Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in JapanThe role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions—asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of their conscience and bound only by this Constitution and its laws." Consistent with this requirement, Japanese courts have long enjoyed a reputation for vigilant independence—an idea challenged only occasionally, and most often anecdotally. But in this book, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen use the latest statistical techniques to examine whether that reputation always holds up to scrutiny—whether, and to what extent, the careers of lower court judges can be manipulated to political advantage. On the basis of careful econometric analysis of career data for hundreds of judges, Ramseyer and Rasmusen find that Japanese politics do influence judicial careers, discreetly and indirectly: judges who decide politically charged cases in ways favored by the ruling party enjoy better careers after their decisions than might otherwise be expected, while dissenting judges are more likely to find their careers hampered by assignments to less desirable positions. Ramseyer and Rasmusen's sophisticated yet accessible analysis has much to offer anyone interested in either judicial independence or the application of econometric techniques in the social sciences. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 42
Page 3
... lower cost . Because preventing corruption is costly , the level of judicial corruption in private disputes will turn on the costs and benefits of monitoring judges and on the time horizons of the people involved . The more cheaply ...
... lower cost . Because preventing corruption is costly , the level of judicial corruption in private disputes will turn on the costs and benefits of monitoring judges and on the time horizons of the people involved . The more cheaply ...
Page 5
... lower,level bureaucrats. They do jeopardize them by getting the law wrong. In chapter 6, we examine criminal cases. In Japan, criminal defendants face extraordinarily high conviction rates. We ask whether this might reflect skewed ...
... lower,level bureaucrats. They do jeopardize them by getting the law wrong. In chapter 6, we examine criminal cases. In Japan, criminal defendants face extraordinarily high conviction rates. We ask whether this might reflect skewed ...
Page 7
... from other judges, as we detail in subsection G. Judges in the lower courts face mandatory retirement at age. 1. Saibansho ho. Law No. 59 of 1947. 2. For details on this educational system, see Ramseyer and 7 1 The Setting.
... from other judges, as we detail in subsection G. Judges in the lower courts face mandatory retirement at age. 1. Saibansho ho. Law No. 59 of 1947. 2. For details on this educational system, see Ramseyer and 7 1 The Setting.
Page 8
... lower courts face mandatory retirement at age sixty,five (Courts Act, § 50). Formally, they serve a series of ten,year terms (Courts Act, § 40). In practice, they work continuously. Only twice since World War II has the Cabinet formally ...
... lower courts face mandatory retirement at age sixty,five (Courts Act, § 50). Formally, they serve a series of ten,year terms (Courts Act, § 40). In practice, they work continuously. Only twice since World War II has the Cabinet formally ...
Page 9
... lower courts (Courts Act, § 40). Typically, it delegates that power to the Supreme Court Secretariat, the administrative office of the courts. The Secretariat in turn hires almost all LRTI graduates who apply to be a judge. From time to ...
... lower courts (Courts Act, § 40). Typically, it delegates that power to the Supreme Court Secretariat, the administrative office of the courts. The Secretariat in turn hires almost all LRTI graduates who apply to be a judge. From time to ...
Contents
1 | |
7 | |
Methodology and Communist Judges | 26 |
AntiGovernment Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes | 48 |
Military Malapportionment Injunctions and Constitutional Law | 62 |
Taxpayers against the Government | 82 |
Suspects against the Government | 96 |
7 Toward a PartyAlternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence | 122 |
8 Conclusions | 169 |
Appendixes | 173 |
References | 187 |
Index | 197 |
Other editions - View all
Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan J. Mark Ramseyer,Eric B. Rasmusen No preview available - 2003 |
Common terms and phrases
1st_Tokyo 90 percent confidence acquitted administrative American anti-government opinions appointment apportionment scheme assignments bias branch offices budget bureaucrats Cabinet chapter coefficients Constitution control variables conviction rate correlated crime criminal decade decide defendants Dependent Variable disputes elected electoral Elite College federal Flunks Fukushima High Court imperial Japan incentives independent courts intervene issues Japan Japanese judges Japanese politicians judge’s judicial careers judicial independence judiciary Justice Kenseikai Kyoto LDP leaders leftist less litigation lower-court LRTI marginal effects McCubbins median minister Opinions/Yr ordered probit Osaka panel party percent confidence level plea bargains politicians positive Post Bad Jobs Post Good Jobs predicted PriorGoodJobs prosecute prosecutors Ramseyer and Rosenbluth regression reversed Rosenbluth 1997 ruling sample Secretariat Seniority sokatsu statistically significant Supreme Court t-statistics theory tobit Tokyo District Court trial two-tailed test U.S. Constitution unconstitutional United University of Tokyo values voters YJL members ZSKS
Popular passages
Page 178 - The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs.
Page 70 - Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
Page 178 - Judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary action against judges shall be administered by any executive organ or agency. ARTICLE 79 The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet. The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed...
References to this book
Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile Lisa Hilbink Limited preview - 2007 |
The Fable of the Keiretsu: Urban Legends of the Japanese Economy Yoshiro Miwa,J. Mark Ramseyer Limited preview - 2010 |