of the court in the trial court, was of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. no waiver of the objection where such want of Judgment affirmed. jurisdiction appeared upon the record.

[This case will appear in 37 0. S.] In the opinion, it is said that it was not a case where the court had jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the suit, and therefore differs from want of jurisdiction over the person, which was a personal privilege that could be waived. If a defence on the merits in the original ac

PENNSYLVANIA. tion, without objection to the jurisdiction, was not a waiver of the right, after final judgment,

(Supreme Court.) to assign it as error and obtain a reversal, for equally cogent reason will such a detence be no ANGIER v. EATON, COLE & BURNHAM Co. January 2, 1882. bar to an answer setting up want of such juris- Evidence-Patent-Royalty.--Where the evidence is diction in an action on the bond. The right

such that a court would not sustain a verdict that should

find against it, it is not error for the court to practically to do so is equally as clear, and the reasons in rule that there was no disputed question of fact for the support of it, rest on stronger grounds than the jury to determine, instead of submitting the evidence to

the jury. right to assign it as error, after final judgment

While the patent is apparently valid,and the licensed is in the original action.

enjoying the benefit of its supposed validity, he is bound This conclusion is supported by Vose v. Cock- to pay the stipulated royalty, and cannot set up as a deroft, 44 N. Y. 415, which, like the present,

ferise the actual invalidity of the patent; but when, in

addition to the invalidity of the patent, by reason of a was an action on a bond given to obtain the re- prior outstanding patent for the same invention, it is lease of a vessel seized under the Watercraft Law shown that the owner of the prior patent is asserting his of New York, which its own courts had

exclusive rights thereunder by supplyivg the market pro

with the patented article, forbidding all interference on nounced unconstitutional in The Josephine, 39 the part of others, etc., and the licensee under the invalid N. Y. 19.

patent is deprived of the enjoyment of the monopoly for In Vose v. Cockroft the defence was upon the which he contracted, and in consideration of which he

agreed to pay the royalty, he may defend on the ground merits, as to the liability on the bond, but there was of the actual failure of the consideration. no plea to the jurisdiction, as there is, in the present case. It was there held, that the proceeding

WILSON'S APPEAL. March 13, 1882. under which the vessel was released, and the Undue Influence.—Where the chief beneficiary in a bond exacted to obtain such release, were void, will was the confidential adviser of the testator, and was and that the owner of the craft had the right to

the main instrument in procuring the preparation and

execution of the will, he will be required to prove afirmits possession, and a bond given to obtain such ativn"the circumstances connected with the drawing of

Digest of Decisions.

Where a point has already been charged in substance it is not error for the court to refuse to again charge it.

the will, that the testator was lahoring under no mistaken apprehension as to the value of his property and the amount he was giving his confidential adviser, and that such gift was the free, intelligent act of the testator.

The court below in this case granted an issue as to the question of undue influence, and refused an issue upon the question of testamentary incapacity.

Helil, that the evidence upon the latter point amounted to more than a scintilla.

In a case where the person is of great age, suffering from severe illness affecting his brain and vital powers, and where an investigation of a charge of undue influence is admittedly essential, it is best not to limit the investigation to that one matter. Under such circumstan. ces undue influence and mental incapacity are very closely interwoven.


MEAD v. STRATTON ET AL. January 17, 1882. Civil Damage Act.- Plaintiff's husband went to defendant's hotel, drank several times and became so intoxicated that he had to be helped into his buggy. He was found dead with his knee caught under the foot bar and his head between the wheel and the wagon so that it had been beaten by the spokes and otherwise injured. Held, That an action to recover for loos of support could be maintained ; that the statute was designed to embrace all injuries produced by the intoxication and which legitimately resulted therefrom.

Defendant, S., inanaged the hotel and his wife owned it and lived there with her husband and attended to the domestic arrangements. The evidence tended to show that she knew that her husband sold intoxicating liquors. Held, That it was for the jury to determine whether she knew the building was used for such purposes; that it could not be said as matter of law that the husband was in possession and that the wife was relieved froin liabil. ity as an owner who had no knowledge of the sale of liquors; that it was immaterial whether the strict relation of landlord and tenant existed between them if she permitted bim to occupy, with knowledge that he was engaged in such sales, and that the fact that the ownership and possession commenced before the statute was passed did not relieve her from liability.

Thos. Swan V. THE PEOPLE. December, 1881. Abortion, Evidence,-Where an abortion is committed in one county and death results therefroin in another, an indictinent therefor may be brought in the latter county.

On the trial of an indictment for abortion a witness was allowed to testify as to statements made in his presence, which gave hiin the impression that the prisoner had attempted to produce abortion on other occasions. Held, Error.


(Now cases filed since last report, up to March 27, 1882.]

