tion of title in the defendant as dispenses with proof of a demand, where that would otherwise be necessary; [and it seems that where the general denial is followed by a special averment of property in the defendant, this does not relieve plaintiff from proving a demand.]

5. A defect in a judgment not prejudicial to the ap pellant is no ground of reversal.

HINMAN AND OTHERS v. C... H. HAMILTON PAPER Co.Filed October 18, 1881.

Judgment by default-Motion to set aside.-Defendant pleaded a good defence, and intended in good faith to go to trial when the cause should be called; and its counsel, with the virtual consent of the court, arranged with the clerk to notify defendant by telephone, at its place of business in the city where the court sat, when the case would be called; and there was only slight unnecessary delay, if any, on the part of defendant in appearing in court after, being so notified; and, finding that a jury had been empanelled, and had assessed the plaintiff's damages, and judgment had been rendered therefor, it immediately asked to have the judgment set aside, and for an immediate new trial; and that being denied, afterwards moved for a new trial on affidavits showing the facts. Held, that a denial of the motion

was error.

KLATT v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE.-Filed October 18, 1881.

Injuries-City, how far liable for defective street.-1. In case of injuries suffered in attempting to pass over streets while they are undergoing repair or improvement, a city is liable only for a want of ordinary care; and where a street, during the process of repair, has been made safe, so far as the public is concerned, by barriers or other proper precautions, but afterwards, suddenly and without warning to or fault of the city, becomes unsafe by the removal of such barriers or other precautions, the city is not liable for damage occasioned thereby, without actual or implied or presumptive notice to it of such removal, and the lapse of a reasonable time for guarding against the consequent danger.

2. Under a charter requiring a city to insert in contracts for street improvements a stipulation that the contractor" shall put up and maintain such barriers and lights as will effectually prevent the happening of any accident," where a sufficient barrier has in fact been put up across the dangerous street, but removed by some unknown person before the accident, the liability of the city is still limited, as defined in the foregoing proposition.

3. Where the special findings show that the accident happened in the night, five hours after the barriers were erected, and that in the interval such barriers had been removed, but do not show where or by whom the removal was made, nor any facts bearing upon the question of implied or presumptive notice, it cannot be held as a matter of law that there was such notice.

BRONSON AND ANOTHER v. MARKEY AND ANOTHER.— Filed October, 18, 1881.

Practice Demurrer.-1. Where one count of a complaint states, in itself, a good and complete cause of action for a personal judgment, a general demurrer thereto will not lie merely because another count attempts and fails to state another cause of action for a lien.

2. The failure of one count in the complaint to state a cause of action against one of two defendants, cannot be reached by a general demurrer thereto of the other defendant; but the objection that there is a misjoinder of parties in such a case must be taken by the defendant not affected by such count, by demurrer or plea in abatement for misjoinder.

MICHIGAN.

(Supreme Court.)

BARRIE v. SMITH AND OTHERS.-Filed October 26, 1881. Conditional Conveyance.-Conditions subsequent, tending as they do to destroy estates, are to be strictly construed.

A party allowing, without objection, property to be

used in violation of a condition subsequent, by which a forfeiture thereof might be claimed, and valuable improvements to be thereafter erected thereon, will be deemed thereby to have waived his right to enforce the condition for such violation.

A condition in a conveyance, which evinces no intention of actual or substantial benefit to the grantor, is one merely nominal, within the meaning of section 4113, Comp. Laws.

A condition in a conveyance by which the land is to revert to the grantor, should it ever be used for the purpose of carrying on the sale of intoxicating liquors, cannot be enforced if the grantor permits such use to be continued and valuable improvements to be thereafter erect thereon without objection, or if no substantial injury is individuɛ y sustained by him in consequence of such use.

DAVIDSON v. DAVIDSON.-Filed October 26, 1881.

Support of wife, apart from her husband.-A bill for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative. If from the evidence the court is satisfied the difficulties between the parties are not serious, the bill will be dismissed, espcially where there are young children for whom they ought to provide a home.

GRAND RAPIDS & IND. RAILROAD Co. v. MONROE.Filed October 26, 1881.

Railroad-How far liable for damages to cattle on the track.-A railroad company in maintaining fences along the track is only bound to reasonable diligence, and is not liable for injuries occurring to cattle which come upon the track through defects in fences not traceable to want of care.

