(4) Allectio, election by the governing body of a community, admitted strangers to civitas.

It follows that a man might be a citizen of several states; of one by origo, another by adoptio, another by allectio. This may seem to be contradicted by Cicero: Duarum civitatum civis esse nostro jure civili nemo potest, Pro Balbo, 2: but Cicero is here speaking of independent sovereign states; not of the dependent states composing the organism of the Roman empire.

When the lex Julia municipalis had given Roman citizenship to all Italy, and an ordinance of Caracalla, subsequent to the time of Gaius, had extended it to all the Provinces, every member of any municipality had at least a double citizenship: he was citizen of Rome as well as of the smaller municipality: Omnibus municipibus duas esse censeo patrias, unam naturae, alteram civitatis . . . habuit alteram loci patriam, alteram juris, Cicero, De legibus, 2, 2. Roma communis nostra patria est, Modestinus, D. 50, 1, 33.

The principal effects of citizenship in a municipality were threefold:

(1) Obligation to bear certain burdensome municipal offices (munera);

(2) Subjection or obligation of submission to the municipal magistrates and tribunals, including liability as defendant to be sued before its courts (forum originis);

(3) Subjection to municipal laws, including the determination of a man's personal capacity-infancy, minority, majority, capacity of disposition, &c.-by the laws of the community in which he had civitas (lex originis).

In all these effects a man's Roman citizenship was of slight importance compared with his municipal citizenship. The burdens (munera) of the metropolitan city were provided for by arrangements peculiar to Rome. The liability of a defendant to be sued before a Roman forum was limited to the time when he happened to be resident in Rome, and then was subject to many exceptions, included under the general name of jus revocandi domum: and in any case of collision between the laws relating to personal capacity, the laws of Rome always yielded to those of the local patria or father town (lex originis).

In all the above consequences Domicil (domicilium, incolatus, domus) had an operation similar to civitas. Domicil is the place which a man has voluntarily chosen for his permanent residence, as

the central station of his fortunes, and the head-quarters of his dealings and dispositions: Incolas vero . . . domicilium facit. Et in eo loco singulos habere domicilium non ambigitur, ubi quis larem rerumque ac fortunarum suarum summam constituit, unde rursus non sit discessurus, si nihil avocet, unde quum profectus est, peregrinari videtur, quo si rediit, peregrinari jam destitit, C. 10, 39, 7. Home is identical with Domicil; and Domicil is agreed to be the place where a man has established his household gods and the head-quarters of his transactions and obligations: the place which he will not leave except for a special purpose; absence from which makes him seem to be a stranger, and return to which makes him cease to be a stranger.' Sed de ea re constitutum esse (respondit), eam domum unicuique nostrum debere existimari, ubi quisque sedes et tabulas haberet suarumque rerum constitutionem fecisset, D. 50, 16, 203. 'It is undisputed that a man's home is the place where he is settled and has his counting-house (account-books) and the basis of his operations (or, centre of gravitation of his fortunes).'

A man was liable to munera of the city which he had chosen for a domicil as well as of that where he had the rights and duties of citizenship. Domicil, as well as Origo, constituted a man's General forum; that is, in any action in which a man was defendant, the plaintiff had the election whether he would sue him at his forum originis or forum domicilii. A man can only be governed by one Lex and if he was citizen in any municipality, he was governed by lex originis; if he was nowhere citizen, he was governed by lex domicilii. [Domicilium originis, a monstrous combination of modern writers, ought to express the coincidence of Domicil and Fatherland, but is intended to express the paternal domicil (domicil of a man's father).]

The subversion of the Roman empire in the west abolished the importance of the Municipalities; and, with the exception of Switzerland where it still prevails, the doctrine of Origo disappeared from those countries which are still influenced by Roman jurisprudence. The doctrine of Domicilium still survives, at least as to Forum and Lex, in Private international law: what related to Munera shared the fate of the other political institutions of the empire. Savigny, §§ 350-359.

We may observe that the reason assigned by Ulpian for the incapacity of Dediticius to make a will, his want of patria, appears inadequate for, if he had no patria, at least he had domicilium, and

we have seen that, in the absence of patria, a man's personal capacity was determined by his domicilium. We may infer that the equivalence of domicilium to patria-to say nothing of the modern maxim: Locus regit actum, 4 § 53, com., the ability of even temporary residence, as opposed to domicil, to give validity to the mere Form of a disposition-was not completely established, not at all events in favour of Dediticius, in the times of Gaius or even in those of Ulpian.

§ 76. The third class of freedmanship (dedititia libertas) had long been obsolete when it was formally abolished by Justinian, A.D. 530, Cod. 7, 5.

The second class (latinitas), under which the freedman relapsed into servitude at the moment of death, was also offensive to Roman feelings in the time of Justinian, and was by him formally abolished, the principal modes of creating latinitas being transformed into modes of acquiring quiritary status or civitas Romana, and the remainder being declared inoperative, Cod. 7, 6.