1085. The Delphos Paper Co. v. Ferdinavd J. King. Error to the District Court of Van Wert County, Saltzgaber & Glenny for plaintiff; Richie & Richie, H. G. Richie and James Mckenzie for defendant,

1086. Isaac Burklart v. Wesley Tenpenning. ErrorReserved in the District Court of Williams County. Kont, Newton & Pugsley for plaintiff.

1087. John Wagner v. New York Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. Error to the District Court of Cuyahoga County. J. W. Heisley for plaintiff; Estep, Dickey & Squire for defendant.

1088. J. H. Devereux, Receiver v. Stella M, Hart. Error to the District Court of Trumbull County. Adams & Russell and L. C. Jones for plaintift; Hutchins & Tulite and Harrison for defendant,

1089. Louis Woodmansee v. Hannah Woodnianseu et al. Error to the District Court of Belmont County. Wm. Okey and others for plaintiff; D. D. T. Cowen & Son for defendants.

1090. B. F. Stahl v. Silas Idleman. Error to the Dig. trict Court of Marion County. B. F. Stabl for plaintiff.

1091. Catharine Meyers v. John J. Myers. Error to the District Court of Wood County, Cook & Troup for plaintift; F. A. Baldwin for defendant.


(Court of Appcals.)

FLEETWOOD v, COMMONWEALTH. January 5, 1882. 1. Criminal Law.-A peace officer has the right and it is his duty to arrest one who is committing a breach of the peace in his presence, and to use such force as inay be necessary to effect the arrest.

2. If a person disturbing, the peace resists a peace officer, and in so doing kills said officer, he is guilty of murder if he knew that the person attempting to make the arrest was an officer, and guilty of manslaughter if he did not know it.

3. The law of self-defense as applicable to rencounters between private persons, does not apply in such a case, unless the person resisting the arrest has reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that the officer is not acting in good faith in the attempt to arrest; but is using his official position to gratily personal feeling. against the person sought to be arrested, and that by submitting to arrest he will bu in danger of great bodily harm or of losing his life.


(Supreme Court.)

FISHER V. HENRY. December Term, 1881. Statute-Constitution of.Statutes which are remedial should be liberally construed, to the end that intention of their enactinent may be made effectual. Evorything is to be done in advancement of the remedy that can be consistently with any construction that can be put upon the statute.


ET AL. December, 1881. 1. Public Policy-Covenant Void as Against.The condition in a covenant to a railroad company that the latter shall not build a side track to its main line in a given town, is against public policy, and void.

2. Contract Void consideration.-Such void condition being embodied in a contract of mutual promises which constitute mutual consideration, and not severable from its other portions, vitiates the entire eontract and no recovery can be had upon any part thereof.


(Court of Appeals.) THE PEOPLE V. O'CONNELL. January 17, 1882. Insanity, Practice. Where the defense of insanity is interposed, the burden of proof as to whether the acts complained of were committed by the prisoner and wbether he was at the time in such condition of mind as so be responsible for them is upon the prosecutor. He is bound to satisfy the jury on the whole evidence that the prisoner was mentally responsible, as he has the affirmative of the issue to the ond of the trial.

The legal presumption that every man is sane is sufficient to sustain the latter point until evidence to the contrary is given.


April 12th-No. 40. W. H. Crabill Ex'r v. Nancy Marsh. Error to the District Court of Clark County:

April 20th-Julius C. Bowen et al. v. C. L. Bowen Error to the District Court of Washington County.


appears that dofondant is doing or threatens to do nota rospecting the subjoct of an action ponding, tonding to

render the judgment ineffectual. (Yeoman 0. Lasley, 88 ANUARY TERM, 1888.

Obio Bt. 416 followed and approved.)

8. 80 where the relief sought in the court below was Hon. JOHN W. OKEY, Chief Justice; Hon.

an injunction which was refused, and on error to this

court the judgment 18 roversed for such refusal, this WILLIAM WHITE, Hon. W. W. JOHNson, Hon.

court may, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, Gro. W. McILVAINE, Hon. NICHOLAS LONGWORTH, proceed to render the judgmont which the court below Judges.

should bave rendered.

Judgment reversed and injunction granted until Anal

termination in the probate court of the proceedings Tuesday, March 28, 1882. there pending to appropriate a right of way over the GENERAL DOCKET.

plaintiff's property. No. 64. Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Commercial

28. The Scioto Valley Railway Co. v. David Lawrence Mutual Ins. Co. Error to the District Court of Cuyaboga

6t al. Error to the District Court of Scioto County. County.

WHITE, J. Held:

1. Where the construction of a railroad in a stroat of a LONGWORTH, J., Held: Where an insurance company, after having taken a

city, will work material injury to the abutting property, riok and reinsured in another company to Indemnify

such construction may be enjoined, at the suit of the itaelt against loss on its policy, discharges its liability

owners, until the right to construct such road in the

street shall first be acquired, under proceedings insti. by the payment of a less sum than that for wbich the original Insurance was effected, the sum so paid by it will be

tuted against such owners as required by law for the ap takon as the amount of damage sustained, and the meas

propriation of private property.

