classes, the farmers, graziers, and traders of England, with whom he more especially sympathises, prays, with an anxious heart and a loyal mind, for the interposition of your Lordship in this momen tous matter. And your memorialist will ever pray. London, October 25, 1827. SUGGESTIONS respecting the formation of a NATIONAL BANK, as a means of protection for the private Bankers and the Public, against the designs of the Governor and Company of the BANK of ENGLAND. 1. The directors of the Bank of England, by establishing Branch Banks, and adopting proceedings to render the Bank of England and its Branch Banks the general and principal banking establishments of the country, have invaded the rights of private bankers; and, by thus aiming at an exclusive monopoly, have produced great evil to the community. The Governor and Company of the Bank of England ought to remain the bankers of the state, and of the state only: it is unjust that they should interfere with the general banking business of the country, because no fair competition can exist between a great corporation with exclusive privileges and private individuals; and because, in case of need, the government may again protect this corporation against the payment of its debts, while no such protection can be had for private bankers. The private bankers of England are therefore recommended to relinquish the practice of circulating Bank of England notes, to adopt measures for their own protection, and to insure the perfect security and independence of the public. 2. The directors of the Bank of England adopted their recent measures in great ignorance of the wants and habits of the people, without any adequate preparatory investigation, and without due consultation with those who were most concerned in their proceedings. Their conduct is therefore referred to, as an example of inconsiderateness and folly, to be avoided by the private bankers. 3. The private bankers should declare their opinion, that to restore the relative circumstances of the Bank of England, of private bankers, and of the public, as nearly as possible to the state in which they were two years ago, is the wisest purpose to which their actions can be directed. This opinion would be adopted by every well-informed, reflecting man in the kingdom. 4. Keeping this, therefore, viz. the restoration of matters to their former state, constantly in view, as the polar star by which the course of the private bankers should at first be guided, they should endeavor, by seeking conferences with the directors, and by expostulation, to accomplish their purpose consistently with that harmony which has always prevailed between the directors of the Bank of England and the private bankers. Secondly, if that fail, by an appeal, for the same object, to government, or parliament, or both; and lastly, if driven by the injustice and pertinacity of the Bank directors, they must adopt effectual means to attain the protection, security, and independence of themselves and the public. 5. As there can arise but little difference of opinion respecting the expediency of first trying the effect of conferences and expostulations, either in private or public; to ascertain how the ultimate purpose can be accomplished, appears the main consideration for private bankers. A clear demonstration of the means of depriving the Bank of England of the principal amount of profit which it has derived from the circulation of notes, may cause the directors, or the proprietors of Bank Stock, to adopt the opinions of the private bankers but if it should not have that effect, it cannot fail of assuring the private bankers how completely they have, by union among themselves, the power to secure their own protection and independence, by raising a rival establishment against the Bank of England. 6. Though their own protection and that of the public stimulate the private bankers to raise a rival establishment to that of the Bank of England, they cannot doubt that they would also, thereby, acquire the means of great emolument for the subscribers to a new bank stock. But as a National Bank is so important an undertaking, as, at first, to startle the mind by its magnitude, it may be necessary to proceed step by step: first, to ascertain the extent of risk which would be incurred, by adhering to the most cautious policy in conducting it; and secondly, to see how profit may be gained by proceedings of less restricted caution, but still of the most unquestionable prudence. 7. Suppose that, after opening books to receive subscriptions for a National Bank, the requisite number and amount be filled up by private bankers alone. A temporary office might be opened at Northampton, for receiving deposits and issuing notes. Six persons, subscribers to the National Bank stock, or otherwise, might at the same time open an office in London, and be the agents of the National Bank till the year 1833, when the exclusive privileges of the Bank of England cease. Or six well-known men, of the highest character, now engaged in extensive money transactions, who favor this project, might undertake to conduct a bank in London on these principles, and on their own responsibility, for their own advantage, till the associated bankers of England could be incorporated, or could act together as National Bank Stock proprietors. The subscriptions for a National Bank Stock being first filled up by private bankers, it would not be very material, merely for protection and without regard to immediate profit, whether the plan of establishing a bank by six persons in London, or by a larger number at a distance exceeding 65 miles from London, were adopted. Either or both these banks could be opened, and business conducted at them till the year 1833. 