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still more powerfully serve to command our admiration; for they are the GRECIAN orders; they derive their origin from those times, and were the ornament of those countries which are most hallowed in our imaginations; and it is difficult for us to see them, even in their modern copies, without feeling them operate upon our minds as relics of those polished nations where they first arose, and of that greater people by whom they were afterwards borrowed."

Agreeing as he does with Mr. Alison, and all modern inquirers, that the whole beauty of objects consists, in the far greater number of instances, in the associations to which we have alluded, he still maintains, that some few visible objects affect us with a sense of beauty in consequence of the pleasurable impression they make upon the sense-and that our perception of beauty is, in these instances, a mere organic sensation. Now, we have already stated, that it would be something quite unexampled in the history either of mind or of language, if certain physical and bodily sensations should thus be confounded with moral and social feelings with which they had no connection, and pass familiarly under one and the same name. Beauty consists confessedly, in almost all cases, in the suggestion of moral or social emotions, mixed

This analysis is to us perfectly satisfactory. But, indeed, we cannot conceive any more complete refutation of the notion of an intrinsic and inherent beauty in the proportions of the Grecian architecture, than the fact of the admitted beauty of such very opposite proportions in the Gothic. Opposite as they are, however, the great elements of beauty are the same in this style as in the other-up and modified by a present sensation or the impressions of religious awe and of chivalrous recollections, coming here in place of the classical associations which constitute so great a share of the interest of the former. It is well observed too by Mr. Alison, that the great durability and costliness of the productions of this art, have had the effect, in almost all regions of the world, of rendering their Fashion permanent, after it had once attained such a degree of perfection as to fulfil its substantial purposes.

"Buildings," he observes, "may last, and are intended to last for centuries. The life of man is very inadequate to the duration of such productions; and the present period of the world, though old with respect to those arts which are employed upon perishable subjects, is yet young in relation to an art, which is employed upon so durable materials as those of architecture. Instead of a few years, therefore, centuries must probably pass before such productions demand to be renewed; and, long before that period is elapsed, the sacredness of antiquity is acquired by the subject itself, and a new motive given for the preservation of similar forms. In every country, accordingly, the same effect has taken place and the same causes which have thus served to produce among us, for so many years, an uniformity of taste with regard to the style of Grecian architecture, have produced also among the nations of the East, for a much longer course of time, a similar uniformity of taste with regard to their ornamental style of architecture; and have perpetuated among them the same forms which were in use among their forefathers, before the Grecian orders were invented."

It is not necessary, we think, to carry these illustrations any farther: as the theory they are intended to explain, is now, we believe, universally adopted, though with some limitations, which we see no reason to retain. Those suggested by Mr. Alison, we have already endeavoured to dispose of in the few remarks we have made upon his publication; and it only remains to say a word or two more upon Mr. Knight's doctrine as to the primitive and independent beauty of colours, upon which we have already hazarded some remarks.

perception; and it is this suggestion, and this identification with a present object, that constitutes its essence, and gives a common character to the whole class of feelings it produces, sufficient to justify their being designated by a common appellation. If the word beauty, in short, must mean something, and if this be very clearly what it means, in all the remarkable instances of its occurrence, it is difficult to conceive, that it should occasionally mean something quite different, and denote a mere sensual or physical gratification, unaccompanied by the suggestion of any moral emotion whatever. According to Mr. Knight, however, and, indeed, to many other writers, this is the case with regard to the beauty of colours; which depends altogether, they say, upon the delight which the eye naturally takes in their contemplation-this delight being just as primitive and sensual as that which the palate receives from the contact of agreeable flavours.