When conflicting charges are given, one of which is erroneous, it is to be presumed that the jury may have followed that which was erroneous; and the judgment will be reversed.

LEDUKE v. BARNETT.-Filed October 26, 1881. Lease. A condition in a lease of land and building not to assign or release is not broken by allowing another to occupy a room in the building for a short time.

A lease contained a condition that the lessee should not assign or release without the written consent of the lessor, and authorized the lessor to re-enter for violation of the covenant. In an action by the lessor to recover the premises on account of an alleged assignment or re-letting, held, that it was incumbent upon him to show that such assignment or re-letting was without his consent.

STEVENSON v. FITZGERALD AND ANOTHER.-Filed October 26, 1881.

Trover.-To enable a party to maintain trover for property converted it is necessary for him to show that at the time of the conversion he was in actual possession or entitled to the immediate possession of the property converted.

WHITE AND ANOTHER v. Ross.-Filed October 26, 1881. Action against parents for enticing daughter from her husband.-A father and mother were sued for enticing

their daughter away from her husband and alienating her affections from him. The evidence showed the inarriage to have been clandestine; that the antecedents of the husband had been bad; that at the time of the marriage it was agreed it should be kept secret and the wife remain with her parents for a year, but the husband soon disclosed it; that the parents were greatly agitated and excited when they were made acquainted with the facts, and the father threatened violence if the daughter was taken away at once, but said that after a week's delay if she saw fit to go no obstacle should be interposed; that before the week was up she expressed a dislike and repugnance to the husband and determined to stay with her father; and there was no evidence of compulsion or solicitation, or of language which the husband's conduct did not merit. It seems that the court might well instruct the jury that there was no case for their consideration.

In such an action, if the husband does not make the wife a witness, it is not competent for him to prove her statements, either written or oral, made before or after marriage, but not in the presence of the defendants, to show her affection for him.

McMANN v. WESTCOTT AND ANOTHER.-Filed October 26, 1881.

Correction of mistake in mortgage.-Complainant, as assignee, filed a bill for the correction of a mistake in the description of a mortgage, and for its foreclosure as corrected, alleging that one defendant had purchased the land intended to be described after the execution of and subject to the mortgage, and had agreed to pay it. This defendant answered, admitting execution and delivery of mortgage, assignment to complainant, agreement to pay it, and conveyance of land to him, but neither admitted nor denied that the mortgagor intended to create a lien on the property s conveyed, or the mistake; he also averred full payment. Complainant then filed amended bill setting up that afterwards the mortgagor gave a new note and mortgage correcting the old one, which was duly recorded, and that the defendant purchased subject thereto, and asked a forelcosure of this mortgage. On motion to strike amended bill from the files, it was explained by affidavit that the original mortgage was, through inadvertence and mistake, handed to complainant's solicitor, and proceeded upon. Held, that the filing the amended bill was proper, and it was improperly stricken from the files.

SOVEREIGN AND ANOTHER V. ORTMAN AND Filed October 26, 1881.

an

OTHERS.

Parol agreement.-A parol agreement, void because not in writing, is valid so far as it may have been executed, and. cannot be revoked so as to undo what has been earned under it.

Where a written agreement as to the right to cut logs from certain land was to be executed between parties, and pending the preparation and execution of such written agreement parties of one part went on and did work in making roads, preparing camps, and getting out lumber under a verbal agreement that they might do so, helu, that the verbal agreement so made was not dependent for its validity upon the original contract, and that it was valid so far as carried out and rights acquired thereunder.

Ross v. Ross.-Filed October 26, 1881. Divorce.-Courts will not compel a husband, in a divorce proceeding to make an allowance to the wife for maintenance and counsel fees unless it is made to appear that she has no property of her own. There is no presumption of law that she has no property. An order for such an allowance, where no such showing is made, will not sustain proceedings for the punishment of the husband as for contempt in disobeying the same.

KENTUCKY.

(Court of Appeals.)

BIGGS V. THE LEX. & BIG SANDY R. R. Co. Filed Oct. 1, 1881.

1. Limitation against action to correct a mistake.-An action for compensation for a material deficit in lands sold,

under a mistake as to quantity, must be brought within five years from the discovery of the mistake, if payment has been made before such discovery.

Payment and discovery must concur before a recovery can be had.

