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the plaintiff in most or all of the States must plant this principle by submitting the damages have a general or special property in the chat. in such cases as punishment to an inexperitels, and be entitled to the possession of the enced jury cannot fail to be productive of missame; and this right must be shown by affidavit chief. A jury, which, under the direction of a before the writ is issued. The officer seizes the capable, conscientious, fearless judge, who will property, if it can be found, and delivers it to instruct them in as few words as possible, in a the plaintiff upon receiving a bond, with sure- clear and direct manner as to the law applicable ties, for its return in case the plaintiff fails to to that particular case and the rule fixing the sustain the action. Both parties are actors. If measure of damages, will rarely go astray; but, the plaintiff recovers, he takes judgment for any if left to themselves, without limitation or didamages he may have proved, while if the de- rection, are very liable to err, and this, too, withfendant recovers, he takes judgment for a return out the possibility of correcting the error, as the of the property and such damages as he has damages, being in the nature of punishment, proved, or for the value of the property. In are properly left to them to fix the amount. many of the States the action may even proceed But it is said that the doctrine of punitive to judgment without a return of the property, damages is now too firmly rooted in our juriswhere the officer was unable to find the same, or prudence to admit of further serious discussion. the plaintitt was unable to give satisfactory se- This is begging the question. It is equivalent curity for its return. The rights of both parties to saying the rule, although wrong in principle, seem to be sufficiently guarded, and it is difficult has been sanctioned by a number of courts for to perceive how the writ could be obtained with
many years, and therefore must be followed. out committing perjury, or be used as a means We must remember that this is not a rule by of oppression.
which title to property or rights are acquired or The cases where punitive damages have been held, and while it is called a rule for measuring allowed in cases of fraud, negligence, etc., do not, damages, it is in fact a discarding of all rules. so far as I am aware, rest on the decision of any This is not the age to quietly accept an arbitrary English court. But even if they did, they are rule as the law simply because it may have renot sanctioned either by the common or civil ceived the sanction of any'tribunal. Every case
must be submitted to the crucial test of whether The rule of damages for a breach of contract to it is right; and decisions based upon wrong prindo or not to do some particular thing, as laid ciples will be continually assailed until overdown in Hadley v. Baxandale, [9 Exch. 341], turned. that “where two parties have made a contract It may be well to enquire by what authority which one of them has broken, the damages courts impose punitive damages. Courts are orwhich the other party
ought to receive in re- ganized to administer the law. The law which spect to such breach of contract should be either they are to administer is derived from constitusuch as may fairly or substantially be considered tions, statutes, and the common law, including as arising naturally,-i. e., according to the us- equity. If a power is exercised by a court which ual course of things,-from such breach of con- is not conferred upon it, it is pure usurpation. tract itself, or such as may reasonably be sup- The Constitution of the United States provides posed to have been in the contemplation of the that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, parties at the time they made the contract, as or property without due process of law." [Art. the probable result of the breach of it,” is gener- Amendments). Art. vi. provides that in all ally accepted as a correct statement of the law.criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the In that case the plaintiffs were the owners of a right to a speedy and public trial, by an imparsteam-mill, and the shaft being broken, it was tial jury, etc. There are other provisions that deliyered to the defendant, as a carrier, to be are intended to guard the rights of the citizen taken to an engineer to serve as a model for a and prevent the confiscation of his property, to new one. At the time of the delivery the de- which it is unnecessary to refer. These pro fendant's clerk was informed that the mill was visions, in substance, have been incorporated stopped, and the shaft must be sent at once. into the constitutions of all, or nearly all, of the The shaft was not sent immediately, in conse- States. At common law, before a party could be quence of which the mill remained idle. In an put on trial for an offence he must be charged action for breach of contract, it was held that if with the commission of the same, either by inthe carrier had been informed that a loss of dictment, or, in case of a misdemeanor, it might profits would result from the delay on his part, be by information. Blackstone says: "It (the he would have been liable; but as this did not information] differs in no respect from an indictappear, he was not liable for such profits. ment in its form and substance, except that it
The rule is broader in cases of tort than in ac- is filed at the mere discretion of the proper law tions on contract, but the damages complained officer of the government, ex officin, without the of must be the direct and natural result of the intervention of a grand jury. [4 Bla. Comm. wrong or injury in either case. And this rule 308]. And these provisions exist by statute I certainly applies in actions of trover, replevin, think, in every State of the Union. Suppose a injuries to property, fraud, negligence, etc., and party was convicted of some offence, and a fine is fully carried out by making full compensation of $1,000, or any other sum, imposed upon him, for the injury sustained. Any attempi to sup- but no accusation or information charging the
offence had been made and filed against him, is
EXTRADITION. there a court in the United States that would sustain such a judgment? I think not, because SUPERIOR COURT OF CINCINNATI. the court that imposed the fine would have no jurisdiction. If, then, a court would have no In November last, John Larney, (known as jurisdiction, without an information or indict
Mollie Matches), was arrested in Cincinnati on ment, to try a party accused of an offence created by statute, has it any authority to proceed with
a requisition from the Governor of Illinois, out such accusation in offences that have no stat- charging him with complicity in a bank robutory existence, and which in fact exist only in bery at Galesburg. Larney had a hearing before the imagination of the court?
