preme Court of New York, who had allowed a writ of habeas corpus to produce the body of one Charles E. Hopson, and to which the provost-marshal had made the return prescribed in the orders from the Provost Marshal-General's office, upon which return an attachment was ordered to be issued, and a rule afterward entered to show cause why the return should not be deemed sufficient, the judge held the return to be sufficient, and sustained the correctness of Mr. Whiting's opinion. On this decision being removed to the general term of the district, the court were equally divided; Judges Bacon and Morgan decided that the court had no jurisdiction while the proclamation was in force, Judges Allen and Mullin that it had. Judge Leonard, of the Supreme Court of New York, in a case in New York city, fully concurs in the conclusions of Judges Paddock and Mullin. A person named Barrett was held by Provost-Marshal Nugent as a deserter. It was claimed on behalf of Barrett that he was never legally enlisted, and therefore could not desert. A writ of habeas corpus, issued, which the provost-marshal declined to obey, on the ground that Barrett was only amenable to military law. Counsel then applied for an attachment against Nugent for not obeying the writ, and Judge Leonard decided the motion. The judge in his opinion held that the military authority was subordinate to the civil; that the case of Ableman vs. Booth was essentially different from this, as Booth was in custody on process by a United States court, which Barrett was not; that this was a question not sought for by the court, and it must be decided according to law, not in view of expediency, and that this inquiry was not as to whether Barrett was a deserter or not, but an enquiry as to whether he was legally enlisted. The judge therefore concluded that Marshal Nugent must produce the body of Barrett. In the order granted by Judge Leonard, in accordance with his opinion, the following language was used: Ordered, That the person of the said Michael Barrett be produced by the respondent, Robert Nugent, in this court at 10 o'clock of the day next after the service of a copy of this order, or in default, that an attachment issue against the said Robert Nugent. Judge Chapman, of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, ordered the release of a person held by the provost-marshal, the marshal in that case making the return directed by the provost-marshal-general. The question arising in all these cases was as to the jurisdiction of the State courts. The United States courts exercised the right to issue the writ in cases of persons held under the Enrolment Act as deserters, and of minors enlisting without any objection being urged to their jurisdiction, Judge Leavitt, of Cincinnati, discharging a minor, who, it was alleged, had enlisted without his parents' consent. Judge Hall, U. S. District Judge of the Northern District of New York, discharged a minor named Jordan, who had enlisted, holding that the signing of the enlistment paper, and taking the oath which it contains, do not preclude the recruit or his parent from showing his true age, and if his age is shown to be less than eighteen years at the time of his enlistment, and that the parent had not consented thereto, he might be discharged from the service on habeas corpus. The denial of jurisdiction in the State courts had proceeded from military orders; but on the 15th of September the President issued the following proclamation: By the President of the United States, a Proclama tion: Whereas, the Constitution of the United States has ordained that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it, and whereas a rebellion was existing in March 3d, 1863, which rebellion is still existing, and whereas, by a statute which was approved on that day, it was enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, that during the present insurrection, the President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof; and whereas, in the judgment of the President, the public safety does require that the privilege of said writ shall now be suspended throughout the United States, in cases where, by the authority of the President of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the United States, or either of them, hold persons under their custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen, enrolled, drafted, or mustered, or enlisted in, or belong. ing to the land or naval force of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or to the rules or articles of war, or the rules and regulations prescribed for military or naval service by the authority of the President of the United States, or for resisting a draft, or for any other offence against the military or naval service. Now, therefore, I Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim and make known to all whom may concern, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended throughout the United States in the several cases before mentioned, and that this suspension will continue throughout the duration of said rebellion, or until this proclamation shall, by a subsequent one to be issued by the President of the United States, be modified and revoked; and I do hereby require all magistrates and other civil officers within the United States, and all officers and others in the military and naval service of the United States, to take distinct notice of this suspension, and give it full effect, and that all citizens of the United States are to conduct and govern themselves accordingly, and in conformity with the Constitution of the United States, and the laws of Congress in such cases made and provided. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed, this 15th day of September, in the year of our Lord 1863, and of the Independence of the United States of America the 88th. By the President, A. LINCOLN. WASHINGTON, September 18th, 1868. The Secretary of War has ordered the act of Congress relative to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the proclamation of the President based upon the same, to be published for the benefit of all concerned; and that the following special instructions for persons in the military service of the United States be strictly observed, viz. : The attention of every officer in the military service of the United States, is called to the proclamation of the President, issued on the 15th day of September, 1863, by which the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. If therefore a writ of habeas corpus should, in violation of the aforesaid proclamation, be sued out and served upon any officers in the military service of the. United States, commanding him to produce, before any Court or Judge, any person who is held in his custody by the authority of the President of the United States, belonging to any one of the classes specified in the proclamation, it shall be the duty of such officer to make known by his certificate under oath, to whomsoever may issue or serve such writ of habeas corpus, that the person named in said writ is detained by him as a prisoner under the authority of the President of the United States. And such return having been made, if any person serving or attempting to serve such a writ, either by command of any Court or Judge or otherwise, and with or without process of law, shall attempt to arrest the officer making such return and holding in custody such person, the said officer is hereby commanded to refuse submission and obedience to such arrest, and if there should be any attempt to take such person from the custody of such officer, or arrest such officer, he shall resist such attempt, calling to his aid any force that may be necessary to maintain the authority of the United States, and render such resistance effectual. JAMES B. FRY, Provost-Marshal-General. The courts were immediately called upon to decide whether the proclamation affected cases in which the writ had already been issued, and which were then pending. Several cases were in this position in the U. S. District Court of Pennsylvania, before Judge Cadwalader. In many of these cases postponements of the hearings had been allowed on the application of the Boards of Enrolment, and in one case the writ had been issued two weeks before, and the final hearing deferred on account of continuances granted on the Board of Enrolment's application. Judge Cadwalader, it appears, invited a full and free discussion, in order that he might have all the information possible before giving a decision. One new case was presented which raised an important question. It is thus stated: On Tuesday Gustavus Remak, Esq., counsel for a drafted man named John Yunger, prepared a petition in the usual form in his behalf for a writ of habeas corpus. Yunger, it seems, had been served in the sixth ward with a notice that he had been drafted, but as the notice had been directed to William, and not John, and as he alleged the name of John Yunger bad not been drawn from the wheel, he appeared before the board claiming exemption. The board disallowed his claim, and, taking his notice, erased the name of William and inserted that of John. The President's proclamation intervening, his counsel on Wednesday appeared, and, together with the petitioner, presented the following supplemental affidavit: John Yunger, the petitioner named in the foregoing petition, being duly sworn according to law, doth further depose and say: I am not held under the command, nor am I in the custody of any military, naval, or civil officer of the United States, either as a prisoner of war, spy, aider or abettor of the enemy, or as an officer, soldier, or seaman enrolled, drafted, or mustered in or belonging to the land and naval forces of the United States, or as a deserter therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law or the rules and articles of war, or the rules and regulations prescribed for military and naval service by authority of the President of the United States, or for resisting a draft, or for any other offence against the military or naval service. It will be noticed that the words of the President's proclamation are quoted in order to aver that the relator does not come within its terms. Judge Cadwalader granted a rule to show cause why the writ should not be granted, and this will bring up the whole question. In the course of the discussion Judge Cadwalader stated that the question was not whether there were hardships or whether a man had a remedy, but whether the remedy by a writ of habeas corpus was suspended. Congress could not, constitutionally, suspend all remedies which a man might have, but could they not suspend this particular form of remedy? Mr. Remak stated that he should follow a line of argument in order to present the case thus: 1. Has Congress the power to delegate the authority of suspending the writ of habeas corpus to the President of the United States? or is not Congress bound, if the Constitution invests it with the right of suspension, to exercise that power? 