they meant to proceed respecting the bill before the House? Counsel were then ordered to be called in. When they had taken their stations in the places at the bar assigned them, The Lord-Chancellor said, I wish the counsel to state in what manner they mean to proceed in their case now before the House. Mr. Brougham.-My Lord, we wish, on the part of her Majesty, to proceed forthwith. The Lord-Chancellor. Do you mean, Mr. Brougham, by saying that you wish to proceed forthwith, to state to` the House that you are now ready to open your case, and then to proceed directly, by following it up with your evidence? or do you mean merely to say, that you wish now to open your case, and when you have done that, to pray further time before you produce your evidence? It is my duty to require from you this expla nation. Mr. Brougham.-What I mean, my lords, to say, is this that I am now ready to enter upon her Majesty's defence; and then, if I shall be so advised, to call evidence in support of that defence. If, however, I shall also be advised to call witnesses not now in the country, in such a case, perhaps, it will be necessary for me to entreat the indulgence of your lordships, to enable me to bring before you that evidence after I shall have opened her Majesty's case, and begun with the evidence. in support of it. On the motion of the Earl of Lauderdale, counsel were ordered to withdraw. His lordship then observed, that it was obvious, after the answer just given by her Majesty's Attorney-General, that it was necessary that he should have a longer time allowed to bring over all his witnesses. He thought, however, the answer given by the counsel to the question put by the noble and learned lord on the woolsack was by no means as explicit as it ought to be; and he therefore trusted that the counsel would be called upon to give a more definite answer. Lord Erskine was of opinion that the learned counsel ought now to be permitted to proceed with his case in defence of her Majesty the Queen, without being called upon to determine whether he would stop, or where he would stop, in the evidence he meant to offer to their lordships. Hought not to be now called upon to mis any answer to such a question as it was the wish of his noble friend to put. When he (Lord Erskine) practised at the bar, he should have complained of any question which went to influence his determination in the defence of his client until he had entered upon and proceeded with that defence. The learned counsel ought to be at liberty to begin his defence just as he pleased, and afterwards either to call witnesses, or not to call them, as suited best his own sense of the trust reposed in him. In all the courts of law-and he begged to assure their lordships that it was his anxious wish, in this case, to follow the analogy of their practice, as far as it could be applied to so anomalous a case as the present—in the courts of law the line of proceeding was this:-The case was set down for a hearing when its turn came, the counsel for the case were called upon to proceed forthwith they must do so, or show ample cause why they could not, or they must render the further proceeding unnecessary, by withdrawing the record. When the counsel once began their case, it was too late to stop it : their course was then onward, and the defence must follow in consecutive and immediate order. If in the course of these proceedings, in the order he had mentioned, any apparent injustice had been committed, which the presence of a particular witness, who could not then have been forthcoming, would have prevented, then the law wisely provided a remedy, in the shape of an application for a new trial. In the courts the scales of justice were held equally poized between both parties in the cause; the practice in them was calculated to work without partiality or prejudice; for the law of England was a law of humanity and mercy. He would just remind their lordships how the case of her Majesty the Queen was now placed by the proceedings had before their lordships. The bill had gone forth to the world, the preamble of which contained the charge against her Majesty. The case in support of that bill had been heard: and he humbly submitted, that if their lordships meant to have called on the counsel for the defence to proceed straight forward through the whole of their evidence, they ought to have, in the first instance, furnished them with the means of meeting the charge, by giving them, if not a list of the witnesses, at least a specification of the times and places to which the accusation referred. Had their lordships given this information, by acceding to the motion which he had on a former occasion submitted to them, and then postponing the commencement of the case until proper time were allowed for all parties to be prepared, there would have been no ground for claiming any delay between the evidence for the prosecution and that for the defence. But their lordships had thought proper to reject his motion, and they had by so doing deprived the accused of the opportunity of knowing any thing like the particular line of defence which it might be necessary for her to adopt, until the whole of the case for the bill had been gone through. He could not, under these circumstances, see how they could call upon her Majesty's Attorney-General to state the precise course which it was his intention to take in shaping the defence. To call upon him now to say whether he was ready to go through his whole defence would be quite peremptory, considering that their lordships had already admitted that delay would be necessary to enable the counsel fully to cross-examine the witnesses in favour of the bill. It was obvious, he thought, that they had as yet hardly time to acquire that information respecting the witnesses which could be supposed to qualify them properly for a full cross-examination. At all events the question of adjournment was not now before their