2. In such case it is smmaterial whether the fee is ure u indemnity, to be recovered from the reinsuring

vested in the city or in the abutting owners, so long as it company; provided such sum is within the amount of the roinsurance policy, and does not exceed the amount

is held upon the same defined uses. Railway Co. v. of actual loss, and such policy contains no condition for

Cumminsville, (14 Obio 8. 524) approved and followed. prorating loss or limiting liability.

Judgment affirmed.

42. · Elizabeth Lafferty and others v. Willie Shinn and Judgment afirmed.

others. Error to the District Court of Adams County. 04. Bloubenvillo v. Culp. Error to the District Court of Jefferson County.


1. The provision in the code of civil procedure as ro

vised in 1878, by which the period within which & froA police officer, suspended from office, by the mayor of a city, under the authority granted by secs. 121 and 211

coeding in error may be commenced is reduced from of the Municipal Code (66 O. L. 170 and 184), is not entitled

three to two years (Code of 1853, 8 623; 75 Obio L. 808, § 20;

Rev. Stats. & 6723), does not apply to judgments which to wages during the period of such suspension, notwith

had been rendered when the act of 1878 took effect, but by standing the council afterward declared the cause of sus

force of the act of 1866 (& & S. 1) the period of three years, pension insufficient.

prescribed in section 523, governs as to those judgments. Judgment reversed. 18. The Marietta & Cincinnati Railroad Company as

2. Where a denturrer to an answer is sustained, but roorganized v. The Western Union Telegraph Company

no judgment is rendered or order made wbich is 'defi

nitive in its character until a subsequent termi, the time et al. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County. MCILVAINE, J. Held:

within wbich a proceeding in error may be commenced 1. A railroad company, having a line of telegraph

by the defendant must be computed from the date of the poles and wire, granted to a telegraph company, the priv

final judgment or order. Ilege of placing another wire on the poles "for general

3. Where an action is brought under the code of civil telegraphic correspondence,” and of establishing tele

procedure for the partition of real estate, and the admin

istrator of the ancestor from whom the estate descended graph stations at points along the line as it might think

to the pererns asking for partition is made a defendant, propor, but reserving to the grantor all local telegraph business, “it being understood and agreed between the

and files A' answer and cross-petition setting forth that partles,” that, the telegraph company should be entitled

it is necessary to sell such property for the purpose of only to the business of sending such messages as might

paying the debts of such ancestor, and asking for an orbe rocoived at any of its stations destined for stations on

der of sale, such administrator is, upon proper showing, other telegraph lines connected at points where it had

entitled to such order of sale, and statutos of limitations stations, or such messages as might be received fộom

have no application in favor of such heirs. Taylor v.

Thorn, 29 Ohio 8t. 569, followed. otber lines connected at points where it had stations degtinad for its stations, or other lines connected at points

Judgment roversed. wbere it bad stations, with a further agreement for pro

37. Phenix Insurance Co.v. Robinson Priest, adminis

trator, &c. Error to the District Court of Ashland County. rating as to business re-telegraphed between the parties : Had, 1. The right acquired by the telegraph com

Judgmont affirmed. There will be no further report. pany in the business of the line, other than local busi

41. Edward A. Bratton v. Edward D. Dodge et al. Er

ror to the District Court of Vinton County. Judgment Dons, was not exclusive. 2. The railroad company was not precluded from placing another wire upon its poles

reversed, and judgment rendered in favor of plaintoithor for its own use or the use of another party.

iff in error, and cause remanded to the court of common 2. Equity will not compel specific performance, where

pleas for an account. There will be no further report. the benefits of the contract cannot be realized in accord

63. The German and English Roformed Congregation anco with its terms. Hence, where a railroad company,

of Zion's Churcb &c. v. The Evangelical Lutberan Church

Error to the District Court of Holmes County. Judghaving a line of telegraph, grants the use of its poles to ment of the district court reversed, and the court pro. a tolograph company on certain conditions and stipulations in favor of the grantor, which are ultra vires, an in

ceeding to render the judgment the district court should junction will not be granted whereby the grantor will be

have rendered, order the appeal to be dismissed on aurequired to perform other stipulations made in consider

thority of Barger v. Cochran, 15 Ohio St. 460. There will ation of such void stipulations.

be no further report.

811. Samuel Brown v. John R. Brown. Error to the Judgment reversod and petition dismissed.

District Court of Franklin County. Dismissed by plaintWhite, J. concurred in the judgment on the ground iff in error and at his costs. stated in the second proposition.

MOTION DOCKET. 1087. John Wagner v. The N. Y. C. & St. L. Railway Co. Error to the District Court of Cuyahoga County.

