It must be assumed that the learned counsel in the present case has carefully examined the decisions, and cited us to all there are upon the subject. Probably the reason that there are no more decisions upon the precise question is that cases have seldom arisen involving it. The courts of England hold that the shareholder is not liable where he has made an out and out transfer, and do not consider the motive; holding, however, that where the transfer is merely colorable, or to a mere dummy, the shareholder retains such an interest as makes him liable. The courts of this country have, as already shown, gone further, and hold the transferrer liable when they find an intent to escape the statutory liability. We see no reason why the rule should be carried further. To hold otherwise would be to hold the stockholder liable where he has made a bona fide gift of the same for a good consideration, and to continue his liability for months, and even years, afterwards, if evidence can be produced that at the time the bank was embarrassed. The law contains no language to justify an implication that it was intended to impose this double liability upon bona fide transferrers of stock. We think that courts are not justified in reading such a liability into it.

The decree must be affirmed as to defendants Chatterton, Fraser, and Mifflin, with costs, and reversed as to defendants Edmonds, Stahl, and Row, and as to them the bill will be dismissed, with costs of both courts.

The other Justices concurred.

HIGHWAYS-MAINTENANCE-CARE REQUIRED-BICYCLES. Reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of highways for ordinary vehicles, such as wagons and carriages, is the measure of duty resting upon municipalities and townships under the existing statute (3 How. Stat. § 1446c et seq.), and, in the absence of further legislation, the courts will not extend the duty so as to require the highways to be kept safe for bicycles and vehicles of like character.

Error to superior court of Grand Rapids; Burlingame, J. Submitted February 8, 1899. Decided April 18, 1899.

Case by Mary A. Leslie Rapids for personal injuries. fendant, plaintiff brings error.

against the city of Grand From a judgment for deAffirmed

Taylor & Eddy, for appellant.

Henry J. Felker, City Attorney, for appellee.

LONG, J. This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, who was thrown from her bicycle, on the evening of November 26, 1897, in consequence of the defective condition of the asphalt pavement on Canal street, in defendant city. That street was paved with asphalt covering, from 2 to 3 inches in thickness. The break in the pavement into which the plaintiff rode with her wheel was about 24 feet by 2 feet in extent, and from 2 to 24 inches deep. The asphalt had been worn away down to the concrete by the passage of teams over it. It is one of the most used streets in the city, hundreds of teams passing over it daily. The asphalt was worn in several other places, as well. These holes or broken places had existed for 60 days or more previous to the accident, so that the real controversy

arises over the question whether the city was bound, under the statute, to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition and fit for vehicles of that character to pass over them. It appears, without contradiction, that the street was in reasonably safe and fit condition for ordinary vehicles, such as wagons and carriages.

It has been held in this State, and in others, that a bicy-. cle is a vehicle; but the question has never before been presented in this State whether, under this statute, the streets must be kept in a reasonably safe condition for this class of vehicles. When the amendment to the statute was passed in 1887 (3 How. Stat. § 1446c et seq.), this class of vehicles was in use only to a limited extent, and we do not think the legislature had this class of vehicles in mind, or intended to place the burden upon townships and cities to keep their roads and streets in a safe condition for them. Reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of highways for ordinary vehicles, such as wagons and carriages, is the measure of duty resting upon municipalities. In Sutphen v. Town of North Hempstead, 80 Hun, 409, the court said:

"It is apparent that a bicycle rider upon an ordinary country road is exposed to greater dangers than a person riding in a wagon, and the great increase in the number of persons using these vehicles has created a demand for better and safer roads; but, under the present highway laws, a road in a condition which is reasonably safe for general and ordinary travel is all that the commissioners of highways are bound to maintain."

Our statute makes no distinction between country roads and streets in cities and villages. If a highway in the country is not kept in a reasonably safe and fit condition for public travel, the liability for injuries attaches, and the same statute imposes upon cities and villages a like burden. The testimony in the present case is conclusive that, while hundreds of ordinary vehicles passed and repassed over this street daily, no accidents or injuries occurred. There is no question but that the street was

reasonably safe and fit for that kind of travel; and that is all the statute requires. If the statute ought to be extended to cover vehicles of the bicycle class, that question must be addressed to the legislature, and not to the courts. The court below should have directed the verdict in favor of the defendant; therefore it is unnecessary to discuss the various assignments of error set out by counsel for plaintiff. The jury found in favor of the defendant. That judgment must be affirmed.

GRANT, C. J., MONTGOMERY and MOORE, JJ., concurred. HOOKER, J., did not sit.

WHITELEY v. WHITELEY.

DEEDS-CANCELLATION-GIFT-FRAUD-BURDEN OF PROOF. Where a son of mature years and business experience obtains from his aged and feeble mother, without consideration, a conveyance of valuable property, which a few weeks before she had devised by a will unsatisfactory to the son, and which, as she had occasionally expressed herself, she had intended to retain control of until her death, and it appears, on a bill to set aside the deed, that she was given no opportunity, before executing the conveyance, to consult with any one except the donee and his immediate family, the burden of showing the good faith of the transaction is upon the donee; especially if the grantor, upon being informed, subsequently, that such a conveyance was of record, repudiated the grant, and claimed that it was represented to her that the paper signed was simply a modification of her will.

Appeal from Ingham; Person, J. Submitted February 9, 1899. Decided April 18, 1899.

Bill by Elizabeth Whiteley, revived in the names of James Whiteley, executor, and others, devisees of deceased,

against Elizabeth Whiteley and Nellie M. Whiteley, to set aside a deed. From a decree for complainants, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Smith & Hood, for complainants.

M. V. & R. A. Montgomery (Charles F. Hammond, of counsel), for defendants.

LONG, J. This bill was filed to set aside a deed made by Elizabeth Whiteley, deceased. The court below entered a decree setting the deed aside. Defendants appeal. The facts are set out in the opinion filed by the court below. We have read the record with care, and are satisfied that the circuit court was not in error in entering the decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and therefore adopt as our own the opinion of that court, as follows:

"This suit was commenced by Elizabeth Whiteley, the mother of John Whiteley and James Whiteley, against Elizabeth, the widow of John, and Nellie, his only child and heir at law. Its object is the cancellation of a certain deed made by the mother to John in his lifetime. The mother herself has died since the bill was filed, and the case stands revived, with her executor and devisees as present complainants. The old lady was owner of a farm in the country and certain real estate in the city. She also had a small amount of personal property. The country and city properties about equaled each other in value. John and James were both of mature years, and were her only children. Her home was, and for a long time had been, with James, but she was in the habit of paying John occasional visits. It cannot be said, from the evidence, that she had, up to the time of the occurrence out of which this suit has grown, more affection for the one son than for the other. John was a man of quite large wealth, and James, I think, was in comfortable financial circumstances. In the early fall of the year 1890, the old lady met with a severe accident, shortly after which she executed a will. By the terms of this will the farm was to go to James, and the city and personal property to John, the latter to pay the former $1,500 in money to equalize the distribution. It is true that the propriety of