ance descend from the ancestor to two or more persons. This estate is obsolete; it no longer exists in Pennsylvania because the intestate laws of this commonwealth provide that where lands descend to several persons under its provisions they shall take and hold as tenants in common.

5-C. Tenancy in Common. Is where two or more persons not husband and wife have an undivided interest in the same land. As the name implies, it means land held in common. Each cotenant is considered in law as being possessed of the whole of an undivided part not of an undivided part of the whole. It, therefore, follows there is no survivorship in this species of joint estate and any one of the co-tenants may compel partition of the whole or devise his portion to his heirs. Since the Act of 1812 all estates except estates by entireties (See Par. 5-D) and trust estates held in Pennsylvania by a plurality of persons are tenancies in common.

5-D. Estate by Entireties. In our definition of the Estate of Tenancy in Common it will be observed we excepted husband and wife. This, because an estate vested jointly in husband and wife would be an estate by entireties. It differs from a tenancy in common in that the incident of survivorship is present in this estate, and as Blackstone explains "if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife they are neither properly joint tenants or tenants in common for husband and wife being considered one person in the law they cannot take the estate by moieties (parts) but both are seised by the entirety." Husband and wife cannot hold jointly in any other way. Thus, where lands were conveyed to husband and wife their heirs and assigns to hold as tenants in common and not as joint tenants; the court held that the clearly expressed intention to make the husband and wife. tenants in common could not be regarded (Stuckey vs. Keefe, 26 Pa. 397; Hoover v. Potter, 42 Super. 21; note page 280).

A tenancy by entireties arises whenever an estate vests in two persons who at the time when the estate vests are husband and wife (Klenke Estate, 210 Pa. 572; Myers Estate, 232 Pa. 89). This estate may be created not only in real property but also in personal property (Brainberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628). Upon the death of either husband or wife the survivor takes the whole estate and his estate dates not from time of death of the other, but from the date of the deed. Thus, if a judgment lien is entered against the husband who holds an estate by entireties

and the husband dies, the judgment lien does not bind his wife's estate because her estate relates back to the deed and so antedates the judgment (Hertzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60). Such a judgment would not bind the joint estate of the husband and wife but only the expectant interest of the husband. Hence the husband and wife could notwithstanding such judgment convey away a clear unencumbered marketable title free from its lien. "The owner of such lien must hold it subject to its possible extinction in either of two events, the predecease of the husband, or the alienation of the estate by the joint act of the parties. The efficiency of the lien depends upon the non-happening of either" (Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 528). But should the husband survive the judgment remains a valid lien against his estate, and would even be prior in lien to a mortgage dated after its entry, executed by both husband and wife (Fleek v. Zellhaver, 117 Pa. 213). Partition of this estate cannot be compelled and the incident of survivorship cannot be divested unless both husband and wife join in the deed. In no other way can this be done for even a divorce from bonds of matrimony can not convert an estate by entireties to one of tenancy in common (Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604).

Title is the evidence of ownership in land. Land cannot be moved; hence if the owner should go on a long journey he must leave it behind. Suppose on his return he finds a stranger in possession. The rightful owner to eject him must rely on his evidence of ownership, in other words, his title. Hence can be seen the necessity of having the title in a convenient permanent form. For this reason have arisen the various methods of preserving this evidence of ownership of land as reflected in the modern recording system of which we will treat later (See Chapter VIII, page 158). Title may be good or bad or occupy an intermediary position such as weak. Let us begin at the bottom of the ladder and work up. Of course an absolutely bad title is no title at all, the lowest form of title is

Naked Possession or Actual Occupation of land without any right or pretense of right to hold and continue possession. This

one would say at the first blush is practically no title. True to a degree, but the mere possession with no right is something more than no possession with no right, for as we shall presently see, a continuance of such possession adverse to the owner may ripen into an absolutely good title. Then, again, if A should occupy a certain piece of land without any shadow of right and B also having no right, should seek to eject him, B cannot argue A's lack of title, for the settled rule of the law is that the plaintiff seeking to eject another must rely solely on the strength of his own title; he cannot recover on the weakness of his adversary's (Lane v. Reynard, 2 S. & R. 65).

7. Right to Possession.

The next higher grade of title is the right to possession. The right to possession springs out of a good title, it belongs to him who has a right to the property. It passes with the right of property. Suppose A purchases a piece of land in Kentucky and when he visits the property he finds a stranger in possession who refuses to remove. Here it will be seen the stranger has the actual possession while A has the right to possession. Suppose A without commencing suit to eject the stranger should transfer his title to B. B immediately has the right to possession although he actually never entered into possession. As against the stranger his right would prevail.

