rejection of the several negotiations entered into met with their warm concurrence; that they applauded the sentiments of joy which the late ministers expressed at the failure of such negotiations. We cannot, then, feel much confidence from the principles of their administration. If there be, indeed, any difference in their principles-if there is any improvement in their views, this night will give them the means of discovering them to the House. They know that the former ministers were accused of abusing their influence in the House, for the most dangerous purpose-for avoiding accusation, and stifling inquiry. If they then are to act on other principles, let them come forward to give their support to the present motion, whose object is, to ascertain the real state of the nation. Here, Sir, I shall leave the subject in the hands of the House, conjuring them to give it all that consideration which its extreme importance demands. If they are persuaded, by the representations of gentlemen on the other side, that the country is in a state of prosperity: if they are satisfied that the war has been successful; if they are convinced that the system pursued by the old ministers has been beneficial, and that the new ones professing to act on the same principles, are entitled to confidence, they will of consequence feel it their duty to accede to the present motion. But if, on the contrary, they think that the war has been impolitic in its conduct and disastrous in its consequences that the country, instead of being in a state of prosperity, is now labouring under the extremity of distress-that the system pursued by the old ministers, and to be adopted by the new, is subversive of all that is venerable in the British constitution, they will this night renounce a system of blind confidence, and accede to a motion whose object is constitutional inquiry; viz. “That this House will resolve itself into a committee of the whole House to take into consideration the State of the Nation." exhibition, till their actions shall disclose their principles and their conduct. I would ask, however, what would be the conduct of an individual if he were looking out for a person to take on him the direction of his private affairs? Would he take for this purpose a person of whom he had no knowledge? or would he not rather say, you may be a person fully qualified for the situation which you offer yourself to fill; but at present my estate is embarrassed, and it is necessary that I should be served by a person of tried abilities and unquestionable knowledge, the result of experience. On this principle, the new ministers are hitherto entitled to no support from their talents, to no confidence from their knowledge, to no attachment from their experience. But, Sir, is there no experience which we have already had, by which we may be enabled to judge of the characters of those ministers now entering on the administration of public affairs? The part they have previously taken in public life, I should conceive to be a pretty fair means of judging of their abilities and character. Most of them, Sir, have been known in this way to the House. Many of them have been in subordinate situations under those ministers who have retired from official stations, and the rest have been known for the support of their Allowing all that is fairly due to want of practice in the particular situations which they are now to fill, I do not think they are such ministers as the country requires under its present perilous circumstances. We are told, Sir, not to prejudge their principles; but has it not been already declared that their principles and system are similar to those of their predecessors? Is it conceived then that these principles and this system will be carried on with still fuller effect than under the former administration? If I were to ask any of those who supported the old ministers, whether they supposed that this would be the case ? I do not be lieve that a single member in the House would be bold enough to make such an assertion. What then is it that we are to look for under their measures? Is it the prosecution of the war with the same malignant spirit, or the rejection of all offers negotiation with the same insolence as distinguished those whom they have succeeded? We have already seen that they fully approved of the conduct of the war, so pregnant with disasters; that the measures. of Mr. Dundas rose, and said-Sir; the hon. gentleman who has just sat down, has supported his motion by urging the necessity of enquiry into the following particulars:-1st. The inefficient and disastrous manner in which the present war has been conducted. 2dly. The improper rejection of negotiations for peace at the various times it has been in our power to negotiate, and particularly at the end of the campaign of 1799, when a direct offer was made by the first consul of France; and again, at the period of a negotiation respecting an armistice, when it was in our power at the end of that negotiation, to have treated for a separate peace with France. 3dly. The unwarrantable conduct of the late government with regard to the northern powers, which has been productive of so formidable a confederacy against us. 4thly. The internal state of the country with regard to its failing resources, and its increasing distresses, manifested by the increase of poor-rates, and other unequivocal circumstances. 