the rare examples of such conscientiousness built not upon vague notions of honour, but upon simple and defi nite principles of moral truth, would have been invaluable for direction and encouragement to others. He has, however, left his own best monument in his admirable little treatise, and his memory has certainly been in no small degree fortunate in having the care and adornings of the monument consigned to the affectionate offices of the Friend who has exhibited it to the public.

From his earliest years," writes his Editor in the introductory notice, "my lamented friend was remarkable for a scrupulous regard to justice. I have never known another person so entirely conscientious On all occasions his first a desire was to know what ought to be done, and to do it. The great and invisible things which belong to truth, justice, and mercy, seemed with him ever present. On the other hand, the ordinary objects of selfish ambition appeared to him fantastic and unreal. It is not uncommon to meet men who inquire, as metaphysicians, into the first principles of right and wrong but he followed justice into its minutest details; he believed the broken bread of justice to be the food of all social life, and reverently gathered up its very crumbs: nothing seemed trivial to him in which conscience had a part. While his faith was thus strong, he was, from natural disposition, and from habits of philosophical inquiry, unusually sceptical as to matters of the mere understanding. 1Those who remember his extreme caustion will not be tempted to think that on -so important a subject he had rushed precipitately into a system of his own.

Jus

"His religious convictions were profound he knew that moral principles have their root in divine truths, and can only be realized through aid from above. This will account for the Christian tone that pervades his work : indeed, but for these convictions, I do not know whether it would ever have been written. tice is fond rather of upbraiding than assisting. It was Christian zeal and Christian charity which inspired him with an unceasing desire to maintain what he believed to be the cause of truth. In particular he was anxious to assist those young men of his own profession, who with views in the main honourable, and average clearness of mind, are yet unequal to contend against the favourite Borruptions of the time, supported as it is, not only by personal interest, but by a very large number of specious sophisms

offered to their choice, as well as a considerable weight of pretended authority and modern tradition.

in thegion was

"His eminently practical sense of the word. It was his habit to observe the influence of Christian principles as applied to the common detail of life. He disliked religious controversy; and occult dogmas, he thought, were to be believed in faithfully, not scrutinised impertinently. He loved the reflected light of Christian truth; and remembered that if we fix a direct gaze too long upon the sun, our eyes are dimmed, and we walk in the dark. He meditated often on that text, Thy Word is a lantern unto my feet;' and appeared to discover a spirituality in obedience which escapes the penetration of more speculative religionists. The consequence was such as might be expected. The Professions, indeed all occupations by which men live, and which are permanent elements in society, seemed to him delivered from the secular character that belongs to them naturally. He did not consider the Christian commonwealth as consisting of statesmen, lawyers, physicians, farmers, and other classes of men, who, besides their social avocations, possess, religious opinions: rather he viewed it as a body of Christians who are led providentially to certain outward pursuits; who undertake them on Christian conditions; who speak sincerely in naming each such pursuit a calling (the state of life to which it hath pleased God to call me'); and who regard it not chiefly as a means of selfish advancement, but as the sphere of those labours allotted to them by the divine command, and for the good of their neighbour. Such a doctrine must always appear to the world as visionary, because it requires us to become unworldly: nay, it carries the war into the enemy's camp: and seems to violate that silent truce by which religion, on condition of not trespassing beyond bounds, or interfering with the Babel-worship of the world, is permitted to remain herself unmolested -except by being superseded. Such, however, were the opinions which my friend maintained."—pp. xi.-xiii.

And again

"The few points in my friend's character to which I have adverted will best explain the design of his book, and his motives in writing it. I have recorded them for that small but fit audience which alone he wished to gather round him. What degree of popular favour may await this work is of but little importance. The grave which has closed on its Author does not more securely

shield him from the arrows of fortune, or the sharp and flattering speeches of men, than did his own manly and modest nature; and those who remain will possess in this book a memorial of their friend more consoling than public applause could be. In it his portraiture remains; stamped upon it, they will find not his love of justice alone, but that kindness which made him seem, if injured, to remember justice only against himself: they will observe his fearless reverence for truth, and at the same time his respect for opinions long established, his slowness to oppose them, his candour in weighing them, his charitable desire to exculpate those who hold them, and that higher charity which stimulated him to combat their error: they will be reminded of his reluctance to give pain, and his greater fear of doing wrong; his distrust of his own judgment, and his invariable faith in the moral sense and the Divine commands; his indifference to promiscuous applause, and his solicitude for the esteem of those he esteemed, the love of those he loved. They will find many light traces for memory to fill up, of his single-heartedness, his humility, his earnestness, and his courtesy. Some passages will bring back before their eyes the very gestures and expression of countenance with which he used to enunciate such sentiments."pp. xv. xvi.

