v. Ardner, 98 Mich. 70 (56 N. W. Rep. 1105). Mere inadequacy of price is insufficient to implicate the vendee in the fraudulent intent, unless the price be so manifestly inadequate as to shock the moral sense, and create at once a suspicion of fraud. Bierne et al. v. Ray et al., 37 W. Va. 571 (16 S. E. Rep. 804). A decree setting aside a conveyance as fraudulent will not be disturbed where the evidence shows a chain of fraudulent circumstances which the parties interested make no attempt to explain. Corn Exch. Bank v. Applegate, Ia. (59 N. W. Rep. 268).

Where a brother of failing debtors who have made an assignment, purchases the property from the assignee, and afterwards sells it at a profit, and subsequently engages in business with the brothers, these facts alone, without proof of fraud, will not render the transaction subject to an attack by the creditors. First Nat. Bank of Springfield et al. v. Lancaster et al., Ky. (14 S. W. Rep. 536). A trust deed executed to secure claims of certain creditors is not per se fraudulent because the exact amount of debts is not accurately stated; nor because there can be no sale until one or more of the creditors require it; nor because of a reservation of the use of the property to the grantor until sold; nor because the sale is provided to be for cash. Norris v. Lake et al., 89 Va. 513 (16 S. E. Rep. 663). Cases involving particular facts in which the evidence is considered, and held sufficient to authorize the setting aside of a conveyance, on the ground that it was made in fraud of creditors. Mertens v. Welsing, 85 Ia: 508 (52 N. W. Rep. 362); Lutkenhoff et al. v. Lutkenhoff, Ky. (17 S. W. Rep. 863); Dickson et al. v. McLarney et al., 97 Ala. 383 (12 So. Rep. 398); Thompson v. Tower Mfg Co., Ala. (16 So. Rep. 116); Ansorge v. Barth, 88 Wis. 553 (60 N. W. Rep. 1055). Particular facts held sufficient to show a fraudulent conveyance from one partner to another. Burt v. Agassiz et al., 6 Wash. St. 242 (33 Pac. Rep. 508). Same as to conveyance from father to son. Clark v. Raymond, 86 Ia. 661 (53 N. W. Rep. 354); Reynolds' Adm'rs v. Gawthrop's Heirs, 37 W. Va. 3 (16 S. E. Rep. 364); McKeague v. Armstrong et al., 50 N. J. Eq. 309 (24 Atl. Rep. 398). Particular conveyances from father to son held not fraudulent. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Louisville

V. Sears et al., Ky. (20 S. W. Rep. 269); Griffis v. Griffis, 89 Ga. 142 (15 S. E. Rep. 23). Cases in which the particular facts are considered and held not sufficient to authorize the setting aside of a conveyance on the ground that it was made in fraud of creditors. Mayer v. Frasche et al., 7 Wash. St. 405 (35 Pac. Rep. 409); Neuberger et al. v. Keim et al., 134 N. Y. 35 (31 N. E. Rep. 268); Faitoute v. Sayre et ux., N. J. Eq. (28 Atl. Rep. 711); First Nat. Ala. (12 So. Rep.

Bank of Birmingham v. Steele, 783).

Sec. 371. Bona fide purchasers. If property be conveyed with design on the part of the vendor and participated in by the vendee, to defraud his creditors, his vendee's title will not be protected, notwithstanding he pays valuable consideration; but a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge of the intended fraud will be protected in his title, and he may transfer such title to one having knowledge of the fraud. Bruen v. Dunn, 87 Ia. 483 (54 N. W. Rep. 468). As against a purchaser it must be shown that he had notice of such facts tending to show the fraud as would put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry. Edwards et al. v. Reid et al., 39 Neb. 645 (58 N. W. Rep. 202). The burden is on the purchaser from a fraudulent grantee to establish the good faith of his purchase. Schaible v. Ardner, 98 Mich. 70 (56 N. W. Rep. 1105). One who, without notice, for a valuable consideration, purchases a note executed by the wife of a failing debtor, which is secured by a mortgage, is not chargeable with notice of fraud affecting the transaction leading up to the execution of the note. Peck v. Dyer, 147 Ill. 592 (35 N. E. Rep. 479). One who purchases at a judicial sale is not affected by fraud in a prior transfer of the decree, where the sale itself is free from fraud and collusion. 7. T. Robinson Notion Co. v. Foot, Neb. (60 N. W. Rep. 316). Where a pretended mortgage debt is evidenced by a single promissory note for a gross and entire sum, the innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration, of a fractional part of the debt will be protected on a pro rata basis in his equitable interest so acquired. Holmes v. Gardner et al., 50 O. St. 167 (33 N. E. Rep 644; 20 L. R. A. 329). Particular facts

held insufficient to constitute one a bona fide purchaser. Allen v. Stingel, 95 Mich. 195 (54 N. W. Rep. 880).

Sec. 372. Liability of fraudulent grantee. One who holds a deed of another's land merely as a cover to cheat the owner's creditors is not thereby chargeable as his trustee, for the land is not "effects" in his hands or possession, nor its value a "credit," and there is no indebtedness to constitute a "credit." In such case the land is attachable in the ordinary way; but, if the grantee should be held chargeable with its value, he might, after having paid that value to one creditor, have the land taken from him by another creditor, and thus lose it after having paid for it. National Union Bank of Swanton v. Brainerd et al., 65 Vt. 291 (26 Atl. Rep. 723).