2. Injunction did not prevent statute from running.The granting of an injunction, in this case, did not stay the appellee's action; it only prescribed when and how he should institute it; and appellee will not be allowed to deduct any time by reason of the granting of the injunction, and thus reduce the period below the requisite statutory bar.

PARROT v. KELLY. Filed Oct. 4, 1881.

Wife may will her estate to her husband, when, &c.-A. conveyance by husband and wife, of the real estate of the wife, to a third person, who re-conveys it to the separate use of the wife, with power to dispose of it by will, confers upon the feme covert the power to devise the real estate to her husband, if the conveyance and the execution of the will are made without fraud or undue influence.

PHILLIPS V. BRECK'S EX's. Filed Sept. 28, 1881.

A party seeking to enforce a vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money for land, must allege and prove, if denied, the terms of the contract, the character of the title to be made, and his ability and willingness to convey according to the terms of the contract.

When the title is in the vendor's devisees or heirs, and the action is brought by a personal representative he must allege their ability and willingness to convey, &c.

HUMPHREY V. HUGHES' G'DN, &c. Filed Oct. 4, 1881. 1. Withdrawal of Pleadings.-A party to an action can withdraw any pleading, or at least it is within the discretion of the court to permit any pleading to be withdrawn, unless it works an injury to his adversary.

2. In an action on an assignment it is necessary to allege the consideration for the assignment, and the recovery is limited to the amount actually paid therefor. Section 7, chapter 22, General Statutes.

3. A party improperly uniting two causes of action should be compelled to elect which he will prosecute.

TURNBULL v. COMMONWEALTH. Filed Oct. 6, 1881. 1. Husband is an incompetent witness against his wife. 2. Judgment, in a criminal case, reversed for an error not specified in the grounds for new trial.-It is not necessary that the error of the court in admitting incompetent evidence be relied upon in a motion for a new trial in order to enable the accused to avail himself of that error upon appeal.

ANDERSON, TRUSTEE, &c., v. STERRITT. Filed Oct. 8, 1881.

1. An action for dower is an action for the recovery of real estate, and not a mere personal right or chose in action.

2. Limitation as to action for dower.-The widow's right of action accrues upon the death of her husband, and where the husband's vendee claims and holds the land as his own, her right of action will be barred by the statute of limitations, in fifteen years.

RUDD v. MATTHEWS. Filed Oct. 13, 1881.

1. Estoppel by admissions or representations.-Admissions or representations made with the intention, or reasonably calculated, to influence the conduct of another, estop the person making them, from denying their truth when they have been acted upon.

It is not necessary to create the estoppel that the admissions or representations were made with a fraudulent intent.

2. Having admitted that his signature was genuine, and that he was bound thereby as surety, the party making such admissions, in this case, will not be permitted to deny his liability, although the jury found that he neither signed the note or authorized any one to sign it for him.

CALIFORNIA.

(Supreme Court.)

THE PEOPLE v. JOHN MONOHAN. Sept. 23, 1881. Instructions calculated to confuse jury.-An instruction calculated to confuse the jury, and from which it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to determine what was the correct definition of the crime with which the defendant was charged, is ground for a reversal of the judgment.

THE PEOPLE V. JOHN E. WILLIAMS. Sept. 21, 1881.

Crime against nature-Information.-An information charging that at, etc., on, etc., defendant did wilfully and unlawfully and feloniously make an assault upon H. G., "with intent to commit in and upon the person of the said H. G. the infamous crime against nature, contrary," etc., is sufficient.

Information sufficient if acts are stated in ordinary and concise language.-An information is sufficient if the acts constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise language, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. Every person of ordinary intelligence understands what the crime against nature with a human being is.

F. L. HENDERSON v. WILLIAM J. HICKS ET AL. Oct. 5, 1881.

Specific performance-Laches-Reasonable time.-A refusal by a party to comply with the terms of an agreement to purchase lands within a reasonable time operates a waiver of his right, and the owner of the land is at liberty to sell it to some other party: Accordingly, Held, that the owner was justified in selling land after six years had expired from the time the money became due on a contract to purchase, there being no excuse for the Jaches shown, and that equity would refuse a decree of specific performance.

Rescission of contract.-Defendant Reynolds, before purchasing the land, agreed that he would convey it to Hicks upon the payment by the latter of a certain sum within eight months. Hicks did not pay the money, and defendant returned to him what had been paid on account: Held, defendant had a right to treat the contract with Hicks and himself as at an end, and no longer binding on him.