It must be admitted, we think, in the first place, that such an allegation is in itself extremely improbable, and contrary to all analogy, and all experience of the structure of language, or of the laws of thought. It is farther to be considered, too, that if the pleasures of the senses are ever to be considered as beautiful, those pleasures which are the most lively and important would be the most likely to usurp this denomination, and to take rank with the higher gratifications that result from the perception of beauty. Now, it admits of no dispute, that the mere organic pleasures of the eye (if indeed they have any existence) are far inferior to those of the palate, the touch, and indeed almost all the other senses-none of which, however, are in any case confounded with the sense of beauty. In the next place, it should follow, that if what affords organic pleasure to the eye be properly called beautiful, what offends or gives pain to it, should be called ugly. Now, excessive or dazzling light is offensive to the eye-but, considered by itself, it is never called ugly, but only painful or disagreeable. The moderate excitement of light, on the other hand, or the soothing of certain bright but temperate colours, when considered in

this primary aspect, are not called beautiful, but only agreeable or refreshing. So far as the direct offence or comfort of the organ, in short, is referred to, the language which we nse relates strictly to physical or bodily sensation, and is not confounded with that which relates to mental emotion; and we really see no ground for supposing that there is any exception to this rule.

all cases, absolutely indifferent. But it is the colour only that is called beautiful or otherwise; and these qualities we think it very plainly derives from the common fountain of association.

which seem to possess the same power of pleasing, are found, upon examination, to owe it entirely to the principle of association? The only reason that can be assigned, or that actually exists for this distinction, is, that it has been supposed more difficult to account for the beauty of colours, upon the principles which have accounted for other beauties, or to specify the particular associations by virtue It is very remarkable, indeed, that the of which they could acquire this quality. sense whose organic gratification is here sup- Now, it appears to us that there is no such posed to constitute the primary feeling of difficulty; and that there is no reason whatbeauty, should be one, in the first place, ever for holding that one colour, or combinawhose direct organic gratifications are of very tion of colours, is more pleasing than another, little force or intensity;—and, in the next except upon the same grounds of association place, one whose office it is, almost exclu- which recommend particular forms, motions, sively, to make us acquainted with the exist- or proportions. It appears to us, that the orence and properties of those external objects ganic pleasures of the eye are extremely few which are naturally interesting to our inward and insignificant. It is hurt, no doubt, by an feelings and affections. This peculiarity excessive glare of light; and it is in some demakes it (at the very least) extremely proba- gree gratified, perhaps, by a moderate degree ble, that ideas of emotion should be associated of it. But it is only by the quantity or inwith the perceptions of this sense; but ex- tensity of the light, we think, that it is so tremely improbable, that its naked and unas-affected. The colour of it, we take it, is, in sociated sensations should in any case be classed with such emotions. If the name of beauty were given to what directly gratifies any sense, such as that of tasting or smelling, which does not make us acquainted with the nature or relations of outward objects, there In the first place, we would ask, whether would be less room for such an explanation. there is any colour that is beautiful in all But when it is the business of a particular situations? and, in the next place, whether sense or organ to introduce to our knowledge there is any colour that is not beautiful in those objects which are naturally connected some situation? With regard to the first, take with ideas of emotion, it is easy to understand the colours that are most commonly referred how its perceptions should be associated with to as intrinsically beautiful-bright and soft these emotions, and an interest and impor-green-clear blue-bright pink, or vermilion. tance thus extended to them, that belong to the intimations of no other bodily organ. But, for those very reasons, we should be prepared to suspect, that all the interest they possess is derived from this association; and to distrust the accuracy of any observations that might lead us to conclude that its mere organic impulses ever produced any thing akin to those associated emotions, or entitled to pass under their name. This caution will appear still more reasonable, when it is considered, that all the other qualities of visible objects, except only their colours, are now admitted to be perfectly indifferent in themselves, and to possess no other beauty than they may derive from their associations with our ordinary affections. There are no forms, for example, even in Mr. Knight's opinion, that have any intrinsic beauty, or any power of pleasing or affecting us, except through their associations, or affinities to mental affections, either as expressive of fitness and utility, or as types and symbols of certain moral or intellectual qualities, in which the sources of our interest are obvious. Yet the form of an object is as conspicuous an ingredient of its beauty as its colour; and a property, too, which seems at first view to be as intrinsically and independently pleasing. Why, then, should we persist in holding that colours, or combinations of colours, please from being naturally agreeable to the organ of sight, when it is admitted that other visible qualities,

