Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in JapanThe role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions—asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of their conscience and bound only by this Constitution and its laws." Consistent with this requirement, Japanese courts have long enjoyed a reputation for vigilant independence—an idea challenged only occasionally, and most often anecdotally. But in this book, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen use the latest statistical techniques to examine whether that reputation always holds up to scrutiny—whether, and to what extent, the careers of lower court judges can be manipulated to political advantage. On the basis of careful econometric analysis of career data for hundreds of judges, Ramseyer and Rasmusen find that Japanese politics do influence judicial careers, discreetly and indirectly: judges who decide politically charged cases in ways favored by the ruling party enjoy better careers after their decisions than might otherwise be expected, while dissenting judges are more likely to find their careers hampered by assignments to less desirable positions. Ramseyer and Rasmusen's sophisticated yet accessible analysis has much to offer anyone interested in either judicial independence or the application of econometric techniques in the social sciences. |
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Page 4
... judiciary may simply be the best at concealing political pressure. Surprisingly, this appears not to be well understood, and any attempt to rely on data compiled by others on other countries risks concluding that the most politicized ...
... judiciary may simply be the best at concealing political pressure. Surprisingly, this appears not to be well understood, and any attempt to rely on data compiled by others on other countries risks concluding that the most politicized ...
Page 7
... Judiciary A. Court Structure Japan maintains one national court system and no prefectural (i.e.. state) courts. It has eight High Courts and a widely dispersed array of District and Family Courts (Courts Act, §§2, 15-52; Family Courts ...
... Judiciary A. Court Structure Japan maintains one national court system and no prefectural (i.e.. state) courts. It has eight High Courts and a widely dispersed array of District and Family Courts (Courts Act, §§2, 15-52; Family Courts ...
Page 10
... judiciary, the Secretariat names him to a specific court for two or three years. At the end of that term, it moves him to another. Some cities (such as Tokyo) are more desirable than others (see subsection 3 below), just as some duties ...
... judiciary, the Secretariat names him to a specific court for two or three years. At the end of that term, it moves him to another. Some cities (such as Tokyo) are more desirable than others (see subsection 3 below), just as some duties ...
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Contents
1 | |
7 | |
Methodology and Communist Judges | 26 |
AntiGovernment Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes | 48 |
Military Malapportionment Injunctions and Constitutional Law | 62 |
Taxpayers against the Government | 82 |
Suspects against the Government | 96 |
7 Toward a PartyAlternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence | 122 |
8 Conclusions | 169 |
Appendixes | 173 |
References | 187 |
Index | 197 |
Other editions - View all
Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan J. Mark Ramseyer,Eric B. Rasmusen No preview available - 2003 |
Common terms and phrases
acquitted administrative American appeal appointment assignments average branch offices budget bureaucrats Cabinet career chapter chief coefficients compared Constitution conviction conviction rate correlated cost crime criminal decade decide decisions defendants District effect effort elections electoral estimates example expect explain face find first Flunks followed give Given held High Court higher important incentives increase independent issue Japan Japanese Jobs judge’s judges judicial judiciary Justice keep later least less lower majority marginal matter Mean measure minister Note observers officials opinions otherwise party percent political politicians positively posting predicted probability promotions prosecute prosecutors published punishment Ramseyer reason received regression result reversed ruling sample Second Secretariat Seniority significant sokatsu spend statistically success suggest Supreme Court term theory Tokyo trial United University values variables voters
Popular passages
Page 178 - The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs.
Page 70 - Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
Page 178 - Judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary action against judges shall be administered by any executive organ or agency. ARTICLE 79 The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet. The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed...
References to this book
Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile Lisa Hilbink Limited preview - 2007 |
The Fable of the Keiretsu: Urban Legends of the Japanese Economy Yoshiro Miwa,J. Mark Ramseyer Limited preview - 2010 |