BENEDICT v. PEPPERS ET AL. Oct. 5, 1881.

Purchaser for value-Contracts to purchase lands-Mortgage-Notice-Assignment.-After Peppers had executed a mortgage, and which was recorded, of his right to purchase land from the W. D. Co., he executed a deed of the premises to Mann, but did not in terms assign the contract. Mann assigned the contract to defendant without consideration. Afterward Mann paid the balance of the purchase money to the W. D. Co., and at his request a deed was executed to defendant by the W. D. Co. Neither the contract nor any assignment thereof was recorded. Held, that defendant's rights were no greater than Mann's, and that they were subject to the mortgage executed by Peppers. Held further, that the mere recital in the assignment to defendant of a consideration of five dollars did not show that she was a purchaser for value.

WORMOUTH v. JOHNSON. Oct. 8, 1881.

Trust.-Defendant furnished money to her son, at that time husband of plaintiff, for the purpose of purchasing the property in controversy, it being understood and agreed that the title was to be taken in the son's name, but for the use and benefit of defendant, all of which was known to plaintiff. Instead of having had the title conveyed to the son, it was agreed between the latter and plaintiff that the title should be conveyed to and held by the plaintiff, and a deed-in form of a gift-was so made by the grantor, plaintiff taking with full notice of defendant's equities, and of the trust between her and her son. The Court below, as conclusions of law, found that the legal title to the land wes vested, as community property, in plaintiff as the wife of King; that the title was taken

in trust for the benefit of defendant, and that the latter was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the premises. Held, proper.

Evidence-Declarations.-Held further, that declarations by the son, after he has caused the deed of gift to be made to plaintiff, that the purchase money of the premises belonged to defendant, and that the purchase was made with her money and for her benefit, and that the title was held for her use, were properly admitted.

Statute of limitations-Cases followed.-Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547, and Gerdes v. Moody, 41 Id. 335, to the effect that the statute of limitations does not run in favor of a trustee, as against the cestui que trust, while the latter is in possession of the estate, and there has been no adverse holding on the part of the trustee, followed.

ILLINOIS.

(Supreme Court.)

PATSY DEVINE v、 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.-Opinion by MULKEY, J., reversing. Filed Sept. 30, 1881.

1. Criminal law-Rules of evidence should be strictly observed.-Where one is tried on an issue that involves his life, the prosecution should be held to at least a substantial, if not a strict observance of the well-established rules of evidence, and no matter or thing should be admitted against the objections of the accused which do not prove, or tend to prove, the issue, more especially when it may have an improper influence upon the jury.

2. Evidence-Of the theory of witness and others as to guilty party.-On the trial of one for murder when the only evidence relied on to connect the prisoner with the crime was circumstantial evidence, a captain of the police was allowed to testify that on the night of the homicide he saw another person, and learned what he knew about the prisoner and another, and that he and the police formed the theory that the prisoner and such other person did the shooting of the deceased: Held, that the admission of this testimony was unjust to the accused, and clearly erroneous.

3. Judge-Has no power to amend or change bill of exceptions in vacation.—It is a well recognized principle that a judge can exercise no judicial functions in vacation, except such as are specifically authorized by statute. He cannot authorize an amendment or change in a bill of exceptions, except in term time, and then only on notice to the other party.

4. Bill of exceptions- When filed is a part of the record. -While it may be true that the settling of a bill of exceptions may not be the exercise of a judicial power, yet when one is once signed, sealed and filed, it becomes as much a part of the record as an indictment or declaration, and like other portions of the record, imports verity, and no plea or averment can be received to contradict its import.

SUPREME COURT RECORD.

[New cases filed since our last report, up to Nov. 29, 1881.]

No. 1225. Peter Simonis v. The Insurance Co. of North America. Error to the District Court of Seneca County. Seney & Kepple for plaintiff; N. L. Brewer for defend

ant.

1226. James T. Warder et al. v. Commissioners of Clark County. Appeal-Reserved in the District Court of Clark County. S. A. Bowman for plaintiffs; George Arthur and Harrison, Olds & Marsh for defendants.

1227. Edward Hazard et al. v. Ohio, on complaint of Anna Dickson. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County. Wulsin & Worthington for plaintiffs; E. A. Guthrie for defendants.

1228. John W. Tweed v. George Sheer. Error to the District Court of Brown County. W. D. Young for plaintiff; G. Bumbach for defendant.