lordships, and they were not called upon to anticipate it. For that reason they ought not to interpose and prevent the counsel from entering upon their defence, now when the season has arrived for his meeting the charge. The Attorney-General lately made an application to their lordships for delay, which he afterwards withdrew; and the noble and learned lord on the woolsack subsequently admitted the propriety of that application, and added that the Attorney-General had a right to make it. Why then say to the Queen's Attorney-General, "You must adjourn now, or not at all?" Why anticipate that he may make an application for delay, which may not, at the time he shall make it, be proved to be right, to be reasonable and proper? He conjured the House just to reflect for a moment at its present situation. The case for the bill was closed: the counsel against it were called upon for their defence; they replied they were ready to proceed with it forthwith. Yet, notwithstanding their undoubted right to meet the case so adduced, some of their lordships appeared to think that the case had bet ter be now adjourned until the counsel could say they were prepared with the whole of their evidence. A delay under such circumstances would, he thought, be most unfavourable to one of the parties. The evidence in support of the bill had gone forth up to the present state; it had gone forth not only to the public of this, but of every other country. To say that such a publication of the evidence was calculated to make no impression was to utter that which could not be the fact; indeed, the noble earl opposite (the Earl of Liverpool) had, much to his honour, admitted that it was calculated to make such an impression, but that there was no avoiding it; though he added, that he had no doubt their lordships, who were the judges in the case, would suffer no impression to be made upon them until they had heard the whole of the case on both sides. But how was it possible for them to avoid the influence of this first impression, which the statement of one part of the case was necessarily calculated to produce? He hoped no man would consider him either blasphemous or irreve rent when he said that God could not make them forbear feeling that which he had in his wisdom already ordained, and which it was the constitution of human nature to feel, according to the influence of circumstances. It was therefore impossible for their lordships, with the attributes which belonged to human minds, to look over the minutes of these proceedings, without feeling that impression which they were calculated to excite. If they intended to adjourn without hearing any statement from her Majesty's counsel, they were bound to have adjourned when the last evidence for the Crown closed; there they should have stopped, if such had been their intention, and not permitted the SolicitorGeneral to have summed up. What was that summing up? It was what it ought to be, standing as the Solicitor-General was placed. He (Lord Erskine) had left his seat, and gone into one of the galleries for the greater convenience of hearing it. The learned solicitor said, in his summing up, not only that the evidence, as it stood, made out a clear case against her Majesty, and in support of the whole crime set forth in the preamble of the bill; but he felt it his duty to add, that he could not by any possibility see or imagine how, from the nature of the evidence, the facts stated by the witnesses could in any manner be combatted. He had repeated over and over again, that it was impossible the facts could be rebutted, that no such consequence could arise from any evidence which could be produced for the defence. The learned Solicitor-General, in making these comments upon the case he was bound to support, had done no more than his duty: but if their lordships, after hearing that speech, decided upon adjourning without hearing any observations from the counsel against the bill, then they would, during the time of their adjournment, be it for two or three months, be exposed, not alone to the im pression of the evidence for the bill, but also of the speech made in support of it in the summing up of the evidence. He begged leave just to put a case. Sup pose the case of a prosecution bad terminated at a late bour in the day, and that the counsel for the prosecution applied to the judge to adjourn until the following day, when it would be more convenient to begin with hearing the defence suppose, then, the counsel for the defence should say, "No, I oppose the adjournment; I desire to have my right of answering this case before the jury shall go home under the influence of the prosecutor's statement: seek now to be heard to take off that impression, which I can do." Did their lordships think any learned judge upon the bench would tell that counsel who demanded to be heard, that he must desist from removing the impression created by the counsel for the prosecution until the following morning? No judge would say so; if he did, he would violate his duty. Besides, he desired to know on what ground the question of adjournment was brought at all under their lordships' conderation at the present moment. No adjournment was now called for, and no decision upon it was now necessary, Whenever that subject came before them, their lordships could consider the grounds upon which it was made, and dispose of it as their sense of justice dictated. An adjournment now would, it was said, be favourable to the Queen, as it would enable her Majesty fully to meet the evidence against her: now, on the contrary, he thought it would be rather unfavourable to her, after the summing up had been permitted. He conjured the House to suffer the Queen's Attorney-General to proceed he had stated that he was prepared with testimony which would overthrow the impression which the statement of counsel for the bill was calculated to produce. Let, then, "the bane and antidote" go forth both |