It is with perfect truth and fairness that he observes, of the work of so singularly sincere a mind

"Such a work, if read at all, should be read with attention and respect. Unless we approach it in an ingenuous spirit, willing to understand before we criticise, deeming it possible that the objections which present themselves to our minds so readily, may have occurred to the Author also, and been for good reasons put aside; desiring to stand, at least for the time, on the spot which he occupied, and contemplate the subject from his point of view; if we do not possess this small measure of self-command and philosophical docility, then there does not exist between our mind and that of the Writer such a degree of moral conformity as is necessary for the appreciation of the work. We shall in such a case do ourselves least injury, and our Monitor least injustice, by leaving his book unread."-p. x.

The plan of the work is formed upon the model of George Herbert's beautiful Country Parson; a happy thought, which might, perhaps, be advantageously extended to the other Professions,

so as to form a cycle of moral directories for the different callings of life. It adopts (it would seem, almost unconsciously) the archaisms of Herbert and his times; and certainly the ancient costume has seldom been worn with more perfect ease. The thoughts of the writer, formed in an antique mould, appear to assume the corresponding dress as their natural garb. Separated as we are from those ages by the corrupt philosophy of the eighteenth century, which created its own appropriate formulas; when we would think with Hooker and Herbert, we can scarcely help borrowing more or less their very forms of phrase. Indeed we are sometimes obliged to do so, in order to preclude the false associations that gather round the language of a peculiar age, and that insinuate themselves into the mind of a reader in defiance of all our explanations. A bad philosophy contaminates the language which it has degraded by making it the instrument of its diffusion; pure thoughts consecrate that shrine of holy words in which they have been made to dwell, and from which they evermore reveal themselves to mankind. And thus the very language of our old sages comes to possess a sort of sacredness; we reverence even its fragments as we would the broken beams and columns of a tem ple; we cannot without an effort bend its dignified gravity to any low or trivial purpose, and we feel it, when out of its own high region, stiff, uncouth, and unsuitable. It is high praise of our Lawyer to say that he may fairly stand on the same shelf with Herbert. The difference of the two seems to turn more on the difference of their respective subjects than on any great inequality in the treatment of them. If there is more of contemplative tenderness in Herbert, perhaps there is more of force and dignity in our author -more too of that closeness of practical detail which gives body and substance to principles. It is possible also that the novelty of the subject strengthens the effect. For we are all accustomed to direct religious exhortation; but it is something new, something to startle and arrest, to find legal practice reformed to this high ideal. The Country Parson is at best but living the blessed life we were prepared to admit to be his duty and his

privilege; the Lawyer seen in the same light has unfortunately almost the novelty of a discovery. For even those (and they are not few in this country) who do carry their Christianity into their legal practice, seldom do so on any very definite principles; their honesty, real and unaffected as it is, seems but the indirect result of strong religious impressions; and they usually appear unprepared either to discountenance, by vigorous public protest, the less scrupulous course adopted by their brethren, or to exhibit as their own basis of action any absolute moral axiom or well-considered moral theory on the subject.

Our author was not to be satisfied with this indecisive position; he has thought out his theory; and has exhibited his ideal Lawyer moving under its influence through the whole orbit of his profession. An introductory "Apology for the Work" vindicates his general principle at considerable length; and we are then presented with a series of scenes from the moral drama of the Lawyer's life. We have the Lawyer choosing his Calling, his mode of Life, his Knowledge, and his Duties. He is exhibited in the details of his profession-drawing pleadings, advising on evidence, consulting with his brethren, examining witnesses, drawing wills and deeds; as a peaceinaker as an arbitrator-as engaged in the tumult of elections. He is seen ex. crcising Humanity, Charity, Courtesy, Hospitality. He is contemplated in the higher characters of Legislator and Judge. And, "last scene of all that ends this strange eventful history," he is beheld upon his death-bed—the death-bed of an humble but unshrinking Christian man. These successive chapters exhibit the Lawyer's various temptations to avarice, dishonesty, and craftiness; and they evince how the simple and inflexible Rule of Conscience is equally applicable to them all. In an appendix the author has collected a large body of testimonies, drawn principally from our elder divines, and confirming his statements in various ways; an appendix which he modestly "commends to the reader as the worthier part of this little book."

The first chapter offers a fair specimen of the style, and presents us with the author's conception of his Calling. It is very beautifully written,

though we fear we cannot answer for its universal popularity in the Four Courts.