The first is unquestionably beautiful in vernal woods and summer meadows; and, we humbly conceive, is beautiful, because it is the natural sign and concomitant of those scenes and seasons of enjoyment. Blue, again, is beautiful in the vernal sky;-and, as we be lieve, for the sake of the pleasures of which such skies are prolific; and pink is beautiful on the cheeks of a young woman or the leaves of a rose, for reasons too obvious to be stated. We have associations enough, therefore, to recommend all those colours, in the situations in which they are beautiful: But, strong as these associations are, they are unable to make them universally beautiful-or beautiful, indeed, in any other situations. Green would not be beautiful in the sky-nor blue on the cheek-nor vermilion on the grass. It may be said, indeed, that, though they are always recognised as beautiful in themselves, their obvious unfitness in such situations counteracts the effect of their beauty, and make an opposite impression, as of something monstrous and unnatural; and that, accordingly, they are all beautiful in indifferent situations, where there is no such antagonist principlein furniture, dress, and ornaments. Now the fact, in the first place, is not so;-these bright colours being but seldom and sparingly admitted in ornaments or works of art; and no man, for example, choosing to have a blue house, or a green ceiling, or a pink coat. But, in the second place, if the facts were admitted

we think it obvious, that the general beauty of | used without reference to the practical diffithose colours would be sufficiently accounted culties of the art, which must go for nothing for by the very interesting and powerful asso- in the present question, really mean little more ciations under which all of them are so fre- than the true and natural appearance of coquently presented by the hand of Nature. loured objects, seen through the same tinted The interest we take in female beauty,-in or partially obscure medium that commonly vernal delights,-in unclouded skies,-is far constitutes the atmosphere: and for the actual too lively and too constantly recurring, not to optical effects of which but few artists know stamp a kindred interest upon the colours how to make the proper allowance. In nathat are naturally associated with such ob- ture, we know of no discordant or offensive jects; and to make us regard with some affec- colouring, except what may be referred to tion and delight those hues that remind us of some accident or disaster that spoils the moral them, although we should only meet them or sentimental expression of the scene, and upon a fan, or a dressing-box, the lining of a disturbs the associations upon which all its curtain, or the back of a screen. Finally, we beauty, whether of forms or of hues, seems beg leave to observe, that all bright and clear to us very plainly dependent. We are percolours are naturally typical of cheerfulness fectly aware, that ingenious persons have been and purity of mind, and are hailed as em- disposed to dogmatize and to speculate very blems of moral qualities, to which no one can confidently upon these subjects; and have be indifferent. had the benefit of seeing various learned treatises upon the natural gamut of colours, and the inherent congruity of those that are called complementary, with reference to the prismatic spectrum. But we confess we have no faith in any of those fancies; and believe, that, if all these colours were fairly arranged on a plain board, according to the most rigid rules of this supposed harmony, nobody, but the author of the theory, would perceive the smallest beauty in the exhibition, or be the least offended by reversing their collocation.

With regard to ugly colours again, we really are not aware of any to which that epithet can be safely applied. Dull and dingy hues are usually mentioned as in themselves the least pleasing. Yet these are the prevailing tints in many beautiful landscapes, and many admired pictures. They are also the most common colours that are chosen for dress (male dress at least),—for building,-for furniture,—where the consideration of beauty is the only motive for the choice. In fact, the shaded parts of all coloured objects pass into tints of this description:-nor can we at present recollect any one colour, which we could specify as in itself disagreeable, without running counter to the feelings and the practice of the great mass of mankind. If the fact, however, were otherwise, and if certain muddy and dull colours were universally allowed to be disagreeable, we should think there could be no difficulty in referring these, too, to natural associations. Darkness, and all that approaches it, is naturally associated with ideas of melancholy,-of helplessness, and danger; --and the gloomy hues that remind us of it, or seem to draw upon it, must share in the same associations. Lurid skies, too, it should be observed, and turbid waters, and unfruitful swamps, and dreary morasses, are the natural and most common wearers of these dismal liveries. It is from these that we first become acquainted with them; and it is needless, therefore, to say, that such objects are necessarily associated with ideas of discomfort, and sadness, and danger; and that the colours that remind us of them, can scarcely fail to recal some of the same disagreeable sensations.

