other state, without service other than by publication, does not in any way affect her property rights in the state where she resides. Doerr v. Forsythe, 50 O. St. 726 (35 N. E. Rep. 1055). A decree for alimony to be paid in money is a lien upon the real estate of the husband the same as a judgment for a debt. Conrad v. Everich, 50 O. St. 476 (35 N. E. Rep.58; 40 Am. St. Rep. 679). Under Cal. Civ. Code, § 146, by which it is provided that upon divorce, "if a homestead has been selected from the separate property of either, it shall be assigned to the former owner of such property, subject to the power of the court to assign it for a limited period to the innocent party," it is held that the court has no power to assign it to the innocent party beyond the period of his life, and where such assignment is made for a limited period, in case of the death of the party before the expiration of the time fixed, the estate reverts immediately to the original owner. Neary v. Godfrey et al., 102 Cal. 338 (36 Pac. Rep. 655). Ky. Civ. Code, § 425, construed-order restoring property upon divorce. nett v. Bennett, 95 Ky. 545 (26 S. W. Rep. 392). Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 4508, providing that in case of divorce "the guilty party shall forfeit all rights and claims under and by virtue of the marriage," does not affect homestead rights. Biffle v. Pullman, 114 Mo. 50 (21 S. W. Rep. 450). Nor does this statute affect the wife's title to property which her husband had previously caused to be conveyed to her and her children by him. Kinzey v. Kinzey et al., 115 Mo. 496 (22 S. W. Rep. 497; 20 L. R. A. 222). N. C. Code 1883, § 1840, applied-rights of husband in separate real estate of wife where she has obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro. Taylor v. Taylor, 112 N. C. 134 (16 S. E. Rep. 1019). See Estates by

entireties.

Ben

Sec. 410. Miscellaneous notes. A husband and wife may become joint owners of a leasehold interest without involving a partnership between them. Wineman v. Phillips, 93 Mich. 223 (53 N. W. Rep. 168). Under Cal. Civ. Code, § 164, as amended in 1889, a conveyance to a married woman and her husband creates a presumption that she takes the part conveyed to her as tenant in common, unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument. Jordan v. Fay, 98 Cal. 264

(33 Pac. Rep. 95). Under a statute (Tex. Rev. Stat., art. 559) requiring the joint deed of a husband and wife to convey her separate real estate, it is not necessary that they both execute the deed at the same time. Halbert v. Hendrix,

Tex. Civ. App. (26 S. W. Rep. 911). Where a husband causes land to be conveyed to his wife as a gift, the title becomes vested in her, and he cannot, after her death, acquire the fee by having her name erased from the deed and his own substituted as grantee. Berry et al. v. Kinnaird et al.,

Ky. (20 S. W. Rep. 511). Where the husband purchased land with his wife's money and sold it before the deed was executed, having the grantor convey directly to the purchaser, the wife having consented to the husband's selling the land, she cannot have such deed set aside as fraudulent, although the purchaser did not know of her consent, and she had no knowledge of this particular transaction. Beckett et al. v. Sawyer, Ky. (15 S. W. Rep. 12). It is held that if a man or woman represent to the other, as an inducement to marriage, that he or she is the owner of certain property and the marriage in part upon such consideration should be consummated, a secret voluntary conveyance of such property by one of the parties would be a fraud upon the other. Alkire v. Alkire et al., 134 Ind. 350 (32 N. E. Rep. 571).

IMPROVEMENTS.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 411. Occupying claimants. Where a vendee in possession under a contract of purchase makes valuable improvements upon the land, upon the faith of his contract, and the contract is such that specific performance cannot be enforced, the vendor will be compelled to refund the purchasemoney, and to pay the actual value of the improvements. Chabot v. Winter Park Co., 34 Fla. 258 (15 So. Rep. 756). An occupant of swamp land under a void patent from the

United States, who in good faith drains the land, may recover money expended in such drainage from one who afterwards acquires good title to such land from the state in which it is situated, though Act Cong., Sept. 28, 1850, requires the state to drain swamp lands donated to it under such act. Sherman

v. A. P. Cook Co., 98 Mich. 61 (57 N. W. Rep. 23). A deed void on its face is admissible in support of a plea of improvements in good faith. Schleicher et al. v. Gatlin, 85 Tex. 270 (20 S. W. Rep. 120). Mansf. Ark. Dig., §§ 2644, 2645, which provides that where a person peaceably improves land under color of title, believing himself to be the owner, he shall be entitled to the value of improvements and taxes paid before possession shall be delivered to the owner, do not apply to land bought by the state at a tax sale, and sold by it to a third person, since such statutes do not affect the sovereign. Martin v. Roesch et al., 57 Ark. 474 (21 S. W. Rep. 881). Iowa Code, §§ 1976-1987 construed. Gleiser v. Mc Gregor, 85 Ia. 489 (52 N. W. Rep. 366). Particular fact case in which vendee was held entitled to recover for improvements. Holthouse v. Rynd, 155 Pa. 43 (25 Atl. Rep. 760). Permanent improvements made by one having color of title will be presumed to have been made in good faith. Hilgenberg v. Northup et al., 134 Ind. 92 (33 N. E. Rep. 786). Where a court of equity permits a grantor to show his conveyance to be a mortgage and allows him the privilege of redeeming therefrom, he will be required to allow his grantee, who has in good faith taken possession of the premises and made improvements thereon, the cost of such improvements. Gleiser v. McGregor, 85 Ia. 489 (52 N. W. Rep. 366). Under Ky. Gen. Stat., ch. 80, art. 1, § 1, an occupying claimant cannot recover for improvements made after he has notice of the real owner's claim, though he may have believed that such claim was unfounded. Leavison et al. v. Harris, Ky. (14 S. W. Rep. 343). In construing the Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, §§ 4645, 4647, providing that an unsuccessful defendant in ejectment may recover for improvements made in good faith before notice of the adverse title, and may have an injunction against the writ of ejectment pending the ascertainment of the value of such improvements, it is held, that in such action the claimant cannot relitigate a question of title determined in the