8. As the National Bank would be solely a bank for providing a bankpaper currency, and not a bank for general purposes, it might be conducted without great annual expense. And if the most cautious policy were at first pursued; viz. issuing notes only on the deposit of coin or bullion, of the same value of the notes, somewhat after the manner of the Amsterdam bank, the coin or bullion might be retained in the bank to answer any demand for the payment of its notes. In this manner the notes would get into circulation, and very soon become the most esteemed notes of the country. The expense would then be limited to the paying for the stamps, for keeping the simplest accounts, and for the safe custody of the coin or bullion. 9. In a very early stage of the proceedings, however, profit would be sought, somewhat after the following manner : Bankers being the principal or sole subscribers to this bank stock, every banker who held its stock would for convenience, as well as from a desire to give credit and currency to the National Bank notes, use them instead of the Bank of England notes, or coin; for the same purposes, and exactly in the same manner, as he now uses Bank of England notes. It would be easy to obtain a return from all bankers of the amount of National Bank notes, which, in the place of the Bank of England notes now held, they would at all times keep in their banks as reserves for emergency, or to meet extraordinary demands. Being favorers of the establishment, and participators in its profits, the bankers might pledge themselves to fill up the amount in their respective banks, whenever it became reduced below a certain sum. The aggregate amount of these respective sums remaining at all times in the hands of the private bankers, and the amount originally subscribed and paid by the proprietors, would be the sum of the disposable capital of the National Bank. This sum, still preserving a cautionary margin within the whole amount, might, with unquestionable prudence, be lent on government or other security, according to the practice of the Equitable Assurance Office, or other wealthy societies; and thus a profit would accrue to the proprietors of the National Bank Stock. 10. In this manner would a National Bank, of great solidity and acknowleged utility, be established, without deviating, in any degree whatever, from the principles of protection and independence which first suggested the undertaking; and without interfering, in any manner, with any existing establishment, except that of the Bank of England. 11. No reflecting man, acquainted with the habits and practices of country bankers, could desire to interfere with the circulation of country bank notes. Without insisting on certain peculiar advantages which might, abstractedly, be urged in their favor, they are amongst the established means of power and convenience to country bankers; by which, in some measure, their own connexions with the public have been formed, and by which many of the most important operations in industry are continued. The country bankers and the public have, to this extent, a vested right in the usage of country bank notes: an usage which cannot be disturbed without manifest injustice. At the same time, when projects are put forth, in high quarters, for supplanting country bank notes, the becoming participators in the profits of a National Bank must be regarded with unmixed satisfaction by country bankers; because that is the only safe and practical means by which they can, under all circumstances, be thoroughly protected against the sinister designs of powerful existing establishments, or the undermining influence of local joint-stock companies which may be created. 12. In the event of the private bankers being frustrated in their first efforts, of endeavoring to obtain their object by conferences, the design of the promoters of this undertaking would be limited to supplying an amount of notes for circulation, equal to the amount of the notes of the Bank of England which would be driven in by the private bankers acting on a resolution to use them no longer: the notes of the National Bank to be used in the same manner, and for the same purposes precisely, as the notes of the Bank of England have been used. ΤΟ THE REV. HENRY PHILLPOTTS, D.D. : ON THE SUBJECT OF HIS TWO LETTERS TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE GEORGE CANNING, BY THOMAS GISBORNE, JUN. LONDON:-1827. "Touch Ralph de Vipont's shield-touch the Hospitaller's shield; he has the least sure seat, he is your cheapest bargain. "The knight moving onward amid these well-meant hints, ascended the platform by the sloping alley which led to it from the lists, and to the astonishment of all present, riding straight up to the central pavilion, struck with the sharp end of his spear, the shield of Brian de Bois Guilbert, until it rung again. All stood astonished at his presumption, but none more than the redoubted knight whom he had thus defied to mortal combat."-IVANHOE. Vol. i. p. 165. SIR, Cintra, June 18th, 1827. I AM afraid that an allusion to Ivanhoe may be much more descriptive of the temerity than of the success of my attempt: but it is precisely because you are the boldest champion, because you are the Bois Guilbert of the Anticatholic cause, that I have undertaken to address you. Nor does this, I believe, arise from any overweening idea of my own powers. At the present period of the Catholic controversy all minor obstacles are cleared away; the skirmishers on each side are called in; the forces are concentrated; and it is useless for a combatant to appear in the field, who is not, trusting in the goodness of his cause and the strength of his weapons, prepared to assail the centre of the enemies' position, or to defend the centre of his own. You have placed yourself in the front of the battle, and I cannot enter the field without encountering you. It may be that I had judged better to leave the field to abler combatants, but, being there, to attack you involves no increase of presumption. I have at least this consolation-if I am discomfited, the overthrow of an unknown champion will not injure my cause. If I might succeed in forcing you back from your imposing position, I shall have performed good service. I had just completed the reading of your two letters to Mr. Canning, when I took up M. de Pradt's "Jesuitisme Ancien et |