5thly. The increased influence of the crown, not only from the increased taxation which the war has produced, but from the direct addition of power, by which the authority of the crown has been augmented, and the liberty of the subject encroached upon. 6thly. The state of Ireland, particularly as connected with the Catholics in that country; and, Lastly, The mysterious and unaccountable circumstances which have attended the resignation of the late, and the appointment of a new administration. points brought forward by the hon. gentleman, I flatter myself at least in securing the indulgent attention of the House to what I shall observe upon the first head on which he thinks inquiry necessary, and in the decision of which my own character is so particularly impli cated. If I should appear less anxious respecting the other topics, on which he has grounded his motion, it is because there are, as I well know, other gentlemen, of more extensive talents and eloquence, perfectly ready to follow me in the examination of each of them with ability and precision. Before we can form a judgment respecting the conduct of this war, it is necessary, in the first place, to decide what are the principles by which Great Britain ought to be governed when engaged in hostilities; secondly, how far these principles have been adhered to in the conduct of this war; and thirdly, what has been the result of the war so conducted, compared with any other period of war in the annals of our history. Upon the first of these heads I must observe, that, from our insular situation, from our limited population not admitting of extensive continental operations, and from our importance depending in so material a degree upon the extent of our commerce and navigation, it is obvious, that, be the causes of the war what they may, the primary object of attention ought to be, by what means we can most effec tually increase those resources on which depend our naval superiority, and at the same time diminish or appropriate to ourselves those which might otherwise enable the enemy to contend with us in this respect. Navigation and commerce are inseparably connected, and that nation must be the most powerful maritime state which possesses the most extensive commerce. I need scarcely observe, that it follows as a necessary corollary from these Although the hon. member has stated these various points in a general and cursory manner, it is obvious that to examine each of them separately and minutely would require a length of time altogether incompatible with the attention I have any right to expect from the indulgence of the House. This great variety of subjects forms of itself an insuperable objection to the motion, because it is perfectly in the power of the hon. gentleman, or any other member of the House to bring forward each of those points as distinct, separate propositions, in which form there would be room to examine how justly ground had been laid for referring the subject to a committee of inquiry; but by proposing a general and indiscriminate inquiry, upon a variety of points so totally disconnected, the hon. gentleman has reduced us to the necessity of either reject-premises, that, if possible, we ought, as ing his motion altogether, or of agreeing to it, without any fair opportunity of accurately examining the propriety of such acquiescence. Having been so fortunate, Mr. Speaker, as to attract your attention, I am anxious to avail myself of it at the present moment, because I am apprehensive that the heat of a crowded House will disable me from attending to the late hour to which this debate may be protracted; and although I cannot hope for sufficient strength to go over all the early as we can at the commencement of a war, to cut off the commercial resources of our enemies, as by so doing we infallibly weaken or destroy their naval resources. I need not attempt to prove in this House what must be obvious to all, that upon the possession of distant and colonial commerce the extent of our trade must in a great degree depend. It is therefore as much the duty of those entrusted with the conduct of a British war to cut off the colonial resources of the [1074 enemy, as it would be that of the general with all their dependencies in the East, of a great army to destroy or intercept the and those of Demerary, Essequibo and magazines of his opponent. So much do Berbice, in the West Indies, were also I consider offensive operations against the taken possession of. In 1797, the French colonial possessions of our enemies as the establishment on the island of Madagascar first object to be attended to in almost was destroyed, Trinadada was conquered, every war in which Great Britain can be and four ships of the line that were laying engaged, that I have no hesitation in lay- there were taken or destroyed. In 1798, ing it down as a fundamental maxim in Minorca was taken by sir C. Stuart. In the policy of this country, that, at the 1799, the colony of Surinam surrendered breaking out of hostilities, exertions of to general Trigge and lord Hugh Seymour, that nature ought to admit of no limita- And in the course of the last year, Goree tion, except what may arise from the ne- on the coast of Africa, Curaçoa in the cessary reserve of force to be kept at West Indies, and the island of Malta, home for the security of the united king- were added to our acquisitions. It may dom of Great Britain and Ireland. This, now be proper to take notice of those although the most obvious, is not the only circumstances of total or partial failure in reason which should induce the councils the course of the last fifteen months, upon of Great Britain to seize upon the foreign which gentlemen have thought themselves possessions of its enemies. It becomes a warranted to arraign the whole conduct necessary consequence of every war, in of the war, to contend that nothing but which this country can be involved, but disgrace and disaster have attended his particularly if an extensive continental majesty's arms, and that these consewar should prevail at the same time, that quences are imputable to the mismanageour manufacturers must be deprived of ment of his majesty's late ministers, who many of their accustomed markets; and were undeserving of the confidence of the effect of seizing upon the distant and their country. In this view I imagine I colonial possessions of the enemy, is to do full justice to the arguments of my opprovide new and beneficial markets, as a ponents, when I refer to the expeditions substitute for those in which there is a to Holland, Ferrol, and Cadiz, as the temporary