Judge Harmon of the Superior Court of Cincin
, is punishment; and if this power is sustained nati, during which the prisoner endeavored to at all, it must be under the criminal law of the
introduce certain testimony tending to show State as a fine, as there is confessedly no power
that he was not a fugitive from justice, not havunder the civil jurisdiction of a court to require ing fled from the State of Illinois, as he was not A., as a punishment, to convey his property to within that State at the time he is charged as B., and a judgment of that kind would be void. But in a criminal trial for any offence, the proof having committed the crime set forth in the inmust establish the guilt of the accused beyond a
dictment, and that, therefore, the Governor of reasonable doubt, and the presumption of inno Ohio had no authority to issue the warrant upon cence continues as evidence in his favor until which he was in custody. On a motion to exovercome by the testimony. Now, suppose & clude this testimony, Judge Harmon gave his judgment for punitive damages' is rendered against a party because he was unable to sustain opinion, in substance, as follows: an attachment, and his property is sold to satisfy
The question is a double one. What is it the judgment, can it be said that he has been de competent for the prioner to prove in prived of his property by due process of law ? such a case, and does the evidence tend In such case he would be convicted of an offence
to prove it? It is broadly contended for unknown to the law, without being charged the prisoner that the fact of his being therewith in writing, or his guilt established be
a fugitive from justice, in the sense of having yond a reasonable doubt. It will be seen at
fled from the demanding State on purpose to once that every element necessary to give the avoid the consequences of his conduct there, is court jurisdiction is wanting. If the action of a jurisdictional, and that, therefore, if it appear creditor who has failed in an attachment, and
that there was no evidence of that fact before who will thereby perhaps lose his debt, or if a
the Governor when he issued the warrant, it is claimant in replevin who has failed in his action, void, while if there was such evidence, it is open is not to be tried on the merits and damages to be rebutted by the prisoner in this proceeding. awarded according to the injury, but according The propositions followed to their logical results to the intent of the party instituting the action,
would abolish all limitation to the inquiry to be is this principle not capable of being extended made by the court upon habeas corpus in such to that of a debtor who wilfully refuses to pay a
cases. While it is settled that the question of debt whereby his creditor becomes bankrupt, and
the prisoner's guilt or innocence can not as such make him liable for the wrong? It will not do be raised, because all the Constitution requires to say that the measure of damage is different in for his extradition is that he be duly charged such cases, because all actions to recover money
with crime in the demanding State, yet, if the are bused upon the wrong done the plaintiff
. actual fact that he fled from justice in the sense So, too, if a common carrier, by permitting contended for be the basis of the Governor's juits train, to pass the depot a few yards risdiction to surrender him, and not the fact that by which the plaintiff sustained a
tri. he is charged with actual criminal presence in fing, injury, is to be mulcted in $4,500 the demanding State, and demanded as having for the use of the plaintiff, as in the Mis- left it before he could be arrested, why may be sissippi case cited, how much should the man not prove his innocence as bearing upon the who fails to pay his note when it becomes due question of his having filed and being a fugitive be required to pay as a penalty for his negli- from justice ? If he committed no crime, gence? The cases rest upon the same founda- how can he be a fugitive from justice i tion, and the principle of punitive damages can
If he merely left the State, not having not be adopted without overturning the rules for offended its laws and not even aware that determining the measure of damages, and pro
he was charged with co doing, how can it be ducing chaos and confusion.
said that he fled from it? The Constitution re: SAMUEL MAXWELL. fers to "a person charged * * *
* * * with crime Southern Law Review, March, 1882.