Enough, however, and more than enough, has been said about the supposed primitive and independant beauty of separate colours. It is chiefly upon the intrinsic beauty of their mixture or combinations that Mr. Knight and his adherents have insisted;--and it is no doubt quite true, that, among painters and connoisseurs, we hear a great deal about the harmony and composition of tints, and the charms and difficulties of a judicious colouring. In all this, however, we cannot help suspecting that there is no little pedantry, and no little jargon; and that these phrases, when

We do not mean, however, to dispute, that the laws of colouring, insisted on by learned artists, will produce a more pleasing effect upon trained judges of the art, than a neglect of these laws; because we have little doubt that these combinations of colour are recommended by certain associations, which render them generally pleasing to persons so trained and educated—all that we maintain is, that there are no combinations that are originally and universally pleasing or displeasing to the eye, independent of such associations; and it seems to us an irresistible proof of this, that these laws of harmonious colouring are perpetually and deliberately violated by great multitudes of persons, who not only have the perfect use of their sight, but are actually bestowing great pains and expense in providing for its gratification, in the very act of this violation. The Dutch trader, who paints over the outside of his country-house with as many bright colours as are to be found in his tulipbed, and garnishes his green shutters with blue facings, and his purple roof with lilac ridges, not only sees as well as the studied colourist, who shudders at the exhibition, but actually receives as much pleasure, and as strong an impression of beauty, from the finished lusthaus, as the artist does from one of his best pictures. It is impossible, then, that these combinations of colours can be naturally or intrinsically offensive to the organ of sight; and their beauty or ugliness must depend upon the associations which different individuals may have happened to form with regard to them. We contend, however, for nothing more; and are quite willing to allow that the associations which recommend his staring tawdriness to the burgomaster, are such as

could not easily have been formed in the mind of a diligent and extensive observer of nature, and that they would probably be reversed by habits of reflection and study. But the same thing, it is obvious, may be said of the notions of beauty of any other description that prevail among the rude, the inexperienced, and uninstructed; though, in all other instances, we take it for granted, that the beauty which is perceived depends altogether upon association, and in no degree on its power of giving a pleasurable impulse to the organ to which it addresses itself. If any considerable number of persons, with the perfect use of sight, actually take pleasure in certain combinations of colours-that is complete proof that such combinations are not naturally offensive to the organ of sight, and that the pleasure of such persons, exactly like that of those who disagree with them, is derived not from the sense, but from associations with its perceptions.

in a picture; because, considered as mere objects of sight, they may often present beautiful effects of colouring and shadow; and these are preserved or heightened in the imitation, disjointed from all their offensive accompaniments. Now, if the tints and shades were the exclusive sources of our gratification, and if this gratification was diminished, instead of being heightened, by the suggestion which, however transiently, must still intrude itself, that they appeared in an imitation of disgusting objects, it must certainly follow, that the pleasure and the beauty would be much enhanced if there was no imitation of any thing whatever, and if the canvas merely presented the tints and shades, unaccompanied with the representation of any particular object. It is perfectly obvious, however, that it would be absurd to call such a collection of coloured spots a beautiful picture; and that a man would be laughed at who should hang up such a piece of stained canvas among the works of the great artists. Again, if it were really possible for any one, but a student of art, to confine the attention to the mere colouring and shadowing of any picture, there is nothing so disgusting but what might form the subject of a beautiful imitation. A piece of putrid veal, or a cancerous ulcer, or the rags that are taken from it, may display the most brilliant tints, and the finest distribution of light and shadow. Does Mr. Knight, however, seriously think, that either of these experiments would succeed? Or are there, in reality, no other qualities in the pictures in question, to which their beauty can be ascribed, but the organic effect of their colours? We humbly conceive that there are; and that far less ingenuity than his might have been able to detect them.