The rules of succession to intestate freedmen of the first class, the only class henceforth recognized, were immensely simplified by Justinian. He abolished all distinction between freedman and freedwoman, between patron and patroness, children of patron and children of patroness of either sex, treated adoptive children of the patron or freedman as strangers, and deprived patrons of their right to succeed before the children of a freedwoman; that is, he eliminated from the title to succession all the doctrines of agnation or the civil family: deprived patrons of their right of succession concurrently with the children of opulent freedmen ; that is, reduced them to the rank of agnates, where they had been placed by the Twelve Tables, from that of sui heredes, to which they had been virtually promoted by subsequent legislation: and changed the remaining series of titles by patronage as defined by the praetorian edict in default of patrons and their children.

The praetorian edict had contained the following series of titles to bonorum possessio, or classes of successors to the estate of intestate freedmen:

(1) Unde liberi. The children of the deceased, whether under power, or emancipated, or given in adoption, had the first and highest title to succeed to the estate of their father.

(2) Unde legitimi. Patrons and their children occupy the second rank. As a freedman could have no agnates or cognates (agnation

and cognation being only traceable through a common ancestor, and Roman law taking no notice of servile relationship, Inst. 3, 6, 10) the Twelve Tables in default of sui heredes of the freedman, that is to say, in the rank corresponding to that which they gave to agnates in other successions, conferred the right of succeeding to the estate of a freedman on the patron and such children of the patron as continued in the civil family of their father.

(3) Tum quem ex familia (patroni proximum inveniam ?). Failing the patron and the patron's children, the nearest agnates of the patron were entitled to succeed.

(4) Unde liberi patroni patronaeque et parentes eorum. Failing agnates of the patron, his cognates in an ascending or descending line were summoned to the succession.

(5) Unde vir et uxor.

(6) Unde cognati manumissoris. Failing the preceding titles, the patron's collateral cognates succeeded.

If no one succeeded under any of these titles, the estate of the deceased escheated to the treasury.

For this series of titles Justinian substituted one far simpler, the same nominally as that which governs succession to freemen, though with some necessary modifications of signification, and consisting of the following groups: (1) Unde liberi; (2) Unde legitimi; (3) Unde cognati; (4) Unde vir et uxor.

The first head includes all the natural descendants of the freedman or freedwoman, and excludes their adoptive children.

The second head entitles patrons and their natural children, whether in their civil family or not; that is to say, it entitles the patron and his children not, as formerly, in their character of supposed agnates of the freedman, but in the character of his supposed cognates.

The third head summons to the succession all the collateral cognates of the patron, but only to the fifth degree. The freedman himself, from the law's disregard of servile relationship, could no more have cognates than he could agnates.

The augmented rights which the lex Papia conferred on patrons against the estate of more opulent freedmen were abolished by Justinian, except in the case of their testacy. If a freedman possessed of a hundred aurei and upwards (this sum Justinian considered equivalent to the hundred thousand sesterces and upwards of the lex Papia) institutes a stranger as his heir (adoptive children being

regarded as strangers) the patron and his descendants to the fifth degree are entitled to a clear third of the inheritance. This third to which the patron is entitled against the external devisee of an opulent freedman, Justinian calls his Falcidia, and says that the Falcidia of the devisees, instead of being one fourth of the estate as in other cases, will in this case be only a fourth of two thirds, that is, a sixth of the estate, Cod. 6, 4. In fact, the praetorian edict giving the patron in the absence of sui heredes naturales of the freedman a right to a moiety of his estate, and the lex Papia giving him a right to a half or a third, even concurrently with sui heredes naturales, had really pro tanto promoted the patron from the order of agnates, assigned to him by the Twelve Tables, to that of sui heredes; at least, they gave him indefeasible rights similar to those of suus heres, both against intestate successions and against testamentum inofficiosum. Justinian cut down the rights of the patron and reduced him, except in this instance, to his old rank of agnate: still, by calling his portion his Falcidia, he recognizes that he has to this extent treated him as a suus heres.

A remarkable feature which pervades these new rules of succession to intestate freedmen is their disregard of agnation or civil relationship, wherein they are an anticipation of Novella, 118, which, A.D. 543, eliminated agnation from title by descent in the succession of ingenui. It had taken eight or nine hundred years to rid Roman jurisprudence of a barbarian caprice which had filled it with intricacy and, as irrational laws cannot be supposed to be generally comprehended, must have often caused cruel disappointments as to the devolution of property among blood relations,

SUCCESSIO PER BONORUM VENDITIONEM.

§ 77. Videamus autem et de ea successione quae nobis ex emptione bonorum competit.

§ 78. Bona autem veneunt aut vivorum aut mortuorum. vivorum, velut eorum qui fraudationis causa latitant, nec absentes defenduntur; item eorum qui ex lege Iulia bonis cedunt; item iudicatorum post tempus, quod eis partim lege XII tabularum, partim edicto Praetoris ad expediendam pecuniam tribuitur. mortuorum bona veneunt velut eorum, quibus certum est neque he

§ 77. We next proceed to succession of a vendee to the estate of a bankrupt.

§ 78. The estate of a bankrupt may be sold either in his lifetime or after his death. It is sold in his lifetime when, for instance, he defrauds his creditors by absconding, or when he is absent and undefended, or when he avails himself of the lex Julia and surrenders his estate, or when, after judgment recovered against him, he has suffered the term to expire that is pre