had no confidence in the government of Lord Amherst. This statement, he must take leave to say, was altogether without foundation. As to the authority of letters from India, on which the honourable member seemed to place so much reliance, he would observe, that he also had seen many letters from that country, from persons equally in telligent and respectable as those to whom the honourable member had alluded, and they gave a very different account of the state of feeling in India from that which the honourable gentle. man had described.

Sir C. Forbes. With respect to the melancholy affair at Barrackpore, it should be stated, in justice to Lord Amherst, that he was not in any degree implicated in that occurrence.

Mr W. Wynn could not see on what ground it should ever have been asserted that Lord Amherst was implicated in the affair of Barrackpore.

Mr Hume defended the authenticity of the information contained in the letters to which he had referred, and observed that many of them came from parties as respectable as any from whom the right honourable gentleman received his accounts from India. As to the

affair at Barrackpore, the conduct of government was blameable, in neglecting to give any answer to the applications made to them on the part of the troops which had refused to march. He understood that a communication was made on their part full ten days before the melancholy affair in which the transaction ended, and that it was suffered to lie in the office without any answer being given to it. He understood that the then Adjutant-General was now in London, and the truth of the circumstance to which he alluded might be easily ascertained.

Mr Freemantle observed, that the honourable member was greatly misled, if he believed that no communication was made to the refractory troops for ten days before it was found ne cessary to resort to force. The very reverse was the fact; for, from the time when they first objected to march, up to the period when the fatal termination of the affair occurred, communications were, he might say, hourly made to them from government, and no pacific effort was left untried.

The address was then brought up, and agreed to without a division.

The

cause; and, if no remedy could be found, in endeavouring to discover a preventative. There were two classes of evils arising from the state of the currency. The first was its excess, which produced the exportation of the precious metals, by affecting prices and the exchanges. Another class of evil was the insecurity with which it visited the lower orders of the community, by depriving them of the value of their labour and the profits of their industry. The latter was by far the most serious grievance of the two. When he recollected the prerogatives of the crown, none appeared to him more valuable than that of coining money, which, interposed as a shield between ignorance and fraud. In country towns, local paper was usually the only currency in which the poor were paid for their labour. If they refused to receive the paper in payment, they must go without the reward of their labour. state of the currency, as connected with the issue of small notes, was, therefore, a subject which called for serious attention. He believed there was no person, but must now be of opinion that the excessive issue of small notes had had the effect of driving the precious metals out of the country, as well as of raising prices generally, during the last two years. This observation applied more particularly to the notes of country bankers. The effect produced by an excessive issue of small notes had been most correctly described in a pamphlet by Mr Tooke, who justly stated the operation of an overissue to be this-the first effect was to create an artificial abundance of capital; the accumulation of capital caused a reduction in the rate of interest; by the reduction in the rate of interest facilities were afforded for speculation; speculation produced a rise in prices; the alteration in prices checked the progress of mercantile exports, and so caused the precious metals to be sent

out of the country. With respect to the consequences of suppressing the issue of small notes, he entertained no apprehension whatever. It was, he knew, the opinion of many, that a paper currency was a species of accommodation, of which the country in its present situation, and with its existing amount of taxation, stood in need. After the most attentive consideration, he could not bring his mind to believe, that it was at all advantageous to enable a person to do that without capital which should only be done with capital. It remained to be considered whether the average rate of prices might not be as great under a metallic currency. Suppose a commodity, which, under a paper currency, sold at one time for L.100, and at another for L.50, should, under a metallic currency, sell at two different periods for L.90 and L.60; the average was the same, and it was certainly more advan➡ tageous to the interests of the community that a steady scale of prices exist, than that a constant fluctuation should take place, occasioned by a system of paper issues. Some persons, he knew, held the opinion that this most opulent country could not procure such a share of the precious metals as would enable her to carry on her commercial transactions. He knew that such an opinion was contrary to fact. It was proved by experience, that when any occasion for it existed, a flow of gold into this country never failed to take place. On one occasion the Bank was able, in the course of two years, to increase a treasure of less than three millions of gold to fourteen millions. Whilst he entertained the opinion which he had expressed, of the propriety of checking the issue of the small notes of country banks, he was equally desirous to see the Bank of England deprived of the power of circulating notes of the same kind. The Bank deserved great credit forthe promptitude with which they en