who shall flee from justice," while the act of 1793, R. S. U. Š., 5278, provides for the surrender of any person “ demanded as a fugitive from justice," as doos our act of March 3, 1875. The ar gument of prisoner's counsel would require the very strict construction of the Constitution that that the court had before it all the papers and it refers only to those who flee with hot foot be- proofs upon which the Governor had acted, cause already charged or about to be charged yet there was no conflict upon this question. with crime. But such has not been the ruling | The prisoner was probably merely charged in of courts nor the opinion of jurists. It is suffi- those papers as in ex parte Sheldon, with being a cient if the person withdraws himself without fugitive-a mere legal conclusion. waiting to abide the consequence of his con- But suppose there had been a conflict in the duct.” Matter of Voorheis, 3 V room, 147. Judge testimony. Suppose the papers and proofs u pon Cooley, in Princeton Review, 7 A. L. Rec., which the Governor acted had specifically 722.
charged that Nolze had made, in the State of The framers of the Constitution naturally New York, the false statement with which he used language which described the ordinary con- was charged, that he had been there and afterward duct of guilty persons in such cases, yet it can came to Ohio. Did the court mean to say that not be doubted that they intended it to cover upon the production by the prisoner of a preponany case of voluntary withdrawal of physical derance of evidence to the contrary, the jurisdicpresence however deliberate, and although in tion of the Governor would cease and the prisfact occasioned by other motive than fear of pros- oner become entitled to his discharge? I do not ecution, where its effect is to escape prosecution. think so. The prisoner was permitted, not to disThey certainly did not refer to a person not act- prove what was proven on behalf of the demand. ually, but only constructively present in the de- ing State, but to prove something which did not manding State. The language is not "a person appear before the Governor, which took away his charged, etc., in one State and found in another," power to act. I do not understand the court as but who shall Ace and be found.” Wilcox v. dissenting from the well settled law (see WharNolze, 34 O. S., 520.
ton on Criminal Pleadings and Proceedings, secUpon the case just named the prisoner's coun- tion 35, No 6; Spear on Extradition, page 303), sel mainly relied, and some of the language of that the averments of the indictment and afti . the opinion, considered without reference to the davit can not be contradicted by parol. I do not question under discussion, would perhaps bear think the Governor's jurisdiction depends upon the construction that the absolute fact of actual the uncertain and varying judgment of the presence of the prisoner in the demanding State many courts to which the prisoner may appeal at the time of the alleged offense and fight by habeas corpus upon a question of weight of therefrom is jurisdictional and always open to
evidence. Even if the same evidence were predisproof. But when it is considered that in the sented, courts might differ as to the side having same opinion it is said as to the questions open the preponderance. The ultimate power of to inquiry, "nor have the courts larger powers in determination must rest somewhere, and the these respects than the Governor;" that in policy of the law requires that it be with the Work v. Corrington; p. 64 of the same volume, it Governor. is held that when requisition is made, "and the When the prisoner is demanded as having case shown to be within the provisions of the committed a crime, while actually in another Constitution and act of Congress, no discretion State, as having placed himself beyond the reach is vested in the Governor, but it is his imperative of prosecution therefor by withdrawing his presduty to issue the warrant; " and that in Ex ence, and the evidence duly presented by the Govparte Sheldon, p. 319, id., it was held that "an ernor of such State sustains those facts, our Goveralleged fugitive, etc., will not be discharged on nor's jurisdiction attaches and certainly does not the ground that there was no evidence before the shift and re-shift by any subsequent conflict of executive issuing the warrant showing that the evidence; though the prisoner's rights are fully fugitive had filed from the demanditig State to protected by the Governor's right to revoke hís avoid prosecution,
" " that it was for the execu- warrant. Work v. Corrington, 34 0. S. 64. tive to put a construction upon this language But if I am mistaken, and the supreme court of the affidavit before him upon the subject; we mean to announce the broad rule that it is alare bound to understand the court as meaning ways open to the prisoner, not merely to show that where it is made clearly to appear, not that upon habeas corpus what I have just indicated, there is greater testimony for the prisoner than but to overcome, by evidence, the proof made for the demanding State upon the issue of his have against him, the evidence sought to be excluded ing been present in that State when charged here does not go far enough to entitle him to in. with so being, but that the prisoner is not really voke the principle of that case. charged with having been actually present there The indictment charges that the prisoner comat all, or really demanded as a fugitive in the mitted the crime of grand larceny at Galesburg, sense of the constitution, but only as construct- Ill., on July 3, 1879. The accompanying, affidaively present and a fugitive, the Governor bas vit avers that on or about July 4, 1879, he fled no jurisdiction. The court found that there was from that State to this. The crime charged is
no conflict in the testimony that Nolze's state- one requiring his actual presence at the place of ments were all made in this State," referring to commission. He is not sworn in general terms the statements alleged to have been false pre- to be a fugitive, which might include construotenses, upon which he was charged with obtain- tion by the witness, but to have fled from that ing goods from a firm in New York. It appears State to this at or about a certain time. The
depositions and the prisoner's own testimony wholly ignorant in relation to it until she ascertained it are to the effect that during the whole of the 3d
from counsel. Held, tbe statute of limitations could not
be invoked; and the complaint stated a cause of action. and 4th days of July, 1879, he was in Cleveland, 0., his home. He says he arrived there at 6 a. m. on the former day, whence he does not state.