2. If Congress have the power so to delegate that authority, can they do it for an indefinite period of time? Is not "during the present rebellion" an indefinite period? 3. The act of Congress, if valid, authorizes the suspension "of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it." This means that the President shall exercise his judgment in each individual case as it arises, but does not empower the President to suspend the writ in all cases that may occur in future, as he does in his proclamation. He must decide in each case. 4. The act of Congress does not contemplate that the writs shall be refused by the judges, but, on the contrary, states in what manner, when issued, the writs shall be suspended. 5. The President's proclamation does not embrace parties who are applying for the writ when not drafted, but claimed as drafted persons. He contended that the power to suspend the privi lege of the writ existed in Congress, and in Congress would seem to be limited in the Constitution, first, as alone, as it is a legislative power; and this power to the territory to be affected; second, as to the time during which it is to last; and, third, as to individuals engaged or charged with being engaged in the rebellion or invasion; that is to say, there being nothing to ted by the framers of the Constitution that Congress the contrary in the Constitution, it was not contemplashould ever suspend the writ except in parts of the United States. The place where the rebellion or invasion exists forms a material question. Mr. Remak's next point was that the proclamation was limited to the individual. It must be against some person charg ed with an offence, but it does not touch the civilian who is not charged or is not held by any magistrate or any officer, civil or military, but who is still in the enjoyment of his rights, except that he stands in the position of having been enrolled, as one who may be called upon to serve the United States, and who may or may not be exempt on account of age or disability. When he had concluded Judge Cadwalader said that, as at present advised, he would not hear the district attorney. It appeared to him that the words "either as" in the proclamation, governed all the words until we came to the words “or as," and hence that any person held "as" a soldier, enrolled or drafted, whether rightfully or not, came within the meaning of the act of Congress. There are none of these cases where the parties do not allege that they are held as "drafted" men, and hence they place themselves within the provisions of the act and the proclamation. My present opinion is that the proclamation applies to every man of whom the custody is held or claimed by military persons, so that they exert power over them as drafted men. As to those cases under the 14th section of the Conscription Act, there is no doubt that the proceedings are suspended. (These are the cases of appeals from the decision of the Board of Enrol ment.) In regard to the other cases, where the allega tion is that the parties are not enrolled or drafted, he promised to give his decision the next morning. By implication it would seem that Judge Cadwalader did not assent to the first point, and was of opinion that Congress had the right to delegate the power of suspending the writ to the President. A New York paper of September 17th says: Considerable excitement has been occasioned in legal circles of this city and Brooklyn by the President's proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus during the continuance of the war. For several days past the Judges of the State Courts have been applied to for writs to discharge recruits and young men who had enlisted without the consent of their parents, while under age. Frederick A. War ing, a young man from Brooklyn, was brought up before Judge Betts yesterday on a writ of habeas corpus. This morning Mr. Slossom, for the Government, interposed the proclamation of the President of the United States, suspending the privilege of the writ. Mr. Waring, the uncle of the relator, contended that as the young man was yesterday in the custody of the Judge, before the proclamation of the President was known judicially, therefore, the case must be proceeded with as if no such proclamation had been issued, suspending the privileges of the writ. The Judge differed in opinion with Mr. Waring, but held the matter under consideration. In the Supreme Court, Judge Clerke had the cases of James Mehan and David C. Doremus, who claimed to have been illegally enlisted by Colonel Jenkins, brought up before him on writ of habeas corpus by adjournment. His Honor said that in view of the proclamation of the President of the United States suspending the writ of habeas corpus, the prisoners must be remanded and the writs discharged. The boys went off in custody of the sergeant and the guard. In the case of John Baldinger, Judge Betts, of the U. S. District Court, said that the fact whether this man is improperly in custody or not is the very question which the Court is, by the proclamation, not allowed to inquire into. habeas