ejectment proceedings; that he is not entitled to pay for improvements made after he has notice of the outstanding claim, although he honestly believed he had title; nor is the successful plaintiff in ejectment estopped to claim the improvements because he did not stop the erection thereof, he having notified the defendant of his claim of title; that the action does not involve the question of the right to chattels on the land; and the injunction is merely ancillary to the action for improvements, and attorney fees incurred in defending such action cannot be recovered as part of the damages occasioned by the injunction. Brown v. Baldwin, 121 Mo. 106 (25 S. W. Rep. 858); Brown v. Baldwin, 121 Mo. 126 (25 S. W. Rep. 863). In order to recover for improvements they must be made while a party is occupying the premises claiming title under some deed or contract made or acquired in good faith; a mere expectation that the owner will give the premises to the occupant is not sufficient. Thomas et al. v. Thomas, 69 Miss. 564 (13 So. Rep. 666); Anderson v. Williams, 59 Ark. 144 (26 S. W. Rep. 818). One taking possession in good faith under a parol gift is entitled to pay for improvements. N. C. Code, § 476 applied. Vann et al. v. Newsom, 110 N. C. 122 (14 S. E. Rep. 519). S. C. Act 1885 (19 Stat. 343) applied. Gadsden et al. v. Desportes et al., 39 S. C. 131 (17 S. E. Rep. 706). A mortgagee buying on foreclosure cannot make a claim for improvements made by his mortgagor before giving the mortgage. C. Aultman & Co. v. Utsey, S. C. (19 S. E. Rep. 617). It is only a bona fide occupant who can, under either the civil law or the statute, be allowed the value of his improvements when he has been ousted by one having a better title. Wood v. Conrad, 2 S. Dak. 334 (50 N. W. Rep. 95). An occupying claimant cannot recover for improvements except the same be made while he was in good faith claiming title, legal or equitable, to the premises. Carter v. Brown, 35 Neb. 670 (53 N. W. Rep. 580).

Sec. 412.

Tenants.

One cotenant is not responsible to his cotenant for the cost of improvements put upon the common property, unless he so agreed, and afterwards ratified the act of making them. Welland v. Williams et ux., 21

Nev. 230 (29 Pac. Rep. 403). In partition the cotenant is entitled to compensation for valuable, lasting and necessary improvements made by him under the belief that he had acquired all the interests in fee. Parish v. Camplin,

Ind.

(37 N. E. Rep. 607). In Alabama it is held that where a cotenant improves the common property while in the sole possession, the other tenants making no claim thereto, it appearing that the improvements were made without any intention to obtain any advantage of the other tenants, a court of equity, in making partition of the land, will award to the tenant making the improvements, the portion so improved by him, or when this cannot be done and it is shown that the tenant making the improvements believed himself to be the sole owner of the land, equity will require the other tenants to reimburse him for such improvements. Ferris v. Montgomery Land & Imp. Co., 94 Ala. 557 (10 So. Rep. 607; 33 Am. St. Rep. 146). A life tenant or her heir cannot, as against a debt owing to the remainder-man, when it is asserted by him in equity, set up as a defense thereto, the value of permanent improvements made by such life tenant while in possession of the land. Sparks' Adm'rx v. Ball et al., 91 Ky. 502 (16 S. W. Rep. 272; 34 Am. St. Rep. 236). It is held that a life tenant cannot lay out money in building on the land and charge it on the estate in remainder or make it a personal charge against the remainder-men; neither can a guardian. Caldwell v. Jacob, Ky. (22 S. W. Rep. 436; 27 S. W. Rep. 86). The tenant of a life estate, making permanent and valuable improvements, can have no claim the remainder-men for reimbursement. Wilson v. Miss. (14 So. Rep. 264). One enter

upon

Parker et al.,

ing as a

make

tenant, in the absence of any claim of title, cannot

a claim for improvements. Wolf v. Holton, 92 Mich.

136 (52 N. W. Rep. 459).

Sec. 413. Miscellaneous notes. One who enters upon land under a conveyance from one who is a trespasser without color of right, cannot be compensated for improvements made during such possession. Armstrong et al. v. Oppenheimer et al., 84 Tex. 365 (19 S. W. Rep. 520). Filling and grading a lot is held to constitute an "improvement."