Sec. 373. Miscellaneous notes. The rule that a cause of action for fraud is not assignable does not apply to a contractual debt as the basis of a suit to set aside fraudulent conveyances. Howd v. Breckinridge et al., 97 Mich. 65 (56 N. W. Rep. 221). As to whether or not a conveyance is fraudulent will be determined by the law of the place where the property is situated and the conveyance is executed. Boehme v. Rall et al., 51 N. J. Eq. 541 (26 Atl. Rep. 832). Where a debtor has the title and possession of the land of another it cannot be subjected to the claims of creditors unless the true owner be guilty of such conduct as would estop him, as against creditors, from asserting title. Breeze et al. v. Brooks et al., 97 Cal. 72 (31 Pac. Rep. 742). A court of equity will not lend its aid to the setting aside of a conveyance unless the transaction involves something of value. Klosterman v. Vader et al., 6 Wash. St. 99 (32 Pac. Rep. 1055). Several transactions, the prime object of which is the fraudulent disposition of property to the injury of creditors, though made at different times, and with different persons, may be treated as one cause of action. Bomar et al. v. Means et al., 37 S. C. 520 (16 S. E. Rep. 537). In order to support a decree annulling his title there must be either a special or general finding against the purchaser. Edwards et al. v. Reid et al., 39 Neb. 645 (58 N. W. Rep. 202). In South Carolina it is held that the creditor filing a bill to have a conveyance declared void, does not thereby acquire any superior

equity over other creditors, and that where a deed is set aside as interfering with the rights of other creditors, it is as to those creditors as if it had never existed. The effect is to leave the creditors to enforce their claim and obtain satisfaction according to their legal priorities. Curlee v. Rambert et al., 37 S. C. 214 (15 S. E. Rep. 954). The right to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may be barred by lapse of time. Strutton v. Young, Ky. (25 S. W. Rep. 109). Under Ark. Act of 1887, p. 193, which provides that only one suit shall be necessary to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, an action to cancel a deed of land, the consideration of which was a debt, defendant may show that plaintiff derived title by deed in fraud of his rights as a creditor. In such case the defendant's title will be confirmed, no other creditors appearing. Rudy v. Austin, 56 Ark. 73 (19 S. W. Rep. 111). In an action to set aside conveyances as fraudulent, there was, so far as the parties to the bill were concerned, no variance between an allegation that M., the defendant, owned the land in fee, and proof that the fee was in M., and another not a party to the bill, the defendent having conveyed, by deed with warranties, to the grantors of his wife, who claimed only under title derived from the husband through them. Moog et ux. v. Barrow et al., Ala. (13 So. Rep. 665). Under Colo. Gen. Stat. 1883, § 2174, the action is barred within three years after the discovery of the fraud. Arnett et al. v. Coffee, 1 Colo. App. 34 (27 Pac. Rep. 614). Ky. Gen. Stat., ch. 44, art. 2, § 2, applied. Lebus v. Wayne Ratterman Co., Ky. (21 S. W. Rep. 652). Va. Code 1887, § 2460, amended by Acts 1889-90, p. 73, construed-priority of the lien of the party setting aside the conveyance. Davis et al. v. Bonney et al., 89 Va. 755 (17 S. E. Rep. 229). N. J. Revision, p. 36; p. 446, construed and applied. North Ward Nat. Bank v. Conklin, 51 N. J. Eq. 7 (26 Atl. Rep. 678). U. S. Rev. Stat., § 5044; M. & V. Tenn. Code, §§ 5031, 5032, construed and applied. Epperson v. Robertson, 91

Tenn. 407 (19 S. W. Rep. 230).

GUARDIANS.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 374. Authority and power as affecting land. It is held that the legislature has power to confer upon guardians, the authority to convey the right of way in the lands of their wards, without requiring them to be taken by regular condemnation proceedings, and that such laws are not open to the objection that they provide for a taking of private property without compensation and without due process of law; nor to the objection that they fail to provide for notice to the minor. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Blythe et al., 69 Miss. 939 (11 So. Rep. 111; 30 Am. St. Rep. 599). A guardian's sale for a purpose not authorized by a statute is void. Hays et al.

v. Bradley, Ky. (23 S. W. Rep. 372). A purchaser is presumed to know the extent of the guardian's authority. In re Axtell, 95 Mich. 244 (54 N. W. Rep. 889). Without an order of court a guardian has no power to ratify a voidable conveyance previously executed by his insane ward. Funk, Guardian et al. v. Rentchler et al., 134 Ind. 68 (33 N. E. Rep. 364, 898). A guardian's control of the person and property of his wards is not necessarily lost by his removal or their removal from the state. Myers et al. v. McCavock et al., 39 Neb. 843 (58 N. W. Rep. 522). Where a guardian has expended his own funds in the support and education of his ward, under such circumstances that had the application been made the court would have ordered a sale of the ward's real estate for his support and maintenance, the guardian is entitled to be reimbursed out of the ward's estate and for that purpose the court may order a sale of real estate. Bellamy v. Thornton, Ala. (15 So. Rep. 831). As to the power of a guardian to render the ward's lands liable for improvements. See Bent et al. v. Barnett, 90 Ky. 600 (14 S. W. Rep. 596).