GETHIN v. WALKER. January 12, 1882. There is no evidence that he never was in Illi- Rescission-Contract of Sale.-Plaintiff, successor to ono nois, not even that he was not there about the
H., sued defendant in ejectment. Defendant had entered time laid in the indictment and mentioned in
into possession under a contract of sale inade with H.
while he (II.) was the owner of the premises. Held, the the affidavit. For aught that appears he may testimony showed a rescission of the contract between de. have been there on the 1st of July or the 6th. He
fendant and H. prior to the acquisition of title by plaintdoes not apply his evidence to the material por- Escrow Tender of Deed.-By, agreement between de tions of the charge against him, as Nolze did. fendant and H. the latter placed the deed in escrow to be He does not show that he was not in Illinois,
delivered on the payment of the balance of the purchase when the money was stolen which he is charged
money. Defendani knew where the deed was and the
mode in which he could procure it under the agreement. with stealing. He does not contradict the affi- Held: It was not necessary to tender the deed, in order davit that he fled from that State on or about
to place defendant in default after his failure to pay the
balance, so as to affect a rescission of the contract on the July 4, 1879. He assails only the immaterial
part of H. part of the charge in the indictment, the time Evidence-Notice to Produce Writing-Notice. It is not laid, variance as to which even upon trial would
necessary to give notice to the opposite party to produce be immaterial. (Roscoe's Crim. Ev., page 100;
a writing, which is itself a notice. Parol evidence is ad
missible to provo the contents of such notice. Wharton's Crim. Ev., Sec. 103.) Nor does he Deed-Certified Corry- Recorder's Ofice:-A certified make it appear, the evidence does not even sugo
copy us a Deed from the Recorder's office is primary evi
dence. gest the possibility, that an effort is being made to extradite him upon the theory of his constructive presence at the commission of the crime.
ARNAZ v. ESCANDON ET AL. January 9, 1882 While the fact that the evidence offered might Notary's Certificate-Deed-Married Woman-Interprebe competent upon his trial to prove an alibi is ter- Notice.-The Court found that the Notary taking no objection to its use for another legitimate
the acknowledgment of a married woman failed to make
known to her the contents of the deed ; that the acknowlpurpose here, yet the fact that it tends to prove edgment was taken through an interpreter, who did not nothing but a mere alibi is fatal to it.
correctly interpret the contents of the instrument, but The suggestion that a guilty person may es
told her it was a mortgage to secure the payment of a cer
tain sum of money. Plaintiff, the grantee, bad na notice cape extradition by showing that he did the of such facts: Held, the Notary's certificate was concluguilty acts in another than the demanding State,
sive as to the facts recited in it. while a person fully prepared to show hisinnocence
Husband and Wife-Delivery of Deed.-Being conclu
sively bound by the certificate of acknowledgment, may be taken if the evidence be excluded, has which shows her knowledge of the contents of the deed, no weight. Extradition does not depend upon and having permitted her husband.to take and use it acactual guilt, but upon Aight from a charge of cording to his own judgment, the wife has no right to guilt, and if in showing he never was present in and manifest purpose. Under such circumstances a do the demanding State and never fled therefrom livery by hiun must bind her as well as bipuself, the he shows he was guilty somewhere, as in the
grantue having no notice of her dissent. case of Nolze, it is a mere incident.