corpus did not apply to such cases. The judge concluded his opinion by saying that the objections made by the counsel in these cases to the application of the proclamation cannot prevail, and he was precluded from further inquiry by the proclamation, and if any of the parties before him were entitled to relief they must seek it from the officers or the tribunals able by law to grant it. The prisoners were then remanded to the custody of Gen. Devens, to be taken back to the camp at Long Island. A writ of habeas corpus, issued by Judge Shipman, of the U. S. Circuit Court, upon Provost marshal Pardee at New Haven for the body of George Howland, an alleged deserter from the Sixth Connecticut volunteers, was returnable the next day. A return was accordingly made, setting forth that the President's proclamation suspending the habeas corpus, having just been received, the marshal found it necessary to decline giving up the prisoner. The judge accepted the return, and suspended further proceedings in the case. It was stated that the War Department had made a modification of the President's proclamation suspending the habeas corpus act, so that hereafter the civil courts would be allowed to take cognizance as heretofore of all cases for the discharge of minors improperly enlisted and illegally detained by the military authoriNo other change or modification was ties. made in the proclamation during the year, so that at the end of 1863 the privileges of the writ were suspended as to all persons held by military authority except minors illegally enlisted. HARCOURT, Admiral OOTAVIUS VERNON, an officer in the British navy, born December 26th, 1793, died at Swinton Park, Yorkshire, August 14th, 1863. He was a son of Dr. The basis of the argument appears to be that the Edward Vernon, late Archbishop of York Government cannot compel an infant to serve. I do (who took the name of Harcourt, in 1831, on not concur in that view. Our form of government has his coming to the estate of the last Earl as much right to call to the field every man capable of Harcourt). He entered the navy in 1806 as bearing arms as any absolute monarchy on the face of the earth. The return states that he is detained as a midshipman of the "Tigre," under Captain deserter. It is a high crime for any one to desert his B. Hallowell, in the expedition to Egypt and colors. The question occurs where he shall be tried. Alexandria, 1807; and saw much boat service If he was brought before any of the courts of the on the Nile. He was present in the same ship United States he could not be tried, and the only triat the blockade of Toulon, and destruction of bunal before which he can be heard is that of the Provost Marshal. I see nothing in this case to induce the French line-of-battle-ships "Robuste" and me to take it out of the jurisdiction in which it is "Lion," in 1809; and on the promotion of properly placed by the proclamation, which is conclu- Captain Hallowell to his flag, followed him sive on all the courts, and I have no power to inquire into the "Malta," and continued serving with into the case of any man who is a soldier and under him on the coast of Spain, and at the siege of the military authorities. I have no more authority to act under the writ than I would have to issue a writ. Tarragona, until made a lieutenant in 1814. Mulgrave," This writ is, therefore, dismissed and the relator is He was then appointed to the " remanded to the military tribunals. was transferred to the " Amelia,” and, after the battle of Waterloo, was sent with a major of the Tuscan army to summon the town of Porto Ferrajo. In 1820 he was promoted to the rank of Commander, serving successively Britomart," upon the "Drake," "Carnation,' and "Primrose," the latter vessel on the West India station; from which he returned to England with a freight of more than a million dollars; and, after acting as aide-de-camp to the On Saturday morning, Oct. 26th, Judge Sprague gave a decision in the United States District Court, Boston, in the case of the five persons held for military service by General Devens, and who had asked for writs of habeas corpus, one claiming to be a felon, one an alien, and the three others minors. It was urged by the counsel for the defendants that the President's proclamation suspending the writ of 9966 lord high admiral during the visit of his royal highness to the seaports, was promoted to the rank of captain, July 7th, 1827. In 1834 he was appointed to the "North Star," and was for a time employed on a survey of the coast of Central America. He became rearadmiral in July, 1854. Upon his marriage, in 1838, he took up his residence at Swinton Park, and soon after became magistrate for the north and west districts of Yorkshire; and in 1848 was high-sheriff. He was a man of great benevolence of character, and a benefactor of the Church, having built and endowed one near Masham, and another in Devonshire. He built a number of alms-houses for the benefit of the poor, beside contributing largely to the different schools in and near Masham. HATHERTON, Rt. Hon. EDWARD JOHN LITTLETON, Lord, born March 18th, 1791, died at Teddesley Park, May 4th, 1863. He was the only son of Moreton Walhouse, Esq., of Hatherton, but on the death of his great uncle, Sir Edward Littleton, Bart., he inherited the estates and assumed the name of Littleton. He was educated at