51. Charles E. Fish v. City of Columbus. Motion to dis

miss cause 583 on the General Docket. Motion sustained. JOHNSON, J. Held: 1. In proceedings by a corporation to appropriate pri

52. John Wagner v. New York, Chicago and St. Louis

Railway Co. Motion for injunction in cause No. 1087, on vate property, thore must be a judgment confirming the verdíct of the jury, before the corporation is entitled, by

the General Docket. Motion disposed of by the disponi

tion of the cause. a deposit of the amount of such verdict, to possessiou of The court will take a rocons on Saturday the 1st day of the property appropriated. 2. It is within the appollate jurisdiction of the su

April next until Monday April 10th, hence there will be

no examination of applicants for admission to the bar in promo court to allow & tomporary injunction where it

April. (Rep.)

Ohio Law Journal.

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cross-examination of witnesses who gave their testimony on the said trial, to all which participa

tion and interference the defendant, by his counCOLUMBUS, OHIO,

APRIL 6, 1882.

sel, then objected, and protested against the same.

But the court overruled said objection and perAS TO RIGHT OF OUTSIDE PARTIES TO

mitted said persons to participate in the trial of EMPLOY COUNSEL IN BEHALF OF

said case, and in the examination and cross-exTHE STATE IN CRIMINAL CASES.

amination of the several witnesses who testified ATHENS, 0. March 31, 1882.

therein, to all of which, the defendant, by his

counsel, then excepted." EDITORS Ohio Law JOURNAL:

Messrs. West, Walker & Kennedy, filed their I have waited quietly to hear further from

motion in the Supreme Court for leave to file a some one who sustained the ruling of the Court petition in error, in said cause, to reverse the of Common Pleas in Vinton County, at its Jan-judgment and sentence of the common pleas. uary term, in the case of The State of Ohio v. G.

The assignment of error is as follows: Gilman, in which the learned judge decided

“The record shows that persons other than against the right of a prosecuting witness in a

the Prosecuting Attorney, were permitted to ob criminal case, to employ attorneys.

trude themselves into, and to take part in the At the argument it was claimed that the Su

trial of said case against the protest of the preme Court of Ohio had decided the very ques- prisoner.” tion, and that it had held that the court had dis

Hon. Wm. Lawrence and others argued for the cretion to permit outside counsel to so appear, State, and cited an unbroken line of authority even though the court had already appointed an

in support of their position. assistant.

The Supreme Court held, there was no error in The court in Vinton County held, that the

the ruling of the court of common pleas, and recourt having assigned one attorney to assist the

fused to allow a petition in error to be filed. State, its power was exhausted, and that it

In this district, Judges Guthrie, Knowles and would be error to allow another, even though re

Bradbury, had each held the same way before quested by the prosecuting attorney, and no ex

this decision. tra charge to the county was to be made.

Thus it will be seen that I was right in my Some one from Steuben ville, and Prot' Aldrich,

statement that the ruling in Vinton County of Columbus, sustained the court in Vinton with

was "unsupported by law, precedent or common expressions of their opinion.

sense,” and I now add, “in plain, and flagrant Having stated to the court in Vinton that the

defiance of the decision of the Supreme Court." question had already been decided in Ohio, I

G. have felt called upon to make diligent search for the opinions.

NEW BOOKS. Judge Walker, of Logan County, has been kind enough to cite the case and I have it before THE LAW OF CONVEYANCIXG.-A treatise on the Law of me. The question was made in the case of Ba

Convexancing. By W. B. Martindale Esq., St. Louis.

W. H Stevenson, Law Publisher and publisher of the zil Bailey v. The State of Ohio. Error to the

Central Law Journal. 1882, Pp. LXI, 63 ; Price $6.00 Court of Common Pleas of Logan County, Ohio. It appears by the bill of exceptions in that case, We are inclined to think, after examination of filed in the Supreme Court, January 15, 1878, the general scope and plan of the work before us that on the trial of the defendant in the court of that it stands alone in supplying to the profescommon pleas“ Thereupon, John A. Price, sion, and indeed to all who have aught to do

. William H. Martin, W. W. Beatty and William with real estate and real estate titles, what is Lawrence, attorneys of this court, but neither popularly denominated "a want long felt.” one of them being Prosecuting Attorney, nor There is no book extant, to our knowledge, that assistant Prosecuting Attorney, nor in any man- deals with all the contingencies of acquiring and ner appointed by the court or otherwise assistant conveying titles to real estate in so thorough Prosecuting Attorney, with consent and acqui- and satisfactory manner as does this new publiescence of the said Duncan McLaughlin, Prosecut-cation. The author understands the subject; ing Attorney, took part in, and aided in conduct- that much is evident from the arrangement and ing the said trial, and in the examination and | manner of treatment of its various phases. H


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