The motion will be granted, and the prisoner HARRIS, ADMINISTRATRIX V. HARRIS. January 13, 1882 remanded to the Sheriff's custody to be dealt with according to law.
Execution of Deed-Signature-Written Authority. It
is not necessary that the person who guides tbe hand of M. F. Wilson, Attorney for the Sheriff.
another, while such other is signing a deed, should be
authorized by writing so to do. “One signing & conT. F. Shay, Attorney for defendant.
tract commonly writes his name with his own hand; but, if another writes it for him in his presence and at his request, or especially, it he holds the top of the red while the other writes it, or diakes his mark to his name which the other has written, or if he acknowledges the signature, however made, to be his own, this is sufciont."
Finding8.-The jury found, first, the deceased wos " İR
the possoussion and 1180.of bis mental faculties at the time CALIFORNIA.
said deed was signed, so as to bo capable of understanding and comprehending what was being done in the exe
cuiion of sald deed." Second, that deceased "was not (Supreme Court.)
cupable to contract. Held, the last finding was not a le
gitimate inference from the facts fouud in the first COTA v. JONES AND WIFE. January 20, 1882.
Assuming that deceased was in the possession and use Limitation of Action-Discovery of Fraud.-It appeared of his mental faculties at the tiine, and capable of underthat plaintiff discovered the fraud alleged, only two standing and comprehending what was done, Held, the months before the commencement of the action in 1878; finding that he did not, after reading the deed or hearthat defendants had, in 1866, by false and fraudulent ing it read, know its contents," was preposterous." practices, obtained froni ber, for $1,500, & conveyance of The finding of the jury that the deed was not signed property of the value of $8,000, and tbat she did not know and delivered, Held, not sustained by the evidenre. of the fraud by which it had been acomplished until the Consideration.-Want of consideration is not sufficient investigation of counsel revealed it, because she was ig- to vitiate a deed. dorant andunacquainted with business and could neither Fraudulent Conveyance-Reconveyance.—That land bad read nor speak the English language, and could not ascer. been conveyed to defraud creditors, does not affoct the tain for herself anything upon the subject, and was validity of a voluntary reconveyance.
Digest of Decisions.
PEOPLE v. BIMONS. February 1, 1882. Homicide-Oominencement of Afray-Sell-Defense Instruction.--The following instruction held erroneous : “ If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant hilled the deceased, then to render said killing justifiable it must appear that the defendant was wholly without fault imputable to him by law in bringing about or commencing the dificulty in which the mortal wound was given."
It defendant had been the assailant, if he had really and in good faith endeavored to decline any further strug. glo before the honiicide was committed, the killing might be justifiable in self-defense.
inafter mentioned shall .mean the amount of weight averdupois, in this section specified, viz:
Of Wheat, 60 pounds ; of Rye, 56 pounds; of Oats, 82 pounds; of Clover seed, 60 pounds; of Timothy seed, 45 pounds; of Hemp seed, 44 pounds; of Millet seed, 60 pounds; of Buckwheat, 50 pounds; of Beans, 60 pounds ; of Pons, 60 pounds; of Hominy, 60 poundw; of Irish Potatoes, 60 pounds; of Sweet Potatoes, 50 pounds; of on: ions, 50 pounds; of Drird Peaches, 33 pounds; of Dried Apples, 22 pounds; us Flax seed, 66 pounds; of Barley, 48 pounds; of Malt, 84 pounds; of Hungarian grass seed, 60 pounds; of Lime, 70 pounds; of Coke, 40 pounds; of Biiuminous Coal, 80 pounds; of Cannel Coal, 70 pounds; of Corn, shelled, 56 pounds; of Tomatoes, 56 pounds; of Corn in the ear, 70 pounds, until the first of January next after it is raised, and after that date, 68 pounds.
Senate Bill No. 26. Authorizing the incorporated vile lage of Doylestown, Wayne County, to levy a tax and issue bonds to raise money to build a town ball.
S. B. 4. Repealing an act to provide for the more of. fectual drainage of Hog Creek Marsh, in Hardin County, passed June 6, 1879, and an act amendatory thereof.
SUPREME COURT RECORD.
(New cases üled since our last report, up to Feb. 28, 1882.]