8. Perfect or Good Title.

Finally the perfect title exists where the person who has the possession has also the right to possession and right of property. He has, what we might call a good and complete title. Possession, actual or constructive, is necessary or the title is not complete. To give an example: Suppose A has a complete paper title by which we mean that the evidence of his right forms a perfect chain whether by deed or will. Suppose now, X enters possession of the premises during A's absence and refuses to vacate on A's return. A is the record owner and has a complete chain of title. Should he proceed against X he will prevail. But suppose A does nothing for twenty-one years and then sells his right to B. B gets the same complete paper title, but X can no longer be ousted. X's title now prevails. He has gained what is termed a title by adverse possesion. The paper title is still the same but now it is worthless.

9. Marketable Title.

This leads us to consider what we term a marketable title. A marketable title is not to be confounded with a good title. Strange as it may sound a good title may not be marketable. Speaking strictly from a legal standpoint there is no such a thing as a doubtful title. A title is either good or bad as far as the court is concerned but this situation is conceivable. A has a perfect title to some land. B enters an agreement to purchase it. Then he learns that a stranger has been in possession for ten years. The title of A is undoubted; he can eject the stranger and so can his successor, but to do so requires the expense, annoyance and hazard of a law suit. Legally A's title is good, perfect, but from a practical standpoint it is doubtful, therefore, unmarketable. No one buys the hazard of a law suit unless at a greatly reduced figure. An unmarketable title has been well defined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, as a title which exposes the party holding it to the hazard of litigation (Reighard's Estate, 192 Pa. 108; Dohnert's Appeal, 64 Pa. 311; Christ Church v. Clark, 47 Pa. Superior Ct. 286; Stone v. Caster, 48 Pa. Superior Ct. 236).

It must, however, be remembered that not all objections render a good title unmarketable and the question as to what is and is not marketable title is too large a subject to develop in this book, but in practice the difficulty is avoided by defining in the agreement of sale what the parties mean by a marketable title and it is usually done by inserting the following clause: "The title to be good and marketable and such as will be insured by any title insurance or trust company in Philadelphia" (Srolovitz v. Margulis, 35 Pa. Superior Ct. 252) (or specify the city where settlement is to be made). In this way it will be observed that an objection raised by a title company makes the title unmarketable as agreed to between the parties.

10. Equitable Title. Equity.

To properly understand the difference between a legal title and an equitable title we must understand the meaning of the word equity. Equity is a difficult word to define. Blackstone (Blks. Introduction, Sec. 2, page 61) adopts the definition of Grotius, who says that "Equity is the correction of that wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient.'' But this

definition like all others requires explanation. Bispham, in his admirable book on Equity Jurisprudence, explains the meaning of equity by setting forth its history rather than by attempting to define it, and we cannot do better than to adopt his method.

Historically the fountainhead of English justice was the sovereign, the King. At the time of the Norman Conquest and immediately thereafter the law was administered by the King and a certain council which he convened from among the lords of the realm. From this council there developed the courts later known as the Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, etc. In all of these courts there was administered justice according to the rules and precedents of the common law. Under these rules and precedents the party injured was always entitled to a judgment of money damages to compensate him for his injuries. As time passed it became evident that money damages awarded after an injury was not always a sufficient compensation for the injury suffered. E. g., suppose a man had a beautiful grove of shade trees and his neighbor out of pure wantonness cuts down a shade tree, the next day cuts down another and announces his intention of continuing to do so until all are gone. The injured man can, of course, sue and recover damages. But money damages, while they may punish the wrongdoer cannot replace the trees. The court of law could not prevent the trespasser from continuing his wanton trespasses. It could only give damages to the grieved party. Again, Suppose A agreed to sell a certain valuable painting to B and later refused to carry out his agreement, B could sue him, but money damages would not give him that certain painting and if it were the only one of its kind manifestly no amount of damages could redress the injured party.

Again, X has a stream of water running through his place which he uses to run his mill, Y who is up stream diverts the water, leaving X's mill high and dry. The common law court could give X damages, but his stream was gone forever. Thus, examples could be multiplied where the common law by reason of its inflexibility (universality) afforded no proper relief to the injured party. Now, as the King was the Supreme Judge, or head of Justice, it became natural for the injured subject to whom money damages afforded no relief to petition his sovereign for redress. The King had the power to grant extraordinary