With regard, again, to the effect of broken masses of light and shadow, it is proper, in the first place, to remember, that by the eye we see colour only; and that lights and shadows, as far as the mere organ is concerned, mean nothing but variations of tint. It is very true, no doubt, that we soon learn to refer many of those variations to light and shade, and that they thus become signs to us of depth, and distance, and relief. But, is not this, of itself, sufficient to refute the idea of their affording any primitive or organic pleasure? In so far as they are mere variations of tints, they may be imitated by unmeaning daubs of paint on a pallet ;-in so far as they are signs, it is to the mind that they address themselves, and not to the organ. They are signs, too, it should be recollected, and the only signs we have, by which we can receive any correct knowledge of the existence and There is, in the first place, the pleasing ascondition of all external objects at a distance sociation of the skill and power of the artist from us, whether interesting or not interest--a skill and power which we know may be ing. Without the assistance of variety of tint, and of lights and shadows, we could never distinguish one object from another, except by the touch. These appearances, therefore, are the perpetual vehicles of almost all our interesting perceptions; and are consequently associated with all the emotions we receive from visible objects. It is pleasant to see many things in one prospect, because some of them are probably agreeable; and it is pleasant to know the relations of those things, because the qualities or associations, by means of which they interest us, generally depend upon that knowledge. The mixture of colours and shades, however, is necessary to this enjoyment, and consequently is a sign of it, and a source of associated interest or beauty.

Mr. Knight, however, goes much farther than this; and maintains, that the beauty which is so distinctly felt in many pictures of objects in themselves disagreeable, is to be ascribed entirely to the effect of the brilliant and harmonious tints, and the masses of light and shadow that may be employed in the representation. The filthy and tattered rags of a beggar, he observes, and the putrifying contents of a dunghill, may form beautiful objects

employed to produce unmingled delight; whatever may be the character of the particular effort before us: and with the pride of whose possessors we sympathise. But, in the second place, we do humbly conceive that there are many interesting associations connected with the subjects which have been represented as purely disgusting. The aspect of human wretchedness and decay is not, at all events, an indifferent spectacle; and, if presented to us without actual offence to our senses, or any call on our active beneficence, may excite a sympathetic emotion, which is known to be far from undelightful. Many an attractive poem has been written on the mise ries of beggars; and why should painting be supposed more fastidious? Besides, it will be observed, that the beggars of the painter are generally among the most interesting of that interesting order;-either young and lovely children, whose health and gaiety, and sweet expression, form an affecting contrast with their squalid garments, and the neglect and misery to which they seem to be destined-or old and venerable persons, mingling something of the dignity and reverence of age with the broken spirit of their condition, anu