Rugby, graduating at Brasennose College, Oxford, and had barely attained his majority when, in 1812, he succeeded to the representation of Staffordshire. The business habits of Mr. Littleton, his tact and good judgment, soon gained him a high station in the Commons, and he was long considered one of the best authorities on the forms and procedure of Parliament. He succeeded his uncle in the chairmanship of the Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal Company, an office he retained to his death. Mr. Littleton was a constant supporter of Catholic Emancipation, the advocacy of which measure for many years imperilled his seat. He was also one of the principal framers of the "wings" of the Catholic Relief Bill, as well as one of the promoters of the unsuccessful measure for the payment of the Catholic clergy. He was a supporter of Mr. Canning's short lived ministry, and on the accession of Lord Grey to the premiership, he immediately joined the whig party. Upon the passage of the measures of Reform, the Cabinet intrusted to him the difficult duty of planning the boundaries of the newly enfranchised towns and divisions of counties, and of extending the limits of the old parliamentary cities and boroughs, and with very few and immaterial modifications the suggested boundaries became the law of the land. On the dissolution of Parliament in 1835 he was again returned for South Stafford, and the same year was created a peer, by the title of Baron Hatherton, of Hatherton. In 1854 he was appointed Lordlieutenant of Staffordshire. During the Crimean War he devoted himself to the organization of the militia of his county, and latterly to the formation of Volunteer Rifle Corps. His hospitality was profuse, and he annually entertained public men of all parties and men of letters, together with many distinguished foreigners visiting England; and no man of his rank took a deeper interest in the welfare of the working classes. HEAT. An important revolution has been going on within the last few years in the philosophy of physics, which must have the effect of changing our fundamental conceptions of the nature and relations of force. The publication in London of Prof. Tyndall's new and admirable work on "Heat as a Mode of Motion," must be regarded as an important result of the progress of thought in this direction, and the republication of this book in New York-as it is the first regular work upon this subject in America-by bringing forward the new views, and opening the general discussion, has a special interest at the present time. Every reflecting student of physical science has no doubt been perplexed by the phrase "imponderable forms of matter," which is applied in our text books to beat, light, electricity, and magnetism. No one has proposed to rank chemical affinity in this category, or to consider the force which produces or resists motion as an imponderable. By this hypothesis agencies, which are closely allied, and unquestionably of a kindred nature, have been so completely separated as to involve the whole subject in absurdity, and prevent the progress of rational and consistent theory. According to the old view, caloric is regarded as the substance of heat-as a subtile, imponderable matter which flows in and out of bodies, warming and cooling them according to its quantity. When heat disappears, the caloric is said to become "latent; as different bodies require different quantities of heat to raise them through the same degree of temperature, they are said to have different "capacities" for containing or holding the caloric fluid; while if a body becomes heated by rubbing, it is because its latent heat is liberated by friction. So also with electricity. By friction of various bodies the equilibrium of the all-pervading "electric fluid" is supposed to be disturbed. When the glass plate of the electrical machine is rubbed by the cushion the effect is to draw up the "electric fluid" out of the earth, the "common reservoir," and when a circuit of wire becomes electrically active, it is because a "current" of the "electric fluid" is flowing round and round through the conductors. This old hypothesis has no doubt been of important service in its day. Before the time had come to perceive the true relations of these agencies, the best that could be done was to borrow the conception and language of fluids, and apply them to these subtile and mobile effects of force that had to be represented in some way. But the hypothesis was grossly material; caloric was regarded as matter, as truly and essentially as gold or iron. And as the fundamental modern conception of the chemical elements is that they cannot be transmuted one into the others, so the radical conception of the imponderables was that as each had an independent material existence, they could not be transformed into each other. This hypothesis being the very reverse of the fact, its dogmas have long offered a barrier to the true course of physical investigation. It is now established that the forces possess none of the attributes of matter-they are not entities-substantive things, endowed with peculiar, persistent individual properties, but they are modes of motion, or forms of movement in common matter, and are convertible one into another. It has long been known, for example, that heat, as in the case of the steam engine, produces mechanical