THE first shipment of 36th Ohio State Reports was insufficient to fill all our orders for the same; hence we have been compelled to tax the patience of some of our subscribers by the delay in getting books to supply their demands. We trust to be able to fill all orders within a very few days.

It does not seem to be fully understood that we intend to publish in full, all the opinions of the Supreme Court of this state, as fast as they are prepared by the Judges. the Judges. Through the courtesy and assistance of Mr. E. L. De Witt, the State Reporter, and the kindness of the judges in examining the proof sheets, we are enabled to give the opinions as complete and accurate as they will appear in the reports.

A FULL and complete index to the first volume of the LAW JOURNAL, from August 19th, 1880, to August 11th, 1881, inclusive, has just been prepared, and ready for delivery to our subscribers who may desire it. A great many of our present subscribers never received the whole of the first volume and would not desire the index for the purpose of binding the volume, but to those desiring it we will gladly forward the same upon application.

THE Supreme Court will probably adjourn next week. It is absolutely necessary that the Clerk should have the intervening time, from December 15th to January 3d, to prepare the new docket for the next term. The Judges will each take up cases, which they will consider during the interim. Over 240 cases have thus far been disposed of this term, the Judges having cases up to and including 220, on the regular calendar, in their hands for consideration. Last year at the close of the term, cause number 141, on the General Docket, was the highest reached in regular order. Thus far this term the court has disposed of 215 motions, besides the great number of cases taken out of their regular order, which makes up the total number of cases on the General Docket

disposed of as above stated. Having passed number 200 on the General Docket, the court has reached the cases that have come up to the Supreme Court without leave, since the year

1878. This leaves the court a little over three years behind, on the docket at this time, but it is thought that a large number of cases will be found of easy disposition, as doubtless many will be found without much merit, as regards right of appeal, &c., not having been examined into before being brought to the Supreme Court.

BANK FAILURE.

The failure of the Mechanics' Bank, [at Newark, New Jersey], produced the usual controversies as to who should bear the loss upon commercial paper payable there. The failure of the bank is the last thing in the contemplation of the parties, and the questions must be settled by rules of law. It is a case where strict law may be applied and no one can complain of injustice. The party who wins considers himself in luck, and the one who loses bears his loss with the rest of the victims of the disaster.

In one case an auctioneer had given a check for the proceeds of a sale. The person who received the check went to the bank and instead of getting the money had the check certified and took it to New York, where he put it in his own bank for collection. This was on Saturday, and on Monday the bank closed. The holder called upon the maker to pay the check, but he replied that the other might have got the money on Saturday if he had asked for it, and that having taken the bank's certificate instead for his own convenience, he took the risk of the failure of the bank. Upon this the holder sought legal advice and was told that the maker was right, and that having taken the bank's certificate he had made the bank the only debtor and discharged the drawer; and his counsel referred to the case of the Essex County National Bank v. Bank of Montreal, 7 Biss. 193; Daniel on Neg. Inst. § 1601-2, 3, 4; Ball on Nat. Banks 90.

There were some cases in which checks had been taken uncertified, had not been presented. for collection immediately, and in the meantime the bank had failed; and the question was presented whether the makers were liable or not. There can be no doubt in a case in which the check was deposited for collection on the following day and sent through the banks in the usual course of business, even though it might have been several days in coming. But if the holder fails to deposit on the following day, does that of itself discharge the maker in case of loss? It is well settled that unreasonable delay will have that effect, and the rule seems to be that the deposit must be made on the day following the receipt of the check. Ball on National Banks 74; Morse on Banking 262.

A more complicated case was this: A Chicago draft in his bank for collection. It was sent to a man drew upon a man in Newark and put the bank in Newark, and by that bank presented to the drawee, who accepted it "payable at the Mechanics' National Bank." The collecting