"A lawyer is the servant of his fellow-men for the attainment of justice; in which definition is expressed both the lowliness and the dignity of his calling; the lowliness, in that he is the servant of all, ever ready to assist as well the meanest as the loftiest: the dignity, in that the end whereto he serves has among things temporal no superior or equal. For justice is nothing less than the support of the world whereby each has from all others that which is his due; the poor their succour, the rich their ease, the powerful their honour. For it were governments framed and powers ordained of God; flourishing it cheers, and languishing it dejects the minds of good men; and in its overthrow is involved the ruin and fall of commonwealths. That justice

should ever be contemned or trodden under foot is a grief to God and angels; how glorious then is his calling whose work it is to prevent her fall, or to raise her fallen! Truly the Lawyer, while the servant of earth, is the minister of heaven; while he labours for the good of his fellow-men he works none other than the work of God."

The great principle of Mr. O'Brien's book is the obligation of governing legal practice by strict reference to the supreme Law of Conscience, in despite of the evil prescription that so strongly countenances oblique and dishonest courses. This, as we have said, he is induced in his "Apology" to reason out elaborately, in order to resist prejudications which would have been fatal to the influence of his views. The insertion of this preliminary argument was the judicious suggestion of a distinguished legal friend. It is a valuable dissertation, expressed with great strength and unaffectedness, and leaving few or none of the popular allegations unanswered.

We will dedicate a page or two to the consideration of this question ; stating its moral bearings as they appear to us, and in general conformity with the principles of pure and elevated truth, delivered in the excellent little digest before us.

The whole will of course turn upon our conception of the Relation of the Lawyer to his Client. The true idea of that relation is well expressed in various parts of Mr. O'Brien's book.

He feels the importance of precisely defining it.

Thus-" If, as is obvious, the resulting force (to speak mechanically) of the three persons united-the client, attorney, and advocate-ought to be the same as that of the client alone, were he endowed with the powers and knowledge necessary to plead his own cause, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that the advocate should not lend himself to produce, in concert with his client and the attorney, an effect which could not with justice be produced by the client alone, when filling all the three characters in his own person."(Appendix, p. 188.) Or again, and to the same effect-" To barristers properly it appertains, legally and in order, to set before judges and juries that which the diligence of the attorney has gathered from the complaint of the client; so that the whole together barrister, attorney, and client-make as it were one man, whom of right one spirit of truth, justice, and mercy should move and animate." (Chap. ii.) Or thus-" In one word, the lawyer regards himself as put in his client's place to do for him whatever he might do for himself (had he the lawyer's skill) consistently with truth and justice; more than this he will not do; and he desires not those for his clients who dare not trust him to act with the same prudence, integrity, and zeal as if the cause were his own."-(Chap. vii.) Or once more

"All that is maintained is, that the advocate has a right to expect what every person who calls upon another to aid him in any undertaking is bound to give an assurance that the object he is called upon to co-operate in effecting is such as may morally and lawfully be sought."-(Apol. for the work, p. 33.) These statements as prefacing the argument for a high estimate of legal duties, are important, because they seem directly to meet the popular plea of the identification of the advocate with his client. They suggest at once the proper reply, which concedes the alleged identification, but maintains that the advocate is identified not with all the client may desire to do, but with all he ought to do-identified with the client not as with a being of mere will and blind or malignant impulse, but as with a moral agent essentially bound to all the laws of justice

and truth. For it is surely manifest that no-man-lawyer or not-can justly abandon his own moral nature under any conceivable circumstance; can deliberately cease to be possessed of a sense of right and wrong, or possessing it, can voluntarily cease to be responsible for the actions which that sense of duty is meant to govern. Nor can that identification be more than a monstrous fiction which can only proceed upon supposing the wilful suppression of an essential constituent of human nature on the part of him who is to enter into this relation of imagi nary identity.

Such is the conception of the Relation of Lawyer and Client which reason and justice appear to authenticate. Now let us attend to the rival statement.

The popular theory (for such we fear it must be styled) is expounded in all its fulness in the following passage of Lord Brougham's celebrated Defence of Queen Caroline before the House of Lords; a passage the enthusiastic reception of which by the majority of an honourable profession, only evinces how easily a principle of false honour may assume the dignity of self-sacrificing virtue. "An Advocate," said the eloquent speaker, "by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in the discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client and none other. To save that client by all expedient means; to protect that client at all hazards and costs to all others, and among others to himself is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction, which he may bring upon any other. Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must go on, reckless of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be to involve his country in confusion for his client's protection!" Surely we are not unreasonable in asking for some argumentative ground for such a subversion as this is of all Duty, under the name and sanction of Duty; surely it is not unfair to ask how the title and calling of a Lawyer obliges a man under pain of grievous guilt to become an accessary to guilt the most atrocious; justifies him in voluntarily assuming