force, while mechanical force, as in the case of friction, produces heat. But in what way is the effect related to the cause? The old hypothesis assumes the intervention of a fluid, which, so long as its agency is entertained, blinds us to the simplicity of the facts. The new explanation says that the conception of the fluid is superfluous-that heat actually passes into mechanical motion, and mechanical motion actually passes into heat, or that there is a conversion of one into another. So with all the other forces known as "imponderables;" they are mutually convertible into one another-a fact which has been described by Mr. Grove, under the phrase "correlation of forces." In his able treatise upon this subject, which, we are glad to learn, is to be republished in this country, he gives a lucid account of the principle from which the following paragraphs are abridged. The various affections of matter, which constitute the main objects of experimental physics -namely, heat, light, electricity, magnetism, chemical affinity, and motion, are all correlative, or have a reciprocal dependence. Neither, taken abstractly, can be said to be the essential cause of the others, but either may produce or be convertible into any of the others. Thus heat may mediately or immediately produce electricity, electricity may produce heat, and so of the rest, each merging itself as the force it produces becomes developed. The same must hold good of other forces, it being an irresistible inference from observed phenomena, that a force cannot originate otherwise than by the dissolation of some preëxisting force or forces. The term correlation, strictly interpreted, means a necessary mental or reciprocal dependence of two ideas inseparable even in mental conception; thus the idea of height cannot exist without involving the idea of depth; the idea of parent cannot exist without involving the idea of offspring. The probability is that, if not all, the greater number of physical phenomena are correlative, and that without a duality of conception the mind cannot form an idea of them. Thus matter and force are correlates in the strictest sense of the word; the conception of the existence of the one, involves the conception of the existence of the other. The correlation of forces implies their reciprocal production; that any force capable of producing another may, in its turn, be produced by it-nay more, can be itself resisted by the force it produces in proportion to the energy of such production, as action is ever accompanied and resisted by reaction. Thus the action of an electro-magnetic machine is reacted upon by the magneto-electricity developed by the action. With regard to the forces of electricity and magnetism in a dynamic state, we cannot electrize a substance without magnetizing it-we cannot magnetize without electrizing it. Each molecule, the instant it is affected by one of these forces, is affected by the other, but in transverse directions; the forces are inseparable and mutually dependent; correlative, but not identical. In many cases where one physical force is excited, all the others are also set in action. Thus, when a substance, such as sulphuret of antimony, is electrified, at the instant of electrization, it becomes magnetic in directions at right angles to the lines of electrical force; at the same time it becomes heated to an extent greater or less according to the intensity of the electric force. If this intensity is exalted to a certain point, the sulphuret becomes luminous, or light is produced; it expands, consequently motion is produced; and it is decomposed, therefore chemical action is produced. Motion, the most obvious, the most distinctly conceived of all the affections of matter will directly produce heat and electricity, and electricity, being produced by it, will produce magnetism. Light also is readily produced by motion; either directly, as when accompanying the heat of friction, or immediately by electricity resulting from motion. In the decompositions and compositions which the terminal wires proceeding from the conductors of an electrical machine develop when immersed in different chemical media, we get the production of chemical affinity by electricity, of which motion is the initial source. If heat be now taken as the starting point, we shall find that the other modes of force may be readily produced by it. Motion is so generally, if it be not invariably, the immediate effect of heat, that we may almost, if not entirely, resolve heat into motion, and view it as a mechanically repulsive force tending to move the particles of all bodies, or to separate them from each other. This molecular motion we may readily change into the motion of masses, or motion in its most ordinary and palpable form. Heat, then, being a force capable of producing motion, and motion, as we have also seen, being capable of producing the other modes of force, it necessarily follows that heat is capable immediately of producing them. It will immediately produce electricity, as shown in the beautiful experiment of Seabeck. With regard to chemical affinity and magnetism, perhaps the only method by which, in strictness, the force of heat may be said to produce them, is through the medium of electricity; the thermo-electric current being capable of deflecting the magnet, of magnetizing iron, and exhibiting the other |