with the plaintiff. The British Parliament has laid down the limits within which the Local Legislatures have authority to act, and beyond these limits they cannot go. If they legislate beyond their powers, their enactments are no more binding than the rules and regulations of any other unauthorized body. The simple sanction of the Governor-General could not give validity to an act beyond the powers of the Local Legislature.

MONK, J.

I agree with my colleagues the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Drummond in this case.

At the time of the argument, I was inclined to the opinion expressed by Judges Caron and Badgley, but upon careful condideration, I think we have the right, and that in fact, it is our duty, to disregard a law of the local Parliament if it be in conflict with the Imperial Act which confers a Constitution upon the Dominion. It is satisfactory to me to know that my brother Caron is also of that opinion, though he differs from the Court upon the ground that there is no conflict in this case. Several learned Judges of the Dominion and many text-writers, whose decisions and authority are applicable to this case, uphold that view, and I therefore readily yield to what appears to be the more approved doctrine.

It is said that our decision will lead to consequences of the gravest character. If this be so, the fault is not ours; we have the Imperial Act, which undoubtedly we are bound to obey and to enforce. If we find a local law in conflict with its provisions, we have no more right to give that effect, than we should a Byelaw of the Corporation contrary to a local law.

But assuming this doctrine as to the powers and duties of this Court to be sound, does this Act transgress the Dominion Act? Does then exist the conflict contended for by the Respondent?

It is argued and with considerable force, I think, that only general legislation on Insolvency was reserved to the Dominion or Federal Parliament and that this Act not possessing that character, it does not come within the prohibition. The law, however, does not, expressly or by clear implication, make that distinction, and, in that case, this Court would not probably feel justified in doing so. The local Act says in plain English that the Union St. Jacques, being Insolvent, unable to meet its liabilities and engagements and not being able to induce the Res

pondent and other ladies to accept a composition, the power of the local Parliament is invoked to legalize a reduction of the claims, in other words, to compel the interested parties to accept a forced composition. All this is said and enacted, in less precise, in milder words, yet, this is a concise statement of the case. The whole act means insolvency and forced composition; nothing more and nothing less.

If this be true, then the letter of the Imperial Act is plainly violated and, although I have some doubts as to whether that statute meant to prohibit the local Parliament from legislating on Insolvency in matters of the nature brought before us, yet there is a judgment of the Court below, and my doubts are not strong enough to induce me to disturb it more especially under the circumstances of this case.

WILLS AND INTESTACY.

Our correspondent at St. John, N.B., has sent us the following answer to the Hon. J. H. Gray's last article on this subject.

ST. JOHN, 18th July, 1872.

I have just seen the April number of La Revue Critique, containing Mr. Gray's answer to my observations upon his article on "Wills and Intestacy," and I take the earliest opportunity of stating that I think his reference to the Provincial Act, 21 Vict., c. 26, which he quotes on page 152, does not in any way support his position.

I was quite aware of that Act when I wrote my communication, but did not refer to it, because I never supposed that it could be contended that the effect of it was to make any other change in the law of inheritance than to deprive the heir-at-law of the double portion of the real estate, which, till then, he had been entitled to, leaving the other branch of the law, namely, the distribution among the next of kin, where the intestate left no children, just at it was under the Act 26, Geo. 3, c. 3.

Mr. Gray seems to rely upon the omission of the words "heirat-law" in the Act 21, Vict. c. 26, as supporting his view; but I cannot see any force in that argument, because now, there is no "heir at law" in the sense in which that term was previously used, the preference given to the eldest son by the common law, and by one Act 26, Geo. 3, in a limited degree, having been

abolished by the Act 21 Vict., c. 26, which divides the real estate among all the children equally, any reference then to the heir at law in this Act, would be, to say the least, meaningless.

As a judicial construction had been given to the words "next of kindred," when applied to the distribution of real estate, by the case of Doe v. Crane, decided in 1846, it must be presumed that when in the year 1858, the Legislature used the same words in the Act 21 Vict., c. 26, in reference to the same subject matters, they intended them to have the same meaning which had already been judicially assigned to them, and that if they had intended to alter that interpretation, and to give to those words the meaning contended for by Mr. Gray, they would certainly have used some language to shew that such was their intention. In the absence of the slightest indication of such an intended change, the only construction that can properly be given to the. Act 21 Vict., c. 26, is, that the Legislature only intended to alter so much of the previous law, as gave the heir-at-law a double portion of the real estate, and that they did not intend to make, and have not made any change in the other part of the Act, relating to the next of kin, and which, consequently, remains as it was established by the case of Doe v. Crane.

