Frisbee v. Frisbee, 86 Me. 444 (29 Atl. Rep. 1115). A voluntary conveyance made in fraud of prior creditors, subsequent creditors whose means were used to pay off the prior debts will be subrogated to the rights of those of the creditors whose debts their means have been used to pay. Rudy v. Austin, 56 Ark. 73 (19 S. W. Rep. 111). It is not a misdemeanor for one to purchase at administrator's sale land set apart as the homestead of minor children, and such purchaser may be subrogated to the rights against the estate which were held by the creditors whose claims his money has paid. But the creditors to whose rights the purchaser seeks to be subrogated, are necessary parties to the suit to obtain such subrogation, Harris v. Watson, 56 Ark. 574 (20 S. W. Rep. 529). A party may purchase the homestead of a decedent at a void probate sale for the payment of debts, under the belief that he is aquiring title, and will be subrogated to the rights of the creditors to the payment of whose claims the purchase-money was appropriated. Bond v. Montgomery, 56 Ark. 563 (20 S. W. Rep. 525). Where an insolvent procures money with which to discharge a valid incumbrance upon his homestead, upon agreement that he will procure an assignment of such incumbrance to the person fnrnishing the money and instead of procuring such assignment pays off the incumbrance and procures a discharge, equity will subrogate the party furnishing the money to the rights of the holder of the incumbrance, as against both the insolvent and his wife. Heuser v. Sharman, Ia. (56 N. W. Rep. 525). Where a joint tenant is compelled, in order to protect his own interests, to pay and satisfy a mortgage, he will be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. Shaffer v. McCloskey et al., 101 Cal. 576 (36 Pac. Rep. 196). One who pays debts of a decedent is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the creditors. Kelley v. Ball et al., Ky. (19 S. W. Rep. 581); Bailey v. Bailey, S. C. (19 S. E. Rep. 669). Cases in which particular facts are considered and held to be sufficient to authorize a subrogation. Hofman v. Demple, 52 Kan. 756 (35 Pac. Rep. 803); London & N. W. American Mortg. Co. v. Tracy, Minn. (59 N. W. Rep. 1001); Reimler et al. v. Pfingsten, (28 Atl. Rep. 24).

Md.

Sec. 287. As to when the right of subrogation will be denied. The right of subrogation does not exist in favor of one who pays a debt which he has made primarily his own. Witt v. Rice, Ia. (57 N. W. Rep. 951). Nor in favor of a mere volunteer. Kleimann v. Gieselmann et al., 114 Mo. 437 (21 S. W. Rep. 796). Nor in favor of a trustee who advances money to extinguish a lien on the trust property. Norris v. Woods, 89 Va. 873 (17 S. E. Rep. 552). It is held that where a mortgage is given on land owned in common by husband and wife to secure a debt of the husband, a purchaser of the husband's interest in the land, who pays off the mortgage debt, is not entitled to be subrogated to the mortgagee's right as against the wife's interest in the land, since she waɛ only surety for her husband, and was as effectually released by the payment of the debt by the purchaser as if the husband, the principal debtor, had paid it. Zeller v. Henry et al., 157 Pa. St. 1 (27 Atl. Rep. 559). The doctrine of subrogation will not be so applied as to enable those who are negligent to secure an advantage over those who are diligent. Ft. Dodge Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Scott, 86 Ia. 431 (53 N. W. Rep. 283). Where a mortgage is given to secure several notes, a surety upon one of the notes is not entitled to subrogation until all are paid. London & N. W. American Mortg. Co. v. Fitzgerald et al., 55 Minn. 71 (56 N. W. Rep. 464). One cannot be subrogated to the rights of another having a mortgage security until he has paid the debt secured by it. Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Sprague, Minn. (60 N. W. Rep. 1101).

Sec. 288. The doctrine of relation.

The doctrine of

the relation of a conveyance back to the date of the contract of sale is not to be applied in favor of a mere trespasser. This doctrine is a fiction of law adopted by courts solely for the purpose of justice and is only applied for the security and protection of persons who stand in some privity with the party that instituted proceedings for the land and acquired the equitable claim or right to the title. Stahl v. Lynn et al., 86 Wis. 75 (56 N. W. Rep. 188).

Sec.

289. Equitable principles Miscellaneous The absence of a plain and adequate remedy at law

affords the only test of equity jurisdiction, and the application of this principle to a particular case must depend altogether upon the character of the case, as disclosed in the proceedings. It is not enough that there is a remedy at law. It must be plain and adequate, or, in other words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice, and its prompt administration, as the remedy in equity. Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, followed. Welton v. Dickson et al., 38 Neb. 767 (57 N. W. Rep. 559; 22 L. R. A. 496). A court of equity will not aid parties who are seeking to evade the policy of law as defined in a public statute, but it will leave them where it finds them. Dewhurst et al. v. Wright, 29 Fla. 223 (10 So. Rep. 682). "Where one tenant in common pays off a lien upon the joint property, he becomes entitled to contribution from his cotenants, to the extent of their respective interests; and a court of equity will, in order to secure such contribution, enforce upon the interests of all an equitable lien of the same character as that which has been removed." Lang v. Cadwell et al., 13 Mont. 458 (34 Pac. Rep. 957). One seeking the aid of a court of equity must be diligent, and 'guilty of no fraud. Jeffries et al. v. Southwest Virginia Imp. Co. et al., 88 Va. 862 (14 S. E. Rep. 661); Gorman v. McAuliffe, Ga. (20 S. E. Rep. 330); and must do equity, Pounds et al. v. Clarke et al., 70 Miss. 263 (14 So. Rep. 22).