bank then presented it at the Mechanics' Bank and had it certified by the teller on Saturday, October 29th. The amount of the draft was then of course charged to the account of the drawee in the Mechanics' Bank. On Monday the Mechanics' Bank was closed. The collecting bank then, instead of crediting the Mechanics' Bank with the certified draft and holding the draft against that bank, returned it as uncollected to its correspondent in Chicago, who notified the drawer that it was unpaid. He took it up and charged the amount to the acceptor, and sent the draft back to him. The acceptor now insists that he had paid the draft on Saturday and that the collecting bank is responsible for the loss. The argument is that the collecting bank might have obtained the money on Saturday, and having accepted the certificate of the Mechanics' Bank instead for its own convenience, it assumed the risk of the solvency of the bank. The certification was a transaction entirely between the two banks, and was equivalent to a payment by the acceptor. The amount of it was charged to his account and the draft became the check of the Mechanics' Bank upon itself, which was accepted as money by the collecting bank. On the other hand the collecting bank insists that it was acting merely as an agent, and is responsible only for neglect; that taking the certificate of the bank was in accordance with a well known and necessary usage, and that there were no remissness to be charged against it. It seems to us that the argument of the acceptor must prevail. The bank could have obtained actual payment on Saturday, and was bound to do so unless it would accept something else upon its own risk. It took the certification of the other bank in lieu of payment, and must now look to the other bank alone. It may well be that the state of the accounts between them was such that there will be no loss upon the draft. It may have gone to reduce the debt due from the collecting bank to the bank that has failed. If the case were that of a check, it would be governed by the authorities cited above-Essex County National Bank v. Bank of Montreal, 7 Biss. 193; Dan. on Neg. Inst. 1601, etc.; Morse on Banking 280-and there is no sound distinction in this respect between a check and an accepted draft payable at a certain bank. Ames Cases on Bills and Notes

739 n. 1, 802, Meads v. Merchants Bank, 25 N. Y. 143.-The New Jersey Law Journal.

IN Muse v. Muse, 84 N. C. 35, it was held that "a husband is not excused from the maintenance of his wife because he lacks an estate. He must labor, if need be, for her support." "The court adopted the very minimum that an ablebodied man can earn, ten cents a day."

THE Supreme Court of the United States has just this week decided that a sheriff is not personally liable for damages in having obeyed the mandate of a court.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

THE WESTERn Union Telegraph ComPANY

V.

GRISWOLD & DUNHAM.

November 1, 1881.

1. While a telegraph company may, by special agreement, or by reasonable rules and regulations, limit its liability to damages for errors or mistakes in the transmission and delivery of messages, it cannot stipulate, or provide, for immunity from liability, where the error, or mistake, results from its own negligence. Such a stipulation, or regulation, being contrary to public policy, is void.

2. Where in an action against the company for damages resulting from an inaccurate transmission of a message, such inaccuracy is made to appear, the burden of proof is on the company to show that the mistake was not attributable to its fault or negligence.

3. The plaintiff's agent sent to them from Woodstock Ontario, a message in these words:-"Will you give one fifty for twenty-five hundred at London. Answer at once, as I have only till night." The court instructed the jury that the message was not in cipher or obscure, within the meaning of a stipulation in the agreement under which the message was sent, that the company "assumed no liability for errors in cipher or obscure messages."

Held, That the instruction was correct.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County-Reserved in the District Court.

The defendants in error, dealers in flax seed and manufacturers of linseed oil, at Cleveland, brought an action against the plaintiff in error, The Western Union Telegraph Company, in November, 1872, to recover damages for the negligent transmission of a dispatch from Buffalo to Cleveland, sent by the defendants' agent, S. W. Cowpland, from Woodstock, Ontario, upon which the defendants acted, and by reason of which negligence they suffered damages to the alleged amount of $1,163.70, for which sum, with interest thereon from December 23, 1871, they prayed judgment. The dispatch sent was as follows:

"WOODSTOCK, ONTARIO, December 23d, 1871. "Messrs. Griswold & Dunham : "Will you give one fifty for twenty-five hundred at London? Answer at once, as I have only till night. "S. W. CowPLAND."

The dispatch, as intended by Cowpland and understood by Griswold & Dunham, meant to inquire whether the latter would pay one dollar and fifty cents in gold for twenty-five hundred bushels of flax seed, at London, Ontario, the parties having had a prior correspondence in reference to the purchase of flax seed in Canada. The dispatch was sent from Woodstock to Buffalo over the lines of the Montreal Telegraph Company, and thence to Cleveland over the lines of the plaintiff in error.

The dispatch delivered to Griswold & Dunham, at Cleveland, was as follows.

"WOODSTOCK, ONTARIO, December 23d, 1871. "To Griswold & Dunham: "Will you give one five for twenty-five hundred at London. Answer at once, as I have only till night. "S. M. CoWPLAND."