The idea put forward by Mr. Gray as to the construction of this Act, is I believe, a novelty in this Province, unheard of hitherto, by either the Bench or the Bar, and I venture to affirm that his construction cannot possibly be sustained.

LE CONSEIL PRIVÉ.

Le Comité judiciaire du Conseil Privé est un tribunal devant lequel un nombre assez considérable de nos concitoyens vont demander justice et sur la composition et les habitudes duquel il règne en général d'assez vagues notions.

Voici ce qu'en disait récemment le London Times :

THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE.

The evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the working of the appellate jurisdiction exercised by that House and by the Privy Council, has recently been issued. Mr. Henry Reeve, the Registrar of the Privy Council, gave an account of the constitution and practice of the Judicial committee. It appears that the Lord President of the Council, a political functionary, has to settle (with the aid of information furnished by the Registrar) what members of the Judicial Committee shall be summoned to sit in any case that is coming on. The present Lord President, the Marquis of Ripon, intimated to the Registrar that in "purely legal cases" the Lord Chancellor is the fittest person to direct what members it is proper to summon, and, consequently, Mr. Reeve has communicated more with the Lord Chancellor and less with the Lord President than he had been in the habit of doing before. But he observes that many Lord Presidents have taken a very active part, and themselves decided on the composition of the Committee to sit upon a particular case. He mentions that the recent appointment of paid members has certainly not superseded the other members. In the Gorham case the whole of the Judicial Committee were summoned. The Lord President thought the Bennett case a matter of considerable public interest to the Church; the Registrrar mentioned to him the course pursued in the Gorham case, and again a step was taken which the Registrar describes as "not very common ;" a letter was written to every member of the Judicial Committee asking whether he would attend. In reference to intervening ecclesiastical causes, the Westerton case, the Purchas case, the Voysey case, and the case connected with Essays and Reviews, the Registrar says, "We summoned a very considerable number of the members; in all those cases I took precise directions either from the Lord President or the Lord Chancellor." The Marquis of Salisbury suggested that the practice of summoning the Court is "characterized by a certain amount of vagueness." The Lord President reminded the Registrar that no reference was made to him in the Purchas case; and the Registrar answered that in that case he took the directions of the Lord Chancellor. Mr. Recve stated

further in answer to questions put to him, that it happened onceviz., in the Purchas case, that a moiety of the Court consisted of privy councillors not being lawyers. The case was heard by only four members, and two of them were prelates. Lord Westbury, in the course of the examination of Mr. Reeve, inquired whether what had occurred was not this:-That there having been some complaint or some murmur, with regard to summoning individual Judges, the conclusion arrived at in the Bennett case was that, instead of picking out Judges, it would be better to send a general circular to all the mempers of the Judicial Committee; and the Registrar answered that it was so. It has never been settled whether a member of the Judicial Committee not summoned or invited may attend. Another question arose-In the Orders made in 1627, "to be observed in assemblies of the Council," it is directed that a decision is to be "by the most voices,” but that “no publication is afterwards to be made by any man how the particular voices and opinions went." The Star Chamber was then exercising jurisdiction; but it is considered that the practice and traditions of the Privy Council have not been affected by the abolition of the powers exercised by the Star Chamber, which was a Committee of the Privy Council. The rule was observed for two centuries, and was departed from in the Gorham case. The practise has always been that when the Judicial Committee have deliberated in private, some member is asked to draw up the judgment of the Committee, or of the majority; that document is generally sent to the Registrar of the Council, printed confidentially at the Cabinet Press, and circulated among the members of the Committee who heard the case. These make notes upon it, and suggest any alteration they think desirable, until at last it is got into a form which embodies the opinion of their Lordships or of the majority of them. It purports to be the opinion of "the Committee," and no mention is made of differences of opinion. The Registrar considers that "the Crown would be extremely embarrassed if, on applying to a Committee of its Privy Council for advice, It were told that three members of the Committee were of one opinion and two of another; the Crown requires a decisive opinion upon which to act." Lord Chelmsford came to the help of the witness by observing, in the form of putting a question, that the Crown does not necessarily understand that the recommendation is the unanimous opinion of the Committee. Lord Westbury, in another question, made the not unreasonable suggestion that it seems right that the truth should be stated to the Crown. The public and the profession also might as well be allowed to have the means of weighing the value of the decision. It appears, however, that shortly after the creation of the Judicial Committee this question of the publication or concealment of votes arose; the first time there was a difference of opinion, some of their Lordships were anxious to express their opinions. The Court consisted at that time of Lord Brougham, Mr. Baron Parke, and other Judges. The ancient