A claimant of an equitable title to lands under unsealed instruments purporting to convey, cannot, without proof of the instruments, have equitable relief as against the holders of the legal title, although the grantor in such instruments is defaulted. Head et al. v. Thurber, 142 Ill. 430 (32 N. E. Rep. 492). The fact that a second mortgagee of land, to induce the first mortgagee to permit a third party to have a first lien, became surety of the first mortgagee's debt, does not give to other or subsequent creditors of the mortgagor the right to demand that the first mortgagee should first collect from such surety. Moses et al. v. Home B. & L. A., Ala.

(14 So. Rep. 412). Where lands are directed to be converted into money and the proceeds given as a legacy, the devise will be treated as a legacy of personal property; and when the conversion is so ordered it takes effect from the death of the testator. Snover v. Squire et al., N. J. Eq.

(24 Atl. Rep. 365). Where a wife mortgages her property to secure a debt of her husband for which the creditor holds other security, he may be required to exhaust such other security before selling her property. Grand Rapids Sav. Bank v. Denison, 92 Mich. 418 (52 N. W. Rep 733).

ESTATES.

MCILHINNY v. MclLHINNY.

(137 Ind. 411).

Shelley's case-Application of the rule. When a deed conveyed a life estate to the grantee with the remainder to "the issue of her body," but in the event of the grantee's death without "issue of her body" then with remainder to another, it is held that the word "issue" is a word of purchase and that the rule in Shelley's case does not apply; overruling Fletcher v. Fletcher, 88 Ind. 418.

MCCABE, J.

Sec. 290. Facts stated. Suit by appellee to quiet title against appellant. Overruling appellant's exceptions to the conclusions of law stated on a special finding by the court is assigned here for error. The substance of the special finding is that on the 21st day of December, 1881, one William Merrill, the father of appellee, was the owner in fee simple and in possession of the real estate described in the complaint, which was 65 acres of land. That on said day, while he was such owner, he and his wife executed to his daughter, Annie Merrill, then aged 14 years, a deed for said real estate, reading as follows: "This identure witnesseth that we, William Merrill and Annie Merrill, his wife, of Fayette county, in the state of Indiana, convey and warrant to Annie Merrill, Junior, of Fayette county, Indiana, for and during her life, with remainder over to the issue of her body born alive, then with remainder over to John Merrill for and in consideration of the sum of eight thousand dollars as an advancement made to the said Annie Merrill, Junior, by the said William Merrill in his

estate, the following real estate in Fayette county, in the state of Indiana, to wit (then follows a description of the land). In witness whereof the said William Merrill and Annie Merrill, his wife, have hereunto set their hands and seals this 21st day of December, A. D. 1881. William Merrill. Annie MerThat the execution of said deed was duly acknowledged before the proper officer on the same day by the grantors. That the plaintiff, Anna C. McIlhinny, is the same person named in said deed as Annie Merrill, Jr. That at the time of said deed the plaintiff was an unmarried daughter of said William Merrill, and did not have born to her any children until the 27th day of July, 1890. On that day Jennie L. McIlhinny was born to the plaintiff, she being the plaintiff's first and only child, and is now living. That after the execution of the deed the appellee took possession of the premises conveyed. That the defendant John Merrill is the John Merrill mentioned in the deed. That John Payne is now, and was before the beginning of the suit, the legal and qualified guardian of said Jennie L. McIlhinny. That the appellee has not parted with the title to said real estate conveyed to her by said deed, but is still the owner of whatever title said deed conveyed to her. That John Merrill and John Payne, appellant's guardian, both claimed, prior to bringing the suit, that the appellee was not the owner in fee simple, and that they had some interest in the land. That said claim casts a cloud upon the title of appellee in fee simple. The conclusions of law are "that appellee, Annie C. McIlhinny, was at the beginning of the suit, and is now, the owner in fee simple of the real estate described in the complaint, setting out the description by metes and bounds; and that said John Merrill and Jennie L. McIlhinny have no interest in said real estate."

Sec. 291. The rule in Shelley's case. It is contended by the appellee's counsel that the rule in Shelley's Case applies to the deed, and that by that rule a title in fee. simple vested in the first taker by virtue of the deed. The appellant's counsel contend that the rule in Shelley's Case does not not apply, and, if that rule does not apply, the plainly. expressed intention of the grantor was to vest a life estate in the appellee, with remainder over in fee to the issue of her