interruption. I take it to be im- transactions to which those invectives are possible to controvert any one of the pro- meant to apply; and I must here, in the positions I have stated; and the next first place, complain of the total want of point therefore to be considered is, whe- candour in those who, whilst they comther these maxims have been attended to placently dwell upon some partial failures, in the conduct of the present war, pre- choose so completely to overlook the mising that the whole force of the coun- whole train of success which has attended try disposable at that time amounted to the various other operations of his mano more than about 20,000 infantry in jesty's forces. I do not, however, much both Great Britain and Ireland. Hostili- complain; for I own I did not expect ties commenced in February 1793, and in candour on their part, and I am not disthe islands of Tobago, St. Pierre-appointed in finding the want of it. I do, and Miquelon, with the exclusive right however, confidently expect justice. I and occupation of the fisheries on the appeal to the House for the exercise of coast of Newfoundland, the settlement of it, and I am not afraid that my appeal Pondicherry, and part of the island of St. will be made in vain. As to the expediDomingo, were taken possession of, and tion to Holland, it was the subject of a the fleet at Toulon was either seized upon long discussion in this House, and if I am or destroyed. In 1794, the French islands not too partial to the statements then of Martinique, Guadaloupe, St. Lucie, made, I flatter myself the House was sa the Saints Mariegalante and Desiada, tisfied that it was neither attended with were taken between the first of February any disgrace, nor with such disaster as in and the end of April. Corsica was also any respect to outweigh in the balance attacked and taken in the course of this the advantages which were derived from year. In 1795, Malacca, Trincomale, it. The objects of that expedition were (the surrender of which was soon followed threefold. 1st, To create a diversion in by the remainder of the Island of Ceylon) favour of the arms of our allies. 2dly, To and the Cape of Good Hope, submitted aid, by our co-operation, our ancient to his majesty's arms. In 1796, the allies in the united provinces, in rescuing Dutch possessions of Amboyna and Banda, themselves from the yoke of France, which [VOL. XXXV.] [3 Z] that year there was much ground to suppose they were anxious to attempt. Lastly, If we should not be able to render them beneficial allies, it was our duty to annihilate the means they had of being instruments subservient to the hostile views of France. If the elements had not thwarted our expedition, in a manner altogether unparalleled at the season of the year when it was undertaken, there is no rational ground to doubt that we should have succeeded in every one of those objects. If, instead of landing on the 27th day of August, sir Ralph Abercrombie had disembarked on the 16th of that month, as we had naturally just ground to hope, there is every reason to believe that he must have been in possession of Amsterdam long before any effectual resistance could have been brought against him; but notwithstanding all the untoward and unforeseen disappointments and disasters which befel him, and the troops which afterwards followed him, we succeeded in creating a most powerful diversion in favour of the allied armies in Switzerland and in Piedmont; and we took from Holland the whole efficient naval force of that country, amounting to ten ships of the line, thirteen frigates, one sloop of war, and some smaller vessels, which, if not so taken away, would at this moment have been forming a part of that northern confederacy, against which we are now called upon to contend, in support of the ancient and most essential maritime rights of this country. The principal naval arsenals of that power were also destroyed in the course of that expedition. With respect to the expedition against Ferrol, it is necessary to remind the House of some of the circumstances which occurred immediately previous to that expedition. The object of his majesty's councils at the early period of the last campaign, was to assist his allies upon the continent by such seasonable and well concerted co-operation or diversion as might distract the forces of the enemy, and oblige them to have kept a large proportion of their armies upon their own coasts, in order to guard against the effect of such conjunct naval and military expeditions as might be 'directed against them with that view. This naturally led to a proposed division of our force, part of it to act from Minorca in the Mediterranean, and part of it to act from Belle-Isle, if we should be so fortunate as to capture that island at an early period of the season. I need not remind the House that the battle of Marengo, and the fatal consequences that followed that most melancholy and disastrous event, and which led to the first armistice on the continent, deranged the whole of this plan, and a scene immediately presented itself, _new in two very material respects. First, Portugal was under the greatest apprehension of a serious attack from Spain, at the instigation of France, and called loudly for the protecting aid of Great Britain, its old and faithful ally. Secondly, we began about that period to perceive the first dawning of that confederacy in the North, which has since assumed so serious an aspect. Under these circumstances, it is obvious, that whatever appropriation of our force we might then have had in view for a later season of the year, it was essential, as early as possible, to undertake such operations as might have effect in two respects. In the first place, if Spain could be alarmed and distracted upon its own coasts, it was the best defence for Portugal against any attempt from that quarter. In the next place, if the success of any expedition undertaken for this purpose should go still further, and put into our