PEOPLE v. HURLEY. February 2, 1882. Larceny-Recent Possession.-Upon a charge of larceny the fact that the stolen property is found within
a certain period, in the possession of defendant, is not sufficient to justify the inference that he stole the property. To justify that inference it must further appear that the possession was personal, and that it involved a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by him. Accordingly, the bare fact of finding hides of cattle that had been stolen in the defendant's barn, which was shown to have been open to any one who chose to enter it, in the absence of any evidence tending to prove that he know or had any reason to suppose that such hides were there, is insufficient to justify the inference of guilt.
Explanation of Possession of Stolen Properly.-Further: Until the declaration of defendant that he knew nothing about the hides being in his barn was shown to be false. he was not called upon to give any explanation as to how they came there.
Character-Possession. The presumption arising from possession alone of stolen property, is completely removed by evidence of the good character of defendant,
No. 1058. P. P. Mast & Co. v. Lucinda Gustin. Error to the District Court of Clinton County. L H. Baldwin and A. H. Jones for plaintitfs; Bloue & Walker for defendant.
1059. _Samuel Martin, et al. v. E. E. Roney, auditor &c. et al. Error to the District Court of Brown CountyD. W. C. Loudon and G. Bumbacb for plaintiffs; Moore & Harding for defendants.
1060. Herman Levi v. George Tremmel. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County. Yaple, Moos aud McCabe fur plaintiff; Jordan, Jordan & Willianis for defendant,
1061. William Edwards, et al. v. The Bedford Chair Co. et al. Error to the District Court of Cuyaboa County. Mix, Noble & White for plaintiffs.
1062. Harriet Tompkins v. Theodore B. Starr. Error to the District Court of Cuyaboga County. Mix. Noble & White for plaintiff.
1063. W. H. Harrison et al. v. J. M. Neeley et al. Error t: the District Court of Hamilton County. O'Connor, Glidden & Burgoyne and P. W. Stelubrecher for plaints itis.
KERN v. POWELL. November, 1881. Unrecorded assignmrnt in trust for benefit of single creditor-Assignment for benefit of general creditors. - An unrocorded assigninent of property, in trust for the benefit of a single creditor, is invalid us against a subsequent general recorded assignment for the benefit of all the ausignor's creditors. 1, therefore, the assignoos under
namod in the first assignment, the assignee under data 1064. Waldemar Otis v. The Euclid Avon
first-named assignment can recover neither the proceeds nor avalls of the said property.
House. Error to the District Court of Cuyaloga County. Mix, Noble & While for plaintiff; Gilbert & Joliuson for defendant.
1065. Rachel Gaff, Exe'x. &c. and Mary J. Povin, Exe'x. &c. v. Rokart Crigle. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County. Moulton, Johnson & Lovy for plaiutitts; McDowell & Strafer for defendant.
1066. Samuel Cadwallader v. John W. Barrack, Treag. urer of Senuca County. A. L. Brewer for plaintift; Lutes & Lules for defendaut.
SUPREME COURT ASSIGNMENT.
WILEY V. AULTMAN, ET AL. January 1882. Writ of Attachment-Suficiency of Affidavit.-An affi. davit attached to a writ of attachment which is not made by the plaintiffs or one of them, and does not on its face state that it is made in beball of the plaintiff, nor that the afflant is the agent or attorney, or where the plaintiff is a corporation, the agent, attorney, or officer of the plaintiff, is not a sufficient a fidavit under the statute; And all proceedings baned upon the same are void. It is the better practice in such case that the Affilavit, in addition to stating the relation of the affiant to the plaintiff, should further state the afiant's knowledge upon the subject of the indebtedness of the defendant to the plaintiff.
YOR ORAL ARGUMENT.
LXVTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OHIO.
March 20-No. 18. Marietta & Cincinnati Rallroad Company v. Western Union Telegruph Company et al.
March 8d-No. 87. Phenix Insurance Coinpany v. Priest, adm'r, etc.
March 8th-No._40. Crabill, ex'r v. Marsh. No. 60. Clty of Ironton v. Kelley and Wife.
March 8th-No. 740. City of Ironton v. Thomas D. Kelley.
March 9th-No. 7. Dawson v. Obio and J. B. Koch. No. 74. Obio ex rel. Da woun et al. v. Board of Education of Wooster.
March 10th--No. 46. Mighton v. Dawson et al.
ANYPOBIS OF LAWS PAASED THIS SESSION,
FEBRUARY 17, 1882. Houne BIII No. 198.-To amond section 4448 of the Revised Statutes, to read as follows:
Section 4443. A bushel of the respective articles here