seeming to reproach mankind for exposing whatever may be thought of the proper name neads so old and white to the pelting of the of this singular gratification, of a musical ear, pitiless storm. While such pictures suggest it seems to be quite certain, that all that rises images so pathetic, it looks almost like a wil- to the dignity of an emotion in the pleasure we ful perversity, to ascribe their beauty entirely receive from sounds, is as clearly the gift of to the mixture of colours which they display, association, as in the case of visible beauty,and to the forgetfulness of these images. of association with the passionate tones and Even for the dunghill, we think it is possible modulations of the human voice,-with the to say something,-though, we confess, we scenes to which the interesting sounds are have never happened to see any picture, of native,-with the poetry to which they have which that useful compound formed the pe- been married,-or even with the skill and culiar subject. There is the display of the genius of the artist by whom they have been painter's art and power here also; and the arranged. dunghill is not only useful, but is associated Hitherto we have spoken of the beauty of with many pleasing images of rustic toil and external objects only. But the whole diffioccupation, and of the simplicity, and comfort, culty of the theory consists in its application and innocence of agricultural life. We do not to them. If that be once adjusted, the beauty know that a dunghill is at all a disagreeable of immaterial objects can occasion no perobject to look at, even in plain reality-pro- plexity. Poems and other compositions in vided it be so far off as not to annoy us with words, are beautiful in proportion as they are its odour, or to soil us with its effusions. In conversant with beautiful objects-or as they a picture, however, we are safe from any of suggest to us, in a more direct way, the moral these disasters; and, considering that it is and social emotions on which the beauty of usually combined, in such delineations, with all objects depends. Theorems and demonother more pleasing and touching remem- strations again are beautiful, according as they brancers of humble happiness and content-excite in us emotions of admiration for the ment, we really do not see that it was at all necessary to impute any mysterious or intrinsic beauty to its complexion, in order to account for the satisfaction with which we can then bear to behold it.

genius and intellectual power of their inventors, and images of the magnificent and beneficial ends to which such discoveries may be applied;-and mechanical contrivances are beautiful when they remind us of similar talents and ingenuity, and at the same time impress us with a more direct sense of their vast utility to mankind, and of the great additional conveniences with which life is consequently adorned. In all cases, therefore, there is the suggestion of some interesting conception or emotion associated with a present perception, in which it is apparently confounded and embodied—and this, according to the whole of the preceding deduction, is the distinguishing characteristic of beauty.

Having now explained, as fully as we think necessary, the grounds of that opinion as to the nature of beauty which appears to be most conformable to the truth-we have only to add a word or two as to the necessary consequences of its adoption upon several other controversies of a kindred description.

Having said so much with a view to reduce to its just value, as an ingredient of beauty, the mere organical delight which the eye is supposed to derive from colours, we really have not patience to apply the same considerations to the alleged beauty of Sounds that are supposed to be insignificant. Beautiful sounds, in general, we think, are beautiful from association only, from their resembling the natural tones of various passions and affections-or from their being originally and most frequently presented to us in scenes or on occasions of natural interest or emotion. With regard, again, to successive or coexistent sounds, we do not, of course, mean to dispute, that there are such things as melody and harmony; and that most men are offended or gratified by the violation or observance of those laws upon which they depend. This, In the first place, then, we conceive that it however, it should be observed, is a faculty establishes the substantial identity of the quite unique, and unlike anything else in our Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Picturesque; constitution; by no means universal, as the and, consequently, puts an end to all controsense of beauty is, even in cultivated societies; versy that is not purely verbal, as to the difand apparently withheld from whole commu- ference of those several qualities. Every nities of quick-eared savages and barbarians. material object that interests us, without acWhether the kind of gratification, which re- tually hurting or gratifying our bodily feelings, sults from the mere musical arrangement of must do so, according to this theory, in one sounds, would be felt to be beautiful, or would and the same manner, that is, by suggesting pass under that name, if it could be presented or recalling some emotion or affection of ourentirely detached from any associated emo- selves, or some other sentient being, and pretions, appears to us to be exceedingly doubtful.senting, to our imagination at least, some Even with the benefit of such combinations, we do not find, that every arrangement which merely preserves inviolate the rules of composition, is considered as beautiful; and we do not think that it would be consonant, either with the common feeling or common language of mankind, to bestow this epithet upon pieces that had no other merit. At all events, and

natural object of love, pity, admiration, or awe. The interest of material objects, therefore, is always the same; and arises, in every case, not from any physical qualities they may possess, but from their association with some idea of emotion. But, though material objects have but one means of exciting emotion, the emotions they do excite are infinite. They

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