possession the Spanish fleets, both at Ferrol and Cadiz, or at either of these ports, such an advantage would have been the most effectual blow against the maritime power of the confederacy with which we were threatened. Hence the plan of the armament prepared against the harbours and arsenals of Ferrol and Cadiz. And if such a plan could have been executed without much risk, and without too great a sacrifice in the attempt, I am ready to contend against any man, that it was a measure which did not merit any of the imputations of folly, weakness or imbecility, with which it has been arraigned by the puerility and ignorance of those who have amused themselves in declaiming upon this subject. With regard to the information and sug gestions upon which we proceeded, the mode of carrying into execution those suggestions, and the preparations for that purpose, I take it for granted, nobody will expect me to detail here, or any where else, the particulars of the intelligence we received upon that part of the subject. I must rest upon the general presumption, that expeditions of this description would not be undertaken, except upon such reasonable grounds of on this occasion is, that the pestilential disorder prevalent in that part of Spain, was not known here at the time the instructions for the expedition were dispatched from this country. success as justified the instructions to the extent they were given. Were you to wait in such cases until probable information could be authenticated, and to lay it down as a rule not to proceed except upon an absolute certainty, the season for It is necessary that at this stage of the action would be spent in vain researches, business I should particularly advert to a and the publicity of your intention charge which has been recently urged would frustrate every chance of success. with great vehemence, founded upon a For these reasons the instructions to the supposed misconduct, in not sending the commanders must of course be discreti- troops to the Mediterranean, so soon as onary; and all that I can say, or will say they might have been sent, at the comupon that point, is, that the meritorious mencement of the last campaign; and it officers who were engaged in the service has been assumed as a certain fact, that now in question, having before them all the disasters of the Austrians in Italy were the information which I possessed, thought the consequence of that procrastination: themselves warranted to proceed, and to but although the refutation of this charge entertain such rational hopes of success will require some minuteness of detail, as justified the attempt. But the ground there is no assertion relative to the supof this undertaking does not rest here; posed misconduct of the war, to which a for the general commanding the expedi- more complete answer can be given. It tion was instructed to consult and concert it here necessary to remind the House, with the illustrious officer who commanded that, at the time the expedition to Holland off Brest, and upon the result of that con- was undertaken, the circumstances which sultation was to depend whether the called for it admitted of no delay; and attempt should or should not be made; although a considerable degree of inconvethat interview took place accordingly, nience arose from the precipitation with and the result was, that both the gallant which it was necessary to make the atearl, now at the head of the Admiralty, tempt, still there was no room for hesitaand the general who commanded the land tion. The hurried state in which the reforces, were strengthened and confirmed giments that had been formed from the in their expectations; and having trans-English militia went to Holland in the mitted their joint opinion to this effect, the expedition proceeded to its destination. With regard to the causes of the failure, it is a military question, upon which it would be presumption in me to give an opinion: the commanding officers were to exercise their discretion, and I have seen no grounds to justify an opinion that the discretion so entrusted was either improperly or unwisely exercised. The attainment of the object was certainly highly desirable: there is no complaint that supplied were not accurately arranged, or in every respect adequate to the purpose of the attempt. I therefore cannot admit that the charge, either of folly or criminality, can justly attach on those who planned the enterprise; and though the failure was certainly a disappointment, I must equally deny that it was disgraceful to those who directed its execution; and it is some consolation to know, that the loss of men was very inconsiderable. Upon the subject of Cadiz, it is unnecessary to trouble you with a similar detail. The plan was taken up with the same views as the expedition against Ferrol; and the only additional fact it may be necessary to state the means autumn of 1799, and the indispensable necessity of sending them in that condition, to support the first division, which had landed under sir Ralph Abercrombie, are points of notoriety; the officers and men having joined and met for the first time almost on the very day of their embarkation, and in many cases before their new clothing, arms, and necessaries could be supplied. Owing to the extreme severity of the service, and of the weather during the short campaign in that country these regiments returned at the end of November, in great want of clothing, of new arms, and requisites of every description, and it was then the unanimous opinion and report of all the superior officers, that however noble and truly British the spirit they had manifested in Holland, still that officers and men, who had been brought together without any previous knowledge of each other, and from a great variety of different regiments of militia, on their return from abroad under the circumstances I have mentioned, would necessarily require some time, even after their wants could be supplied, to ground themselves in military discipline and |