deavoured to arrest the effects of the late panic; but he would add, that the Bank, in the first instance, so far from having arrested the progress of the late evils, had increased them by the extent of its issues. He believed it would appear, that in 1825, but more particularly in 1824, whilst the country bank paper was being increased, considerable additions were made to the issues of paper and discounts of the Bank of England. This was a time when an efficacious check upon the paper circulation might have been administered by the Bank. During the progress of that inquiry, the result of which was known by the name of the bullion report, one of the highest persons connected with the Bank, when asked what he considered to be the criterion of an excess in the issue of paper currency, replied, "A state of trade in which money is hawked about everywhere, and in which many persons are induced to undertake uncertain and imprudent speculations." He would ask their Lordships whether, independently of the exportation of the precious metals, which was actually taking place in 1824, to South America, a more accurate description could be given of the state of trade and speculation in England at that period than was to be found in the words which he had just quoted? Money was hawked about everywhere, and the most imprudent speculations were going on. He was inclined to hope much from the abandonment of part of the Bank privileges. He ventured to suggest that it would be expedient to provide, that wherever country bank notes should be issued, there they should be made payable. There were many persons who approved of the artificial paper currency, because they considered that it enabled them to fulfil those obligations which otherwise they could not do. He was unwilling to admit the possibility of the country being incapable of fulfilling all its en

"I. An account of the number of Bank of England notes in circulation on the 15th of Feb., the 15th of May, the 15th of Aug., and the 15th of Nov., in each year, from 1819 to 1825, distinguishing the notes for L.5 and under; and a like account of notes of the Banks of Scotland and Ireland.

"2. An account of all the notes issued by country bankers in England, Scotland, and Ireland, from 1819, up to the latest period at which the returns could be made, distinguishing the amount of the notes, and the period at which they were issued.

"3. An account of the number of bankrupts in England, Scotland, and Ireland, from 1819 to the latest period at which the return could be made, distinguishing those who were bankers.

"4. Copies of all charters granted to banking establishments during the same period."

The Earl of Liverpool did not rise for the purpose of opposing the motion, nor did he feel it necessary to trouble their Lordships with more than a few words on the present occasion; first, because it would be his duty at a very early period to submit to the consideration of the House certain measures, which would afford him an opportunity of stating his opinions with respect to the present posture of affairs; and, secondly, because there was hardly a sentence which the noble marquis had uttered, from beginning to end, with which he was not disposed to agree.

The Earl of Caernarvon approved of the plan of extending the number of partners in banking establishments, as

a measure calculated to give them increased confidence throughout the country; and agreed also in the propriety of each of the partners in such establishments being made liable in the whole amount of his property for the concerns of the bank. Accompanied with these measures, he would gladly see the country return to silver as the standard of the currency, such as silver was at the old mint price. As to the proposed measure of withdrawing the one and two-pound notes, that was, in his opinion, by no means calculated to remove present evils. Such a measure would operate injuriously to the farmer, and to the humble class of agriculturists and dealers in the country, who principally carried on their business by means of the one and two-pound notes. Besides, great injury would be done generally to the community, by withdrawing so large a sum as six or seven millions-the amount of these small notes-from the circulation of the country, and that at a time, when it was desirable to give it an extension. That the withdrawing the one and twopound notes, and the substitution of a metallic currency, would not go to the root of the evil, appeared, not from his statement merely, but from the letter of the First Lord of the Treasury, and his colleague the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to the Bank Directors. It was there stated, that "though a recurrence to a gold circulation in the country, for the reasons already stated, might be productive of some good, it would by no means go to the root of the evil." The letter proceeded thus:-"We have abundant proof of the truth of this position, in the events which took place in the spring of 1793, when a convulsion occurred in the money transactions and circulation of the country, more extensive than that which we have recently experienced. At that period nearly a hundred country banks

were obliged to stop payment, and Parliament was induced to grant an issue of Exchequer Bills to relieve the distress. Yet, in the year 1793, there were no one or two-pound notes in circulation in England, either by country banks or by the Bank of England." In Scotland, an approved system of banking had been brought to the test of experience. This was admitted in the letter of the noble earl (Lord Liverpool). He would wish to see banking establishments of equal solidity in this country; at all events, he hoped the House would come to no resolu tion without the fullest information, With a view of supplying that information, he moved, "That there be laid before the House an account of all the notes issued by the Bank of England and the country banks since 1790." The motion of his noble friend (Lord Lansdown) went only so far back as 1819, but he was desirous of reverting to an earlier period, for the purpose of considering the issues of that period, and particularly of 1793, 1795, and 1797, and of comparing them with those of the present time when similar distresses prevailed.

These motions were then agreed to.

In the House of Commons, same day, Mr Hume moved for an account of the number of country banks issuing notes, which had become bankrupt in England since January 1816; stating the places at which the business had been carried on, the number of partners in each establishment, the amount of debts proved against each establishment, and the dividends paid. At the suggestion of Mr Pascoe Grenfell, the account called for was extended to Scotland.

Mr Maberly thought the motion altogether objectionable, as an interference with the affairs of individuals.

Mr John Smith said, he was disposed